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About the Cover
The Age of Humans and Climate Disruption We are living in the age 
of humans, and there is no denying that the technologies innovated by 
Homo sapiens have turned us into a major geologic force. The resulting 
modification of the land, the oceans, and the atmosphere has poisoned 
our bodies, imperiled our environment, and disrupted the planet’s cli-
mate. The composite image on the cover acknowledges the inextricable 
link that humans have with our planet. To solve the imminent problem 
of climate disruption, human beings have to realize that we all belong 
to the same Homo sapiens species. We must work together for the com-
mon good since the problems we face require global solutions. Think 
local, to protect your family and community, but act global. This is the 
spirit of the book you are about to read. It describes how the climate 
change problem can still be solved.
V. Ramanathan
University of California, San Diego
Scott Friese
University of California, Office of the President
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vF O R E W O R D
Climate change is among the most urgent risks we face in the twenty- 
first century. Across the globe, natural disasters are becoming more 
prevalent and weather patterns are turning more volatile. We’re wit-
nessing an increase in wildfires, rising sea levels, and the extinction of 
plants and animals. Accelerating changes in our climate are affecting 
everything from disease management and food security to immigration 
patterns and water resources.
These developments impact not only our natural environment, but 
also our economy, our national security, and our very way of life.
Over my 25-year career in public service, I’ve observed the wide-
spread effects of climate change on communities across the United 
States. As Governor of Arizona, I saw how a warming climate contrib-
uted to dangerous weather conditions such as drought and extreme 
heat across the American Southwest. Later, as the U.S. Secretary of 
Homeland Security, I worked to counter negative climate impacts on our 
nation’s critical security infrastructure, from airports to military facilities 
to our transportation networks.
Over time, it became clear to me that climate change was—and is—a 
greater threat to our security, and to the futures of citizens around the 
globe, than any other. For the most vulnerable populations—including 
children, the elderly, and low-income and indigenous communities—the 
risk is even more severe.
This conviction has shaped my focus on sustainability as the Pres-
ident of the University of California. As a pioneer in climate research 
for decades, UC was already a hub for ambitious sustainability work 
when I arrived. In one of my first acts as UC President, I launched the 
UC Carbon Neutrality Initiative, a bold effort to leverage the university’s 
climate expertise to achieve systemwide carbon neutrality by 2025. I 
knew that eliminating greenhouse gas emissions from our campuses, 
medical centers, and laboratories would be challenging. But by setting 
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this audacious goal, we mobilized dozens of efforts that are transform-
ing our institutional approach to sustainability.
In 2014, the Carbon Neutrality Initiative brought together 50 re-
searchers and scholars from across the UC system—led by UC San Diego 
Professor Ram Ramanathan—to collaborate on the groundbreaking Bend-
ing the Curve report. It outlined 10 solutions that could change the tra-
jectory of global carbon emissions and guide other institutions in their 
sustainability efforts. Modeled off of UC’s own institutional sustainability 
commitments, the report broke new ground with its interdisciplinary 
focus, relying on the knowledge of experts from a broad spectrum of 
fields ranging from climate science to ethics, economics, ecology, en-
ergy, environmental justice, political science, and religion.
The practical, cross-sector approach outlined in the Bending the 
Curve report has rippled across other UC sustainability efforts. Inspired 
by the report, faculty members developed a new multi-disciplinary 
online course that challenges students to identify locally and globally 
scalable climate solutions. The class has been launched on six UC cam-
puses, and in 2018 San Diego State University became the first California 
State University institution to pilot the course. In line with UC’s focus on 
scalability, the course is designed to be rapidly expanded at universities 
across the U.S. and abroad, with the goal of creating a new generation 
of engaged climate experts.
In further recognition of the need to share expertise and best prac-
tices, in 2018 UC spearheaded the launch of the University Climate 
Change Coalition, a collective of 20 research universities across the US, 
Canada, and Mexico who are working together to advance local and 
regional climate action. Our coalition has since brought together more 
than 2,600 leaders from the public, private, and academic sectors to 
collaborate on climate solutions and challenges.
With their emphasis on research and innovation in service of the 
public good, universities like UC are well positioned to generate the 
discoveries and innovations the world will need to address climate 
change. By using our campuses and facilities as living laboratories of 
sustainability—powered by the expertise and the energy of our faculty 
and students—we can determine what technologies and approaches 
work, and how they can be scaled up.
Foreword vii
Fortunately, universities aren’t the only institutions working to gen-
erate new solutions and train the next generation of climate champions. 
Across the country, we have seen a massive groundswell of institutions—
cities and states, the private sector, foundations and nonprofits, and 
citizen advocates—stepping up to this challenge. Many of them have 
been working on this issue for decades. What unites all of us in our 
efforts is the recognition that making a real change on a large scale will 
require creativity, persistence, and collaboration.
We have that responsibility as scientists, leaders, and citizens of 
the planet. Let us work together and hold each other to that great 
responsibility.
Janet Napolitano
University of California, Office of the President
Janet Napolitano is the twentieth president of the University of California. She pre-
viously served as the US secretary of homeland security from 2009 to 2013, as 
governor of Arizona from 2003 to 2009, as attorney general of Arizona from 1998 
to 2003, and as US attorney for the District of Arizona from 1993 to 1997.
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P R E FA C E
The book you are reading is years—centuries, even—in the making. You 
can trace its inspiration back to the start of the Industrial Revolution, 
when advances in manufacturing processes triggered massive changes 
in all aspects of daily life, including how human beings interacted with 
their environment and one another. These advances, however, did not 
come without a cost. As the global population grew and communities 
adapted to a higher quality of life, the amount of heat-trapping gases 
released into the atmosphere that could be traced to human activity 
increased markedly.
The title of this book refers to the resulting rise in global tempera-
ture, represented as an ever-steepening curve over time. Bending that 
upward curve to decrease the unsustainable trajectory of an increasing 
global temperature requires a significant focus on reducing the release 
of emissions of carbon dioxide and four short-lived climate pollutants 
into the air. Without mitigation, the warming will reach dangerous levels 
before 2050 and we will be transitioning from climate change to climate 
disruption. The timeline for bending the warming curve is aggressive. 
Mitigation actions have already begun in many cities, states, and na-
tions. It must proceed at a rapid pace such that emissions of all climate- 
warming pollutants will be reduced by 50% to 80% by 2050, followed by 
ongoing carbon neutrality before 2100. We must also be prepared to 
extract as much as 500 billion to a trillion tons of carbon dioxide from 
the air during this century. Bending the curve of climate change has 
emerged as the challenge of our time.
In 2013, University of California President Janet Napolitano an-
nounced the Climate Neutrality Initiative, a landmark initiative that 
commits the university to emitting net zero greenhouse gases from its 
vehicle fleet and physical structures by the year 2025. This commitment 
to the health of the planet brought together more than 50 UC research-
ers and scholars in the fall of 2015 to identify solutions that can flatten 
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the curve of climate change. Out of this collaboration emerged Bending 
the Curve: 10 Scalable Solutions for Carbon Neutrality and Climate Stability 
(V. Ramanathan et al.). The executive summary was published in 2015, 
while the full report appeared in 2016.
This book is an offshoot of the Bending the Curve report. Within 
those 10 solutions is a call to “foster a global culture of climate action 
through coordinated public communication and education at local to 
global scales.” The University of California now offers a multidisciplinary 
undergraduate course based on the report that consists of 18 original 
lectures by 23 faculty representing 9 UC campuses and national labora-
tories. The course is unique in that it goes beyond the scientific under-
pinnings of climate change and focuses on solutions to the problems 
that global warming has created. With this book our aim is to further 
extend the call to bend the curve with 19 chapters that expand on those 
solutions, many written by the same UC scholars and researchers who 
shaped the Bending the Curve report and contributed lectures to the 
course.
Bending the curve of climate change is a battle against time and a 
battle for the well-being of our children and grandchildren. To tackle this 
crisis, we need a million climate stewards to safeguard the planet and 
those who call it home. Fortunately, there is still time and this book gives 
you the tools to help solve the defining problem of our age.
Scott Friese
University of California, Office of the President
V. Ramanathan
University of California, San Diego, Scripps Institution of Oceanography
xI N T R O D U C T I O N
Climate change is one of the most far-reaching social and political 
challenges that humans have ever faced. “Climate change is the defin-
ing issue of our time . . .  we face a direct existential threat,” says UN 
Secretary-General António Guterres. The Pope calls climate change “a 
global problem with grave implications” and “one of the principal chal-
lenges facing humanity in our day.” Climate change is part of a much 
broader problem of unsustainable consumption of natural resources, 
as captured in the declaration by the Kenyan Nobel Laureate, Wangari 
Maathai: “Today we are faced with a challenge that calls for a shift in 
our thinking, so that humanity stops threatening its life-support system. 
We are called to assist the Earth to heal her wounds and in the process 
heal our own.”
That the climate is changing—and that humans are responsible—is 
not in serious doubt. “Warming of the climate system is unequivocal,” 
according to the most prominent international scientific body of over 
1,000 climate scientists for assessing climate change, the Intergovern-
mental Panel on Climate Change. “Human influence on the climate sys-
tem is clear.”
What is open to question, however, is how we, as a species, can 
bend the curve of planetary warming before it is too late. That warming 
curve is illustrated in stylized form on the title page of this book and 
represents that the world needs to cut emissions by 80% by 2050, and 
to cut emissions to close to zero soon after. We don’t have much time. 
We have already emitted 2.2 trillion tons of carbon dioxide into the air, 
and the third trillion will be dumped into the air by 2030. How can we 
rapidly phase out our dependence on fossil fuels? How can we quicken 
the pace of technological innovation and create the social, political, 
and economic impetus to implement those solutions that are already 
available? How can we do so in a way that helps, not harms, the most 
disadvantaged people in society?
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The industrial era was ushered in with the invention of the im-
proved steam engine by the Scottish engineer James Watt in 1769. The 
Industrial Revolution that followed benefited humanity immensely with 
vastly improved health and wealth, but the improvement in the human 
condition came at a huge and unacceptable cost to the environment. 
Largely as a result of industrial emissions of carbon dioxide and other 
greenhouse gases, the planet has already warmed by about 1°C (1.8°F) 
since preindustrial times. If emissions continue at the present rate, the 
planetary warming is highly likely to reach 1.5°C (2.7°F) before 2030. 
The last time the planet was this warm was 130,000 years ago, and it was 
sufficient to increase sea level by about 6 to 9 meters (20 to 30 feet). 
With unchecked emissions beyond 2030, the warming could exceed 2°C 
by 2050, exposing more than 1.5 billion people to extreme heat waves, 
storms, floods, fires, droughts, and a variety of diseases.
Such projections were thought to be unrealistic or dystopian in the 
first decade of the twenty-first century, but not anymore. The science 
linking warming to extreme weather has improved so dramatically in 
the years following the Paris climate summit (in 2015) that the normally 
cautious American Meteorological Society declared in 2017: “We are 
experiencing new weather extremes because we have created a new 
climate.” The prestigious Lancet Commission, consisting of medical ex-
perts in Britain, concluded in 2015: “The effects of climate change are 
being felt today, and future projections represent an unacceptably high 
and potentially catastrophic risk to human health.”
Scientists by and large accept that we have entered the age of hu-
mans—the Anthropocene. In other words, we have transitioned from 
the Holocene epoch with its relatively stable climate to the Anthropo-
cene, a period when climate change has led to climate disruption. Such 
far-reaching disruptions are no longer being debated among the vast 
majority (97%) of scientists.
How This Book Is Organized
This book is about solutions. More than 20 leading experts, most at 
the University of California, share their analyses of how to bend the 
curve of planetary warming. Taken together, the following chapters tell 
us that the deep emission cuts that are required are well within our 
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technical capabilities. This book demonstrates, however, that deploying 
the technological solutions demands a broad understanding of the mul-
tidimensional aspects of the climate change problem.
The book consists of 19 chapters organized by themes into three 
parts: The first part sets the stage for the entire book by introducing 
concepts and solutions. The second part consists of 12 chapters that 
describe in more detail the solutions and their multidimensional nature, 
which capture aspects of societal transformation, governance, market 
instruments, technology measures, and ecosystem restoration. The third 
part focuses on special topics that are vital for developing mitigation 
solutions.
The first 4 chapters of the book set the stage for the entire book 
by introducing concepts and solutions. Chapter 1, Climate Change, is a 
broad summary of climate change science that describes what we know, 
how we know what we know, and the future extreme climates society 
will inherit this century if we do not bend the curve in time. Chapter 
2, Humans, Nature, and the Quest for Climate Justice, gives a broad 
background on the societal behavior and history that led to the current 
state of affairs, while Chapter 3, Climate Change and Human Health, 
describes the impacts of climate change on health—perhaps the most 
important motivation for urgent action. Chapter 4, Overview of the Ten 
Solutions for Bending the Curve, introduces readers to ten solutions to 
bend the curve.
Chapters 5 through 8 together argue that we need to foster a global 
culture of climate action that creates the will to take the measures re-
quired. Such a culture can be created by social movements (Chapter 
5) and by behavioral changes through changing social norms (Chapter 
6). Chapter 7, Religion, Ethics, and Climate Change, brings up a major 
tool for solving the climate change problem, of forming an alliance with 
leaders from a range of religious belief systems to effect large-scale 
societal transformation. Communication is a fundamental requirement 
for fostering a global culture of climate action, as argued in Chapter 
8, which also offers effective communication techniques to persuade 
those who have difficulty accepting climate change science, the data, 
and the predictions.
Chapters 9 and 10 deal with governance solutions that explore 
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policymaking at vastly different scales—the local and the global. Locally 
and regionally, many cities and states in the United States are already 
well on the road to bending the curve and are acting jointly through 
coalitions such as C40 Cities; the case of the state of California is an-
alyzed in detail in Chapter 9. But these leaders—city mayors and state 
governors—need broad-based political support to continue to deepen 
their efforts, while other leaders need to be pushed into action. At the 
global level, Chapter 10 shows the promise of new models of interna-
tional cooperation, and the potential to build on the Paris Agreement.
Solutions related to market instruments are explored in two chapters 
that analyze climate change through an economic lens. Chapters 11 
and 12 discuss market-based, regulatory, and policy approaches such as 
carbon pricing that encourage firms and individuals to switch to cleaner 
production methods, prioritize energy efficiency, and travel more sus-
tainably. The chapters also highlight how market instruments are work-
ing successfully in many parts of the world.
Technological measures are detailed in Chapters 13 to 15, which that 
introduce you to the tools to solve the problem. New breakthroughs 
in renewable energy, vehicle electrification, and smart grids, detailed 
in Chapters 13 and 14, will help to bring down the cost of emission 
reductions and help us reach zero emissions shortly after 2050. But 
reductions in carbon emissions of 30% to 40% are already feasible using 
mature technologies that are available today. Chapter 15 shows that 
tackling short-lived climate pollutants—such as methane, black carbon, 
hydrofluorocarbons, and ozone—can bend the curve quickly, giving time 
for the carbon reduction measures to take effect.
Chapter 16 describes natural and managed ecosystem solutions and 
argues that much of the climate change remedy has already been pro-
vided by nature. As this chapter highlights, we can reduce emissions 
by one-quarter through tackling deforestation, regenerating damaged 
natural ecosystems, improving the ability of soils to store carbon, and 
reducing food waste.
The book concludes with three more chapters on special topics. 
Chapter 17, Sea Level Rise from Melting Ice, addresses the impact 
of the possible disintegration of the massive ice sheets of Antarctica 
and Greenland. Chapter 18, Atmospheric Carbon Extraction: Scope, 
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Available Technologies, and Challenges, addresses a major emerging 
theme in climate solutions, deploying technological measures to extract 
carbon from the atmosphere. Chapter 19, Local Solutions, describes 
a local community-scale living laboratory that is attempting societal 
transformation.
What This Book Does Not Address
This book does not address adaptation to climate change. The world 
has already passed the point where some adaptation will be needed, 
such as changing agricultural practices, retreating from or protecting 
coastlines threatened by rising sea levels, and managing increased heat 
waves and droughts. But that is not our focus here. Nor do we discuss 
climate engineering—drastic, and controversial, measures to try to stave 
off climate change, such as injecting millions of tons of sulfur into the 
atmosphere. Bending the curve of planetary warming must remain the 
first priority—reducing emissions enough to allow us time to adapt and 
avoiding the potentially disastrous unintended consequences of climate 
engineering.
Who Is This Book For?
This book is written for anyone who cares about the future of the planet 
and human well-being. The chapters will help you understand how indi-
viduals, community groups, businesses, religious leaders, mayors, heads 
of state—in short, everyone—can work to bend the emissions curve.
What you will learn from the chapters in this book is this: climate 
change is not a question of political beliefs but a dominant scientific 
and societal issue, and without the fast actions described here to bend 
the curve, it can quickly morph into an issue of incalculable human 
tragedy.
We’ve designed each chapter as a stand-alone resource that can 
be read independently, in any order. If you aren’t familiar with climate 
science, though, it will help to start with Chapter 1, which explains how 
and why the climate is changing, as well as the likely impacts under 
a “business as usual” scenario. And the solutions that can bend the 
warming curve are interconnected. To see this, read Chapter 4, which 
introduces the ten solutions and explains how they fall into a series of 
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six clusters that involve science, societal transformation, governance, 
markets, technology, and ecosystems.
Each chapter is written for a generalist audience—nonexpert readers 
at the level of a second-year undergraduate student—with little assumed 
in the way of prior knowledge. If you are trained as a microbiologist, 
you can jump right into the chapters that draw on political science and 
psychology. If you are an artist or a social scientist, Chapter 1 will in-
troduce you to the physical principles and evidence that demonstrates 
how and why humans are changing the climate. Key terms, especially 
those that might be unfamiliar, are boldfaced and defined when first 
used. Given the interconnected nature of the climate challenge, such an 
interdisciplinary approach is essential. Climate science, economics, and 
engineering all just have a piece of the puzzle. The learning objectives 
at the start of each chapter will give you a road map for what you can 
take away. Discussion questions in the learning companion to this book 
provide an opportunity to extend your understanding through talking 
with classmates, friends, or family members. And if you want to delve 
further, references and in some cases additional readings are given at 
the end of each chapter.
After you read this book, we hope you are convinced of two things. 
First, climate change is a major problem for all human beings. Second, 
the solutions are within reach. But how will that social and economic 
transformation be brought about? Bending the curve will take a world of 
climate champions who can innovate and implement climate solutions. 
This book will help you to join their ranks.
Adam Millard-Ball
University of California, Santa Cruz
V. Ramanathan
University of California, San Diego, Scripps Institution of Oceanography
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H O W  T O  U S E  T H I S  B O O K  
A N D  T H E   L E A R N I N G  C O M P A N I O N
Bending the Curve: Climate Change Solutions brings together leading ex-
perts from diverse areas of academia and research to address the mul-
tidimensional aspect of climate change. As an interdisciplinary book, it 
has been written to appeal to a broad audience, including students and 
instructors in a wide range of educational settings, as well as readers 
beyond the classroom. The chapters do not assume that the reader has 
prior knowledge of climate change science.
To help all audiences gain the most from this book, we have also 
developed a learning companion that includes questions and resources 
to help readers connect ideas, understand key concepts, and increase 
their ability to effectively discuss and explain climate change solutions. 
The learning companion is available for download through the California 
Digital Library as a PDF in print-ready format.
For Students
Each chapter in the book focuses on a particular aspect of climate 
change. To support your learning, each chapter includes an overview 
that highlights the key concepts presented by the author(s). We rec-
ommend that you spend some time familiarizing yourself with the focus 
of each chapter before diving in. For those of you who are interested 
in learning more about the focus of a particular chapter, please consult 
the text sources at the end of the chapter as well as a list of additional 
resources in the learning companion that have been provided on a par-
ticular topic.
The organization of the learning companion mirrors that of the 
book, with a section for each chapter. The companion provides two sets 
of questions for each chapter: review questions and discussion ques-
tions. Review questions are presented in multiple-choice format and are 
designed to help you gauge how well you have grasped key concepts 
and information. Discussion questions are open-ended and designed to 
How to Use This Book and the Learning Companion xvii
help you apply what you read to the world around you. These questions 
are designed to promote deeper learning through conversation with 
your fellow students, or others outside the classroom.
For Instructors
Bending the Curve: Climate Change Solutions is meant to address climate 
change through a wide lens that includes physical and atmospheric sci-
ence, government and policy, economics, technology, as well as the hu-
manities and social sciences. With that in mind, this digital book is meant 
to help you bolster your background in fields beyond your specialty.
The learning companion provides review questions that can be used 
to assess familiarity with key concepts, ensuring all participants are ready 
to apply what they’ve learned. These questions can also help instructors 
identify areas of learning that may require additional explanation. The 
learning companion also provides discussion questions, which can help 
facilitate deeper conversations in the classroom, or activities that en-
gage student-to-student discourse. All of the questions provided in the 
learning companion can be included in live class sessions or through 
online delivery environments.
For Readers Beyond the Classroom
Bending the Curve: Climate Change Solutions, while written primarily for 
a higher-education audience, will also appeal to a broader audience of 
readers. This may include community organizers or climate advocates 
seeking key arguments, facts, and details. This book is also helpful to 
everyone interested in expanding their learning about climate change 
solutions. The book can be helpful to those who are already climate 
change solution champions interested in expanding their learning, as 
well as those who are new to the idea of identifying climate change 
solutions and are curious about learning the basics.
We recognize the importance of public communication and educa-
tion to promote a broad culture of climate action. Using the companion 
guide questions can help you to take action and to collaborate with 
others as a learning community, focused on climate change solutions.
Scott Friese and Alan Roper
University of California, Office of the President
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Learning Objectives
1. Explain the basic concepts of climate change science.
You will learn how some atmospheric gases emitted by human ac-
tivities spread around the planet like a blanket and how that blanket 
traps infrared radiation (heat radiation) and warms the planet. Such 
gases are popularly called greenhouse gases. A basic knowledge of 
climate science will help motivate you to solve the problem of in-
creased greenhouse gases. You will be able to explain the underlying 
scientificprinciplesofclimatechangetoothers,includingskeptics.
2. Discuss the anthropogenic drivers of climate change.
Nextyouwilllearnhowourvariousactivities—driving,flying,cook-
ing, heating and cooling homes, and producing food—contribute 
to climate change. Because these drivers are related to human 
activities, we call them anthropogenic drivers of climate change 
(anthropogenicisthescientifictermfor“human-caused”).
3. Explain how and why the climate is changing.
By this point, you will know how the greenhouse gases emitted by 
human activities are expected to change the climate, based on phys-
ical principles. The third learning objective is to understand how the 
climate is changing now and how our observations of the weather 
are matching predictions from climate models.
4. Describe the likely climate changes and their projected impacts.
The fourth objective is to use the knowledge you have gained thus 
far to describe the potential impacts of the warming on aspects of 
climatethataffectusall,includingheatextremes,droughts,floods,
sea level rise, and melting sea ice and glaciers. It is having huge 
impacts on almost everything we know. Climate change is causing 
newweatherextremessuchasfloods,heatwaves,anddroughts,
withnegativeeffectsonpublichealth.Itisbettertermedasclimate
disruption. We will track down the various impacts we are already 
experiencing today and project the impacts that are likely to occur 
in the future if we continue on our current path of unsustainable 
greenhouse gas emissions.
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Overview
The climate system is dynamic and has undergone major changes in the 
historyoftheplanet.Overthelast2millionyears,theEarth’sclimate
has cycled between cool glacial periods and warm interglacial periods. 
Thesecycleshaveoccurredaboutevery100,000yearsoveratleastthe
past800,000years.Beginning11,700yearsago,theEarthtransitioned
to the current interglacial warm epoch called the Holocene. Before the 
nineteenth century, climate change on the planet was mainly a naturally 
occurringphenomenoncausedbychangesintheEarth’sorbitaround
the sun, changes in the amount of solar radiation reaching the Earth, 
volcanic activity, and natural patterns of heat exchange between the 
land, the ocean, and the atmosphere.
Since the dawn of the industrial era, a new global causal factor has 
been added to this list: humans. We emit carbon dioxide and other 
pollutant gases when we burn fossil fuels and do many other things, 
such as refrigerate our food and fertilize our crops. These pollutants 
have drastically altered the heat-trapping properties of the atmosphere. 
In the case of carbon dioxide, the changes are irreversible on time scales 
of thousands of years or more. These pollutant gases now cover the 
Earth like a blanket, trapping infrared heat and warming the planet. 
Theclimatehasalreadywarmedby1°C since the preindustrial era and 
inanother15years(from2018)willreachlevelsnotseeninthepast
130,000years.Climatescientistshaveconcludedthatifthecurrentrate
of emissions continues, the planet will warm to levels not observed in 
thelast25millionyearsormore.Notonlyistheamountofthewarm-
ing unprecedented, but the rate of change is also orders of magnitude 
larger than that of past natural variations.
Howdoweknowthisistrue?Climatechangescienceisintenselydata
drivenandhasundergonethetraditionalscrutinyandrigorofscientific
methods. It has taken thousands of peer-reviewed studies over more 
than100yearsandlargequantitiesofdatacollectedfromships,surface
stations,aircraft,andsatellitestoarriveattheconclusionsdescribedin
thischapter.Thefindingsreportedherearebasedonanalysesofliterally
trillions of bytes of data by thousands of scientists from around the 
world as reported in thousands of peer-reviewed publications. These 
studies have been reviewed by science academies in the United States 
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andaroundtheworldsincethe1970s,culminatingintheformationof
the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) by the United 
Nationsin1989.Hundredstothousandsofscientistscontributetothe
IPCC’s periodic reports that assess, evaluate, and update the science
and the data. References to some of these reports are provided at the 
end of this chapter.
Themost importantmessages inthischapterarethat(1)anthro-
pogenic emissions are causing climate change at a magnitude and rate 
thatareunprecedentedoveratleastthepastmillionyears,and(2)this
human-caused climate change is likely to have severe impacts on both 
the natural environment and human society. Finally, it is particularly im-
portant to recognize that we still have time to act to reduce human-caused 
climate change and moderate or avoid the most serious impacts—if we start 
actingnow(2019).Thepurposeofthisbookistoempoweryouand
giveyouthetoolsyouwillneedtoactas“climatewarriors”innovating
and implementing climate solutions.
Thischapterwillalsohelpyouaddressquestionsthatpeopleyou
know, including climate change skeptics, might ask you. For example, 
howdoyouknowtheclimateischanging?Evenifitischanging,how
doyouknowthechangeiscausedbyhumanactivities?Andwhomdo
youbelieve?
Youranswertothelastquestionshouldbesimple:wedonothave
to believe anyone. We have the data. Thousands of scientists have an-
alyzed and interpreted observed data from peer-reviewed studies, so 
these are facts, not beliefs. The real issue we want to address is the 
following: if we continue along the current path of unsustainable pollu-
tion,whatdoesthefutureholdforus?Howwilltheplanetlookafew
decadesfromnow?Andwhat’sinstorebytheendofthecentury?The
projectionsmade by various scientific institutions are summarized in
this chapter. 
Hopefully thesescientificallyprojectedscenarioswillgiveyou the
reasons, as well as the motivation, to solve the problem in a timely man-
ner. As you already know, this book is about solving the climate change 
problem.Ahopefulmessagecomesoutofthefindingssummarizedin
this chapter: there is still time to solve the problem of climate change 
and stabilize the climate below dangerous levels of warming. 
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Box 1.The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change
The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) is the most prominent interna-
tional scientific body for assessing climate change. It was formed in 1988 by the World 
Meteorological Organization (WMO) and the United Nations Environment Programme 
(UNEP). There are currently 195 member countries in the IPCC, and membership is open 
to all countries in the WMO and UN. The IPCC is responsible for reviewing and evaluat-
ing scientific, technical, and socioeconomic information related to climate change. While 
the IPCC neither conducts research nor monitors any climate change data directly, it 
provides policymakers with the most comprehensive picture of the scientific consensus.
The information assessed by the IPCC is synthesized into a major assessment report 
(AR) every 5 to 7 years. There are currently five multivolume assessment reports, and the 
latest one, AR5, was finalized in 2014. Each AR has three volumes, each of which is led 
by a working group. Working Group I (WGI) consists of 258 experts who assess the sci-
ence behind climate change and how humans are causing it. With 302 experts, Working 
Group II (WGII) evaluates the impacts of climate change and how living things, such as 
humans, animals, and plants, can adapt. Working Group III (WGIII) has 271 experts and 
focuses on mitigating climate change—that is, slowing it down and preventing its worst 
possible effects.
AR5 has more than 830 lead authors across the three working groups from over 80 
different countries. The reports submitted for any AR undergo a rigorous, multistage 
review process. The IPCC is currently working on AR6, and the contributions from the 
three working groups will be finalized by 2021.
Source: https://www.ipcc.ch/organization/organization.shtml.
Increase in atmospheric concentration of carbon dioxide (CO2), 
methane (CH4), and nitrous oxide (N2O) with time. Reproduced from 
IPCC.
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Figure SPM.1 | The complex relationship between the observations (panels a, b, c, yellow background) and the emissions (panel d,
light blue background) is addressed in Section 1.2 and Topic 1. Observations and other indicators of a changing global climate system. Observa-
tions: (a) Annually and globally averaged combined land and ocean surface temperature anomalies relative to the average over the period 1986 to 2005.
Colours indicate different d ta sets. (b) Annually and globally averaged sea level chan e rel tive to the average over the period 1986 to 2005 in the 
longest-running dataset. Colours indicate different data sets. All datasets are aligned to have the same value in 1993, the first year of satellite altimetry 
data (red). Where assessed, uncertainties are indicated by coloured shading. (c) Atmospheric concentrations of the greenhouse gases carbon dioxide 
(CO2, green), methane (CH4, orange) and nitrous oxide (N2O, red) determined from ice core data (dots) and from direct atmospheric measurements (lines).
Indicators: (d) Global anthropogenic CO2 emissions from forestry and other land use as well as from burning of fossil fuel, cement production and flaring. 
Cumulative emissions of CO2 from these sources and their uncertainties are shown as bars and whiskers, respectively, on the right hand side. The global 
effects of the accumulation of CH4 and N2O emissions are shown in panel c. Greenhouse gas emission data from 1970 to 2010 are shown in Figure SPM.2. 
{Figures 1.1, 1.3, 1.5}
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Before diving into the problemof anthropogenic climate change, it’s
helpfultounderstandwhattheplanet’sclimatewaslikebeforemodern
humans (Homo sapiens) became a major force.
The history of Homo sapiensextendsas farbackas160,000years
ago.However,itwasonlyinthelast10,000years,withtheadventof
the Agricultural Revolution, that Homo sapiens began modifying the land 
surface for growing food. The Agricultural Revolution roughly coincides 
withawarm interglacial thatbeganabout11,700yearsagoandcon-
tinues to the present. Scientists call this period of warm and relatively 
stable climate the Holocene.Althoughthereweresignificantregional
climate fluctuations, the stable climate of the Holocene enabled the
Agricultural Revolution. During this period humans transitioned from 
hunting and gathering to agriculture. Cities, writing, and major human 
civilizations all developedduring this time. The last 270 years of the
Holocene ushered in the Industrial Revolution, and with that, climate 
pollution began to increase dramatically.
1.1 Entering the Age of Humans
Figure 1.1.1 Homo sapiens history. Image from V. Ramanathan.
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The “Great Acceleration”
The Industrial Revolution, which started in Britain and evolved during AD 
1750–1850,waspoweredbyfossilfuels.Nownearlyallnationsinthe
worldconsumethem.Beginningaround1950,afterWorldWarII,the
production and consumption of goods increased dramatically, leading 
to accelerated burning of fossil fuels. This acceleration is illustrated in 
every measure we can think of: population, gross domestic product 
(GDP), water use, fertilizer consumption, the number of motor vehicles 
in circulation, and many more. Because of this, scientists call the period 
from1950tothepresenttheGreat Acceleration.
Not only did the Great Acceleration increase production, consump-
tion,andpopulation,italsoleftahugeimprintontheecosystem.For
example, the rate of change in carbon dioxide concentration, which 
wasalreadysteadilyincreasing,acceleratedin1950.Bythe1980s,this
increaseincarbondioxidehadalreadyledtoasignificantriseinglobal
temperatures, which in turn brought huge ecological impacts. Depletion 
of the ozone layer again became amajor factor in the 1980s. After
1950,thebiodiversityofspeciesstarteddecreasingandtheextinction
of species accelerated. 
Figure 1.1.2 Effects of the Great Acceleration on six different measures. 
As human population and gross domestic product (GDP) have risen sharply, 
so have water use, carbon dioxide emissions, deforestation, and species 
extinctions. Adapted from Steffen et al. 2015.
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Figure 1.1.2 shows a few examples of the rapid increase in human 
activity and its ecological impacts during the Great Acceleration. Notice 
that nearly every measure—population, total real GDP, water use, bio-
sphere degradation (species extinctions), and the loss of tropical rain 
forests—takesoffdramaticallybeginningaround1950.
NopartoftheplanetremainsunaffectedbytheGreatAcceleration.
Theplanetweseetodayisvastlydifferentfromtheplanetourancestors
inherited a century ago.
The Anthropocene
We are still in the Holocene climatologically, but the impacts of the 
Industrial Revolution and Great Acceleration, combined with a massive 
population increase, have caused many scientists and other thinkers to 
argue that we have entered a new period called the Anthropocene, or 
age of humans. Humans have emerged as a major force modifying the 
environment. The activities of all humans combined are comparable to 
geologicalforces,suchasearthquakesandvolcanoes,thatmodifythe
Earth’ssurfaceandatmosphereonlargescalesandinvisibleways.
Scientists have not yet agreed on the time period that marks the be-
ginning of the Anthropocene. Many propose the period started some-
time during the Industrial Revolution. Others argue that it began with 
theadventoftheAgriculturalRevolutionabout10,000yearsago.Still
otherssuggestthatitsstartdateshouldbesetto1945,thedateofthe
firstatomicexplosions.Irrespectiveofhowscientistssettlethestarting
dateoftheAnthropocene,it’stheGreatAccelerationthatbeganinthe
1950s thatmarks thebeginningofHomo sapiens’ trulymassiveglobal
imprinton theplanet. The climatehas alreadywarmedby1°C since
1900.Ifwecontinuewithbusiness-as-usualconsumptionoffossilfuels,
thewarmingbetween1900and2100couldexceed4°C.
Why worry about a warming of 4°C?
Weknowthattheplanethasbeenbothsignificantlywarmerandsignifi-
cantly cooler in the past. Why bother about a human-induced warming 
of 4°C?Howdowe judgewhether this amount ofwarming is large
orsmall?Onewayisbylookingattheglacialtointerglacialcyclesthe
planethasundergonemanytimesoverthe last2.5millionyears.The
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difference inglobalaveragetemperaturebetweenaglacialandan in-
terglacialperiodisonlyabout4°Cto5°C,butthisdifferenceresultsin
adramaticallydifferentclimate.Atthecoldestpointofthelastglacial
period(theIceAge,about20,000yearsago),anicesheetcoveredmost
of what is now Canada and the northern United States. This ice sheet 
wasabout1kilometerthickoverthecurrentlocationofNewYorkCity.
Incontrast,duringthepreviouswarminterglacialperiodabout120,000
years ago, called the Eemian interglacial, there was substantially less ice 
in Greenland and Antarctica than at present, and global sea levels were 
atleast6metershigher.Thetemperatureatthattimewasonlyabout
1°Cwarmerthanthepreindustrialaverageoftheearly1800s.It’sclear
thata4°Cincreaseintheglobaltemperatureis,infact,abigdeal.
It’s also important to understand that the planet is already in its 
warmstate(interglacialperiod),havingwarmedbyabout4°Cfromthe
glacialtemperaturesofabout20,000yearsago.Warmingitbyanother
4°Cwouldpushtheplanet,alongwithallofitsecosystemsandglaciers,
beyond any temperature experienced in the last 25million years. In
short,more than just the4°Cwarming, the fact that thiswarming is
happening on top of the current warm interglacial period is the bigger 
concern.
Finally,pastchangesinglobaltemperaturebyasmuchas4°Coc-
curred over periods of thousands of years or more. Compare that to 
the projected Anthropocene warming, which will happen within a single 
century.Thisrateofwarmingisatleast100timesfasterthannaturally
occurring changes—and far too rapid for social systems, natural species, 
and ecosystems to adapt.
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1.2  The Atmospheric Blanket  
and Its Warming Effect
TheEarth’s atmosphere is anextremely thin shell comparedwith the
size of our planet. The primary gases in the atmosphere by volume are 
nitrogen(78.1%),oxygen(20.9%),andargon(0.9%).Thesefiguresdon’t
includewatervapor,whichvariessignificantlywithlocationandaltitude
butaveragesabout0.4%oftheatmosphereglobally.Othernaturallyoc-
curring gases include carbon dioxide (designated by chemists as CO2), 
ozone, and methane, which all occur in trace amounts. Although CO2, 
methane, and ozone occur naturally, human activities are increasing 
their concentrations.
This blanket of atmosphere sustains life in many fundamental ways. 
First, it is vital to the cycle of plant and animal life. Plants grow by taking 
carbon dioxide from the atmosphere. In the process of photosynthesis, 
they use energy from the sun to synthesize carbon dioxide with water 
and release oxygen to the atmosphere. Plants incorporate the carbon 
into sugars that store energy and into structural materials such as cel-
lulose, while they release the oxygen back into the atmosphere. When 
animals, including human beings, consume plant material (or other an-
imals), they digest it: that is, they take in oxygen, which reacts with the 
food to release its stored energy. In the process, animals and humans 
convert some of the carbon back into carbon dioxide and re-exhale it 
into the atmosphere.
Water vapor is a crucial part of the atmospheric composition. Water 
vapor is produced primarily from evaporation from the oceans, surface 
soils, and subsurfaceaquifers and then spreads around theplanet. It
is the water vapor in the atmosphere that forms clouds and rain, thus 
creating rivers, lakes, glaciers, and ski slopes.
Most important for our purposes, the atmosphere plays a crucial 
role in determining the temperature of our planet, as we will see in our 
discussionofthegreenhouseeffect.Watervapor,carbondioxide,and
1-12 Chapter 1: Climate Change
other greenhouse gases warm our planet. Without these greenhouse 
gases, our planet would be about as cold as Mars—far too cold to sup-
port liquidwaterand life.At theotherextreme,withoutclouds, ice,
andsnowtoreflectsunlight,theplanetwouldbesohotthatitwould
be unlivable.
Thus, the composition of the atmosphere keeps the Earth’s tem-
perature at just the right level for water to be present in the planet in 
all threephases:gaseouswatervapor, liquidwater,andsolid iceand
snow crystals. The presence of all three forms of the water molecule 
is essential for the survival of Homo sapiens and most other species on 
Earth. The atmosphere thus protects life.
The natural greenhouse effect
Ourplanet’sfundamentalenergysourceisincomingradiationfromthe
sun, which we will refer to as incoming solar energy. Not all of this 
solarenergyisabsorbedbytheplanet.About29%ofitisreflectedback
into space by the atmosphere, the land surface, and the sea surface. 
Thepercentageofsolarradiationreflectedbackintospaceiscalledthe
Figure 1.2.1 Atmosphere: a thin, fragile shell. The various ways the 
atmosphere sustains life on the planet. Image by V. Ramanathan. Icons designed 
by Freepik from Flaticon.com.
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albedo.TheprimaryclimatevariablesresponsiblefortheEarth’s29%
albedo are clouds, snow cover, ice sheets, sea ice, glaciers, and oxygen 
and nitrogen in the atmosphere. In general, whiter substances (clouds, 
ice,andsnow)reflectmoresolarradiation.Thescatteringofsunlightby
oxygen and nitrogen gives the sky its blue color.
After29%oftheincomingsolarradiationisreflectedbacktospace,
theEarthabsorbstheremaining71%,whichheatstheland,oceansur-
face, and atmosphere. In response, the surface and the atmosphere 
radiate (i.e., give off) this heat by emitting infrared radiation. This 
infrared radiation is commonly referred to as heat energy because the 
infrared radiation emitted by any substance depends on its tempera-
ture.Thehigheranobject’stemperature,themoreheatenergyitemits.
However, not all of the emitted heat energy can escape to space. 
The greenhouse gases in the intervening atmosphere absorb (trap) some 
of this heat energy. As a result, the heat energy leaving the planet is re-
duced by the intervening atmosphere. It is this trapping of heat energy 
that otherwise would have escaped to space through the atmosphere 
that is referred to as the greenhouse effect.
Figure 1.2.2 The greenhouse effect. Adapted from NASA.
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Now, let’s see how this trapping effect warms the surface. The
greenhouse gases in the atmosphere trap heat energy and reradiate 
some of it back to the surface. The surface absorbs this reradiated heat 
energy, causing it to warm some more. The Earth will continue to warm 
until it reaches a temperature at which the net incoming solar energy 
equalstheheatenergyemittedtospacebythewarmersurfaceandthe
atmosphere.
Thus, the surface temperature of a planet is primarily determined 
by two factors: the net amount of incoming solar energy it receives, and 
the heat-trapping properties of any greenhouse gases in its atmosphere. 
Increasing the concentration of greenhouse gases shifts the balance
between incoming solar energy and outgoing heat energy, requiring
the planet to become warmer and emit more heat energy to restore 
equilibrium.
“Blanket” is a better metaphor
The trapping of heat by the Earth’s atmosphere is
typicallyreferredtoasthe“greenhouseeffect.”This
metaphor compares the heat-trapping gases in the at-
mosphere to the glass panes of a greenhouse, which 
allow solar radiation to enter but slow down outgo-
ing infrared heat radiation. Although this name has 
becomestandard,it’snotthebestmetaphorforun-
derstandingtheeffectsofclimatepollutants.Infact,
themainreasonit’swarmerinsidearealgreenhouse
is not because it traps radiated heat energy, but be-
cause its walls and roof keep warm air from escaping 
and colder outside air from entering.
Amore scientifically accuratemetaphor for the
warming effect of the atmosphere is the blanket 
effect. On a cold night, a blanket (the atmosphere) 
warms us by trapping some of the heat energy ra-
diated by the body (the planet’s surface) and thus
prevents some of it from escaping to the rest of the room (space). 
However, following well-established tradition, we will retain the terms 
greenhouse effect and greenhouse gases throughout this book.
Figure 1.2.3 Blanket 
metaphor. Photograph by 
Matthew Henry on Unsplash.
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What are the natural greenhouse gases?
So,whatarethegasesresponsibleforthisnaturalheat-trappingeffect?
MostoftheEarth’satmosphereismadeupofgases,primarilynitrogen
and oxygen, that do not trap heat energy and do not contribute to 
thegreenhouseeffect.Thetermgreenhouse gases refers to the small 
fraction of gases that do have the ability to trap infrared heat energy.
Thedominantgreenhousegas in theEarth’s atmosphere iswater
vapor. Next is carbon dioxide. Other naturally occurring greenhouse 
gases in the atmosphere include methane, ozone, and nitrous oxide. 
Concentrations of these gases are extremely small when compared with 
oxygen and nitrogen, but they play a crucial role in regulating climate 
and climate change. They have a much larger role in determining the 
Earth’sclimatethantheirtinyconcentrationswouldsuggest.
As we noted earlier, water exists in the atmosphere not only in the 
formof gaseouswater vapor, but also in the formof clouds (liquid
water droplets and ice crystals). Clouds also provide a large greenhouse 
effect,almostcomparabletothatofCO2.However,cloudsalsoreflect
solarenergy.Thereflectiveeffectofcloudsisabouttwiceas largeas
their greenhouse effect. Thus clouds, in spite of trapping significant
amounts of heat, have a large net coolingeffectontheplanet.
Experimental validation of the atmospheric greenhouse 
effect
Howdowe know the greenhouse effect is real?Oneway is to look
at the energy absorbed and emitted by the Earth. Satellites routinely 
measure the incoming solar energy and the outgoing heat energy from 
the planet. Independently, the heat energy emitted by the surface has 
been estimated using observed surface temperatures on land and sea.
A note about units: scientists measure energy in units called joules. 
To describe incoming and outgoing energy for the Earth, scientists use 
watts. A watt is a unit describing the rate at which energy is emitted 
orabsorbed;1wattisequaltoarateof1joulepersecond.Togivea
familiarexample,a60-wattlightbulb,whenlit,emits60joulesofheat
and light energy per second. Scientists measure the rate of incoming 
solar energy and emitted heat energy for a planet in terms of the energy 
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rate per unit of its surface area. This is expressed as watts per square 
meteroftheplanet’ssurface,denotedinshortformasW/m2 (where 
theslashmeans“per”).
Globally,measurements show that the Earth’s surface emits heat
energyat390W/m2.However,satellitemeasurementsduringthe1980s
showed that the heat energy escaping to space through the atmosphere 
wasonly260W/m2. Thus, the atmosphere traps about one-third of the 
surface-emitted heat energy. Clouds decrease the energy that escapes 
byanadditional25W/m2; thus, the net heat energy escaping to space 
(withclouds)is235W/m2.
We can use another, more whole-system approach to validate the 
greenhouseeffect:comparingplanetEarthwithitsneighbors,Venusand
Mars.Ononehand,theaveragesurfacetemperatureofEarthis15°C.
TheVenusiansurface,ontheotherhand,issearinghotat462°C—well
abovethemeltingpointoflead.Whyisthisthecase?Thefirstobvious
suggestionwouldbethatVenusishotbecauseitissoclosetothesun.
Indeed,Venusisclosetothesun,anditsincomingsolarenergyis659
W/m2,comparedwith341W/m2 for Earth.
Butthereisasecondfactortoconsider:Venusiscompletelycloud
coveredandasaresultreflectsasmuchas75%of its incomingsolar
energy(thatis,thealbedoofVenusis75%).Takingthisintoaccount,we
findthatVenusactuallyabsorbssolarenergyof165W/m2, slightly less 
Figure 1.2.4  
Comparative statistics 
of the incoming solar 
energy and surface 
temperatures of 
Venus, Earth, and 
Mars. Adapted from 
NASA.
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thantheamountofsolarenergythatEarthabsorbs(242W/m2). On that 
basis,wewouldexpectVenustobecooler than the Earth.
TheonlyremainingexplanationforVenus’ssearinghotsurfacetem-
peratureisthegreenhouseeffectoftheCO2 in its atmosphere. It turns 
out that the concentration of CO2 on Venus is about 200,000 times
more than that on Earth, creating a superstrong CO2greenhouseeffect,
whichmaintainsVenus’shottemperature.
Mars, on the other hand, is much farther from the sun and receives 
less than half the solar energy that Earth receives. Mars is nearly cloud-
free(exceptforsomedustclouds),anditsalbedoisonly18%.Thenet
effect is that the solar energy thatMars absorbs (125W/m2) is only 
half of that absorbed by Earth. This is the primary reason for the frigid 
average temperature onMars (−55°C).Mars’s atmosphere is mostly
CO2, and the amount of CO2onMarsisactuallyabout15timeslarger
thanthatonEarth,butthestrongergreenhouseeffectisnotenoughto
compensate for the lower incoming solar energy.
Earth in the Goldilocks zone
The above exercise illustrates an important message about the optimal 
climate on Earth. The surface temperature is determined by a delicate 
balancebetween the amountof incoming solar energy, the reflected
solar energy, and the greenhouse gases in the atmosphere.
Aswe sawearlier,water vaporhas the strongestwarmingeffect
of the naturally occurring greenhouse gases. At the same time, clouds 
madeupofcondensedwatervaporhaveanetcoolingeffect.Ifwater
vaporplayssuchasignificantroleinourclimate,whydodiscussionsof
climate changemostly focusonemissionsof carbondioxide?Where
doesthewatervaporgreenhouseeffectfitinthispicture?
While carbon dioxide is emitted by geological processes (and more 
recently, human activities), the concentration of water vapor is primarily 
governed by surface and atmospheric temperatures. The warmer the at-
mosphere, the higher the concentration of water vapor, assuming there 
is an abundant source (such as oceans orwater “cooked out” from
mineralsdeepintheEarth’sinterior).
Because the concentration of water vapor depends on temperature, 
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climate scientists refer to it as a climate feed-
back that amplifies warming, rather than
a direct cause of warming. If there were no 
carbondioxideintheEarth’satmosphere,tem-
peratures would fall to the point that most of 
the water vapor would condense or crystallize 
outof theEarth’s atmosphere aswell.With-
out carbon dioxide, there would be very little 
watervaporgreenhouseeffectandtheEarth
would be much cooler, if not frozen.
Thus, the Earth seems to have just the right 
amount of incoming solar radiation, clouds, 
and CO2 to maintain an equitable climate.
Among the three planets, Earth is the only one whose temperature is 
nottoohot,nottoocold,but“justright”forGoldilocks’sporridge—and
for life.
CO2 increased by human activities
WhilethenaturalgreenhouseeffectisvitalformaintaininglifeonEarth,
humans have added an enormous amount of carbon dioxide to the thin 
shell of the atmosphere since the dawn of the Industrial Revolution. As 
of2017,wehavedumped2,200,000,000,000(2.2trillion) tons of carbon 
dioxideintotheatmosphereoverthepast240years.About45%ofthat
carbon dioxide still remains in the air today. That leaves a blanket of 
human-generated carbon dioxide in our thin atmospheric shell whose 
sheerweight is astounding—990 billion tons. That’s equivalent to the
weightofabout490billioncarscirclingtheplanetallthetime.
How do we know the weight of the human-made CO2?Fromdirect
measurements initiated by Charles David Keeling of the Scripps Institu-
tion of Oceanography (UC San Diego). This wiggly curve (Figure 1.2.6) is 
called the Keeling Curve and shows the concentration of carbon dioxide 
intheatmosphere.WhenKeelingfirststartedmakingmeasurementsin
1958,theatmosphericcarbondioxideconcentrationwas313parts per 
million(abbreviatedas313ppm). That is, out of every million mole-
culesintheatmosphere,313werecarbondioxidemoleculesin1958.
Figure 1.2.5 Goldilocks principle. 
Reproduced from NOAA.
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Passing a major threshold
Intheyear2016,wepassedamajorthreshold—onethatweshouldnot
be passing. Based on measurements of ancient air bubbles trapped in 
ice and other data, scientists estimate that the concentration of CO2 be-
fore1850was275ppm.Thatconcentrationhassinceincreasedsteadily,
shootingpast300ppmby1950,369ppmby2000,and400ppmby
2016.Carbondioxideconcentrationwasabout410ppmin2018,mean-
ing that humans have now increased the overall concentration of carbon 
dioxidebynearly50%sincethepreindustrialera.Crossingthethreshold
of400partspermillionsignifiesthattheplanetcouldbetransitioning
into an era of major climate changes.
The increase is seen everywhere on the planet: the ocean surface, 
mountaintops, and deserts. Whether the data are collected in Hawaii, 
the Arctic, or the Antarctic, the findings are the same. Basically, the
additional CO2 has covered the planet like a blanket.
Figure 1.2.6 The Keeling Curve shows the increase in CO2 from 1958 to 
2017. Reproduced from the Scripps CO2 Program from the Scripps Institution of 
Oceanography.
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Howdidthathappen?Airtravelsfast.PollutionfromNorthAmerica
travels to Europe in days; pollution from Asia travels to North America 
in a week; and pollution from South America travels to the Antarctic 
in a few weeks. Air takes a few years to travel from the Arctic to the 
Antarctic. Travel times for pollution are much shorter than the lifetime 
of the CO2moleculeintheair,whichis100to1,000years.That’swhy
the CO2 increase is found everywhere on the planet. Carbon dioxide is 
what scientists refer to as a well-mixed gas—one that remains in the 
atmosphere much longer than the time it takes to spread around the 
world.
What is the take-home message?
The atmosphere connects every part of the world with every other part 
in a matter of days or weeks. Therefore, we can only solve the climate 
change problem through global cooperation.
Greenhouse gases as pollutants
Why do we call carbon dioxide and other anthropogenic greenhouse 
gases“pollutants”?Pollutemeans“contaminatesomethingwithaharm-
fulortoxicsubstance.”Carbondioxideisanaturalcomponentofthe
atmosphere and a vital part of the respiration cycle that sustains life, 
sohowcanitbeapollutant?Althoughcarbondioxideandmostother
greenhouse gases exist naturally in the atmosphere, human emissions 
areincreasingtheirconcentrations,causingwarmingthatwillmostdefi-
nitely have harmful impacts, as we will see later in this chapter. The 
harmful impacts of these emissions make it appropriate to refer to 
greenhousegasesas“pollutants.”
What are the sources for the observed increase in CO2?
Many human activities that address our basic needs, development, and 
well-being are sources of greenhouse gases. Most of the energy used by 
society since the Industrial Revolution has come from fossil fuels: coal, 
oil, and natural gas. Burning fossil fuels emits the largest amount of CO2 
byfar,contributinganestimated34billiontonsin2016.
Major anthropogenic sources of carbon dioxide include the 
following:
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 ➤ Using fossil fuels to produce 
electricity: In 2016, 65% of
electricity worldwide was gen-
erated by burning fossil fuels, 
including 38% from coal and
23% from natural gas. Coal
emits roughly twice as much 
CO2 per unit of electricity gen-
erated as natural gas, so burn-
ing coal to generate electricity 
is particularly concerning.
 ➤ Transportation: There are 
about1billionmotorvehicles
in use around the world, the 
vast majority of which use 
oil-based fuels. Aviation and 
commercial shipping are also 
major emitters of carbon dioxide.
 ➤ Residential and commercial buildings and activities: In addition to 
indirect emissions from electricity use, buildings can be a direct 
source of CO2 emissions, primarily through heating. In developed 
countries,natural gas is frequentlyused for spaceheating,water
heating,andcooking.Theleastaffluent3billion,withlimitedaccess
tofossilfuels,frequentlyburnwoodoranimaldungforheatingand
cooking, which also release CO2.
 ➤ Industrial processes: A range of industrial processes, in particular 
cementandsteelproduction,emitsignificantamountsofCO2. Ce-
mentproductionaloneisestimatedtohavebeenresponsiblefor2
billion tons of CO2emissionsin2016.
 ➤ Land use: Changes in land use, in particular burning forests to clear 
landforfarming,grazing,orhousing,alsoemitsignificantamounts
ofcarbondioxide.Overthedecade2007–2016,CO2 emissions from 
landuseaveragedabout5billiontonsperyear.
Figure 1.2.7 Sources of greenhouse gas emissions. 
Reproduced from UNEP/GRID-Arendal.
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How much additional heat energy is trapped by the 
990-billion-ton CO2 blanket?
Asof2010,theheat-trappingeffectofhuman-emittedcarbondioxide
wasabout860terawatts(1terawattequals1,000billionwatts—that’s
a 1 followed by 12 zeros). This represents about 50 times our total
globalrateofenergyconsumption!Tounderstandtheenormityof860
terawatts,let’slookatanotherstatistic.Theheatenergytrappedbyour
human-madeblanket isequivalent toburning40 trillion60-watt light-
bulbs every second, every day, every month, every year. We are trap-
ping an enormous amount of heat in the land, oceans, and atmosphere. 
Based on fundamental physics, the temperature of the planet and the 
atmospherewillbeforcedtoincreaseuntiltheextra860terawattsare
radiated away into space. If we continue to increase the concentration 
of CO2 in the atmosphere, even more heat will be trapped, forcing the 
planet to warm even further. This, in a nutshell, is the cause of global 
warming.
Is CO2 the only important anthropogenic greenhouse gas?
Until 1975, we thought that CO2 was the only source of anthropo-
genic warming. Then the greenhouse effect of chlorofluorocarbons 
(CFCs)—agroupofartificiallyproducedmoleculesusedasrefrigerants,
solvents,andpropellants—wasdiscovered in1975.Soonafter,ahost
ofother anthropogenicgases (more than20)wereadded to the list
of climate-warming gases. The most important of these, in terms of 
their warming impact, are methane, ozone, nitrous oxide, and an-
other group of refrigerants known as hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs). The 
sources of these pollutants are the following:
 ➤ Methane is the main natural gas that we use for power generation, 
heating,andcooking.Naturalgasleaks(called“fugitiveemissions”)
at production and processing facilities and through distribution 
pipesareasignificantsourceofmethaneemissions.Anothermajor
source is methane produced by bacteria in the guts of cattle, sheep, 
andgoats.Wetriceagriculture(ricepaddyfields),woodburning,
landfills,andsewagewatertreatmentplantsareamongtheother
significantsources.
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 ➤ CFCs(chlorofluorocarbons)andHFCs(hydrofluorocarbons)arear-
tificiallyproducedforrefrigerationandairconditioning.CFCshave
beenphasedoutby international treaty since the late1980s,but
work to phase out HFCs is just beginning.
 ➤ Ozone is not directly emitted by human activities, but fossil-fuel 
power plants and automobile engines emit gases known as ozone 
precursors (methane, nitrogen oxides, and volatile organic com-
pounds) that react with sunlight to produce ozone in the lower 
atmosphere.
 ➤ Nitrous oxide is released by bacteria in the soil. Nitrogen-based fer-
tilizers used in agriculture increase the activity of soil bacteria and 
their nitrous oxide emissions.
TheIPCCestimatesthatasof2010(theIPCCdata isavailablefor
only up to 2010), CO2 has trapped 1.8W/m
2 of heat, which is 860
terawatts when integrated over the surface area of the whole planet. 
All of the anthropogenic non-CO2gaseshaveaddedanother1.2W/m2, 
bringing the total heat trapped by all anthropogenic greenhouse gases 
to3W/m2(about1,500terawatts).
Is the climate responding to this added heat?
Undoubtedly, the climate is responding to this added heat, according 
to data that scientists have collected at the surface, in the atmosphere 
usingaircraftandballoons,andfromspaceusingsatellites.Theentire
atmosphere, most of the land surface, and the oceans to depths of as 
much as a kilometer have warmed to unprecedented levels compared 
withthetemperaturesofthelast100,000years.Inthefollowingsection,
wewillreviewthevastamountofpastclimatedatathatprovidequanti-
tativeanswersaboutthemagnitudeoftheclimate’sresponse.
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1.3 Why and How Is Climate Changing?
You have so far learned how certain pollutant gases behave like a blan-
ket, trapping heat and causing global warming. In this section, we will 
document the evidence that these gases are changing our climate and 
do a deep dive into why and how the climate is changing. 
Distinguishing between weather and climate
Weather is what is happening at any given time or on a short time 
scale of a few weeks or less. For example, there may be rain today, 
sunshine tomorrow, and a storm a few days later. These kinds of day-
to-day short-term changes are what we call weather. Climate describes 
conditions over a longer term. For example, in many regions winter 
is colder and drier than summer. Summer might bring monsoons to 
some regions. These are descriptions of climate, which is essentially a 
longer-termaverageofweather.Thegreenhouseeffectcauseswarming
and other changes to climate on time scales of seasons or longer. A 
warmer climate in turn leads to other changes, such as extreme weather 
events(heatwaves,droughts,extremestormevents).It’sinthiscontext
that we talk about climate change.
Distinguishing between global warming  
and climate change
Until about two decades ago, scientists used to refer to the increase 
in temperature due to increases in CO2 as global warming. However, 
this term does not describe all of the impacts that go along with warm-
ing, such as extreme weather and rising sea levels. Moreover, in the 
1990sandearly2000s,“globalwarming”becameapoliticizedphrase
and issue, particularly in the United States. Scientists have responded 
by avoiding the phrase global warming and replacing it with the phrase 
climate change. Both terms are used in this text because global warming 
andclimatechangearedistinctprocesses.Bydefinition,globalwarming
Chapter 1: Climate Change 1-25
refersspecificallytothewarmingeffectofanthropogenicgasesonthe
planet. This global warming in turn leads to broader climate change, 
which includes changes in winds, storms, rainfall, and humidity.
Why is the planet warming?
Asbrieflydescribedintheearliersections,theEarthhasbeenwarming
sincethe1850s.Thewarminghasnotbeenconstantorsteady,how-
ever. As we will see, the evidence indicates that most of this warming is 
caused by human activities that release pollutant greenhouse gases into 
the atmosphere, thickening the natural greenhouse blanket. The gases 
beganincreasinginthe1850s,buttheGreatAccelerationinconsump-
tionthatbeganinthe1950s(Section1.1andFigure1.1.2) contributed 
Figure 1.3.1 Human activities that lead to climate pollution. Top left image 
by Alan Kiniry from Pexels. Top right image reproduced from Pixabay. Bottom left 
image by V. Ramanathan. Bottom right image reproduced from Pixabay.
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to a steeper increase in the concentration of many gases during the last 
half of the twentieth century.
The four images in Figure 1.3.1 reveal the interconnectedness of the 
climatechangeproblem.Thewomancookingwithfirewood(thatwas
mygrandmother’skitcheninsouthIndia)couldlosehersourceoffood
because of changes in climate, such as droughts, caused by CO2 emitted 
for the most part in developed countries. Likewise, the smoke coming 
fromthatwoman’skitcheninsouthIndia—aswellasfromcarsintheUS
and power plants in China—could melt glaciers thousands of kilometers 
away.Itisimperativetokeepinmindthatpointingfingersateachother
will not solve the climate change problem. We are all in this together 
and together we must solve this problem.
Wehavealreadyidentifiedcarbondioxideasamajoranthropogenic
greenhousegas.Carbondioxideisasignificantconcerninpartbecause
of its long lifetime in the atmosphere. Roughly half the emitted CO2 
will be taken out of the atmosphere in less than a decade by the land 
biosphere (trees, plants, and soil) and by the ocean, but the remaining 
halfwillstayintheairforatleast100years,andabout20%oftheCO2 
will stay in the atmosphere for 1,000 years or more. You, your children, 
your grandchildren, and future generations yet to be born will still be 
inhaling the carbon dioxide emitted by your car today.
The impact of aerosols
One important point to note from Figure 1.3.1 is that the visible smoke 
and smog shown in the images is made up in part of tiny particles 
called aerosols; carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gases cannot be 
seen by the human eye.Most of these aerosols reflect sunlight and
haveacoolingeffect,butblack carbon aerosols (a major component 
of soot) absorb solar radiation entering the atmosphere and have a 
warming effect. This trapping of incoming solar radiation should not
be confused with the trapping of outgoing infrared radiation emitted 
bythesurface.Oftenblackcarbonisreferredtoasagreenhousegas.
This is wrong on two counts: black carbon is not a gas, and black car-
bon warms the climate by absorbing solar energy rather than infrared 
energy from the planet. Black carbon is mainly produced by incomplete 
combustion. Major anthropogenic sources include internal combustion 
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engines in vehicles (particularly diesel-powered vehicles) and the burn-
ingofsolidcoal,firewood,cropresidues,andanimaldung(forheating
and cooking).
Fertilizing agricultural fields and burning fossil fuels and biomass
fuels (for example, wood) also contribute to other types of aerosol par-
ticles, such as sulfates, nitrates, and organics. Unlike black carbon, these 
otheraerosolparticlesprimarilyreflectsunlightandhaveacoolingef-
fect.Althoughsomeofthiscoolingisoffsetbyblackcarbon’swarming,
theneteffectofallaerosolscombinedisoneofcooling.Thiscooling
hasbeenestimatedtooffsetaboutathirdofthewarmingcausedbyan-
thropogenic greenhouse gases, but the net impact of human emissions 
still warms the planet.
Super pollutants
Asof2010,non-CO2 pollutants (non-CO2 greenhouse gases and black 
carbon)contributeabout45%ofthetotalanthropogenicwarmingef-
fect. These non-CO2 greenhouse gases and black carbon particles are 
also called super pollutants. This is because, per molecule, their warm-
ingeffectsaremuchlargerthanthatofCO2. For example, methane is 
25timesmorepotentthanCO2 at warming the planet; nitrous oxide is 
300timesmorepotent;HFCsandCFCsareafewthousandto10,000
timesmorepotent;andblackcarbonis2,000timesmorepotent(also
Box 1.3.1). These non-CO2pollutantshavepowerfulwarmingeffects,
but methane, ozone, HFCs, and black carbon are also called short-lived 
climate pollutants (SLCPs) because their lifetimes in the air range from 
less than a week (black carbon), to a month (ozone), to a decade or 
two (methane and HFCs), compared with the century to millennial time 
scales of CO2. These relatively short atmospheric lifetimes will be an 
important factor when we begin to look at climate solutions.
Warming trends
Signs of warming can be seen on the land and sea surface as well as in 
the atmosphere and the deeper oceans. The globally averaged surface 
temperature shown in Figure 1.3.2 reveals a persistent warming that 
beganin1900andcontinuesuntilthepresent(2018),withsomeups
anddowns.Mostofthe1°Cwarmingexperiencedsincethebeginning
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Box 1.3.1 Global Warming Potential of Greenhouse Gases
Each greenhouse gas has a different capacity to trap heat in the atmosphere. One way we can 
measure this is through global warming potential (GWP), which compares the heat-trapping 
effect of a gas to the effect of an equal mass of carbon dioxide.
Different gases stay in the atmosphere for different time periods; scientists call the time a 
particular gas remains its lifetime. Since the warming effect of a gas depends in part on how 
long it stays in the atmosphere, global warming potential must be defined for a specific time 
period, usually 20 years or 100 years.
The table below lists the 100-year global warming potential (GWP100) for three of the 
most important greenhouse gases. For example, the 100-year GWP of methane is given as 30 
(with a range of 28 to 36). This means that if we were to emit equal masses of methane and 
carbon dioxide into the atmosphere at the same time, the methane would trap 30 times as 
much heat energy as the carbon dioxide over a period of 100 years.
Greenhouse gas Chemical Formula
Lifetime in the 
Atmosphere (years)
GWP
(100 years)
Methane CH4 12 30
Nitrous Oxide N2O 114 298
HFC-134a* CH2FCF3 14 1,430
* HFC-134a is a commonly used refrigerant and is given as an example of a 
hydrofluorocarbon (HFC). There are dozens of different HFCs in use, with GWP values 
ranging from a few hundred to several thousand.
We can use global warming potentials to define “equivalent emissions” in terms of CO2. 
Scientists call this the CO2 equivalent, typically written as “CO2e” or “CO2eq.” For example, 
since methane has a GWP of 25, the release of 1 ton of methane would have a warming effect 
comparable to 25 tons of CO2. This might be described as the addition of 25 tons of CO2e. 
When looking at greenhouse gas emission numbers, it’s important to note whether they’re 
expressed in tons CO2 or tons CO2e.
You may have noticed that carbon dioxide is not included in the table; its GWP is 1 by 
definition. Also, as we will see, carbon dioxide is removed from the atmosphere by a variety of 
different processes, so it’s not possible to define a single lifetime for CO2.
Also notice that two important greenhouse gases, water vapor and ozone, are not included 
in the table. That’s because their lifetimes in the atmosphere are extremely short, only a few 
days or weeks, so it’s not meaningful to define a 100-year global warming potential for them.
SourceS: Climate Change 2013: The Physical Science Basis. Contribution of Working Group I to the Fifth 
Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change [Stocker, T. F., et al. (eds.)]. Lifetimes, 
Radiative Efficiencies and Metric Values, Table 8.A.1 Cambridge University Press, New York, NY.; UNEP. 2012. 
The Emissions Gap Report 2012. United Nations Environment Programme, Nairobi, Kenya.
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ofthetwentiethcenturyhappenedaftertheGreatAccelerationbegan
inthe1950s.
Asimilarpatternisobservedintheoceantoadepthofatleast700
meters. The warming can be seen over the whole globe with very few 
exceptions. Most every region has experienced the warming, but it is 
not uniform. For example, the land surfaces have warmed more than 
the sea surface. This is expected since the land surface has less thermal 
inertia than the sea and hence warms more rapidly than the ocean. 
The Northern Hemisphere has warmed more than the Southern Hemi-
sphere,againlargelybecauseoftheocean’sinfluence:thespatialextent
of the ocean is not as great in the Northern Hemisphere. The northern 
polar regions have warmed twice as much as the global average: more 
than2°Ccomparedwiththeglobalaverageof1°C.
Figure 1.3.2 Changes in global averaged land and sea surface temperatures 
since 1880, relative to 1951–1980 average. Adapted from NASA/GISS.
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If we keep adding climate pollutants at the present rate, global tem-
peratureswillcontinuetoincreasetomorethan2°Cby2050,andtoa
catastrophic3°Cto7°Cbyendofthiscentury.
How do we know the warming is due to human activities?
A large amount of evidence and many lines of evidence-based reasoning 
haveledscientiststoconcludeunequivocallythatthewarmingiscaused
by the increase in the thickness of the greenhouse blanket of CO2, meth-
ane, CFCs, ozone, and nitrous oxide. There are two primary grounds for 
this conclusion:
1. Natural changes are much too small to produce the observed 
warming. There are three main ways that natural changes can 
contribute to climate change. First, changes in processes within 
the sun can cause variations in incoming solar energy. However, 
incoming solar energy has been regularly monitored by satellites 
sincethelate1970s,andtheobservedvariationsinincomingsolar
energyareaboutafactorof10lowerthanthe3W/m2 increase 
caused by anthropogenic thickening of the greenhouse gas blanket. 
Evenmoresignificantly,changesinsolaroutputoverthelast
couple of decades have been in the opposite direction. That is, the 
sun’senergyoutputhasdecreased slightly, which would tend to 
cause cooling, not warming.
 Asecondnaturalfactorthatcanaffectclimateisvariation
intheEarth’sorbitaroundthesun.Theseorbitalchangesplaya
significantroleinclimatechangesontimescalesof10,000years
or more (for example, the cycles between glacial and interglacial 
periods),buttheyhavenegligibleeffectsontimescalesofa
century or so. They are simply too slow to be responsible for the 
warming observed over the past few decades.
 The third natural factor that can cause climate changes 
isvolcaniceruptions.Volcanoesputoutsulfurgasesthatget
convertedintoreflectiveaerosolparticlesintheatmosphere.By
reflectingsolarenergybackintospace,theseparticlescoolthe
climate.Volcano-inducedcoolingisrealbutlastsforlessthan5
years.Thechangeinreflectedsolarradiationduetovolcanoes
and the resulting temperature changes have been measured 
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from both surface instruments and satellites. For example, the 
eruptionofMountPinatubointhePhilippinesin1991produced
ameasurabledropinglobaltemperaturesforatleast2years.As
the sulfate particles are gradually removed from the atmosphere, 
temperatures tend to return to previous levels. Although volcanoes 
doemitcarbondioxide,theseemissionsarelessthan1%of
human-generated CO2. Scientists have concluded that apart from 
temporarycooling,volcanoeshavehadverylittleeffectonthe
rapidwarmingtrendobservedsincethe1980s.
2. Models can simulate the observed warming only if they include 
human activities. The most sophisticated climate models to 
date account for both natural variations and the human-caused 
increase in greenhouse gases. Model runs that include only natural 
variationsshowyear-to-yearfluctuationsintemperatures,but
they completely fail to reproduce the current warming trend. 
Only when models include the anthropogenic thickening of the 
greenhouse blanket do they reproduce the observed warming 
oftheplanet.WecanseethisinFigure1.3.3.Theblacklines
represent observations, the blue regions represent the range of 
predicted temperatures from models that include only natural 
Figure 1.3.3 Observed temperatures compared with those from models 
using only natural factors and with those from models using both natural and 
anthropogenic factors. Reproduced from IPCC.
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factors, and the pink regions indicate the range of projections 
from models that include both natural and anthropogenic factors. 
The observed warming is far outside the range of projections 
that include only natural factors, but it is well within the range of 
projections that include anthropogenic factors as well. This leads 
climate scientists to conclude that anthropogenic changes are the 
dominant factor in recent warming.
Why trust the models?
Thisleadsustoaquestion:Whyshouldwetrustthemodels?Afterall,
they are just computer calculations. How do we know they accurately 
reflecttherealworld?
Scientists trust the models in attributing the observed warming to 
human activities because, in general, the model projections are con-
sistent with the observed changes. Models have successfully predicted 
many changes that were later observed, a few of which are listed below:
 ➤ In1980,modelswereused topredict thatCO2-induced warming 
wouldbedetectedbytheyear2000.Indeed,in2001thecompre-
hensivereportwrittenbyover1,000scientistsfortheIPCCwasthe
firsttoformallyconcludethattherewasadiscerniblewarmingin
the observed records.
 ➤ Models predicted that warming induced by greenhouse gases would 
penetrate to the deeper oceans. Scientists have deployed thousands 
of underwater probes in every major ocean basin, and their mea-
surements show that warming temperatures have penetrated to at 
least700metersbelowthesurface.
 ➤ Models predicted that the greenhouse-gas-induced warming would 
extend to the entire lower atmosphere (from the surface up to 
above12kilometers).Thishasbeenconfirmedbyballoonandsat-
ellite data.
The predictions suggested that a warmer atmosphere would be-
come more humid and that the increase in water vapor would in turn 
amplify the warming because water vapor is a powerful greenhouse gas. 
Humidity data collected by weather balloons and microwave instruments 
Chapter 1: Climate Change 1-33
onsatellitesconfirmedthatwatervaporhasincreasedwiththeincrease
intemperaturesincethe1980s.
In the late 1960s, a Russian meteorologist predicted that as the
planet warmed, sea ice and snow would retreat, making the surface less 
reflective andexposing thedarkeroceanbelow to solar energy. This
reduced reflectivitywould increase the solarenergyabsorbedby the
Arctic Ocean, amplifying the warming. Indeed, satellite data have shown 
thattheArcticsea icehasretreatedsignificantlysincethe late1970s,
followed by an increase in solar energy absorption by the Arctic Ocean 
andamplifiedwarming.TheArcticregionhaswarmedbyalmost2.5°C,
comparedwiththeglobalaveragewarmingof1°C.
But models are tested not just by their ability to successfully forecast 
changes in climate that are later observed. A typical test for modern cli-
mate models is their ability to reproduce past climate observations, such 
as the temperature record for the twentieth century. This process is 
called hindcasting. The ability of models to pass such tests increases sci-
entists’confidencethattheyincludethefactorsnecessarytodetermine
the causes of observed climate change, as well as to project changes 
likely to occur in the future.
Based on the results from models and other observations and analy-
ses, the most recent report of the US Global Change Research Program, 
composedof13federaldepartmentsandagencies,concludedin2017
that“itisextremelylikelythathumanactivities,especiallyemissionsof
greenhouse gases, are the dominant cause of the observed warming 
sincethemid-20th century. For the warming over the last century, there 
is no convincing alternative explanation supported by the extent of the 
observationalevidence.”
Projecting future warming: climate feedbacks
Aswehaveseen,wehaveagoodscientificunderstandingoftempera-
ture increases over the past century. Warming is driven primarily by 
increases in concentrations of greenhouse gases. This warming has been 
partiallyoffsetbythenetcoolingeffectofaerosols.
Past and future warming is governed by climate feedbacks, which 
happen when the climate system responds to temperature increases in 
ways that can either amplify or moderate warming. Three of the most 
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Box 1.3.2 Climate Change: Is the Science Settled?
Media coverage of climate issues sometimes gives the impression that 
there is significant scientific debate about climate change. In reality, the 
scientific community largely agrees about climate change—both the fact 
that it is occurring and why it is occurring. This understanding of the 
mechanics of climate change is based on fundamental physics and well-es-
tablished scientific principles. We address some of the most common 
questions about the scientific consensus on climate change here.
What fraction of the warming is due to human activities?
My best estimate: 80% or more. How did I arrive at such a number? The 
science tells us that the variations in natural climate forcing (that is, solar 
and volcanic activities) are too small to account for the observed warming 
trends and at times contrary to them. Further, both pedagogical and com-
plex climate models are able to simulate the observed warming magnitude 
(0.9°C to 1°C) only if they include the observed buildup of greenhouse 
gases since 1900. See Box 1.3.3 for details of these calculations.
So, is the science settled?
The answer depends on what aspect of climate change science you ask 
about. Some of the most important questions have been answered with a 
high degree of confidence, as summarized in Table 1.3.1.
What aspect of the science is not settled?
Predictions of future warming are less certain. In the first place, we do not 
know how much climate pollution humans will emit over the coming de-
cades. Even for a particular emissions scenario, however, climate models 
give a wide range of estimates. Some of the major reasons for this range 
include varying assessments of factors such as aerosols, cloud feedbacks, 
and other feedbacks due to the response of soils and plants to warming 
temperatures.
With sufficient warming, there is also the possibility of abrupt and 
irreversible changes if global temperatures cross “tipping points” that can 
push the climate into new states. Examples of tipping points include sig-
nificant methane releases from melting permafrost or large-scale changes 
in ocean circulation. Unfortunately, the temperature thresholds for these 
tipping points are not well understood.
These feedbacks and dynamic processes mean that we must present 
any conclusion regarding the Earth’s future warming as a probable range 
rather than a single value.
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important feedbacks we need to consider in relation to climate change 
inthetwentiethandtwenty-firstcenturiesarethefollowing:
1. Water vapor feedback: We have already discussed this feedback 
earlier in the chapter. When the temperature of the atmosphere 
increases, it holds more water vapor. Since water vapor is a 
greenhouse gas, this feedback acts to amplify warming, resulting in 
temperature changes that are roughly twice as large as would be 
expected from the increase in greenhouse gases alone.
2. Ice-albedo feedback: As described in the previous section, 
increasing temperatures reduce snow and sea ice cover, which 
decreasesalbedoandamplifieswarming.Thisfeedbackhasits
strongesteffectintheArctic,whichiswhythisregionhaswarmed
substantially more than the global average.
3. Cloudfeedbacks:Cloudscanaffecttemperaturesintwodifferent
ways.Cloudsreflectsunlight,whichtendstocooltheEarth.
However,theliquidwateroricecrystalsincloudsalsotrap
infrared radiation, causing warming. It turns out that low, thick 
cloudshaveanetcoolingeffect,whilehighcirruscloudshave
anetwarmingeffect.Thus,theoverallfeedbackfromclouds
depends on whether a warmer world would have more low, 
Table 1.3.1 Summary of scientific consensus
Question Reply
Is the atmosphere getting more polluted? Yes
Are the greenhouse gases CO2, methane, 
and others increasing?
Yes
Are the increases due to human activities? Yes
Is the climate warming? Yes
Is the warming in part due to human 
activities?
Yes
What fraction of the warming is due to 
human activities?
50%–90%
What human activities are responsible for 
the warming?
Increase in CO2, other greenhouse gases, and 
black carbon particles due to human activities
Can we make precise predictions of 
future temperatures?
No. We can only provide probabilistic values.
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Box 1.3.3 Can Climate Science Account for the Observed 
Warming Trends?
Certainly—let me walk you through a little bit of math. We’ve already men-
tioned that scientists measure incoming solar radiation and outgoing heat in 
units of watts per square meter (W/m2). The physics behind the heat-trap-
ping effect of greenhouse gases is well understood, so we can calculate the 
imbalance they create in outgoing versus incoming radiation. Scientists call 
this imbalance greenhouse gas forcing. For the amount of greenhouse gases 
in the atmosphere in 2005, we find that the forcing is about 3 W/m2.
How much warming would that 3 W/m2 forcing be expected to cause? 
To calculate this, we divide the greenhouse gas forcing by a number called 
the climate feedback parameter. Our best estimate of this number is 1.3 W/
(m2 °C), read as “1.3 watts per square meter per degree Celsius.” This 
means that a forcing of 1.3 W/m2 would be expected to raise the global 
temperature by 1°C. Thus we are able to derive the theoretical warming 
that we should have seen from greenhouse gases alone by dividing 3 W/m2 
by 1.3 W/(m2 °C), resulting in an expected warming of 2.3°C. However, we 
have only observed 1°C. Where is this difference coming from?
First, not all of the warming appears at the Earth’s surface; approxi-
mately 0.5°C is stored by the oceans. Also, greenhouse gas forcing is not 
the whole story. About 0.7°C of the expected warming is reversed by aero-
sol cooling, and 0.2°C is reversed by changes in surface albedo, mainly due 
to clearing of forests for agriculture and grazing. When we subtract out 
warming that was stored by the oceans or reversed (2.3 − 0.5 − 0.7 − 0.2), 
we arrive at 0.9°C expected warming for the surface (Table 1.3.2). This is a 
good match for the 1°C warming that has been observed.
What about natural factors, such as changes in the energy radiated 
by the sun, volcanic eruptions, or natural variability due to heat exchanges 
between the oceans, atmosphere, and land? These factors have been ex-
amined carefully, and the conclusion is that they could cause the global 
temperature to vary up or down by as much as 0.2°C. In short, natural 
factors alone are far too small to account for the observed 1°C warming. 
We can only account for the observed warming by including the effects of 
anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions.
Source: Myhre, G., et al. 2013. Anthropogenic and natural radiative forcing. In Climate 
Change 2013: The Physical Science Basis. Contribution of Working Group I to the Fifth 
Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change [Stocker, T. F., et 
al. (eds.)]. Cambridge University Press, New York, NY. https://www.ipcc.ch/site/assets/
uploads/2018/02/WG1AR5_Chapter08_FINAL.pdf. 
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thickcloudsormorehighcirrusclouds.Includingcloudeffectsin
computermodelsisdifficultbecauseoftheirrelativelysmallsize
andcomplexformationprocesses.Thecurrentscientificconsensus
is that, overall, cloud feedbacks are likely to have a small amplifying 
effectonwarming.However,cloudfeedbackscontinuetobeone
of the largest sources of uncertainty in computer projections of 
future temperatures.
Table 1.3.2 Theoretical warming breakdown
Factor Warming
Greenhouse gas forcing (2005) 3 Wm−2
Climate feedback parameter 1.3 Wm−2 °C−1
Theoretical warming we should have seen with just greenhouse gas 
forcing (= greenhouse gas forcing divided by the climate feedback 
parameter = 3/1.3)
2.3°C 
Observed warming 1°C 
Ocean heat storage. This is the heat energy stored in the ocean, and it 
will be released as surface warming in a few decades.
−0.5°C
Masking by aerosol cooling −0.7°C
Surface albedo changes −0.2°C
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1.4 Impacts of Climate Change
Climatechangeaffectsallaspectsoflifeontheplanet,includingecosys-
tems, social systems, economics, public health, urban systems, and rural 
systems.Theobservedwarmingof1°Cisalreadyhavinganimpacton
these systems. With unchecked emissions, warming could reach unman-
ageable levels this century. It may be better to call it climate disruption 
rather than climate change.
As shown in Figure 1.4.1,theEarth’sclimatehasvariedsignificantly
overthelast1,000years.Globalrecordsforthisperiodarenotavail-
able, but proxy records such as tree rings and pollen suggest that the 
northernhalfoftheNorthernHemisphereexperiencedsignificantwarm-
ing(0.5°C)duringtheMedieval Warm PeriodfromAD950to1250.
While Europe enjoyed thewarmth andVikings traveledwestward to
found settlements in Greenland, other regions, including the American 
Southwest,sufferedfrommegadroughtsandheatwaves.Theunlucky
regions included North America, Central and South America, and north-
ern China. The legendary city and massive temple complex of Angkor 
Wat in Cambodia were abandoned largely because of decades-long 
megadroughts interrupted by occasional episodes of intense rainfall and 
flooding.TheMedievalWarmPeriodwasfollowedbytheLittle Ice Age 
from about themid-1600s to themid-1800s, which sawwidespread
cooling over the North Atlantic and Europe, with global temperatures 
on theorderof 0.5°C cooler than in themid-twentieth century. The
Thames River in London froze over multiple times during this period.
These climate events serve to illustrate the strong vulnerability of 
civilizations to climate change. However, the large climate changes 
experiencedduring thepast 1,000 years cannotbe assumed tobe a
reliable guide for expected climate changes in the coming decades, in 
part because the Medieval Warm Period was neither global nor wide-
spread, even over the Northern Hemisphere. We will begin with the 
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documented impacts of twentieth-century warming on a global scale. As 
wewillsee,temperaturechangesduringthetwentiethandtwenty-first
centuries have been larger than those of either the Medieval Warm 
PeriodortheLittleIceAge,withsignificantclimateimpacts.Afterthat,
we will look at the projected impacts of continued warming during the 
twenty-firstcentury.
Current impacts: twentieth and early twenty-first 
centuries
Abouttwo-thirdsofthe1°Cwarmingrecordedsincethebeginningof
the twentieth century has occurred in the past four decades, starting 
Figure 1.4.1 Observed temperature changes during the last 1,000 years 
compared with the predicted changes from 2018 to 2100. Reproduced from 
UNEP/GRID-Arendal.
Climate in Peril26
Variations in the Earth’s surface temperature: year 1000 to 2100
Deviation in oCelsius (in relation to 1990 value)
Source: UNEP&GRID/Arendal, Vital Climate Graphics update, 2005.
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around1980.Asofthiswriting(2019),2009to2018hasbeenthehot-
test10-yearperiodonrecord.
As previously discussed, a warmer atmosphere holds more water 
vapor, so as the planet warms, it becomes more humid. Warmer tem-
peratures also increase the overall cycle of water evaporation and pre-
cipitation, making drier regions even drier and wetter regions wetter. 
Dryareasworldwidehaveincreasedfromabout15%oftheEarth’sland
surfaceduringthemid-twentiethcenturytoabout30%bythefirstde-
cadeofthetwenty-firstcentury.
The last two decades have also witnessed record increases in ex-
treme weather events. The incidence of very strong hurricanes (category 
4and5)hasincreasedattherateofabout25%perdegreeofglobal
averagedwarming.Thenumberofdisastrousfloodshasincreasedfrom
lessthan50peryearduringthemid-twentiethcenturytomorethan150
peryearduringthefirstdecadeofthetwenty-firstcentury.
How do we know the increase in extreme weather is due to anthro-
pogenicglobalwarming?Thescienceofattributingindividualextreme
events to climate change has improved significantly.Multiple factors
are involved in any extreme event, so it’s not possible to say that a
specificweather eventwas “caused” by globalwarming, butwe can
determine how much more likely that kind of event is, given the in-
creased temperatures. For example, the record Russian heat wave of 
2010,whichclaimed15,000lives,aswellasmanyofthemajorstorms
and droughtswitnessed in 2016, have all been statistically attributed
toglobalwarmingwithabout80%certainty.Thatis,thereisafourin
five(80%)chancethattheRussianheatwavewouldnothaveoccurred
in the absence of human-induced climate change. It’s estimated that
widespread warming and rising humidity increased the probability of 
extremeweather, particularly heatwaves, by a factor of 10ormore
from2011to2015.Ananalysisof170reportson190extremeweather
eventsfrom2004tomid-2018suggeststhatabouttwo-thirdsofthese
extreme weather events were made more likely, or more severe, by 
anthropogenic climate change.
The impactsofglobalwarmingcanalsobeseen in itseffectson
iceand sea levels around theplanet. Since1980, the summerextent
ofArctic sea icehasdecreasedby asmuchas10% to15%.Glaciers
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Box 1.4.1 Observed Impacts of Global Warming  
(Late Twentieth and Early Twenty-First Centuries)
Impacts on ecosystems
• As we saw earlier in this chapter, trees and other plants absorb and store carbon 
dioxide from the atmosphere. Prior to the twenty-first century, tropical forests 
acted as a net absorber (sink) of carbon dioxide. For example, a young growing 
tree would absorb carbon in carbon dioxide, while a dying tree would release 
that carbon back to the air. However, during the first decade of the twenty-first 
century, tropical forests became a net source of CO2 because of degradation 
from drought and warming.
• Corals get most of their energy from single-cell, photosynthetic organisms that 
live in their tissues. However, if water temperatures are too warm, the corals 
expel these photosynthesizing organisms and are left as white skeletons. This is 
called coral bleaching. If warm conditions persist for weeks or months, the coral 
may die. Coral bleaching due to warming is happening in most coral reefs; the 
most severe global bleaching event in recorded history occurred from 2015 to 
2017. During this period, it is estimated, as much as half of the coral in Australia’s 
Great Barrier Reef was killed.
Impacts on human societies and human health
• Warming and droughts have increased water demand over 86% of cropping 
area by about 2.3% to 3.6% per decade since 1981, contributing to significant 
reductions in wheat yield and increase in plant diseases.
• Adverse health impacts of climate change, such as heat stress, have been docu-
mented extensively. The Lancet Commissions, which consists of international ex-
perts in public health, air pollution, and climate change, concluded in 2015 that 
the “effects of climate change are being felt today, and future projections rep-
resent an unacceptably high and potentially catastrophic risk to human health.”
• Threats to health, both physical and mental, also arise from decreases in food 
security and water availability. These threats include increases in waterborne 
diseases such as childhood gastrointestinal diseases caused by floods. Due to 
worldwide increases in temperature and humidity, insect-borne diseases, such 
as malaria, dengue fever, Lyme disease, and chikungunya, are migrating outside 
the tropics and to higher altitudes.
• The number of people displaced because of weather extremes has increased to 
21 million people.
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are melting worldwide. Major ice sheets, particularly in Greenland and 
West Antarctica, are losingmass at a significant rate. Sea levels are
risingatarateofabout3millimetersperyearbecauseofthemelting
of glaciers and ice sheets and the expansion of seawater as the ocean 
warms. The ocean is also becoming more acidic because of absorption 
of CO2, which produces carbonic acid.
Thechangesdescribedabovehavehadsignificantimpactsonnatu-
ral ecosystems as well as human society and human health. A few of the 
observed impacts are detailed in Box 1.4.1. 
Climate change to climate disruption
Forthefirsttime,thestatisticalbarrieragainstidentificationofclimate
change as causal factor for extreme weather events was overcome. 
ThescientificallycautiousAmericanMeteorologicalAssociation(AMS)
issued the remarkable statement: 
For years scientists have known humans are changing the risk of 
someextremes.Butfindingmultipleextremeevents thatweren’t
even possible without human influence makes clear that we’re
experiencingnewweather,becausewe’vemadeanewclimate.
TheUnitedNationsOffice forDisaster Risk Reduction estimates that
from 1995 to 2015, weather-related disasters have claimed 606,000
lives;furthermore4.1billionpeoplehavebeeninjured,madehomeless,
orrequiredemergencyassistance.Inaddition,theUNagencyestimates
thenumberofdisastersduringthelatterhalfofthe20-yearperiodwas
doublethatofthefirst10-yearperiod.Climatechangeisthusbringing
new weather extremes and fatal catastrophes—meaning that climate 
change is better termed climate disruption. Unchecked climate change is 
likely to become unmanageable. That could happen in a matter of few 
to several decades as discussed next. 
The next three decades: impacts of 2°C warming
Asof2010,wehavealreadyemitted2trilliontonsofcarbondioxide.
As discussed earlier in this chapter, nearly half of that amount is still in 
theatmosphere—990billiontonsofCO2,trapping860terawattsofheat
energy.Since2010,wehaveaddedanother200billiontons,bringingthe
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totalto2.2trilliontonsasof2018.Evenifweweretostopemissions
immediately,theEarthwouldwarmbyanother0.5°Cby2030tocom-
pensate for the heat energy trapped by the already emitted CO2, along 
with non-CO2 pollutants. Emissions to date have already committed us 
tothis0.5°Criseintemperature,whichwouldbringthetotalwarming
since1850to1.5°C.Forcomparison,eventhe1°Cofwarmingexperi-
encedduringtheEemianinterglacial130,000yearsagowassufficientto
increasesealevelby6to9meters.
Atcurrentemissiongrowthlevels,undera“businessasusual”sce-
nario, we will add another trillion tons of carbon dioxide to the atmo-
spherewithinthenext15years,byabout2030.Thisadditionalcarbon
dioxideislikely(withaprobabilityofatleast50%)tomeanthattotal
warmingwillexceed2°Cbefore2050.Atthatpoint,thedecadalrateof
climate change will be three times faster than the pace experienced until 
now.Mostclimatescientistsandecologistsconcurthat1.5°Cto2°C
represents the warming threshold for dangerous climate impacts.
Theimpactsof2°Cwarmingwouldbequitesevere.Risingtempera-
tureswillresultinanincreaseinthefrequencyanddurationofsevere
heatwaves. It’s estimated thatwith 2°Cwarming,well over 3billion
people—about 40%of the human population by 2050—would experi-
ence summer mean temperatures hotter than the current record hottest 
summers inoneoutof every two years.Moreover, about 1.8billion
peoplewouldbeexposedtolethalheatformorethan20daysayear.
Increasingtemperatureswillalsoleadtomoredroughtsandwildfires,
aswellasincreasesinseverestormsandflooding.
One impactwith trulyglobalconsequences issea level rise.Even
intheunlikelyeventthatwarmingisstabilizedat1.5°C,sealevelrise
will continue for centuries because of ongoing melting of the Green-
land and West Antarctic ice sheets. Studies of data for the past million 
yearssuggestthata1°Cwarming(equivalenttotheEemianwarming)
issufficienttoleadtoaneventualsealevelriseof6to9metersover
severalcenturies,anda2°Cwarmingcould lead toa riseof6 to13
meters.Sincemorethan75%ofthepopulationwillbelivingincoastal
cities by the end of this century, sea level rise of such magnitudes has 
enormous negative implications for displacement and mass migration 
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of people, disruption of social systems, and exacerbation or creation of 
internationalconflicts.
Box 1.4.2providessomeadditionalexamplesoftheimpactsof2°C
warming.
The late twenty-first century: warming of 4°C or more
By the end of this century, a business-as-usual path with unchecked emis-
sionswill leadtowarmingthatcouldexceed4°C.Aswediscussedin
Section1.3,projectionsbymodelsgivearangeofpossiblefuturetem-
peraturesbecauseofdifferingmodeltreatmentsofclimate feedbacks 
that can either amplify the warming or moderate it. These feedbacks, 
as discussed earlier, include increasing water vapor in the atmosphere 
andthemeltingofArcticseaice,replacingthereflectiveicesurfacewith
open ocean waters that absorb additional solar radiation and amplify 
Box 1.4.2 Impacts of 2°C Warming
• Highly populated regions, such as the eastern and western United 
States, Middle East, South Asia, and China, could experience heat 
waves worse than the most severe Russian heat wave of 2010, 
when temperatures reached 55°C (131°F).
• About 600 million additional people will be exposed to dengue, 
chikungunya, and many other viruses because of the expanded 
range of disease-carrying mosquitoes.
• Moderate to severe widespread droughts and fires will occur 
worldwide. Both rural and urban populations will be affected by 
air pollution, loss of property, and land degradation that reduces 
food production and contributes to volatile food prices.
• Floods and storms will become more frequent and/or intense. 
Scientists are still debating whether the frequency of hurricanes 
will increase, but the storms that do occur are expected to be 
stronger, meaning an increase in the strongest (category 4 and 5) 
hurricanes.
• The climate could reach a tipping point when forest recovery 
time increases to more than 55 months and the intervals between 
droughts decrease to less than 55 months. If that happens, forests 
may not recover from droughts and fires.
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Box 1.4.3 Dangerous to Existential Risk: Categories of 
Projected 2100 Warming
The green curve on the left labeled “10 Solutions” represents a scenario 
in which emissions are curtailed or phased out completely, employing 
the ten solutions described in Chapter 4. The other three curves in 
red and brown represent scenarios with unchecked emissions.
For the red and brown curves, BL = baseline, meaning no sig-
nificant mitigation efforts. CI = carbon intensity, referring to the 
amount of carbon dioxide emitted per unit of the global economy. 
Because of shifts in the economy and increasing costs of fossil fuels, 
it’s expected that the carbon intensity of the economy will decrease 
even without significant mitigation efforts. However, because the 
world economy will continue to grow, actual carbon emissions are 
expected to increase. For example, if the carbon intensity of the 
world economy were to decrease by half while the economy grew to 
four times its present size, total emissions would double.
There are specific scenarios shown: BL (CI–80%), the lowest- 
emission scenario of the three, in which carbon intensity decreases 
80% by 2100; BL (CI–0%) in which carbon intensity decreases 50% 
by 2100; and BL (CI–50% & C feedback), which is the same as the 
second scenario except that it also accounts for feedbacks such as a 
decrease in carbon dioxide uptake by soils as temperatures increase, 
meaning that more carbon dioxide would stay in the atmosphere.
Source: Ramanathan, V., et al.  Well Under 2 Degrees Celsius: Fast Action Policies to 
Protect People and the Planet from Extreme Climate Change, 2017. Image from Figure 
1. http://www.igsd.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/09/Well-Under-2-Degrees-
Celsius-Report-2017.pdf.
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warming. We also saw that one of the largest sources for the tempera-
turerangeprojectedbyclimatemodelsisdifferingprojectionsofhow
the amount and distribution of clouds will change in a warming world. 
Because of this, scientists express projections of future temperature in 
terms of a range of probabilities rather than a single temperature.
The curves in Box 1.4.3 show the probability of various levels of 
warmingfordifferentscenariosofemissionsgrowth.Thethreecurves
in red and brown to the right side of the curve are for scenarios in which 
emissions growth is essentially unchecked.
The key point is that continued growth in emissions would result in 
Box 1.4.4 Impacts of 4°C Warming or Greater
• Warming of 4°C would likely expose over 70% of the population 
(this would be about 7.5 billion people by 2100) to lethal heat 
waves. More than 2.5 billion people could be exposed to diseases 
carried by mosquitoes and other pests.
• Warming of 4°C would likely expose about 20% of natural species 
to extinction. This is in addition to the roughly 50% or more of 
species that will be exposed to extinction through habitat destruc-
tion by the 11 billion humans populating the planet by 2100. An 
extinction rate of 70% or more is considered to be a mass ex-
tinction similar to what happened during the Cretaceous period 
when dinosaurs disappeared from the planet.
• Over several centuries, warming greater than 5°C could result in 
an ice-free Earth, with a rise in sea level of more than 90 meters. 
Widespread droughts are likely the most serious outcome, threat-
ening food and water for most of the 11 billion people expected 
to be on the planet by 2100 (Figure 1.4.2).
• These impacts will be in addition to worsening droughts, floods, 
fires, storms, hurricanes, and dying forests. Widespread droughts 
are likely the most serious outcome, threatening food and water 
security for most of the 11 billion people expected to be on the 
planet by 2100.
• These weather extremes, sea level rise, and the spread of 
 vector-borne viral diseases will likely lead to the mass migration 
of millions of human beings.
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temperatures that expose human society and natural ecosystems to very 
severe threats. In these scenarios, the likelywarmingby2100 ranges
fromlessthan3°Ctomorethan7°C.Thereislessthan10%probability
thatthewarmingwillbe lessthan3°C,andlessthan10%probability
thatitwillbegreaterthan7°C.
Warming in excess of 4°C would produce catastrophic changes,
whilewarmingof5°Cormorewouldhave impacts so severe that it
could pose an existential threattosociety,asillustratedbythefindings
in Box 1.4.4.
Onetypeofhigh-impactconsequencethat isofmajorconcern is
the possibility of runaway feedbacks. For example, large temperature 
increases could result in methane release by warming permafrost and 
wetlands and the disappearance of sea ice and glaciers. This could start 
a feedback loop in which higher temperatures cause more methane 
to be released, in turn causing further warming. Such a feedback loop 
wouldbeoutsidehumancontrolandcouldundomuchofthebenefitof
any reductions in anthropogenic emissions.
Figure 1.4.2 Soil moisture conditions in 2080–2099 with unchecked 
emissions as simulated by the Princeton University climate model. Adapted from 
Cook et al. 2015.
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Extreme temperature increasesof6°Corgreaterareanexample
of low-probability, high-impact events. While the chance that these 
eventswilloccurmaybecomparativelylow,theirconsequenceswould
besoseverethatsignificanteffortstoavoidthemarewarranted.One
waytothinkaboutthisistoconsiderthequestion,Wouldyougetona
planeifyouknewtherewasa10%chanceitwouldcrash?Whilethere
isahighprobability(90%)thatyouwouldsurvivetheflight,thesevere
consequences of the “low-probability” crashmightmake you rethink
your plans.
However, the green curve in Box 1.4.3,labeled“10Solutions,”rep-
resents the warming probability if the ten climate solutions presented in 
Chapter4areimplemented.Notethatthiscurvegivesahighprobability
of remainingbelow the2°C threshold fordangerousclimatechange.
The green curve shows us there is real hope that if we act now, we will 
be able to avoid themost serious negative consequences of climate
change.
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1.5 Summary: What Have We Learned So Far?
 ➤ Many scientists propose that the current era be called the Anthro-
pocene in view of the fact that human beings have emerged as a 
major force transforming the planet, comparable to major geolog-
ical events.
 ➤ Human impacts on climate began gradually with the Agricultural 
Revolutionthatstarted10,000yearsago;therateoftransformation
pickedupwiththeIndustrialRevolutionthatstartedaround1750.
Twohundredyearslater,therewasaquantumjumpinthepaceof
transformationwiththeGreatAccelerationbeginningin1950.
 ➤ Thepost-1950periodwitnessedmassivechangesinthecomposition
of the atmosphere due primarily to the use of coal and petroleum 
for power generation, transportation, and industries.
 ➤ Climate change caused by emissions of greenhouse gases and 
black carbon has emerged as one of the iconic impacts of the 
Anthropocene.
 ➤ The primary sources for anthropogenic CO2 emissions are fossil 
fuel combustion, biomass burning, cement manufacturing, and de-
forestation and other land use changes. Methane sources include 
natural gas leaks during production, processing, and transmission; 
wood burning; cattle and other livestock; rice paddy agriculture; and 
landfillsandsewagewatertreatmentplants.SourcesforCFCsand
HFCs are refrigeration and air conditioning. Ozone is not directly 
emitted by human activities, but the emissions of ozone precursor 
gases (methane, nitrogen oxides, volatile organics) produce ozone 
in the lower atmosphere. Nitrous oxide is released by agriculture as 
a result of fertilization. Black carbon is produced by diesel combus-
tion;burningofsolidcoal;andburningoffirewood,cropresidues,
and dung for cooking.
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 ➤ The emitted greenhouse gases cover the planet like a blanket and 
trap the heat energy (infrared radiation) emitted by the surface. 
This trapped heat energy warms the planet. Carbon dioxide is the 
mostimportantwarmingpollutant,contributingasmuchas55%of
the present-day warming. Other greenhouse gases and black car-
bonparticlescontributetheremaining45%.Theplanethasalready
warmedbyabout1°Cbecauseofthisaddedheat.Allpartsofthe
Earth system, including the atmosphere, land, oceans, glaciers, and 
seaice,arewarming.Thewarminghasextendeddownto700me-
tersbelowtheoceansurfaceanduptoabout12kilometersinthe
atmosphere—just as predicted by climate science and climate mod-
els. The last time the planet was this warm was during the Eemian 
interglacialperiodof130,000to115,000yearsago.Impactsofthis
warming include heat waves, severe storms, droughts, and sea level 
rise.
 ➤ Climate change science is intensely data driven. The changes in 
the planetary climate have been documented by thousands of in-
strumentsat thesurfaceandaboardships,aircraft,balloons,and
satellites. These data have been integrated into sophisticated cli-
matemodelsrunbytheworld’sfastestcomputerstodeterminethe
causes and impacts of climate change.
 ➤ The validity and veracity of models have been assessed by simu-
lating climate changes during the twentieth century and so far in 
the twenty-first century, and then comparing themodels’ predic-
tions againstobservations. Predictions that havebeen verified in-
clude when human-induced warming would be detected above the 
background natural variations; amplifying feedbacks involving water 
vapor, sea ice, and sea level rise; and the depth of penetration of the 
warming in the oceans and the atmosphere.
 ➤ Theobserved1°Cwarminghasalreadyledtoasubstantialretreatof
sea ice, an increase in hurricane intensity, an increase in the intensity 
ofprecipitationworldwide,large-scaledroughtsandmorefrequent
fires,andatenfoldincreaseinextremetemperaturesandlethalheat
waves. Major health impacts have also been documented.
 ➤ Theplanetiscurrentlyonapathtowarmto1.5°C(frompreindustrial
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levels)within15years,mostlikelybytheyear2030.Ifwekeepadd-
ing climate pollutants at the present rate, it will continue to warm 
to2°Cby2050,andtoacatastrophic3°Cto7°C(95%confidence
range) by the end of this century. The potential impacts on human 
health, ecosystem health, and species extinction lead to the conclu-
sionthatwarminginexcessof5°Cwouldposeexistentialthreats
to Homo sapiens(all11billionofus)andnumerousotherspecies.
As we have seen in this chapter, the science of global warming is 
clear, and the potential impacts of continuing emissions for human soci-
ety and natural ecosystems are severe. There is still time to act, but we 
haveonlyabout20yearstobringallofthesolutionsdescribedinthis
book up to full speed.
Fortunately, a range of climate solutions that offer real hope are
available and will be explored in detail in the remainder of this book. 
These solutions will help provide you, climate warriors, with the tools to 
avoid such a catastrophic future.
Supplementary Readings
Check out the following resources for more information and discussion 
topics:
National Academy of Sciences. Climate Change: Evidence and Causes.http://
dels.nas.edu/resources/static-assets/exec-office-other/climate-change-full.
pdf.
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. Climate Change 2013. The Physical 
Science Basis: Frequently Asked Questions.https://www.ipcc.ch/report/ar5/
wg1/.
For more comprehensive and detailed scientific reports, see these
sources:
USGlobalChangeResearchProgram.2017.Climate Science Special Report: 
Fourth National Climate Assessment,VolumeI[Wuebbles,D.J.,etal.
(eds.)].USGCRP,Washington,DC.https://science2017.globalchange.gov.
TheIntergovernmentalPanelonClimateChange.http://www.ipcc.ch.
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Learning Objectives
This chapter will teach you how to do the following:
1. Recognize the disproportionate impact of climate change on the 
world’s most vulnerable people.
2. Understand the difference between climate mitigation and climate 
adaptation and why vulnerable populations are less capable of 
both.
3. Understand the difference between the intergenerational and 
intragenerational impacts of climate change.
4. Be familiar with a variety of perspectives about the relationship 
between humans and nature, as well as with the negative 
environmental and human consequences of asserting human 
dominion over the natural world.
5. Appreciate the urgency of climate justice.
6. Understand global and local trends associated with climate 
injustice.
7. Discuss major climate policy frameworks.
8. Be familiar with core climate justice movement ideas, actions, and 
visions of change.
Overview
This chapter will address the impact of climate change on human pop-
ulations and the ecologies that sustain human life. “Climate justice” is a 
set of global responsibilities toward those who are least responsible for 
causing climate change but most negatively affected by it. This chapter 
will emphasize the urgency of climate justice in our world today, and it 
will hopefully stimulate thinking about what you, as a climate champion, 
can do to address it.
Section 2.1 defines climate justice and climate injustice, focusing 
on how climate change affects the bottom 3 billion—that is, the poor-
est people in the world. Here, we will explore the environmental and 
human harms of climate change, emphasizing the disproportionate 
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impacts of climate change on the world’s most vulnerable populations. 
Climate change and poverty are inextricably linked. In this section, we 
will also consider the difference between the intergenerational and intra-
generational harms of climate change—harms both to those now living, 
and to those yet to be born.
Section 2.2 will reflect on the historical relationship between humans 
and the natural world. We will encounter a variety of religious and secu-
lar views, past and present, about the relationship between humans and 
nature, ranging from justifications for human dominion to perspectives 
that advocate a more harmonious relationship. This section is mindful 
of the devastating real-world consequences of human dominion over 
nature both for the environment and for people, especially the most 
vulnerable. We will stress the need for a more harmonious perspective.
In Section 2.3, we will explore the disproportionate impacts of cli-
mate change on vulnerable people around the world and the resulting 
ethical imperatives for us as a global community. This section will intro-
duce the difference between adaptation and mitigation; we will explore 
why poorer communities are less capable of both adapting to a warm-
ing climate and participating in global mitigation strategies to reduce 
greenhouse gas emissions. We will examine cases of climate injustice 
and the effects of climate change on women, Indigenous peoples, and 
African Americans, among others.
Section 2.4 outlines key global climate policy frameworks, from the 
1990s to today. It also surveys climate justice advocates’ criticism of 
such policy frameworks and explores some of their unintended con-
sequences. We aim to illustrate what both climate justice and climate 
injustice are by examining real cases where people and ecosystems are 
affected by climate change. Such cases will help us to think about solu-
tions to these problems from a global policy perspective as well as how 
we might implement solutions on the ground.
Finally, Section 2.5 explores alternative principle and policy ap-
proaches proposed by community-based social movements and climate 
justice activists. We ask, What might climate justice look like?
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We are faced not with two separate crises, one environmental and the 
other social, but rather with one complex crisis, which is both social and 
environmental. Strategies for a solution demand an integrated approach 
to combating poverty, restoring dignity to the excluded, and at the same 
time protecting nature.
His Holiness Pope Francis, Laudato Si’, ch. 4: 139
Climate change and the bottom 3 billion
Climate change is caused disproportionately by the energy consumption 
and production habits of the world’s richest populations. The richest 1 
billion people on the planet are responsible for about 50% of green-
house gas emissions, while the poorest 3 billion, without access to af-
fordable fossil fuels, are responsible for about 5%, as P. Dasgupta and V. 
Ramanathan have found.
A crowd-sourced image of the world at night, Figure 2.1.1 demon-
strates the disproportionate energy usage among the world’s richest 
and poorest populations. This image reveals that dark does not always 
mean “unpopulated.” Dark, densely populated areas are distributed 
across the world. They tend to be the most vulnerable zones on our 
planet, concentrated in the global South, among populations who don’t 
have access to fossil fuels. However, those in the dark typically suffer the 
greatest harms associated with climate change and will continue to be 
most affected by climate change into the future.
In other words, those who contribute the least to the greenhouse 
gas emissions that cause climate change are now, and will continue to 
be, the most severely affected by it. This phenomenon is called climate 
injustice. These same vulnerable populations are also less capable of 
adapting to a warming climate, because they have less access to finan-
cial and other resources that might allow them to avoid harm. Climate 
2.1   Defining Climate Justice and Injustice
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justice, as a philosophy and a set of social movements, demands that we 
recognize the imbalances between responsibilities and harms and that 
we intervene to correct them.
While contributing the least of anyone to the causes of climate 
change, people of color, women, Indigenous communities, and global 
South nations often bear the brunt of climate disruption. Climate dis-
ruption is another term for climate change, one that emphasizes the 
way global warming disrupts climate systems and, along with them, 
environments, economies, and human health. Marginalized communi-
ties are among the first to experience the effects of climate disruption, 
which can include rising levels of respiratory illness and infectious dis-
ease, heat-related deaths, large increases in energy costs, and so-called 
natural disasters that climate change makes more frequent or severe. 
These communities also bear the burdens created by ill-conceived poli-
cies designed to prevent climate disruption.
The effects of climate injustice have been evident for years. Flooding 
from severe storms, rising sea levels, and melting glaciers affect millions 
Figure 2.1.1 In Plain Sight. Installation designed for Dimensions of 
Citizenship, the US Pavilion at the 16th International Architecture Exhibition 
of La Biennale di Venezia, commissioned by the School of the Art Institute of 
Chicago and the University of Chicago. Installation by Diller Scofidio + Renfro, 
Laura Kurgan, and Robert Gerard Pietrusko with the Center for Spatial Research.
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in Asia and Latin America, while sub-Saharan Africa is experiencing sus-
tained droughts. Scholars collectively call these areas of the world the 
global South in order to distinguish them from the global North, which 
includes Europe and the United States. Unlike older terms such as third-
world versus first-world, or developing versus developed countries, these 
terms point to the historical colonization of much of the global South 
by nations in the global North.
Consider that nearly 75% the world’s annual carbon dioxide emis-
sions come from the global North, where only 15% of the global pop-
ulation resides. If historic responsibility for climate change is taken into 
account, global North nations have emitted more than three times their 
share of the total greenhouse gases that we can safely put into the 
global atmosphere, while the poorest 10% of the world’s population 
has contributed less than 1% of emissions. Thus the struggle for racial, 
gender, and economic justice is inseparable from any effort to combat 
climate disruption.
Climate justice is a vision aimed at dissolving and alleviating the un-
equal burdens created by climate change (Figure 2.1.2). The topic of cli-
mate justice is a major point of contention in both US and international 
Figure 2.1.2 People’s Climate March, Seattle, Washington, October 14, 2015. 
Photograph by John Duffy from Flickr.
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policy efforts to address climate disruption, because it would require 
wealthy nations that have contributed the most to the problem to take 
greater responsibility for solutions. For many observers, the path is clear: 
for humanity’s survival, for justice, and for sustainability, they maintain, 
we in the global North must reduce our emissions and consumption.
Why is justice so important?
Justice is a core principle of democracy and is tightly linked with environ-
mental and climate protection. How so? Those communities, states, and 
nations with stronger protections for women and other marginalized 
communities also tend to have stronger environmental protections. In 
other words, those societies with healthier indicators of social equal-
ity, democracy, and justice tend to protect their environments better 
as well. If we want ecological sustainability and climate protection, we 
must work to strengthen our democracies, and that means strengthen-
ing social systems that facilitate justice for all. Let’s consider these claims 
in more detail.
Social scientists such as Liam Downey and Susan Strife have demon-
strated that general measures of social and political inequality are 
strongly correlated with and contribute to greater levels of ecological 
harm. In addition, James Boyce finds that the level of egalitarianism in 
a society strongly predicts the degree of environmental harm it causes. 
That is, societies with higher levels of economic and political inequality 
are characterized by higher overall ecological harm, and the reverse 
is true for societies with more egalitarian structures. How does this 
relationship unfold? Richard Wilkinson and Kate Pickett conclude that 
rising levels of social inequality contribute to heightened competitive 
consumption among a given society’s citizens. This rising consumption, 
in turn, causes an increase in industrial activity that contributes to cli-
mate change in particular and to environmental harm in general.
Scholars have discovered that there are strong correlations between 
gender inequality and environmental harm as well. For example, Chris-
tina Ergas and Richard York find that carbon emissions are lower in 
nations where women have high political status. Thus efforts to im-
prove gender equality and gender justice will likely be more effective 
if they work synergistically with campaigns to address climate change. 
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Ergas and York also find that nations with greater military spending have 
higher carbon emissions than other nations, supporting the work of 
ecofeminist scholars, such as Greta Gaard, who have long argued that 
militaristic policymaking is linked to ecological harm.
Research on climate justice reveals that socially marginalized com-
munities face the greatest threats from climate change but contribute 
the least to the problem. Going further, however, with respect to the 
causes of this crisis, we find that the contemporary “wicked problem” 
of global climate disruption has its roots in European conquests of 
Indigenous peoples and lands in the Americas, the enslavement and 
forced labor of vast swaths of people across the global South, and the 
Industrial Revolution. These major social, economic, and technological 
upheavals also ushered in the Anthropocene—the age in which human 
activity has begun to affect the planet so much that it is leaving marks in 
the geological record (Chapter 1).
Finally, while researchers have shown that marginalized populations 
tend to live in places that experience severe environmental harm, the 
driving forces behind this environmental violence require more inves-
tigation. Traci Brynne Voyles’s concept of “wastelanding” is immensely 
useful here. She shows how the concept of “wasteland” has been used 
to define certain human populations and landscapes as pollutable and 
expendable.
All the research summarized in this section sends a clear message: 
ideologies, policies, and practices that produce and enable human in-
equalities not only harm the people whom they target directly, but also 
drive climate change and environmental damage.
Climate justice: redistributing harms and responsibilities
In 2011, United Nations Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon delivered an 
address to the General Assembly of the United Nations in which he 
voiced the same integral message:
Saving our planet, lifting people out of poverty, advancing economic 
growth—these are one and the same fight. We must connect the 
dots between climate change, water scarcity, energy shortages, 
global health, food scarcity, and women’s empowerment. Solutions 
to one problem must be solutions to all.
2-10 Chapter 2: Humans, Nature, and the Quest for Climate Justice
In 2013, Pope Francis launched his papacy with a similar commit-
ment to tackling these urgencies together. In his inaugural Mass, he 
declared: “Let us be protectors of creation, protectors of God’s plan 
inscribed in nature, protectors of one another, and of the environment.” 
Soon after, in his 2015 encyclical Laudato Si’, he issued perhaps the most 
integral and robust plea for climate justice the world had ever seen.* 
He linked the global fights against poverty and for tolerance and human 
dignity with the fight against climate change. For him, these urgent con-
cerns go hand in hand:
Today we have to realize that a true ecological approach always 
becomes a social approach. It must integrate questions of justice 
and debates on the environment so as to hear both the cry of the 
earth and the cry of the poor.
When Mary Robinson, former president of Ireland, was the UN 
High Commissioner of Human Rights from 1997 to 2002, she made 
climate change central in her human rights agenda. She argued that 
many of the human rights we value as a global community—women’s 
rights, children’s rights, immigrants’ rights, and the rights of all people to 
health and well-being, food and water, shelter, and education—are being 
undermined by climate change. After she left the United Nations, she 
founded the Mary Robinson Foundation–Climate Justice, a center for 
thought leadership, education, and advocacy on the struggle to secure 
justice for those who are vulnerable to the impacts of climate change. 
Though such marginalized communities are disempowered and usually 
forgotten, they have a right to low-carbon development.
We need to consider both the intragenerational and intergenera-
tional harms caused by the wealthy global minority through its energy 
consumption and production habits. Intragenerational harm refers to the 
disproportionate impact of climate change on vulnerable people within 
our own generation; it is the kind of harm discussed in the previous sec-
tion. Climate justice means that we have an urgent ethical responsibility 
to help those who are suffering right now from the impacts of climate 
*Encyclical Letter, Laudato Si’ of the Holy Father Francis, on Care for Our Common 
Home, 2015. http://w2.vatican.va/content/francesco/en/encyclicals/documents/
papa-francesco_20150524_enciclica-laudato-si.html.
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change. But we also have to think about intergenerational harm—that is, 
the harm that climate change will do to those who are not yet born, the 
populations of the future, who cannot consent to the planet that we are 
preparing for them. As a matter of climate justice, we need to reduce 
warming for our own grandchildren and for the grandchildren of all.
Viewed through the lens of human suffering, climate change be-
comes not only an environmental problem but also an urgent ethical 
one. Climate justice demands that those who cause harm, and especially 
those who benefit from that harm, bear primary responsibility for rem-
edying it and for preventing further harm in the future.
In other words, climate justice is both backward looking and for-
ward looking. The wealthy polluting population has an ethical responsi-
bility to alleviate present-day human suffering caused by past acts and 
omissions, in part by providing aid to populations struggling to adapt. 
But the polluting population also has an ethical responsibility to mitigate 
future harm by doing everything we now know is necessary to mobilize 
a low-carbon global economy. This includes both helping people in de-
veloping countries to leapfrog a carbon-based economy and tempering 
the promotion of our own wasteful lifestyles as the epitome of human 
happiness.
It could be said that climate justice redistributes responsibilities and 
harms for the common good. The Mary Robinson Foundation–Climate 
Justice, the first international organization that committed to climate 
justice as a human right, frames this as “sharing benefits and burdens 
equitably”:
The benefits and burdens associated with climate change and 
its resolution must be fairly allocated. . . .  In addition, those who 
have benefited and still benefit from emissions in the form of 
on-going economic development and increased wealth, mainly 
in industrialised countries, have an ethical obligation to share 
benefits with those who are today suffering from the effects of 
these emissions, mainly vulnerable people in developing countries. 
People in low income countries must have access to opportunities 
to adapt to the impacts of climate change and embrace low carbon 
development to avoid future environmental damage.
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There is no time to wait. Your generation will be most affected by the 
changes that are taking place—particularly the most vulnerable among 
your generation. Because of the climate disruption you will witness in 
your lifetimes, you have a valuable perspective on the intergenerational 
harms caused by climate change. Each of us needs to play our role and 
find creative ways to intervene in the crisis (Figure 2.1.3). Reading this 
book is a very good first start.
Figure 2.1.3 The co-author’s son “Marching for Science” in San Diego, 
California, April 22, 2017. Photograph by Fonna Forman.
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2.2  Humans and Nature
How we think about nature has long influenced our actions toward it, as 
well as our actions toward each other as fellow human beings. Has the 
relationship between humans and the natural world been understood 
primarily as one of harmony and care, or as one of dominion? This sec-
tion will stress that traditions of dominion have produced devastating 
environmental and human consequences over time. A more harmonious 
and caring relationship between humans and nature will be essential to 
solving the integral challenge of climate change, which is presently not 
only destroying our environmental ecologies, but also threatening to 
destroy our human ecologies as well. Already vulnerable human com-
munities across the globe are struggling to adapt to a warming climate, 
raising urgent issues of climate justice—but we and our children and 
grandchildren will all be affected by climate change.
Dominion over nature
In some religious traditions, the environment seems to exist to satisfy 
human need and pleasure. Exercising mastery over nature and extract-
ing what nature provides for human ends is thus considered by these 
traditions a mandate of divine law or natural law. A foundational claim 
in the Judeo-Christian tradition, for example, is that God has given the 
Earth to humans for their own sustenance, use, and pleasure. The most 
well-known biblical statement of human dominion over nature can be 
found in Genesis 1:28:
Be fruitful, multiply, fill the earth, and subdue it. Have dominion 
over the fish of the sea, over the birds of the sky, and over every 
living thing that moves on the earth.
Here, humans are acting in accordance with God’s will when they 
subdue the natural world and appropriate the bounty of nature for 
human purposes (Figure 2.2.1). In Western history, this religious way of 
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thinking about human dominion over nature evolved into a full-blown 
secular culture of private property. The religious orientation to domin-
ion in the Judeo-Christian tradition became secularized in the modern 
period and was encoded in modern property law.
The seventeenth-century English philosopher John Locke is an im-
portant figure in this theoretical evolution. Locke is best known today 
for articulating the modern foundations of private property and for his 
theory of moderate government designed primarily to protect “human 
life, liberty, and property.” His theory of property is important to us 
here, since it was a deliberate secularization of the Judeo-Christian idea 
of dominion. Consider this passage, drawn from Locke’s 1690 work, the 
Second Treatise of Government:
God, who hath given the world to men in common, hath also given 
them reason to make use of it to the best advantage of life, and 
convenience. The earth, and all that is therein, is given to men for 
Figure 2.2.1 The Garden of Eden. Painting by Lucas Cranach the Elder (German, 
1472–1553).
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the support and comfort of their being. . . .  Though the earth, and 
all inferior creatures, be common to all men, yet every man has a 
property in his own person. . . .  Whatsoever then he removes out of 
the state that nature hath provided, and left it in, he hath mixed his 
labour with, and joined to it something that is his own, and thereby 
makes it his property . . .  that excludes the common right of other men.
This passage is instructive. God gives the world to humankind in 
common, but through the use of one’s body and mixing one’s labor 
with what is common, an individual can remove something from nature, 
privatize the commons, and make it his own. This, for Locke, is the 
origin of private property. According to Locke, extracting property from 
the commons is God’s plan for humankind: God endowed us all with 
reason so that we could do this. Through the exercise of our reason, 
individuals can conceive of the best ways to use and expropriate nature 
for the betterment of human life. The environment is there for us to use.
Locke’s theory of property is rooted in the ancient idea of terra 
nullius. Terra nullius, an old Latin term, refers to land that is empty 
and belongs to nobody. According to Locke’s theory, an individual can 
rightfully take land that is not being used by another person or group, 
because such land is not fulfilling God’s purpose. An individual can en-
close the commons, cultivate it, make it his own, and fulfill God’s wishes 
for humankind on Earth.
Locke did set an ethical limit on how much an individual can take. 
He said that we cannot appropriate more than we can use. According 
to divine law, we are not permitted to allow nature to spoil in our 
possession and thus deprive others of its usage. We cannot enclose 
more of the commons than we can cultivate. We cannot gather so 
many apples or fish that they rot. However, Locke quickly observed that 
human societies had invented money to bypass the spoilage limitation. 
An individual thus exchanges his property for something that symbolizes 
its value—money—and can accumulate unlimited sums of money since 
money does not spoil. As human societies developed further and money 
became the main method of human exchange, an individual could en-
close large tracts of the commons and pay people to cultivate it for him, 
either with money or the land’s produce. This, for Locke, was the birth 
of agriculture.
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Enclosure and subdivision
Terra nullius, understood as a divine or natural justification for privat-
izing the commons, was useful to the British aristocracy at the time 
that Locke was writing. For example, it gave convenient validation to 
the enclosure movement, which first began in England in the twelfth 
century but accelerated in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. The 
commons were lands held in common by a given community; people 
who did not own land could pasture animals, gather wood, or grow 
vegetables or crops for their own use there. Enclosure referred to divid-
ing up the commons into parcels of private property for more intense 
agricultural usage, a process that was nearly complete across England by 
the close of the nineteenth century (Figures 2.2.2 and 2.2.3).
While enclosure advanced agricultural productivity in England and 
other European nations through the eighteenth and nineteenth centu-
ries, agriculture would not be the sole motivation for enclosing and 
subdividing the commons throughout the twentieth century and into 
the twenty-first (Figures 2.2.4–2.2.8).
For those seeking profit, terra nullius has been a convenient justifica-
tion for enclosing the commons, encroaching on and subdividing empty 
or allegedly underutilized spaces, and expropriating natural resources. 
Figure 2.2.2 This is an eighteenth-century English enclosure map, depicting 
the town of Snaith. Enclosure of the Commons, Yorkshire 1754. Reproduced from 
Howdenshire History.
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Figure 2.2.4 Levittown, Pennsylvania, was the first master-planned 
development in the United States, built in the 1950s. Its 17,000 identical houses 
inaugurated a new symbol of American happiness—the single-family home 
in the suburbs—that also required freeway infrastructure and an oil-hungry 
automobile industry. Reproduced from Wikimedia Commons.
Figure 2.2.3 This is what the enclosure of farmlands looks like today when 
you fly over the United Kingdom—small plots of private land divided by trees, 
shrubs, rocks, and so forth. This aerial photo is of farmland east of Great 
Massingham, 2018. Reproduced from Geograph.
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Figure 2.2.6 Unsustainable American sprawl has been an infectious pattern 
around the world, in both developed and developing cities, from Dubai to 
Nairobi. Here, for example, is a master-planned community in Huaxi, China. 
Photograph by ImmerQi, May 6, 2009, from Flickr.
Figure 2.2.5 This is what suburban sprawl looks like today, in this case 
outside Las Vegas, Nevada. Photograph by Jan Buchholtz from Flickr.
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Figure 2.2.8 Sometimes master-planned developments abut on entirely 
unsustainable environments, like this desert in Rio Rancho, New Mexico. 
Reproduced from Wikimedia Commons.
Figure 2.2.7 Sometimes these master-planned developments abut against 
precious environmental zones, encroaching into wetlands and into forests. 
Here, for example, is a development in Kendale Lakes, Florida, encroaching 
on the Everglades National Park. Photograph by Fred Ward from Wikimedia 
Commons.
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Terra nullius also became a powerful justification for European coloniza-
tion around the world.
Colonization
John Locke’s theory of property, grounded in terra nullius, or empty 
land, had important implications for global dynamics in early modernity. 
Take a look, for example, at this famous cartoon by James Gillray, The 
Plumb-Pudding in Danger, from 1805 (Figure 2.2.9). The French Emperor 
Napoleon, on the right, sits with the British Prime Minister William Pitt, 
on the left, as they carve up the Earth, distributing terra nullius for their 
own national agendas. Extractions from these colonies—gold and silver, 
foodstuffs, wood, raw materials, and so forth—would enrich the mother 
country.
Of course, when Europeans landed in terra nullius, these lands 
weren’t empty at all. They were richly inhabited by ancient societies 
with forms of life that were foreign and often surprising to Europeans. 
Enslaving these inhabitants allowed the conquering nation to extract re-
sources to ship back to the mother country. Centuries of such extractive 
Figure 2.2.9 The Plumb-Pudding in Danger (1805). Cartoon by James Gillray.
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practices destroyed Indigenous cultures as well as the environmental 
ecologies that situated their ways of life. From Spain’s infamous Potosí 
silver mines in Peru and sugarcane plantations in the British Caribbean 
to diamond and gold mining in South Africa and the rubber boom in the 
Congo, modernity has been a brutal story of dominion over land and 
peoples and of slavery, extraction, and environmental mutilation across 
the world (Figure 2.2.10).
Harmony with nature: protecting the environment, 
protecting each other
One hundred years before we were thinking about climate change, 
Gandhi declared, “Earth provides enough to satisfy every man’s needs 
but not every man’s greed.” In contrast with traditions, histories, and 
practices of dominion over the centuries, there are alternative religious 
and secular traditions that have cautioned us to respect the Earth and to 
find ways to live in harmony with it. These include Koranic, Buddhist, and 
Hindu traditions, a vast range of Indigenous traditions and practices, 
and strands within Judeo-Christian tradition itself. Most often these 
Figure 2.2.10 Here we see the environmental scars of mining and of 
deforestation, devastating the integral ecologies of northern Brazil, the lungs of 
our planet. Photograph by Operação Hymenaea, 2016, from Wikipedia.
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traditions recognize the inherent interdependence of natural and social 
systems—what Pope Francis calls our “integral ecology.” They stress that 
irresponsible human dominion over nature causes not only environmen-
tal harm, but human harm as well. It violates not only the integrity of 
nature, but also the well-being of humans.
The great variety of religious and cultural traditions that emphasize 
our harmony with nature, as well as our ethical responsibility toward 
each other, can be very helpful to us today as we tackle the urgent chal-
lenge of climate change. For example, the Koranic ayah 24:45 instructs 
that we are “stewards of the Earth”:
The Earth is green and beautiful, and Allah has appointed you his 
stewards over it. The whole Earth has been created a place of 
worship, pure and clean. Whoever plants a tree and diligently looks 
after it until it matures and bears fruit is rewarded. If a Muslim 
plants a tree or sows a field and humans and beasts and birds eat 
from it, all of it is love on his part.
The Buddhist Za Choeje Rinpoche teaches:
By injuring any part of the world’s system, you injure yourself. 
Think of life on this planet in terms of systems and not detached 
elements. See that the environment does not belong to any single 
country to exploit and then disregard.
Laguna Pueblo poet Paula Gunn Allen describes a Native American 
orientation to the Earth as inherently part of the self, and explicitly re-
jects a relation of dominion:
We are the land . . .  that is the fundamental idea embedded in Native 
American life and culture in the Southwest . . .  the Earth is the mind 
of the people as we are the mind of the Earth. The land is not really 
the place (separate from ourselves) where we act out the drama 
of our isolate destinies. It is not a means of survival, a setting for 
our affairs. . . .  It is rather a part of our being, dynamic, significant, 
real. It is ourself.
There are countless examples of belief systems and practices that em-
brace harmonious views of the human relationship with the natural world.
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An important strategy for climate action today is to identify common 
views among otherwise diverse cultural, religious, and political groups 
to summon agreement, coordinate action, and assert political pressure 
to protect the planet from destructive human behavior (Figure 2.2.11). 
Too often commonalities are buried beneath political contestation over 
other issues—and this can be detrimental to building coalitions around 
urgent environmental and human challenges like climate change.
As an example of finding commonalities, a new and fruitful con-
versation has opened in recent years between climate scientists and 
members of the American evangelical community. Evangelical and at-
mospheric scientist Katharine Hayhoe gives voice to a position, rooted 
in scriptural commitments, that is attracting increasing support among 
some evangelicals:
If I say that I respect God, that I love God, and God has given us 
this incredible life-giving planet, then if I strip every resource at the 
expense of my poor sisters and brothers—one in six of whom die 
because of pollution-related issues, who are suffering and dying 
today—then I’m not somebody who takes the Bible seriously.
Figure 2.2.11 Rise for Climate march in San Francisco, September 8, 2018. 
350.org. Photograph by Xanh Tran, Survival Media Agency, from Flickr.
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Along these lines, the recent “Climate Change: An Evangelical Call 
to Action” asserts that “love of God, love of neighbor, and the demands 
of stewardship are more than enough reason for evangelical Christians 
to respond to the climate change problem with moral passion and 
concrete action.” This document proceeds to cite relevant scripture to 
substantiate its claims:
 ➤ Christians must care about climate change because we love 
God the Creator and Jesus our Lord, through whom and for 
whom the creation was made. This is God’s world, and any 
damage that we do to God’s world is an offense against God 
himself (Gen. 1; Ps. 24; Col. 1:16).
 ➤ Christians must care about climate change because we are 
called to love our neighbors, to do unto others as we would 
have them do unto us, and to protect and care for the least 
of these as though each was Jesus Christ himself (Mt. 22:34–
40; Mt. 7:12; Mt. 25:31–46).
 ➤ Christians, noting the fact that most of the climate change 
problem is human induced, are reminded that when God 
made humanity he commissioned us to exercise stewardship 
over the earth and its creatures. Climate change is the latest 
evidence of our failure to exercise proper stewardship and 
constitutes a critical opportunity for us to do better (Gen. 
1:26–28).
The ethical stand against climate change today, emerging from both 
religious and secular positions, typically combines care for the environ-
ment itself with care for our fellow humans, particularly those who are 
most vulnerable. In the next section, we turn to the human impacts 
of climate change, emphasizing what we call the “disproportionate im-
pacts” on the global poor.
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2.3   Disproportionate Impacts:  
Global and Local Trends
In this section, we turn to the impacts of climate change on human life. 
Here we acknowledge that all of us are vulnerable to climate change but 
that those who are young, elderly, poor, and sick are most vulnerable 
to—and least capable of adapting to—the impacts of climate change.
Climate change is projected to cause widespread and serious harm 
to human settlements on the planet, threatening to unravel many of the 
development gains of the last century. The effects of climate change 
cluster and bear down hard on the global poor, those who are both 
least responsible for the causes and least capable of adapting. The 
health impacts of climate change are predicted to become catastrophic 
by the middle of this century if significant reductions in greenhouse gas 
emissions do not occur.
Several years ago, the Lancet Commissions documented the pub-
lic health impacts of climate change and presented predictions for the 
future. The commissions found that climate change poses unaccept-
able risks to global public health. The United Nations Children’s Fund 
(UNICEF) similarly predicted that there may be “no greater growing 
threat facing the world’s children and their children than climate change. 
This mounting global crisis has the potential to undermine many of the 
gains we have made in child survival and development and poses even 
greater dangers ahead.”
We look around us and we can see that our world is changing. We 
are witnessing the effects of warming through our own senses: more ex-
treme weather events, more damaging wildfires, rising sea levels, more 
frequent and severe floods, and so forth. But these effects do not affect 
everyone in the same way. This section is about the disproportionate 
impacts of climate change on the most vulnerable people around the 
world and in our own regions, cities, and villages. The vulnerable lose 
more when these kinds of disasters strike.
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Adaptation and mitigation
To appreciate the disproportionate impacts of climate change, we begin 
by distinguishing a few concepts. The language of “adaptation” and “mit-
igation” is often used in discussions about climate impacts. Let’s define 
each of these terms and explore why vulnerable communities are less 
capable of both adaptation and mitigation.
Adaptation refers to the capacity of a community or a demographic 
group to accommodate to changes in climate or extreme weather events 
related to climate change. Does climate change disrupt someone’s live-
lihood? Does it displace someone from her home? Does it threaten her 
life or affect her health, and does she have adequate health care to treat 
these health impacts? Does it force her to move, and does she have the 
resources and social capital to relocate if she needs to? Does she have 
access to government services or other social or humanitarian aid re-
sources to assist her? Wealthier individuals and communities have more 
capacity to adapt, and poorer individuals and communities, including 
those who rely on the natural world for subsistence, have less. Thus we 
refer to an “adaptation gap” between the rich and the poor across the 
world.
While adaptation refers to the capacity to accommodate to a chang-
ing climate, mitigation refers to activities that reduce the production 
of carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gases. Poorer individuals and 
communities have fewer resources for participating in mitigation activi-
ties and climate action—in other words, for contributing to a low-carbon 
economy. Poorer communities have less capacity to adapt to a warming 
climate, and they also have less capacity to participate in mitigation 
strategies. Vulnerable communities produce proportionately far less 
carbon than wealthier populations. But as these societies “develop,” it is 
essential that they do so in greener ways, not by mimicking the carbon- 
hungry development patterns of wealthier societies. The problem is that 
it is costly to invest in sustainable development and green technologies. 
For this reason, global resources must flow toward vulnerable commu-
nities to help them leapfrog over the oil-based development patterns of 
wealthy nations that have already gotten us into so much trouble.
With the concepts of adaptation and mitigation in mind, we are 
now better prepared to make sense of the risks of climate change and 
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to appreciate what’s at stake for the poorest societies across the world. 
Let’s consider some cases of climate injustice and what they can tell us 
about how best to address this challenge.
Climate migration
The adaptation gap is evident in the acceleration of climate-related 
human displacement across the world in recent years. Social scientists 
are still figuring out how to accurately measure the rate of climate mi-
gration. In 2009, António Guterres, then the United Nations high com-
missioner for refugees, predicted that climate change would become 
the largest driver of population displacements both inside and across 
national borders. His prediction seems to be bearing out. The global 
rate of displacement has more than doubled since 1970, from fewer 
than 2,000 persons per million to more than 4,000 persons per million 
in 2014.
The most commonly cited estimate is that climate change will force 
200 million people to move by 2050. These displacements, even if tem-
porary, have a profound impact on individuals’ lives, often involving the 
loss of a home or crops. Such relocations disproportionately harm in-
dividuals at the very bottom, who lack the resources to adapt and are 
increasingly susceptible to the perils of human trafficking and forced 
labor.
In their recent paper on climate migration, Fonna Forman and V. Ra-
manathan focus on the slower progressive impacts of climate change, 
such as drought, soil erosion, forest loss, and sea level rise. While 
extreme weather events often cause sudden mass displacements and 
are increasing in frequency, slower processes seem to have a stronger 
predictive effect on the likelihood of climate migration. Those living 
in rural or low-lying coastal areas, whose livelihoods are linked with 
climate- sensitive sectors like agriculture and fishing, are the most vul-
nerable and at highest risk, as they are typically the least capable of 
either adapting or migrating. After all, the capacity to leave one’s home 
requires financial and social capital, such as education, language skills, 
and support networks.
In 1991, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) pre-
dicted that climate change would accelerate urbanization in developing 
2-28 Chapter 2: Humans, Nature, and the Quest for Climate Justice
countries, with populations migrating from coastal lowlands (particularly 
densely inhabited deltas) to inland areas. The world is now urbanizing 
at a rate of roughly 32 million people each year, exerting unmanage-
able demands on urban services and increasing political pressure on 
nation-states.
The 30-year drought in Syria, for example, is inevitably linked with 
the tragic political turbulence we’ve witnessed there in recent years. 
Drought destroyed rural economies and drove farmers into the cities. 
Cities couldn’t handle the dramatic influx of population, which contrib-
uted to greater civil unrest. It would be inaccurate to say that climate 
change was the “cause” of the geopolitical dynamics that have rocked 
Syria and the global community. But it undoubtedly served as a “threat 
multiplier,” exacerbating existing conditions of instability and institu-
tional weakness and accelerating the dramatic political outcomes that 
ensued.
In the developing world, rapid urbanization in recent decades has 
also produced dramatic “asymmetrical” growth patterns. The poorest 
populations have amassed by the millions in precarious informal set-
tlements, often peri-urban and frequently along rivers and lagoons, 
uniquely exposing them to the effects of climate change—floods, 
drought, food and water shortages, and disease. The explosion of slums 
at the periphery of cities across the planet is a humanitarian crisis of 
gargantuan proportions that cities in the developing world today are 
proving unprepared to confront.
Latinx communities in California
For generations, electricity for California’s Central Coast region has been 
produced by polluting gas-fired power plants concentrated in Oxnard, 
a working-class community that is 85% people of color and 75% Latinx. 
Oxnard already has three power plant smokestacks along its shoreline, 
more than any other city on the coast of California. Recently, Oxnard 
faced a proposal for a fourth power plant that would produce more 
greenhouse gases and expose local residents to more particulate matter 
pollution while generating electricity for other cities. In other words, 
Oxnard would shoulder the cost and receive few of the benefits of this 
development. Many neighborhoods in Oxnard are already above the 
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ninetieth percentile for asthma rates in the state of California—their res-
idents are literally gasping for air.
But local residents, grassroots organizations, and college students 
stood up to oppose this power plant and called for an end to dangerous 
and polluting fossil fuel projects that threaten human and environmental 
health. They simultaneously took action to promote positive practices 
and policies, such as the restoration and protection of critical habitat 
and the expansion of safe, well-paying jobs. This is an example of a com-
munity fighting against climate injustice and demanding climate justice, 
and they succeeded in stopping the proposed plant in its tracks (Figure 
2.3.1)
Africa and climate disruption
Western nations are responsible for the great majority of greenhouse 
gas emissions globally. The European Union, the United States, Canada, 
Australia, and Russia are responsible for 68% of global emissions while 
sub-Saharan Africa is responsible for only 2%. The African continent’s 
economies are largely dependent on farming and natural resource ex-
traction and export. These are two of the industries that scientists ex-
pect to be hit hardest by climate disruption in the coming years.
Figure 2.3.1 Puente protest. Photograph by Central Coast Alliance United for a 
Sustainable Economy (CAUSE).
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In fact, according to the IPCC, Africa is the continent most at risk 
from climate disruption. These threats include reduced agricultural pro-
ductivity as a result of rising temperatures, which may lead to rising 
food insecurity, hunger, and political conflict. The output of rainfed 
agriculture is expected to drop by as much as 50% in some African 
nations by 2020. Increasing drought conditions in some parts of the 
continent and rising sea levels near coastal areas may contribute to 
social and economic problems as well. Generally, African nations can 
expect to see increased desertification, more floods and droughts, in-
tensified water shortages, and massive increases in climate refugees. 
In 2009, the Climate Change Vulnerability Index of the conservation 
group NatureServe concluded that of the 28 nations around the world 
facing “extreme risk” due to climate change, 22 of those countries were 
in Africa. Issues that we define as “environmental” or “climate-change 
related” cannot be cordoned off—they intersect with a host of other 
problems and concerns.
African societies are far less responsible for climate disruption than 
other nations because they have far lower per-capita energy consump-
tion and greenhouse gas emissions. Sub-Saharan Africa is the poorest 
region on Earth in strict economic terms. However, it is also the world’s 
most profitable investment site because of its abundance of ecological 
wealth critical to the functioning of the global economy. As journalist 
Naomi Klein puts it, “Africa is poor because its investors and its creditors 
are so unspeakably rich.” Many leaders of nongovernmental organiza-
tions in the global South believe that the struggle for climate justice in 
Africa has to be a part of the broader struggle against inequalities that 
reflect the continuing legacies of colonialism.
African Americans
The story of Africa and climate disruption in many ways mirrors the story 
of African American communities. African Americans make up roughly 
12% of the US population and emit far fewer greenhouse gases than 
white Americans. In fact, African Americans produce only 9% of carbon 
dioxide emissions, while whites, who comprise 62% of the population, 
produce 76% of emissions.
African Americans are less responsible for emissions but experience 
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a disproportionate burden of the costs of climate change. For example, 
African Americans are more likely to live in close proximity to coal-fired 
power plants and suffer from greater vulnerability to asthma, heat 
waves, “natural” disasters, food insecurity, and high energy prices—all of 
which are correlated with intensifying climate disruption. In fact, African 
Americans experience climate injustice at nearly every point in the pro-
cess that causes climate change. They are exposed to health risks from 
living near or working in sites of fossil-fuel extraction, refinement, pro-
cessing, combustion, and waste dumping. African Americans are also 
more vulnerable to hurricanes, heat waves, and other so-called natural 
disasters linked to climate disruption. These pressures are intertwined 
and amplified by historic and contemporary racial inequalities with re-
spect to income and wealth, energy expenditures, urban sprawl and 
transportation design, housing, food security, and disaster relief and 
recovery policies.
Climate disruptions are indelibly marked on the bodies and com-
munities of African Americans. The significant public health effects as-
sociated with climate disruption include more deaths from heat waves, 
increases in asthma and other respiratory illnesses, and developmental 
abnormalities, just to name a few. These health effects harm African 
Americans at higher rates than whites, as Robert Bullard and Beverly 
Wright have shown.
Heat waves and other extreme weather events have devastating and 
unequal effects on African Americans. As a result of historical internal 
migrations and the urbanization of the US, most African Americans live 
in cities, which tend to be several degrees warmer than surrounding 
areas. People living in urban centers suffer the most from heat waves. 
Research has shown that people of color are twice as likely as whites to 
die in a heat wave and also suffer more from heat-related stress and ill-
ness. African Americans are also more likely to suffer during heat waves 
because they have less access to heat-adaptive technologies like home 
insulation and air conditioning, as a result of lower levels of income and 
wealth.
Considering these factors, it is no wonder that we see so much 
tragedy in cities across the US facing heat waves. In the 1995 Chicago 
heat wave, for example, African Americans died at a rate 50% higher 
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than whites did. Climate disruption is expected to increase the number 
of heat waves and related deaths in urban areas in the coming years.
Indigenous rights
Indigenous peoples, in particular, face a range of threats from climate 
disruption.
Leaders of Indigenous communities around the globe have been 
clear about the need to recognize Aboriginal peoples’ rights under inter-
national law, their roles as stewards of ecosystems, the inherent value of 
traditional ecological knowledge, and their positions on the front lines 
both of climate change’s impacts and of forging solutions (Figure 2.3.2). 
These leaders demand that the United Nations Declaration on the Rights 
of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP) be fully recognized and respected in 
all decision-making processes and activities related to climate change 
policy at the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). 
This includes rights to Indigenous lands, territories, environment, and 
natural resources, as outlined in Articles 25–30 of UNDRIP.
In 2009, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) 
Figure 2.3.2  Indigenous block at Rise for Climate march, San Francisco, 
September 8, 2018. 350.org. Photograph by Brooke Anderson, Survival Media 
Agency, from Flickr.
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and various tribal college partners held a workshop on climate change, 
Native peoples, and Native homelands in Anchorage, Alaska. The collec-
tive statement that emerged from this gathering—the Anchorage Decla-
ration—included the following:
In order to provide the resources necessary for our collective sur-
vival in response to the climate crisis, we declare our communities, 
waters, air, forests, oceans, sea ice, traditional lands and territories 
to be “Food Sovereignty Areas,” defined and directed by Indigenous 
Peoples according to customary laws, free from extractive indus-
tries, deforestation and chemical-based industrial food produc-
tion systems (i.e. contaminants, agro-fuels, genetically modified 
organisms).
Workshop organizers stated that climate change affects Indigenous 
peoples first and foremost and that solutions must include “shifting the 
energy paradigm so that we develop efficiency and produce our own 
clean energy, and it means growing our own traditional varieties of food. 
It means returning to self-sufficiency by creating energy and food sover-
eignty that can provide a bright future for the generation yet to come.”
The programmatic exploitation of conventional energy resources 
has run a long and often deadly course in Native communities. It also 
has a distinctly colonial flavor: tribes have supplied energy companies 
with access to abundant ecological resources at low prices in contracts 
promoted by the federal government, yet these communities themselves 
are often unserved or underserved by the benefits of such projects. 
Even the most recent federal energy legislation and incentives are still 
designed to encourage the development of tribal resources by outside 
corporate interests without ownership by or financial benefit to the host 
tribes. The fact that the US has yet to sign on to UNDRIP compounds 
this situation.
Gender and climate
Gender inequality has major implications for how people are affected 
by climate disruption, and scholars have discovered important link-
ages among gender, power, and environmental outcomes. According 
to Joane Nagel, the differing social roles that men and women occupy 
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“position them differently in terms of their vulnerability to the impacts 
of climate change, access to resources associated with recovery from 
climate-related disasters, and participation in the political processes that 
shape mitigation and adaptation policies.”
Researchers report that vulnerability to disasters—including those 
associated with climate disruption—is strongly correlated with demo-
graphic factors such as gender. Exposure to heat, hypothermia, and 
waterborne diseases during extreme weather events disproportionately 
affects women. According to United Nations WomenWatch, studies 
predicting population displacements due to climate change anticipate 
uneven and disproportionate effects on women as a result of their 
social position as people who are primary caregivers for children and 
the elderly, have limited land rights and lower social status, depend on 
subsistence agriculture, and work for low or no wages. In addition, 
women frequently face a heightened risk of sexual and domestic vio-
lence when social norms and networks break down in the aftermath of 
natural disasters.
Not only are women frequently affected more severely by climate 
disruption, but they are also routinely excluded from policy discussions 
on disaster planning, mitigation, and response. This exclusion is espe-
cially troubling because the many women who are small farmers in the 
global South have experience and knowledge that could be of great 
value in shaping climate policy. Social scientists Kari Norgaard and Rich-
ard York have demonstrated that nation-states in which women hold a 
larger share of parliamentary seats are more likely to ratify international 
environmental treaties. As noted earlier, those nations where women 
enjoy higher political status also tend to have lower per-capita carbon 
emissions on average. This all adds up to the conclusion that gender 
equality and climate justice are tightly interwoven, so any effort to se-
cure one of these aims will likely be more transformative if it is tied to 
the other.
Chapter 2: Humans, Nature, and the Quest for Climate Justice 2-35
2.4  Major Policy Frameworks
The UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) of 1992 
is “the law of the land” in most countries, including the United States. All 
signatories to the treaty agreed to stabilize greenhouse gas emissions to 
prevent dangerous climate change. The UNFCCC is based on the princi-
ple of equity and common but differentiated responsibilities. Under the 
treaty, global North, or “Annex 1,” nations have committed to taking the 
lead on reducing their own greenhouse gas emissions, assisting global 
South nations with technology transfer to pursue sustainability goals 
there, and supporting climate change adaptation in the global South 
through funding, with the additional goal of poverty reduction.
In the view of many global South community leaders, the UNFCCC 
has been problematic because it relies primarily on market-based ap-
proaches, which present many challenges for achieving carbon emissions 
reductions and climate justice. These policies are rooted in a framework 
that embraces economic growth and social inequality, though these are 
some of the primary driving forces of the climate crisis in the first place.
Another reason these efforts have fallen short is because Indigenous 
peoples, people of color, women, family farmers, fisherfolk, forest- 
dependent communities, youth, and other marginalized communities 
have been systematically excluded from the negotiations. Moreover, 
despite UNFCCC and IPCC goals, there is, thus far, no meaningful mo-
mentum in the global North toward reducing emissions by the targeted 
amounts. In fact, emissions have actually increased in global North na-
tions; large portions of any claimed reductions have been made through 
offsets in the global South rather than through real action in the North. 
While these last two trends are part of the system’s design, many global 
South environmental advocates argue that this is unacceptable.
The Kyoto Protocol supplements the UNFCCC and puts forth legally 
binding measures for reducing emissions in global North nations. Kyoto 
created a number of flexible procedures for meeting emissions targets, 
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two of which are an international emissions trading (IET) scheme for 
Annex 1 nations and the clean development mechanism (CDM). The 
IET is a carbon cap-and-trade scheme on a global scale, but it has not 
achieved success, according to many critics, because it encourages 
“business as usual” practices in many industries that profit most from 
the use of fossil fuels. Numerous leading global South activists have 
concluded that no cap-and-trade scheme can achieve climate justice.
The clean development mechanism was proposed during Kyoto ne-
gotiations in 1997 as a less painful method of capping greenhouse gas 
emissions and assisting nations in their efforts to adapt to new carbon 
constraints. The CDM has two primary goals: to promote sustainable 
development in global South countries and to allow industrialized coun-
tries to earn emissions credits from their investments in emission-re-
ducing projects in the South. The CDM specifically allows global North 
countries to purchase credits from southern nations that reduce carbon 
emissions. Those northern countries can then use or sell those credits 
in the global North. This program has also been the target of criticism 
for numerous reasons. For example, major emitters in the global North 
generally treat buying CDM offsets as a far cheaper alternative to actu-
ally reducing their own emissions or making large capital investments 
in renewable energy technology. In addition, methane recovery from 
industrial agriculture, large hydropower projects, and coal-fired power 
plants can receive credits under the CDM. Emissions reductions credits 
have also been used to expand polluting industries in the global South.
Finally, CDM includes agrofuel or biofuel crop projects that rely on 
industrial-scale agriculture, which has long relied on deforestation and 
cheap fossil fuels, thus threatening biodiversity and food security for 
Indigenous communities in various regions. While the US and European 
governments have embraced agrofuels as a “green” alternative to fos-
sil fuels for automobiles, in many global South nations rain forests are 
threatened in order to make way for agrofuel plantations. Deforesta-
tion disrupts the regulation of climate systems, as do the nitrous oxide 
emissions from chemical fertilizers used in plantation agriculture. The 
biofuels market has also led to an increase in the cost of staple foods 
like corn, sugar, and soy for people in the global South, leading to pop-
ular unrest in Indonesia, Mexico, and many African nations. In Tanzania, 
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thousands of people have been evicted for the development of agrofuel 
plantations.
Critics claim that the problems with the CDM are insurmountable 
because it seeks to reduce emissions in the South and not in the North, 
while we need such reductions in both places. Many observers view the 
CDM’s strategy as unjust, given the historic responsibility on the part 
of the North for the vast majority of carbon emissions. Furthermore, 
CDM projects often create problems in global South communities, such 
as displacing populations from their land, and lock nations into high- 
carbon pathways.
Reducing emissions from deforestation and degradation (REDD) is 
another offsetting mechanism. Devised by the World Bank, it is slated to 
be a key component of any post-Kyoto climate treaty. REDD is intended 
to help global South countries protect their remaining rain forests and 
reduce the greenhouse gas emissions caused by deforestation, forest 
degradation, and peatland destruction. Countries that reduce net REDD 
emissions below a preset baseline would receive credits that could be 
sold in carbon markets and used by purchasing nations to meet their 
international mitigation obligations.
The definition of forests used by the UNFCCC includes clear-cuts, 
which are euphemistically referred to as “temporarily unstocked areas,” 
and monoculture tree plantations—that is, plantations of one species 
of tree, which are much less biodiverse than forests and less useful in 
taking up carbon dioxide. Therefore, a government or logging com-
pany could hypothetically evict an Indigenous community, clear-cut or 
burn down the forest, impose a monoculture plantation, and still re-
ceive REDD money, since that would not count as deforestation. The 
Climate Justice Now! network stated in 2010, “These plantations destroy 
ecosystems and subsistence agriculture, cause rural unemployment and 
depopulation, deplete soils and water resources and violate Indigenous 
Peoples’ rights.” The International Indigenous Peoples’ Forum on Climate 
Change opposes such carbon markets and calls them a new form of 
colonialism, declaring that “under REDD, States and Carbon Traders will 
take more control over our forests.” Other global South activist groups, 
like La Via Campesina, representing activists from more than 36 nations, 
view REDD as a way of privatizing forests.
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Global South activists argue that we need to reduce both defor-
estation and fossil fuel emissions, not trade between them. Hundreds 
of REDD-type projects already exist and have resulted in human rights 
violations and violence against Indigenous peoples.
The Paris Agreement (Accord de Paris) is a global agreement that 
came into force in 2016 and builds on the UNFCCC with the aim of lim-
iting global temperature rise to less than 2°C above preindustrial levels. 
All parties to this agreement are to report regularly on their emissions 
and implementation efforts. One major limitation of the Paris Agreement 
is that it is voluntary and thus has little in the way of an enforcement 
mechanism.
Perhaps even more exciting is the growth of a number of subnational 
agreements to achieve climate stability. One example is the Under2 Coa-
lition, a diverse group of 177 jurisdictions, 37 nations, and 6 continents 
that represents 1.2 billion people and nearly 40% of the global economy. 
Their aim is to achieve the goal of limiting global temperature rise to 
less than 2°C through subnational government action. In other words, 
Figure 2.4.1  Activists pressure universities and other institutions to divest 
from fossil fuels out of a conviction that we cannot wait for national and 
international leaders to address climate change. Fossil-free UC action at the 
Regents of the University of California meeting in Sacramento, May 16, 2014. 
350.org. Photograph by Mauricio D. Castillo from Flickr.
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they are not waiting on heads of state or world leaders to reach con-
sensus—they’re going ahead regardless of what national governments 
do (Figure 2.4.1).
REDD case study: the Ogiek people
A Mau Forest conservation project in Kenya, funded by the United Na-
tions Environment Programme (UNEP), provides an example of a carbon 
offset project that has resulted in serious human rights violations. In 
2009, the Mau Forest was “prepared” for this carbon offset reforesta-
tion project by the forceful and often violent eviction of its inhabitants, 
including the Indigenous Ogiek people, who had lived on their ancestral 
lands in the region for centuries. Prime Minister Raila Odinga argued 
that in order to preserve the forests, the Indigenous inhabitants had 
to be removed; he represented them as a threat to the stability of the 
ecosystem. Following up on the prime minister’s declaration, Kenyan 
President Mwai Kibaki stated, “The government shall take action against 
people who destroy forests. Such people should not be spared at all, 
they should be arrested and charged with immediate effect.” The prime 
minister and the Kenyan Forest Service evicted more than 20,000 Ogiek 
people from their ancestral lands.
The Ogiek have confronted eviction and displacement in the past, 
extending back to the colonial era when, in the 1930s, British authorities 
similarly claimed that they were depleting forest resources needed by 
others. At that time, the Ogiek were forcibly removed to “native re-
serves” while their lands were logged and replaced with pine plantations. 
In the 1990s, the Kenyan government allotted large areas of the Mau 
Forest to friends and associates of elected officials. In 2009, the same 
week that evictions were announced, the government made allotments 
in the region to 49 companies and individuals, and one such company 
has strong ties with former president Daniel Moi. Underscoring this 
observation, Ogiek leaders argued that the displacement order seemed 
to ignore the activities of logging corporations and non- Indigenous set-
tlers moving into the region. Large tracts of the Mau Forest continued 
to be destroyed by corporations turning trees into plywood, doors, 
and other products for export. Survival International condemned the 
eviction of the Ogiek in a statement that read in part, “If evicted from 
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their ancestral land in the misplaced name of conservation, the Ogiek 
will become the world’s next ‘conservation refugees.’”
But UNEP, which has its headquarters in Nairobi, supported the 
government’s plans for the Mau Forest. In September 2009, well after 
the threats of evictions had started, UNEP’s executive director, Achim 
Steiner, was clear in his embrace of the project: “The Mau Complex is 
of critical importance for sustaining current and future ecological, social 
and economic development in Kenya. The rehabilitation of the ecosys-
tem will require substantial resources and political goodwill. UNEP is 
privileged to work in partnership with the Government of Kenya to-
wards the implementation of this vital project.”
In 2017, the Ogiek won a victory: an international court ruled that 
the Kenyan government had violated their ancestral land rights by evict-
ing them from the forest. There is still fear, however, that the govern-
ment may not abide by the ruling. While many observers agree that the 
Mau Forest must be restored, UNEP’s failure to focus on corporate-led 
deforestation there while ignoring the eviction of thousands of people 
to make way for a carbon offset project is troubling for the future of 
REDD programs and the prospects for millions of Indigenous peoples 
and forest-dwelling communities of the world.
As much as the above issues and cases are cause for concern, there 
are success stories as well. For example, The International Small Group 
and Tree Planting Program (TIST) project is a global effort that seeks 
to empower subsistence farmers in East Africa, South Asia, and Latin 
America to reverse the effects of deforestation, drought, and famine. 
Through the sale of greenhouse gas credits, TIST generates revenue 
for farmers and supports sustainable agriculture, tree planting, and 
improvements in public health and education. TIST has over 70,000 
participants organized across numerous small groups of farmers and 
has achieved impressive results (see www.tist.org). Perhaps the lessons 
from this project can be studied and multiplied many times over.
The evidence strongly suggests that major climate policy frameworks 
have failed to deliver, as emissions continue to rise while deforestation, 
evictions, and land grabs intensify. These agreements also suffer from 
a logical and ideological problem: they are premised on the idea that 
market-based, pro-growth solutions are workable, when in fact it was 
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exactly those kinds of approaches that produced the problem of cli-
mate change in the first place. More fundamentally, the vision of infinite 
economic growth in a finite ecological system is a physical impossibility. 
Perhaps part of the problem is that many of the most affected popu-
lations and their visions of climate justice have been excluded from or 
marginalized in debates. Given all of these challenges, what are some 
alternatives?
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2.5   Policy Alternatives, Alternative Visions:  
What Might Climate Justice Look Like?
Addressing climate debt and ecological debt
According to an Ecuadorian nongovernmental organization, Acción 
Ecológica, ecological debt is “the debt accumulated by Northern, in-
dustrial countries toward Third World countries on account of resource 
plundering, environmental damages, and the free occupation of envi-
ronmental space to deposit wastes, such as greenhouse gases, from 
the industrial countries.” One of the leading scholars in the field of eco-
logical debt studies, Joan Martinez-Alier, calculates ecological debt by 
drawing on many variables, such as
nutrients in exports including virtual water, the oil and minerals no 
longer available, the biodiversity destroyed, sulfur dioxide emitted 
by copper smelters, the mine tailings, the harms to health from 
flower exports, the pollution of water by mining, the commercial 
use of information and knowledge on genetic resources, when 
they have been appropriated gratis (“biopiracy”), and agricultural 
genetic resources.
While each of these examples involves the withdrawal of key ecolog-
ical resources from the global South to the global North, Martinez-Alier 
shows that wealthy nations and corporations have also brought numer-
ous threats into local environments in the South, including tons of haz-
ardous chemical wastes.
About a study of global ecological debt that he led, economist 
Richard Norgaard said, “At least to some extent, the rich nations have 
developed at the expense of the poor, and, in effect, there is a debt 
to the poor.” Nongovernmental organizations across Africa and the 
global South—including Jubilee South, the Pan African Climate Justice 
Alliance, the African Peoples Movement on Climate Change, the World 
Council of Churches, Action Aid, Africa Action, and the Third World 
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Network—endorse repayment of ecological debt. Moreover, the World 
Bank acknowledges the problem of ecological debt and its continuing 
and highly unequal effects on the gross domestic product of various 
nations.
Climate debt is a specific type of ecological debt and is best summed 
up in the UNFCCC’s own words: “The largest share of historical and cur-
rent global emissions of greenhouse gases has originated in developed 
countries . . . [and should be redressed] on the basis of equity and in ac-
cordance with their common but differentiated responsibilities.” Many 
scholars and observers believe that addressing climate debt through 
global North nations’ allocation of funds to the South is a path far supe-
rior to carbon trading.
Progressive financing of climate debt would involve transferring con-
siderable resources to the South to account for the historic excessive 
harm that wealthy nations have visited upon the global climate and for 
future ecological-social crises that will likely unfold in the South. Coali-
tions like La Via Campesina have demanded of the UNFCCC that 6% of 
Annex 1 nations’ gross domestic product be allocated to finance actions 
to mitigate the climate crisis in global South countries. On this topic, 
Pablo Solón, the Bolivian ambassador to the United Nations, stated, 
“We are not assigning guilt, merely responsibility. As they say in the US, 
if you break it, you buy it.”
The debate over market-based solutions
For many global South activists, the explicit commitment to economic 
growth in major policy debates around climate disruption is not useful. 
Growth of the global economy means the production and consumption 
of an ever-increasing amount of goods, using an ever-increasing amount 
of energy, mineral, agricultural, and forest resources. For these critics, 
replacing “growth” as the main objective of the economy is a funda-
mental change that must be made to address climate disruption. The 
challenge ahead is to build a new paradigm rooted in meeting human 
needs equitably and sustainably.
Regarding the growth imperative in climate policy, Tom Goldtooth, 
director of the Indigenous Environmental Network, said:
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The climate crisis is rooted in a political and cultural system 
dedicated to economic growth at any cost. Ideas and actions around 
the climate crisis must include a complete transformation away 
from the dominant economic model of incessant and unsustainable 
growth, and social oppression and injustice. . . .  Indigenous peoples’ 
cosmovision and our worldview are concerned of a world that 
privatizes the air, water and commodifies the sacredness of Mother 
Earth. We must de-colonize the atmosphere.
After the UN Climate Change Conference (COP 16) in Cancun in 
2010, the global coalition La Via Campesina declared, “Stop the ten-
dency to convert the grave problems of the climate crisis into business 
opportunities. . . .  Earth cannot be sold!”
There’s another way to think about this. To meet the challenges of 
the climate crisis, we must make consistent, dramatic, and immediate 
reductions in carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gas emissions. If 
those needs are clear, then why would we put so much of our effort into 
a system that is inherently volatile and has never produced consistent, 
sustainable, and dramatic gains over time?
For some global South communities, the market-based approach is 
a significant obstacle to achieving solutions to the climate crisis. These 
groups oppose the dominant policy and cultural framework for address-
ing climate change, which suggests that the best way to save the planet 
from ecological peril is to ensure that someone can make a profit while 
doing it. This logic views ecosystems as commodities and assumes that 
we will truly value things only if they have a price tag on them. On 
one hand, that means that everything can be sold, even if it has great 
cultural, intrinsic, and ecological value to someone who does not want 
it to be sold. On the other hand, it means that places and things with 
rich cultural value can be ignored or destroyed if they do not also enjoy 
high market value.
Many activists in the global South see this kind of unsustainable 
thinking at the core of market logic. If everything only has a value in 
terms of global markets, then what is most important and dear to local 
communities matters much less. This is one of the many problems with 
cap and trade, CDM, and REDD. These policies are implemented by 
officials, corporations, and governments that care not about what local 
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people value, but only about national and international emissions targets 
appearing to be achieved. These policies run the risk of disempowering 
local communities and devaluing their ecosystems because they ignore 
local peoples’ needs.
Speaking to some of these concerns, the US Environmental Protec-
tion Agency’s Acid Rain Program, established under the 1990 Clean Air 
Act amendments, demonstrates how a market-based cap-and-trade pro-
gram might achieve significant results. According to the Office of Man-
agement and Budget, this project has produced significant reductions in 
sulfur dioxide and nitrogen oxide emissions from coal-fired power plants 
in the United States. Nationally prominent advocacy organizations like 
the Environmental Defense Fund support this particular project and the 
general market-based approach as well. Despite this project’s admirable 
success, it is fair to say that carbon is a far more complex substance to 
regulate than sulfur.
Many global South leaders believe that we sorely need to focus 
on protecting the various commons that we all depend on—the land, 
water, air, and climate systems that we share. Activists and organiza-
tions across the global South call for a post-petroleum and post-fossil 
fuel global economy and society that will produce dramatic, immediate, 
and sustainable reductions in carbon emissions.
Community-based social movement responses
Community-based leaders across the global South insist that we focus 
on the root causes—social, environmental, political, and economic—of 
the climate crisis in order to move toward a total systemic transforma-
tion of our societies. There are numerous exciting proposals and visions 
for how to move toward climate justice from scholars and advocates 
from around the world. The following are just a select few:
 ➤ We need to redefine economic growth. A new paradigm is needed, 
one that is rooted in meeting human needs equitably and sustainably.
 ➤ The long-standing and dominant commitment to infinite economic 
growth in major climate policy debates is downright destructive.
 ➤ We need to shift from export-led development policies and prac-
tices in the global South to supporting locally sustainable economies 
everywhere.
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 ➤ Wealthy nations of the global North must also learn to consume 
less and achieve dramatic reductions in carbon emissions without 
offsetting schemes.
 ➤ We should reexamine global trade and investment rules that en-
courage energy-intensive industries that have been proven harmful 
to ecosystems and the climate.
 ➤ Many observers believe that the United States should launch a Green 
New Deal that would feature a carbon tax on the biggest industrial 
polluters, phase out subsidies to high-emissions industries, and pro-
mote increases in public funding for clean technology, renewable 
energy, public transport, and energy efficiency. All of this would 
improve job creation (Figure 2.5.1).
Those are some examples of proposals for climate justice. The fol-
lowing are some instances of actual documents that leaders from the 
climate justice movement and governments have authored to inspire 
people, organizations, and policymakers to implement these kinds of 
changes.
Figure 2.5.1 These posters reflect the struggle for climate justice, 
underscoring links between social equality and environmental protection. 
350.org, UC Davis, 2017. Reproduced from Flickr.
Chapter 2: Humans, Nature, and the Quest for Climate Justice 2-47
The Bali Principles
In 2002, an international coalition of nongovernmental organizations 
drafted and released the Bali Principles of Climate Justice, which seek to 
redefine climate change from a human rights and environmental justice 
perspective. While covering an ambitious range of topics, these princi-
ples make clear that, for many people, the climate issue is a matter of 
life and death and that perhaps its gravest injustice is that those who 
suffer the greatest harm are the least responsible for contributing to the 
problem. The principles consider the causes of climate change and offer 
a far-reaching vision for solutions.
For example, Principle 24 states: “Climate Justice opposes military 
action, occupation, repression and exploitation of lands, water, oceans, 
peoples and cultures, and other life forms, especially as it relates to 
the fossil fuel industry’s role in this respect.” It is well known but rarely 
stated publicly that military organizations and practices require massive 
fossil fuel production and constitute one of the greatest global threats 
to ecological sustainability.
The Bali Principles suggest that any move forward in global climate 
policy must be inclusive of all peoples, especially persons from those 
communities most affected by climate disruption. Principle 12, for ex-
ample, states: “Climate Justice affirms the right of all people, including 
the poor, women, rural and indigenous peoples, to have access to af-
fordable and sustainable energy.” According to Principle 20, “Climate 
Justice recognizes the right to self-determination of Indigenous Peoples, 
and their right to control their lands, including sub-surface land, terri-
tories and resources and the right to the protection against any action 
or conduct that may result in the destruction or degradation of their 
territories and cultural way of life.”
Finally, Principle 11 calls for new ways of producing energy that are 
sustainable and fair: “Climate Justice calls for clean, renewable, locally 
controlled and low-impact energy resources in the interest of a sustain-
able planet for all living things.”
Grassroots global South networks have argued that successes are 
occurring in the struggle for climate justice in local communities around 
the globe where activists are building movements and power for broader 
democratic change. Such efforts have prevented major new industrial 
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carbon emissions by stopping incineration projects, hydropower proj-
ects, coal-fired power plants, oil refineries, and offshore drilling expan-
sion plans. These groups have also embraced efforts to decommission 
carbon markets and promote massive investments in renewable energy, 
public transportation, urban agriculture, and green jobs.
The rights of Mother Earth
Indigenous rights and environmental justice activists argue that we need 
to expand the concept of rights to include nonhuman nature. Their 
central premise is that ecosystems have inherent value and worth—like 
humans, they have a right to exist. These emerging concepts of environ-
mental citizenship decenter human beings and expand the categories of 
“person” and “citizen” themselves.
The draft Universal Declaration of the Rights of Mother Earth, de-
veloped at the World People’s Conference on Climate Change and the 
Rights of Mother Earth in April 2010 in Cochabamba, Bolivia, is an inter-
national framework to ensure a mechanism for the recognition of human 
rights and for the rights of Mother Earth, or Pachamama. An estimated 
35,000 participants from all over the world attended this gathering to 
urge governments to grant enduring and permanent rights to the Earth, 
while claiming that such a practice will improve efforts to ensure the 
rights of the globe’s most vulnerable peoples.
In 2008, Ecuador announced a revised constitution that affords the 
Earth and nature constitutional rights. One passage states that nature 
“has the right to exist, persist, maintain and regenerate its vital cycles, 
structure, functions and its processes in evolution.” The Pennsylvania- 
based Community Environmental Legal Defense Fund assisted Ecuador 
with the revisions to its constitution and has helped draft similar laws in 
several states in the US as well. Its aim in this regard is to create legal 
systems “that change the status of ecosystems from being regarded as 
property under the law to being recognized as rights-bearing entities.”
Taking all of the above ideas into account, we can return to the 
question, What might climate justice look like?
 ➤ Any effort at achieving climate justice will have to focus on the root 
social, ecological, political, and economic causes of the climate 
crisis.
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 ➤ Systemic transformations are needed—hence the slogan “System 
change not climate change.”
 ➤ Solutions rooted in practices that produced the problem make little 
sense. In particular, market-based solutions must be reevaluated 
since pro-growth policies led us down the path toward climate dis-
ruption in the first place.
 ➤ Community action at the local level works to build political power, to 
reduce and prevent carbon emissions, and to promote sustainability.
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2.6  Conclusion
While climate disruption is a global reality, it affects various popula-
tions and nations in significantly disproportionate and uneven ways. 
The movement for climate justice is inseparable from the debate over 
solutions to the climate crisis. From global South communities in Africa 
to African American communities, individuals and organizations have 
demonstrated against climate injustices and have offered visions for 
ways to mitigate and reverse this problem. The question on many peo-
ple’s minds is whether those nations and institutions most responsible 
for contributing to the climate crisis are willing to take these communi-
ties and their ideas seriously.
This chapter is intended to raise questions that might inform the 
policy debate and action around climate disruption and climate justice. 
Toward that end, we urge you to consider the following questions:
 ➤ How can we work with and empower community-based social 
movements to change the discourse and policymaking around cli-
mate disruption?
 ➤ How can we bring a deeper understanding of social inequalities and 
social justice to climate change debates?
 ➤ What are some alternatives to market-based solutions in the climate 
change debate, and how can we promote them?
 ➤ What might climate justice look like?
To sum up, climate justice and climate injustice are key concepts 
that every informed person should be familiar with because they are 
at the core of both how the problem of climate change developed and 
how we must address this challenge.
In short, we cannot understand and confront climate change with-
out attention to social inequality. Profits derived from stolen Indigenous 
lands and the labor of enslaved African people powered the Industrial 
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Revolution, which set the world on a course toward today’s intensive 
use of fossil fuels. That is, racism and the conquest of people and eco-
systems led to climate disruption in the first place. Justice is not a side 
issue.
Finally, grassroots social change movements are critical for pushing 
dialogue and action forward in order to imagine and realize climate 
justice. How do we build those kinds of movements? Luckily, they’re all 
around us, and they are filled with everyday people like you and me. If 
you’re already involved in that kind of work, keep it up, step it up, and 
do so in ways that are peaceful, respectful, and nonviolent. And if you’re 
not yet involved in that kind of work, the door is wide open and the 
climate justice movement welcomes you. But we also encourage you to 
devise new and even more creative ways of thinking about and acting to 
solve our climate challenges. Thank you for reading this chapter, and all 
the best of luck.
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Learning Objectives
1. Identify the direct and indirect ways that climate change can affect 
health.
2. Describe how fossil fuels can cause injury, disease, and death.
3. Discuss solutions that protect health, and address both fossil fuels 
and climate change.
4. Assess your local community’s vulnerability to climate change.
Overview
Climate change will cause widespread harm to public health, unraveling 
many of the health gains of the last century. Climate change will affect 
everyone, and it will increasingly manifest as violent extremes, ranging 
from heat waves to fires, storms, and floods. Climate-related events 
will have direct effects on human health but will also result in a cascade 
of indirect health effects through population displacement, increased 
conflict over resources, and mental health problems (Figure 3.1.1). 
All people will be affected, but the burden of harm will fall dispropor-
tionately on the poorest communities, the disabled, the very young, 
and the elderly, both in the US and globally. Climate change is a threat 
multiplier, in that it worsens preexisting individual and societal vulnera-
bilities. Building resilience to climate change requires strengthening our 
public health system, our physical infrastructure, and our social support 
systems. Rapid action to reduce greenhouse gases by reducing our de-
pendence on fossil fuels has the potential to improve the quality of life 
for everyone.
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3.1   Climate Change, Health, and Vulnerable 
Populations
The health effects of climate change are already occurring globally and 
are predicted to become devastating by midcentury if significant green-
house gas reductions do not occur. Illnesses and deaths from climate 
change will vary widely across the globe based on geographic, eco-
nomic, and individual factors. The Lancet Countdown: Tracking Progress 
on Health and Climate Change has summarized the health effects of 
climate change and is tracking them over time. In order to save lives, it is 
critical to understand the general relationships between climate change 
and health and to learn to predict how these general relationships will 
play out in a local community. The burning of fossil fuels causes climate 
change and also causes other direct human health consequences, so 
there can be direct and immediate health benefits from taking action 
today to stop and reverse climate change.
The most direct effect from climate change is from heat. Average 
temperatures are rising globally, and dangerous extreme heat events—
“heat waves”—will become increasingly common. Extremes of heat have 
increased significantly since 1990 in every region of the world, with 
157 million more people exposed to heat wave events in 2017 than 
in 2000. Increased heat increases energy and turbulence in the Earth’s 
atmosphere. This energy can manifest as dramatic weather fluctuations, 
including extreme droughts and violent storms. In 2017, a total of 712 
extreme weather events resulted in $326 billion in economic losses, 
almost triple the total losses of 2016.
Most of the health effects from climate change are a direct or indi-
rect result of high heat and weather extremes. For example, oscillation 
from extremely wet to extremely hot and dry increases the risk of fire. 
This is because vegetation grows rapidly in unusually wet periods and 
dies in subsequent drought. If hot, windy conditions follow, the dead 
brush ignites easily and fuels large firestorms. As another example, heat 
increases the risk of infectious disease outbreaks, both because certain 
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species of mosquitoes and ticks can survive warmer winters and be-
come established in areas where they could not previously live, and 
because warmer temperatures encourage bacteria and parasites to 
proliferate, resulting in outbreaks of food-borne and waterborne illness. 
Storms, floods, and droughts all contribute indirectly or directly to food 
and water scarcity, population displacement, conflict, and mental health 
issues (Table 3.1.1).
Ultimately, some areas will be inundated because of sea level rise; 
other areas will face increasing challenges from drought-associated 
food and water shortages; still other areas will encounter river flooding, 
outbreaks of vector-borne disease, and increased agricultural pest pres-
sures, resulting in more intensive pesticide use and higher crop losses. 
In some countries, these events will lead to increased conflicts over 
remaining resources, population displacement and migration, an over-
strained public health system, and general social disruption. Even politi-
cally stable countries will be stressed by internally displaced populations 
and an influx of refugees and migrants. Experience from such events, 
Figure 3.1.1 Health effects of climate change. Reproduced from Centers for 
Disease Control and Prevention.
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Table 3.1.1 Summary of health effects from climate change
Climate-Related 
Stressor
Climate-Related 
Causes
Secondary  
Effects
Health  
Effects
Heat Overall warming Extreme heat days
Ozone smog pollution
Reduced work capacity
Heat-related illness
Respiratory illnesses
Economic stress
Drought Shifts in rainfall 
patterns
Reduced agricultural 
yield
Food scarcity
Malnutrition
Population displacement
Fire Shifts in rainfall 
patterns
Smoke (particulate 
matter)
Property damage
Death
Respiratory illnesses
Cardiovascular illnesses
Population displacement
Mental health effects
Increased 
weed pollen
Higher CO2 levels
Overall warming
More weeds and 
invasive plant species
Worsened allergies and 
asthma
Sea level rise Melting of 
Antarctic and 
Greenland ice 
Coastal flooding
Property damage
Population displacement
Drownings
Mental health effects
Extreme 
weather 
events
Increased atmo-
spheric energy
Warming of 
oceans
Coastal and river 
flooding
Property damage
Drinking water 
contamination
Mold growth
Population displacement
Drownings
Diarrheal disease 
Respiratory and skin 
disease
Chemical contamination
Mental health effects
Vector-borne 
disease
Overall warming
Shifts in rainfall 
patterns
Mosquito- and tick-
borne illnesses shifting 
north and to higher 
elevations
Malaria, dengue fever, 
Zika, chikungunya, Lyme 
disease, and emerging 
illnesses
Algal blooms Overall warming
Runoff from 
heavy rains
Marine mammal and 
bird die-offs
Fishery contamination 
and loss
Diarrheal disease
Neurological disease
Economic stress
Malnutrition
Source: Watts, N., et al. 2018. The 2018 report of the Lancet Countdown on health and 
climate change: shaping the health of nations for centuries to come. Lancet 392(10163), 
2479–2514. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0140-6736(18)32594-7; Mora, C., et al. 2018. 
Broad threat to humanity from cumulative climate hazards intensified by greenhouse gas 
emissions. Nature Climate Change 8, 1062–1071. https://doi.org/10.1038/s41558-018-0315-6.
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both in the United States and globally, has shown that the people most 
likely to suffer and die include the poorest segments of society, the very 
young, the elderly, and the disabled. The health effects in general will be 
more severe in poorer countries, placing the worst health burdens on 
those who contributed least to creating the problem.
Health effects of heat
Extreme heat, the most direct effect of global warming, causes large 
numbers of deaths and severe illnesses, depending on the intensity and 
duration of the heat event. Extreme heat events are projected to con-
tinue to increase significantly in the United States and worldwide (Figure 
3.1.2). Those most likely to die or require emergency hospitalization 
include the elderly, infants, pregnant women, outdoor workers, and 
people with a range of underlying health conditions. Major increases 
in deaths, hospitalizations, and emergency room visits always occur 
during heat waves, but even during a non-heat-wave period there are 
clearly documented associations between increased temperatures and 
a range of health problems. It has been documented in many countries 
that hospital and emergency room visits increase with increased heat, 
including from respiratory disease, emphysema, heart disease, heart 
attack, stroke, diabetes, renal failure, intestinal infections, heat stroke, 
dehydration, hypertension, and asthma. Studies have also shown that 
for every increase of temperature by 10°F there is a nearly 9% increase 
in preterm births.
People exposed to heat can sometimes cool off and rehydrate at 
night, but if the nights remain hot, there is no opportunity for recovery. 
Urban areas with extensive paved surfaces are also high-risk zones. Dark 
pavement and roofing absorbs heat and results in temperatures that are 
several degrees hotter than nearby tree-shaded or grassy areas. This 
phenomenon, known as the urban heat island effect, can be mitigated 
by lighter-colored roofing material, street trees, and parks. Unfortu-
nately many inner-city communities lack natural cooling resources such 
as trees and parks. A national analysis in the US found significant racial 
and ethnic disparities in heat-risk-related land cover of neighborhoods, 
even after adjusting for other factors that influence tree growth. Lack 
of access to air conditioning is also correlated with risks of heat-related 
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illness and death. One study using heat wave data from Chicago, Detroit, 
Minneapolis, and Pittsburgh found that African Americans had a 5.3% 
higher risk of heat-related mortality than Caucasians and that 64% of this 
disparity was potentially attributable to disparities in air conditioning.
Heat reduces work productivity, especially in active outdoor jobs. 
The 2018 Lancet Countdown estimated that 153 billion hours of work 
were lost in 2017 because of excessive heat, an increase of 62 billion 
hours lost relative to 2000. Lack of acclimatization to heat is an impor-
tant risk factor. Workers in hot environments are most likely to develop 
heat-related illness during their first 2 weeks on the job. Research has 
shown that people living in normally cooler areas tend to be more 
susceptible to health effects from heat waves. As one example, during 
the 2006 California heat wave, the greatest increase in emergency de-
partment visits occurred in the normally cooler coastal cities. This phe-
nomenon is probably both because fewer buildings are air- conditioned 
in these areas, and because people there are less physiologically accli-
mated to heat.
Figure 3.1.2 Increase in summer heat wave days over time. Reproduced from 
NOAA. 
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Health effects of air pollution
Heat increases the atmospheric conversion of air pollution from gaso-
line and diesel exhaust into ozone smog. Thus the health threat on hot 
days stems both from heat itself and from ground-level ozone pollution 
that can cause respiratory and cardiac damage. Ozone is created from 
other pollutants such as volatile organic compounds (VOCs) and nitro-
gen oxides that are emitted from industrial sources, power plants, cars, 
and trucks (Figure 3.1.3). These chemicals are transformed by sunlight 
in a chemical reaction that breaks down oxygen in the air and results in 
ozone formation. Heat dramatically speeds up this chemical reaction. 
As the ambient temperature rises, ground-level ozone levels also rise. 
Ozone in the upper atmosphere is beneficial because it protects us 
from the damaging ultraviolet rays of the sun. But ground-level ozone 
is extremely toxic to our lungs. Ozone in the lower atmosphere is also 
known as smog because it creates a gray-brown haze that looks like a 
combination of smoke and fog.
The health effects of inhaled ozone include cough, difficulty 
Figure 3.1.3 Complex mix of air pollution from a power plant. Slide by Gina 
Solomon.
3-10 Chapter 3: Climate Change and Human Health
breathing, chest pain, decreased lung function, and asthmatic symptoms. 
These symptoms send people to the emergency department with acute 
illness. Over time, ozone can also cause significant long-term damage to 
airways, affecting the white blood cells that protect our lungs.
Warmer weather conditions with higher concentrations of carbon 
dioxide (CO2) in the air also foster the growth of allergenic weeds such 
as ragweed. Studies in greenhouses with carefully controlled atmo-
spheric composition have shown that air slightly enriched in CO2, at 
concentrations we expect to see due to climate change within the next 
few decades, causes ragweed to grow more lushly; worse, the plants 
produce about three times more pollen. That extra airborne pollen will 
seriously worsen the suffering of individuals with pollen allergies. These 
findings suggest an increase in health challenges associated with nui-
sance symptoms such as hay fever, as well as more serious conditions 
such as asthma.
In addition to ozone pollution and allergens, particulate matter is 
also a threat to health. Particulate matter is discussed in more detail 
below, since it is produced in massive quantities from wildfire smoke 
and also from the combustion of petroleum and coal—the same sources 
that produce most of the carbon dioxide in the atmosphere.
Health effects of wildfires
A warming climate places enormous stress on many species of trees 
as weather conditions become too warm and either too wet or too 
dry for the climate to which the trees are adapted. Stressed trees are 
much more susceptible to fungal infestations, and bark beetles have 
been decimating the conifer forests of the western United States. Dead 
trees create conditions that are ideal for massive wildfires. In Decem-
ber 2017, the US Forest Service estimated that there were 129 million 
dead trees in California, mostly due to drought and bark beetle infesta-
tion. Drought conditions in numerous countries around the world are 
similarly fueling fires in places ranging from Australia and Indonesia to 
Canada. Rainy conditions that may follow a drought come too late to 
save the trees, but rain results in fast growth (and subsequent dieback) 
of grasses and shrubs that provide kindling to start massive wildfires. 
Wildfires are a natural part of forest cycles, but the fires that occur with 
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climate change are intense firestorms that cover vast areas, burn so 
hot that they destroy everything in their path, and damage ecosystems 
while they threaten humans. In rural areas, fast-moving wildfires can 
burn down homes and destroy communities. In recent fires, deaths have 
occurred among both emergency responders and local residents when 
they were unable to escape from the path of the fire or their escape 
route was cut off.
The health effects of wildfire smoke are similar to the health effects 
of other particulate matter (PM) in the air (Figure 3.1.4). The small 
particles (known as PM2.5 because they are less than 2.5 micrometers 
in diameter) are less visible but more dangerous. These particles cause 
lung inflammation that results in impaired function, cough, phlegm, 
bronchitis, worsened asthma, heart attacks, heart failure, and prema-
ture death. These effects especially occur in people with underlying 
health conditions, such as heart disease, lung disease, and asthma. Even 
healthy people can be sickened when wildfire smoke is severe, leading 
to decreased exercise tolerance, cough, sore throat, and eye irritation. 
Smoke from large fires can cover areas of hundreds of square miles and 
can affect entire cities or even entire states for periods of time that can 
range from days to months.
Figure 3.1.4 Health effects of air pollution. Reproduced from Public Health 
England.
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Health effects of flooding
Although it is difficult to pin any single weather event on climate change, 
climate models show that extreme weather fluctuations increase as the 
Earth warms. For example, rain is more likely to fall in large amounts 
when it does occur, leading to increased risk of flooding. Sea level rise 
will result in inundation of low-lying coastal areas, especially during high 
tides and storm surges. Hurricanes are projected to become more pow-
erful as a result of warming waters in the Atlantic and the Gulf of Mex-
ico. The combination of major storms and sea level rise will predictably 
result in both coastal and river flooding, both in the US and worldwide.
When Hurricane Florence flooded the Carolinas in 2018, not only 
did people lose their lives, but there were enormous health implica-
tions, both immediately and in the longer term. Hurricane Florence was 
considered a “1,000-year storm,” but such storm events will no longer 
be rare in the future, as what is now considered an unusual or extreme 
storm will become a relatively frequent occurrence.
Fifteen percent of all deaths related to natural disasters are due to 
floods. People who are disabled or elderly are often less able to evacu-
ate before a major storm. In some floods, nursing homes and hospitals 
are inundated, leaving elderly and sick people in miserable conditions, 
without adequate care. In the flooding after Hurricanes Katrina, Sandy, 
and Maria, emergency generators at medical facilities failed, and oxygen 
supplies, respirators, heart monitors, and all other advanced medical 
systems stopped functioning, as did air conditioners and lighting. Con-
ditions in these facilities were horrific, and many people suffered and 
died in the days and weeks following these storms.
Flood waters are often contaminated with sewage and chemicals, 
resulting in gastrointestinal illnesses and skin diseases after contact. 
After people’s homes are flooded and the waters recede, it looks like the 
contents of the home have been picked up and swirled around in a huge 
blender. The walls grow a thick carpet of black and brown mold over 
mud and scum (Figure 3.1.5). Testing in flooded homes reveals high air-
borne levels of mold and endotoxin, which are extremely dangerous to 
people’s health. Endotoxin is produced by certain kinds of gram- negative 
bacteria that thrive in damp conditions; it can cause respiratory dis-
tress, low blood pressure, and shock. Mold can cause allergic reactions, 
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asthma, and other health problems. For these reasons, returning home 
to sift through personal belongings can be dangerous and requires res-
pirators, protective coveralls, and gloves.
Floods also cause massive destruction of residential and commercial 
structures, making neighborhoods completely uninhabitable. There can 
also be damage to oil and gas pipelines, water mains, roads, sewage 
treatment plants, and other infrastructure that creates contamination 
across the entire landscape. Industrial facilities, hazardous waste sites, 
and petroleum storage tanks may rupture in the flood and spread toxic 
contamination into the mud and soil, both outdoors and inside the 
flooded homes. Testing in New Orleans after the 2005 flood from Hurri-
canes Katrina and Rita revealed toxic petroleum chemicals, heavy metals 
such as lead and arsenic, and pesticides in the sediment that was left 
behind from the flooding. All of these issues need to be addressed in the 
Figure 3.1.5 Flooded homes after Hurricane Katrina, New Orleans, 2005. 
Photographs by Gina Solomon. 
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cleanup, and they pose hazards to returning residents and to cleanup 
workers.
Floods cause massive population displacement and homelessness. 
Some people can evacuate the area and stay elsewhere with family or 
friends, at least for a while. Others have no place to go and must be 
housed in temporary shelters, sometimes for months. The large num-
bers of displaced people need food, water, and health care. Evacuees 
with underlying chronic diseases frequently experience exacerbations 
of their illness, often from lack of essential medications. For example, 
diabetics who don’t have their insulin, people with seizure disorders, 
and people with severe psychiatric illnesses are all at high risk of seri-
ous and sometimes life-threatening exacerbations. Family and commu-
nity structures and daily routines are completely disrupted, leading to 
depression, anxiety, post-traumatic stress disorder, and confusion for 
many people, especially the elderly. Rates of suicide almost always spike 
after hurricanes and floods.
Infectious diseases
Flooding causes obvious immediate risks of injury and death but also 
can impair drinking water quality by increasing runoff of contaminants 
into surface water sources. Runoff of soil and sediment into rivers and 
streams can lead to growth of parasites in the water, especially Crypto-
sporidium and Giardia. Both of these parasites can cause severe diarrhea 
and especially severe illness in people with immunosuppression. The 
combination of extreme rainfall and a malfunction at a drinking water 
treatment facility is the most likely set of factors that can lead to a major 
outbreak of one of these parasitic diseases.
Increased heat from climate change is another factor that substan-
tially increases the risk of infectious disease spread. The combination of 
warmer conditions and altered rainfall patterns can lead to ponding of 
warm, stagnant water—conditions ideal for the life cycle of numerous 
pests, including the mosquitoes that carry diseases ranging from malaria 
and yellow fever to dengue fever and chikungunya.
As one example, the Aedes albopictus mosquito—known as the Asian 
tiger mosquito—came into Southern California in a shipment of imported 
ornamental “lucky money trees” (Pachira aquatica) from Asia in the early 
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2000s. It entered Texas at about the same time in shipments of used 
tires. Aedes albopictus and a similar mosquito known as Aedes aegypti 
are both relatively new to the United States but have been spreading 
northward rapidly (Figure 3.1.6). In the past, these species would not 
have survived the winters in temperate climates, but their range has 
been steadily extending northward as a result of the warming climate. In 
the tropics, the range of these pests is extending to higher elevations in 
mountainous areas, exposing new populations to threat. For example, 
the highlands of sub-Saharan Africa had a 27.6% rise in the potential for 
transmission of malaria from 1950 to 2017 due to warming. The Aedes 
mosquitoes are hard to avoid, because they prefer to prey on humans, 
they bite during the day, and they breed in little pools of water, such as 
in plant pots, abandoned tires, kiddie pools, bird baths, and other items 
that lie around collecting water in many people’s yards.
Aedes mosquitoes are capable of transmitting a variety of diseases 
that weren’t previously thought to occur in the United States and that 
are not carried by local mosquitos, including dengue fever, chikungunya, 
Figure 3.1.6 Habitat suitability for disease-carrying mosquitoes in the United 
States. Reproduced from Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. 
Not suitable for either Ae. aegypti or Ae. albopictus
Suitable for only Ae. aegypti
Suitable for only Ae. albopictus
Suitable for both Ae. aegypti and Ae. albopictus
Habitat suitability
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and zika virus. Zika caused a well-publicized epidemic in South America 
and raised public fears because it can cause microcephaly—a devastat-
ing birth defect—in infants when women are exposed during pregnancy. 
Zika was also detected in southern Florida in 2016 and has become 
endemic to the area since that time.
Dengue is nicknamed breakbone fever because people who have it 
feel like their bones are breaking. The illness is characterized by severe 
headaches, generalized aches and pains, high fevers, and total loss of 
appetite with nausea and vomiting. The symptoms of chikungunya are 
similar, with high fever and body aches; this disease entered Italy in 2007 
and recurred in 2017 after a decade’s hiatus.
Lyme disease and other fevers that include rash and arthritis are 
spread by ticks. The populations of ticks that carry these diseases are 
moving northward into Canada. Agricultural pests and invasive plant and 
animal species are also moving around the globe as a consequence of air 
travel and trade. When invasive species arrive in an area, they can out-
compete local plants, animals, or insects and may thrive in the warmer 
conditions brought by a changing climate. One reason that agricultural 
pests and invasive species are important is that they can be enormously 
destructive to native species and to local food crops; the other reason 
they are important is that they can result in major increases in pesticide 
use to fight them. Many pesticides are associated with serious human 
health risks, ranging from neurological toxicity, to reproductive effects, 
to cancer.
Food-borne diseases are also a concern with climate change. Many 
people are familiar with Salmonella and E. coli food poisoning outbreaks. 
Warming conditions are ideal for bacterial species, since bacteria pro-
liferate far more rapidly as temperatures increase. Several species of 
Vibrio cause severe skin diseases after water contact, and severe gas-
trointestinal illness from consumption of contaminated shellfish. Vibrio 
shellfish poisoning has now moved into the cool waters off Alaska during 
summer seasons.
Harmful algal blooms and health
Harmful algal blooms (HABs)—sometimes called red tides—are another 
health threat associated with climate change. The combination of 
Chapter 3: Climate Change and Human Health 3-17
nitrogen- and phosphorus-rich water and heat creates conditions ideal 
for the explosion of small marine organisms and algae. The nutrients are 
often contributed by fertilizer runoff in rain events, resulting in pollution 
of lakes and coastal waters. Explosions of algal growth are toxic to fishes 
and amphibians because the oxygen levels in the water drop to dan-
gerously low levels. HABs are doubly dangerous because they produce 
toxins that can directly poison creatures that are in contact with the 
water. In many cases, HABs are quite visible, creating greenish, blue, or 
red material on the surface of the water. In some cases, the problem is 
less visible, thereby failing to alert people to the danger.
HABs often result in major die-offs of aquatic species, including 
fishes, birds, and marine mammals. Dogs and livestock that drink from, 
or swim in, contaminated water are also at high risk of death. People 
can be affected in some cases from skin contact with the contaminated 
water, or inhalation of ocean spray. In most cases, however, people 
are poisoned from contaminated seafood. The symptoms of HAB poi-
soning vary depending on the organism. Brevetoxins, most commonly 
associated with “red tides” off the Florida coast, are respiratory toxins 
when inhaled, leading to asthmatic symptoms even in those who do not 
Figure 3.1.7 Increase in reported harmful algal bloom events over time. 
Reproduced from NOAA.
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have asthma. Cyanobacteria, known as blue-green algae, are found in 
freshwater as well as in salt water. They produce toxins such as micro-
cystin that affect the liver and gastrointestinal tract, causing vomiting, 
diarrhea, and sometimes fatal liver failure. Some of these toxins are also 
potential carcinogens. Other categories of HAB toxins affect the ner-
vous system. Most of these toxins affect humans through consumption 
of contaminated shellfish. For this reason, the names of the diseases 
include “paralytic shellfish poisoning,” “neurotoxic shellfish poisoning,” 
and “amnestic shellfish poisoning.”
Amnestic shellfish poisoning is caused by domoic acid, which is pro-
duced by a microscopic diatom in the genus Pseudo-nitzchia. This organ-
ism grows explosively in salt water when there is nutrient pollution from 
runoff and when the ocean gets warm, but it does not cause a visible 
bloom like a red tide. Shellfish, including clams, mussels, oysters, and 
crabs, consume the organism and do not die. Instead, they sequester 
large quantities of the toxin in their bodies, poisoning anything that eats 
them.
Domoic acid is neurotoxic, causing seizures and death in marine 
mammals and birds. The first sign of an offshore bloom is marine mam-
mals washing up on the beaches: sea otters, sea lions, seals, whales. 
The toxin also affects humans. Symptoms start quickly, within 24 hours 
after ingesting contaminated shellfish. Initially it seems like any other 
food-borne illness, with nausea, vomiting, diarrhea, and abdominal pain. 
Then the neurological symptoms begin, including headache, dizziness, 
weakness, seizures, and changes in mental status. And ultimately, for 
those people who do recover, some develop anterograde memory loss, 
which means that from the time of the illness onward, they are not able 
to retain memories. These people classically can’t remember what they 
had for breakfast that morning, even though they have clear memories 
of their lives prior to the poisoning event. The treatment is supportive 
care. There is no antidote.
The first reported outbreak of amnestic shellfish poisoning was in 
1987 in Prince Edward Island, Canada. Three people died in that out-
break, and over 100 people suffered permanent neurological effects. 
Since that time, the US, Canada, the European Union, and numerous 
other countries have put in place programs to monitor seafood and 
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attempt to ensure that scientists detect domoic acid and other HABs 
before people become ill. The California Dungeness crab fishery was 
shut down for the entire 2015 season because of domoic acid contam-
ination, resulting in enormous economic losses but also saving many 
lives and preventing severe debilitating illness.
Health and social inequality
Climate change has a disproportionate impact on vulnerable and socially 
marginalized populations. Globally, those countries most threatened by 
the risks of global warming are generally the ones that have the fewest 
resources to respond and protect themselves; these are also the same 
countries that are least responsible for climate pollution. According to 
the World Health Organization (WHO), diarrhea, malaria, malnutrition, 
and heat stress are the top causes of death worldwide associated with 
climate change. WHO estimates that the direct health costs of climate 
change will be approximately $2.4 billion per year within the next few 
decades.
Within wealthy countries such as the United States, poor communi-
ties are at greatest risk of harm. Researchers have developed the term 
the climate gap to describe the disproportionate affect of climate change 
on people of color and the poor. Risk to any community or individual 
is a function of hazard multiplied by vulnerability. Hazard in this context 
could include any climate stressor such as living in an urban heat island 
or in a floodplain. Vulnerability describes the ability to anticipate, cope 
with, resist, and recover from a stressor, such as a heat wave or flood. 
Both hazards and vulnerabilities are often greater in poor communities 
of color, resulting in greater overall risks of harm.
Climate change also exacerbates social inequality by increasing costs 
for basic necessities such as food and water. Insurance rates in flood 
and fire zones also rise, resulting in a higher proportion of uninsured or 
underinsured individuals in poor communities. Despite the burdens on 
the poor and on communities of color, however, studies have shown 
that such communities are more inclined to support strong government 
action to reduce greenhouse gas emissions.
The State of California has taken an innovative approach to ad-
dressing climate change and social inequality. Over a billion dollars of 
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funding from the state auctions of carbon credits has been allocated 
to disadvantaged communities for projects to improve rail and other 
public transit, transit-oriented development, affordable housing, bike 
lanes and sidewalks, agricultural land preservation, rebate programs for 
zero-emission vehicles, weatherization programs for low-income com-
munities, urban forestry, and fire risk reduction. In addition to reducing 
greenhouse gases, these investments bring jobs into disadvantaged 
communities, create local conditions that promote health, and help re-
dress environmental injustices. This program has the potential to serve 
as a model for a way to use a market-based greenhouse gas cap-and-
trade program to generate funds that serve to also address principles of 
health and climate justice.
Direct health threats from fossil fuels
Fossil fuels, including coal, oil, and natural gas, continue to be the main 
sources of energy in our global economy. These energy sources fuel 
power plants, providing us with electricity; they fuel our automobiles 
and trucks; and they fuel our industrial sector, producing plastics, 
chemicals, cement, and consumer products. Fossil fuels also are used in 
agriculture to make fertilizer, pesticides, and all the equipment used to 
grow, harvest, and process food.
Fossil fuels have direct health effects at every stage of their production 
and use. Coal mining, oil drilling, and hydraulic fracturing (“fracking”) for 
oil and gas cause emissions of toxic chemicals to air and water, as well 
as occasional dramatic disasters, ranging from worker fatalities in mine 
collapses, explosions, or fires, to massive spills such as the 2010 Deep-
water Horizon BP oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico. Transport of these fuels 
is beset with pipeline leaks, rail disasters including explosions, and spills 
from ocean tankers. Processing of fossil fuels at refineries affects local 
communities on a daily basis with air pollution that includes known human 
carcinogens such as benzene and formaldehyde, asthma-causing chemi-
cals like nitrogen oxides, and reproductive toxicants. Worse still, the highly 
flammable mixtures under high pressures and temperatures at refineries 
can result in explosions and fires, sometimes killing workers or sending 
hundreds or even thousands of local residents to emergency departments.
Combustion of fossil fuels results in release of carbon dioxide, the 
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greenhouse gas that has the longest atmospheric life and is the greatest 
contributor to climate change. Other air pollutants released when fossil 
fuels are burned include particulate matter, benzene, other volatile or-
ganic compounds that can be transformed into ozone, and heavy metals 
such as mercury. Harmful chemicals such as sulfur oxides and nitrogen 
oxides are also released.
Particulate matter is a special concern; black carbon particles small 
enough to be inhaled deep into our lungs are released from power 
plants, refineries, many industrial facilities, diesel engines, diesel gen-
erators, and many other sources. Particulate matter has serious ef-
fects on our hearts and lungs—it increases death rates by increasing 
arrhythmias (abnormal heartbeats), causing abnormal clotting in blood 
vessels, worsening bronchitis, triggering asthma attacks, and causing 
strokes and heart attacks. In 2015, particulate matter from fossil fuel 
combustion was responsible for 2.9 million premature deaths, with coal 
burning being responsible for more than 16% of these deaths. Black 
carbon particles from coal or diesel exhaust contain high concentrations 
of cancer-causing chemicals known as polycyclic aromatic hydrocarbons 
(PAHs), which over time can lead to lung cancer and other cancers.
Poor people of color are more greatly affected by the fossil fuel 
industry, from the points of production near refineries, to the points 
of emission near power plants, major roadways, ports, rail yards, and 
airports. An analysis of the demographic patterns of exposure to par-
ticulate matter and nitrogen oxides from power plants and petroleum 
refineries found that minorities are more likely than non-Hispanic whites 
to live near these facilities, even when the analysis controlled for house-
hold income.
Assessing local risk from climate change
As we live our daily lives, it’s easy to ignore the dangers around us. 
Many people think that the scenes they see on television or in the news-
papers couldn’t happen to their own community. It is hard to imagine 
how our own communities would look after a devastating fire, storm, 
or flood. In fact, most communities are at risk from climate change in 
the coming years and decades. The way to protect ourselves is to open 
our eyes to the hazards and vulnerabilities in our communities and to 
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prepare, so if disaster does occur, we can protect both ourselves and 
others around us.
The steps to assessing local risk include first identifying the hazards. 
For example, low-lying areas may be at risk of flooding, especially if 
they are in the potential path of coastal storm surge or river flooding. 
However, the widespread flooding in September of 2018 after Hurricane 
Florence in North and South Carolina included low-lying areas simply in-
undated by heavy rainfall. Areas along the urban-wildland interface may 
face a high risk of catastrophic fire. Highly urbanized neighborhoods 
without much tree cover may be at particular risk from extreme heat 
events, especially if many people lack air conditioning or in the event of 
a power failure. Coastal and lake areas face the potential for HAB events, 
and warmer, wetter zones have higher risk of mosquito-borne disease 
outbreaks. Identifying local hazards from climate change can help create 
plans to either reduce those hazards or to prepare for a potential event.
Local vulnerabilities can also be assessed at any scale, from a single 
family to an entire state. For example, identifying the presence and lo-
cations of elderly or disabled people who may need extra assistance in 
the event of an evacuation, or who may be more vulnerable to heat, can 
help ensure that those people receive the assistance they need. Schools, 
day care centers, hospitals, nursing homes, and other facilities that can 
be difficult to evacuate are also critical to locate. Such facilities should 
have extensive plans for preparing and responding to disasters.
In climate catastrophes, relatively few people will die in the immedi-
ate event. The main brunt of the illnesses and deaths occurs in the after-
math, when the effectiveness of the response and recovery is critical to 
determining the outcome for many people. For example, if people with 
underlying illnesses or acute injuries are able to access timely medical 
care, they may avoid serious outcomes. Mental health services, reloca-
tion services, housing, food, safe drinking water, and social support are 
all essential components for recovery.
Ultimately we will need to make very difficult decisions as a society. 
For example, rebuilding homes and communities after flooding may be 
seen as an increasingly unwise investment of resources. Adequately pro-
tecting against sea level rise or flooding is a very expensive effort, and 
it can realistically be done only in limited areas. Strategies to reduce the 
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risk of wildfire are also evolving, as people realize that fire suppression is 
ultimately bound to fail, and as massive tree die-offs occur from drought 
and pest infestations. Yet optimal forest management is controversial 
and complex.
Reducing climate vulnerability
The interconnections between climate change, health, and justice sug-
gest the importance of incorporating co-benefits into climate mitigation 
policy to ensure that solutions leverage improvements in community 
health while advancing climate justice. Linking social equity, health, and 
sustainability goals in environmental policy can mobilize key constituen-
cies to address climate change.
The State of California has made significant efforts to integrate eq-
uity into policies and programs to address climate change, in order to 
ensure that disadvantaged populations receive an appropriate distribu-
tion of benefits as well as protection from additional harms. Disadvan-
taged communities in California have been identified and prioritized for 
funding, using the California Communities Environmental Health Screen-
ing Tool (CalEnviroScreen). CalEnviroScreen was developed through a 
public process that included extensive community input. It enables the 
identification of communities in California that are burdened by multiple 
sources of pollution and face a combination of factors, including contact 
with pollutants, adverse environmental conditions in their community, 
biological vulnerability due to underlying disease burden or age distri-
bution, and social vulnerability due to poverty and other community 
characteristics. The concept of using cumulative impacts in communities 
to prioritize areas for funding allows some principles of climate justice 
to be integrated into climate mitigation decisions.
Other approaches to reducing greenhouse gases (GHGs) while 
adapting to a changing climate and protecting public health include the 
following:
 ➤ Promote alternative modes of transit, including walking, biking, 
and public transit. These strategies reduce GHGs while directly en-
hancing health by reducing motor vehicle pollution and increasing 
physical activity.
 ➤ Make communities greener by planting trees and developing green/
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cool roof projects, parks, and buffer zones in flood-prone areas. 
These strategies reduce air pollution and noise, directly improve 
mental and physical health, and reduce the urban heat island effect.
 ➤ Construct green, efficient buildings that reduce GHGs while also 
improving indoor air quality, thereby directly benefiting the health of 
occupants. Such buildings may also be more resilient to heat while 
using less energy for cooling.
 ➤ Reduce fossil fuel use, and gain a series of direct benefits to public 
health in communities affected by air pollution. Reduced fossil fuel 
combustion will reduce toxic chemical emissions and particulate 
matter pollution. It will also reduce the emissions of ozone precur-
sor chemicals, thus reducing smog despite a warming climate.
 ➤ Reduce consumption of meat and high-fat dairy products to sub-
stantially reduce emissions of methane, which is sometimes referred 
to as a super pollutant because of its potency as a GHG. Reduced 
meat and dairy fat consumption would also reduce risks of cardio-
vascular disease and cancer, both of which are associated with diet.
There are numerous actions we can all take in the near term to 
reduce our climate footprint while also benefiting our health and the 
health of our communities. At the same time, we must evaluate the risks 
in our local areas and develop strategies to reduce those risks or in-
crease our resilience so that we will escape the worst effects of climate 
change and protect our families, our neighbors, our environment, and 
people around the globe.
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Learning Objectives
1. Summarize the basic concepts and the urgency of climate 
mitigation.
You will learn why immediate action to mitigate emissions of climate 
pollutants is needed if we are to avoid severe impacts on human and 
natural systems. Central to these mitigation efforts is a transition 
away from CO2-emitting fossil fuels as well as drastic reductions 
of short-lived climate pollutants (SLCPs). You will also learn why 
actions on these pollutants must be scaled up rapidly over the next 
few years to avoid dangerous levels of warming.
2. Describe the multidimensional scope of climate change 
mitigation.
You will see that a wide range of societal sectors will feel the impacts 
of climate change. Moreover, solutions to climate change require 
expertise from a range of fields and must be addressed through 
interdisciplinary collaborations including both experts and ordinary 
citizens. It’s also important to keep in mind that some of the most 
severe impacts will be felt by future generations and by the global 
poor, whose emissions are very low. Thus, both intergenerational 
and intragenerational equity must be considered in the develop-
ment and evaluation of climate solutions.
3. Explain why we need to organize mitigation under six clusters 
and ten solutions.
Because climate change solutions cover so many sectors and require 
knowledge from so many fields, we need a framework to help us 
organize and evaluate solutions. In 2015, an interdisciplinary group 
of experts came together to develop broad strategies to mitigate 
emissions and the impacts of climate change. They distilled these 
strategies into a list of ten solutions, grouped into six clusters. This 
structure of ten solutions in six clusters provides the core organizing 
principle for this book.
4. Provide examples of mitigation actions already underway.
Finally, you will get a first look at how cities, states, businesses, uni-
versities, and other institutions have already begun to serve as “living 
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laboratories,” implementing and testing climate solutions and forming 
networks to coordinate their efforts and share lessons learned.
Overview
In Chapter 1, we looked at the science of climate change. We saw the 
strong scientific consensus that human emissions of climate pollutants 
are causing warming of our planet on a scale not experienced in over 
10,000 years. Continuing on a “business as usual” pathway could lead 
to dangerous and even catastrophic changes in the Earth’s climate, with 
severe adverse impacts on human and natural systems. We have at most 
a few decades to change this trajectory and bend the curve of warming. 
In this chapter, we will take an initial look at strategies to mitigate future 
climate change.
The challenges presented by climate change cannot be solved by 
technological innovations alone. Dealing with this problem will require 
changes in our attitudes toward each other and toward nature, as well 
as changes in our behavior. We will need a broad-based effort, with 
active involvement by individuals from a wide range of fields, including 
researchers, academics, engineers, community leaders, and ordinary 
citizens.
This book is organized around a set of ten solutions designed to 
bend the curve—to reverse the trend of increasing human greenhouse 
gas emissions and keep the planet below dangerous levels of warming. 
Until 2015 it was generally assumed that warming above 2°C would 
represent the threshold for danger. More recently, we have come to 
understand that the dangerous warming level is lower: 1.5°C. Warm-
ing limits, such as the 1.5°C goal, should be viewed as broad planning 
tools and not confused with a well-defined geophysical threshold for the 
onset of dangerous changes. As you learned in Chapter 1, dangerous 
impacts of climate changes have already begun at local levels in the form 
of intensified droughts, wildfires, hurricanes, and floods, among other 
extreme weather-related disasters. Such impacts are already being felt 
by several tens of millions; when the warming reaches 1.5°C to 2°C, 1 
billion to 2 billion people could be affected adversely—at which stage, 
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global warming may have to be renamed global heating, and climate 
change renamed climate disruption.
The ten solutions to climate change are organized under six solu-
tions clusters. This set of six clusters and ten solutions was developed 
by a multidisciplinary group of over 50 experts from across the Univer-
sity of California system who came together in the summer of 2015 to 
discuss a comprehensive approach to combating global warming and 
climate change. Their findings and recommendations are included in the 
report Bending the Curve: 10 Scalable Solutions for Carbon Neutrality and 
Climate Stability.
Although the time to act is short, the good news is that we are not 
starting from zero. International agreements, including the Montreal Pro-
tocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer (Montreal Protocol), 
signed in 1987, and especially the Paris Agreement, signed in 2015, have 
laid the groundwork on which we can build future actions. The Montreal 
Protocol’s original focus was on banning emission of chlorofluorocar-
bons (CFCs) that damage the ozone layer. While damage to the ozone 
layer is a separate problem from climate change, those same CFCs have 
powerful climate-warming effects; per ton of emissions, the warming ef-
fects of CFCs are about 10,000 times stronger than the effect of carbon 
dioxide. If they had not been banned, current global warming would 
have been even greater. Moreover, the Montreal Protocol itself has been 
expanded to include climate change. The 2016 Kigali Amendment to the 
Montreal Protocol calls for the phaseout of hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs), 
which do not damage the ozone layer but have very significant warming 
effects (Box 1.3.1 in Chapter 1). The Montreal Protocol and the Kigali 
Amendment are discussed in more detail in Chapter 15.
The Paris Agreement represents a historic advance because it is the 
first international agreement on climate change to include commitments 
(albeit voluntary) from all nations on the planet. This agreement has its 
drawbacks; as we will see in Chapter 10, current national commitments 
under the Paris Agreement are not sufficient to keep warming below 
2°C, and many issues remain regarding monitoring and reporting of 
reductions in emissions. However, as the first truly global agreement on 
climate change that commits countries to specific mitigation actions, 
the Paris Agreement provides a foundation for future progress.
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Beyond these international agreements, significant efforts to mit-
igate emissions and combat climate change have already begun at a 
wide range of institutions, cities, states, and regions, which can act as 
living laboratories to test societal, governance, economic, and technical 
solutions. Lessons learned from these models can help guide the imple-
mentation of mitigation efforts at national and global scales.
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In this section, we will look at two key questions:
1. Why should we mitigate climate change?
2. How much time do we have to begin mitigation efforts?
Why should we mitigate climate change?
The scientific findings presented in Chapter 1 make a compelling case for 
mitigation of climate pollutants. Unmitigated warming along a business- 
as-usual pathway presents serious and possibly existential threats to 
human society and natural ecosystems. Human societies have already 
experienced significant impacts from the 1°C of warming that has oc-
curred since the Industrial Revolution, including increases in extreme 
weather events such as heat waves, droughts, and flooding; a 40% loss 
of summer sea ice in the Arctic; and major episodes of coral reef bleach-
ing. Future warming could cause major population displacements due 
to sea level rise and extreme weather, as well as massive disruption and 
extinction of natural species. These impacts could become catastrophic 
and pose existential threats if warming were to exceed 4°C. The long 
lifetime of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere means that the effects 
would linger for centuries to millennia, affecting our children, grandchil-
dren, and generations still unborn.
The impacts of climate change will be felt in almost every aspect of 
human society and social systems and in natural ecosystems as well. Sea 
level rise, floods, and forest fires will threaten residential and commer-
cial buildings, as well as the insurance companies that could face rising 
liability costs as damage to insured properties increases. Employment 
in the energy sector will be affected by major shifts as the industry 
transitions from fossil fuels to renewables and other low-carbon energy 
sources. Agriculture will be heavily affected by shifts in growing zones; 
in particular, millions of agricultural workers in the subtropics could 
4.1  Setting the Stage for Mitigation
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be displaced by drought and heat waves. Even recreation will be af-
fected. For example, increasing snowmelt is already beginning to affect 
the ski industry, migration of species can affect recreational fishing, and 
increasing temperatures and more frequent heat waves will affect your 
opportunities and ability to enjoy outdoor sports.
As you will read in the coming chapters, mitigation of climate change 
will require a shift away from fossil fuels (coal, oil, and natural gas) as 
our primary energy source. Fossil fuels currently supply about 80% of 
the energy used worldwide, and they are by far the largest source of 
carbon dioxide emissions.
There are many co-benefits to moving away from fossil fuels. Be-
yond their warming effects, emissions associated with the use of fossil 
fuels are also a major health hazard. Aside from the future warming 
avoided, significant health co-benefits will result from phasing out fossil 
fuels. Fossil fuel combustion generates black carbon, which can cause 
heart disease and lung cancer, and ozone, which aggravates respiratory 
conditions and inhibits growth of agricultural crops. Air pollution (out-
doors and indoors) is estimated to cause 7 million premature deaths 
each year, with about half of those deaths attributed to pollutants as-
sociated with fossil fuel burning. Full implementation of the short-lived 
climate pollutant (SLCP) mitigation measures discussed in this chapter 
and in Chapter 15 could save 2.4 million lives that would have been lost 
to outdoor pollution and 3 million lives otherwise lost to indoor pollu-
tion each year, and it could save up to 140 million tons of staple crops 
(maize, rice, soybean, and wheat) that would have been destroyed by 
ozone exposure.
A shift from fossil fuels to low-carbon energy sources would have 
other co-benefits as well. While there would be job losses in traditional 
fossil fuel industries, there would also be significant new employment 
opportunities in sectors such as renewables and energy storage. In light 
of the rapid advances in energy storage technology and dramatic de-
creases in the price of wind and solar energy over the past decade, 
renewables have the potential to provide abundant, affordable energy 
for all people and dramatically improve the lives of the 3 billion global 
poor.
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How much time do we have to begin mitigation?
The short answer is: not much. Humanity has reached a crossroads; the 
consequences of our actions over the next decade or so will affect our 
descendants and the planet for centuries and millennia to come. Given 
the scope and scale of transformations that will be required, it’s clear 
that we must begin mitigation efforts now and bring them up to full 
speed by the middle of this century. We can see this more clearly by 
focusing on two approximate time periods: between now and 2030, and 
between 2030 and 2050.
Since the beginning of the Industrial Revolution, humans have emit-
ted approximately 2 trillion metric tons (actually 2.2 trillion tons as of 
2017) of CO2 into the Earth’s atmosphere. About 44% of these 2 trillion 
tons still remain in the atmosphere (the rest has been taken up by the 
oceans, land plants, and soil organisms). By 2030, under a business-
as-usual scenario we will have added another 1 trillion tons, bringing 
cumulative emissions to 3 trillion tons, and by 2050 they will reach 4 
trillion tons. In short, unchecked emissions would lead to a warming of 
1.5°C by 2030 and more than 2˚C by 2050.
In Table 4.1.1 we show the actual or projected warming that would 
be realized in a given year, as well as a quantity called “committed warm-
ing,” a term that has different meanings depending on the context. Here, 
we define the term committed warming as follows: it is the warming that 
will ultimately happen even if CO2 concentrations stay at current levels. 
The warming continues to increase even after the concentrations have 
stopped increasing because Earth takes roughly a decade or two to 
adjust to increased CO2 in the atmosphere. Currently, the Earth’s surface 
temperature is constantly playing catch-up as we continue to increase 
concentrations of CO2 and other super pollutant greenhouse gases.
Figure 4.1.1 shows possible future temperature trajectories. The pur-
ple line represents measured global temperatures from 1950 to about 
2010, and the labeled lines represent future temperature projections 
under different scenarios. The business-as-usual scenario is represented 
by the gray line that borders the colored zones. The other labeled lines 
represent mitigation pathways that we’ll discuss later in this chapter and 
in Chapter 15 (a stylized version of this curve can be seen on the title 
page of the book).
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If unmitigated emissions continue, we will emit another trillion tons 
between 2030 and 2050, making the total emissions 4 trillion tons. At 
that point we will be committed to 3°C warming, well into the “danger 
zone” of severe impacts on climate, not all of which can be foreseen at 
the present. In that case, we would actually reach 3°C warming around 
2070.
If we do not mitigate emissions during this century, the temperature 
of the Earth will increase by at least 4°C by 2100. More specifically, cli-
mate models show a 1 in 2 chance (50% probability) that temperatures 
by 2100 will be at least 4°C warmer than the preindustrial era, with a 1 
in 20 chance (5% probability) that warming will be 6°C or greater. As 
we saw in Section 1.4, warming exceeding 4°C could represent an exis-
tential threat to human society and natural systems. Although the risk of 
this level of warming is “only” 1 in 20 based on current projections, most 
Figure 4.1.1 Projections 
of future warming, showing 
business-as-usual and pathways 
for CO2 mitigation only, SLCP 
mitigation only, and mitigation 
of both CO2 and SLCPs. The 
purple line represents the 
historical temperature record. 
From Ramanathan et al. 2017.
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people would find this an unacceptable level of risk for a possibility with 
such serious consequences. As pointed out in Chapter 1, few people 
would choose to board a plane if there was a 1 in 20 chance that it 
would crash.
Table 4.1.1 Emissions, actual or projected warming, and committed warming 
under a business-as-usual scenario
Year Cumulative CO2
Actual or Projected 
Warming
Committed  
Warming
2017 2.2 trillion tons 1°C 1.5°C
2030 3 trillion tons 1.5°C 2°C
2050 4 trillion tons 2.2°C 3°C
The committed warming is the equilibrium warming estimated by assuming atmospheric 
concentrations are held fixed at the indicated year. The warming estimates include the 
effects of SLCPs and cooling aerosols. Figures are approximate.
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4.2  The Six Clusters
Although the time to act is limited, you and the million other climate 
champions still have a range of solutions you can employ to avoid dan-
gerous warming of the planet. So, how do you go about bending the 
warming curve?
Major emission sources will need to be addressed in all sectors, 
including electricity generation, residential and commercial buildings, 
transportation, and industrial processes. Solutions will require collab-
orative efforts on unprecedented scales, not only by scientists and 
engineers, but also by civic, business, and religious leaders, as well as 
community members. Given the wide range of impacts, emitting sec-
tors, and areas of expertise required, you need some sort of organizing 
principle to sort through potential solutions, rank them, and identify the 
groups or institutions best qualified to carry them out. The approach 
outlined in Bending the Curve’s executive summary and used in this book 
is to lay out ten broad solutions, organized into six major solutions 
clusters.
Development of the six clusters
The 50 interdisciplinary University of California experts who came to-
gether in the summer of 2015 quickly concluded that a comprehensive 
approach requires solutions from a wide range of sectors and areas 
of expertise. They developed a set of ten broad solutions but found 
there was no single category that would cover them all. In the end, they 
grouped the ten solutions into six solutions clusters. The ten solutions 
represent ten actions that, taken together, can bend the curve and avoid 
dangerous warming of the planet. The six clusters represent the sectors 
and areas of expertise that will be needed to implement these solutions.
The six solutions clusters, listed in rough order of importance, are
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1. Science Pathways Solutions
2. Societal Transformation Solutions
3. Governance Solutions
4. Market- and Regulation-Based Solutions
5. Technology-Based Solutions
6. Natural and Managed Ecosystem Solutions
This ranking does not mean that any of these clusters are optional; all 
will be needed in order to avoid dangerous warming. However, clusters 
ranked higher on the list are generally considered more fundamental; 
solutions clusters that appear lower on the list tend to be in some way 
dependent on the higher clusters. For example, science pathways solu-
tions are placed first because without a scientific understanding of the 
causes of warming and the most effective emissions pathways for bend-
ing the warming curve, we would be unable to take meaningful actions.
In particular, Bending the Curve was the first report to rank socie-
tal transformation solutions so highly, listing it as the second solutions 
cluster. There were several motivations for this high ranking. Without 
broad-based societal understanding of the risks and potential impacts of 
climate change, there will not be sufficient public support to implement 
governance, economic, and technological solutions. Social movements 
can energize individuals by bringing them together to act for broader 
interests. Moreover, some of the individuals and groups most vulnera-
ble to climate change typically have little voice in global governance and 
economic mechanisms. Social movements and collective action can help 
ensure their concerns are heard and addressed. Finally, many of the solu-
tions we will examine are dependent on the collective impact of individual 
actions and choices. Realizing these solutions will require a transforma-
tion of our societal attitudes toward each other and toward nature.
Intragenerational and intergenerational equity
There is one more important issue that we need to consider before we 
look at our ten solutions. Fundamental to the development and evalu-
ation of climate solutions is consideration of equity: whether the distri-
bution of benefits and harm caused by our actions is fundamentally fair. 
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Note that equity is not the same as equality: for example, distributing an 
equal amount of food to everyone in a group might not be seen as eq-
uitable if some have overflowing refrigerators while others are starving. 
Discussions of equity are ultimately based in ethics and personal values, 
and different observers might reach different conclusions as to whether 
a particular situation is equitable or not. However, most people seem to 
believe that it is fundamentally unfair for those who did not share in the 
benefits of an activity to be burdened with its costs or other negative 
impacts.
In the context of climate change, there are two important aspects 
of equity to consider: intergenerational equity and intragenerational 
equity.
Intergenerational equity refers to equity between different genera-
tions, for example, between us and our grandchildren or their descen-
dants. It essentially considers equity between groups of people who are 
separated in time. The impacts of our current emissions will not be felt 
only in this century. A large fraction of the carbon dioxide we emit now 
by burning fossil fuels will remain in the atmosphere for hundreds and 
even thousands of years, meaning that unborn generations will have to 
deal with its impacts even though current generations received the ben-
efits of the energy produced. If warming pushes the Earth’s climate past 
one or more tipping points, it could well become impossible to return 
our planet to the temperatures of the relatively stable Holocene climate 
in which human civilizations developed and flourished (Section 1.1).
Intragenerational equity refers to equity between individuals who 
are alive now but separated by location (for example, living in different 
countries) or social factors (for example, belonging to different eco-
nomic classes). Among those alive on Earth today, there are billions who 
have largely been left behind by the technological advances of the past 
few centuries. We can divide the roughly 7.5 billion people living on 
Earth into three broad groups:
 ➤ The top 1 billion are the most economically well off. Their consump-
tion of fossil fuels contributes roughly 50% of global CO2 pollution.
 ➤ The bottom 3 billion have very limited access to fossil fuels and the 
energy they produce. This group contributes only 5% of global CO2 
pollution. We refer to these as the “bottom” 3 billion, not in any 
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pejorative sense, but because they represent the least affluent of the 
Earth’s population and are at the bottom of the economic and en-
ergy pyramids. On a per-person basis, they emit about one- thirtieth 
as much as individuals in the top 1 billion, but they are often the 
most vulnerable to the impacts of climate change.
 ➤ The middle 3.5 billion are neither the poorest nor the richest; their 
situation is intermediate between the top 1 billion and the bottom 3 
billion. Their per-person emissions are about ten times higher than 
the bottom 3 billion, but only about one-third of the top 1 billion.
Consider where you, your family, or your household might be clas-
sified among these groups. It will be helpful to keep this rough division 
in mind when evaluating the equitability of climate solutions and deter-
mining responsibilities for their implementation.
As Pope Francis noted in his 2015 encyclical, Laudato Si’, “[w]e are 
faced with not two separate crises, one environmental and the other 
social, but rather with one complex crisis which is both social and envi-
ronmental. Strategies for a solution demand an integrated approach to 
combating poverty, restoring dignity to the excluded, and at the same 
time protecting nature.”
Figure 4.2.1 Rich and poor communities living side by side in Mumbai, India. 
Photograph reproduced with permission from Johnny Miller.
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4.3  The Ten Solutions
In this section, we’ll introduce the ten solutions, show how they fit into 
the six solutions clusters, and describe each of them briefly. The follow-
ing chapters will provide in-depth exploration of each of these solutions.
These ten solutions represent an integrated approach to climate 
change across a wide range of expertise and sectors. These solutions are 
described as scalable solutions because they can first be implemented in 
local or regional living laboratories. Lessons learned can then be scaled 
up to national and global levels.
Figure 4.3.1 gives a visual overview of the six clusters, ten solutions, 
and three levers (discussed under Solution #1 below). Table 4.3.1 de-
fines the ten solutions and their relationship to the six solutions clusters.
Figure 4.3.1 The six 
clusters, three levers, 
and ten solutions. From 
Ramanathan et al. 2017.
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Table 4.3.1 The ten solutions
Solutions
I. Science Pathways
1 Bend the warming curve immediately by reducing short-lived climate pollutants 
(SLCPs) and sustainably by replacing current fossil-fueled energy systems with 
carbon-neutral technologies and by extracting carbon dioxide from the air and 
sequestering it or repurposing it for commercial uses.
II. Societal Transformation
2 Foster a global culture of climate action through coordinated public communica-
tion and education at local to global scales.
3 Deepen the global culture of climate collaboration.
III. Governance
4 Scale up subnational models of governance and collaboration around the world 
to embolden and energize national and international action.
IV. Markets and Regulations
5 Adopt market-based instruments to create efficient incentives for businesses and 
individuals to reduce CO2 emissions.
6 Narrowly target direct regulatory measures—such as rebates and efficiency and 
renewable energy portfolio standards—at high-emissions sectors not covered by 
market-based policies.
V. Technology Measures
7 Promote immediate widespread use of mature technologies, such as photovolta-
ics, wind turbines, battery and hydrogen fuel cell electric light-duty vehicles, and 
more efficient end-use devices, especially in lighting, air conditioning, appliances, 
and industrial processes.
8 Aggressively support and promote innovations to accelerate the complete electri-
fication of energy and transportation systems and improve building efficiency.
9 Immediately make maximum use of available technologies combined with regula-
tions to reduce methane emissions by 50% and black carbon emissions by 90%.
VI. Ecosystem Management
10 Regenerate damaged natural ecosystems and restore soil organic carbon to im-
prove natural sinks for carbon (through afforestation, reducing deforestation, and 
restoration of soil organic carbon). Implement food waste reduction programs 
and energy recovery systems to maximize utilization of food produced and to 
recover energy from food that is not consumed.
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I. The science pathways cluster
This cluster describes emission pathways that were derived from climate 
science with the primary goal of keeping the warming below perceived 
dangerous levels. Until about 2015, the threshold for dangerous warming 
was generally perceived to be 2°C. However, recent data on the impacts 
of the 1°C warming that has already taken place (from preindustrial 
times to 2015)—for example, on extreme weather and on the melting of 
the Greenland and West Antarctic ice sheets—have led climate scientists 
and policymakers to conclude that the threshold for dangerous warming 
should be redefined to 1.5°C. It should be noted, however, that data 
from past climates suggest that even a warming of 1.5°C, if it is allowed 
to persist for more than a century, could lead to 6 to 9 meters of sea 
level rise (Chapter 1 for a discussion of the Eemian interglacial period 
130,000 years ago).
SOLUTION #1:  Bend the warming curve immediately 
by reducing short-lived climate pollutants (SLCPs) and 
sustainably by replacing current fossil-fueled energy 
systems with carbon-neutral technologies and by 
extracting carbon dioxide from the air and sequestering 
it or repurposing it for commercial uses. Achieve the SLCP 
reduction targets prescribed in Solution #9 by 2030 to cut 
projected warming by approximately 50% before 2050. To 
limit long-term global warming to 1.5°C, achieve carbon neutrality 
by 2050 and in addition extract as much as 500 billion to 1 trillion 
tons of carbon dioxide from the air by 2100. Solutions #7 to #9 
cover technological solutions, and Solution #10 describes ecosystem 
solutions to accomplish these targets.
Frequently used terms with respect to CO2 emission sources are 
defined here:
 ➤ Low-carbon refers to energy sources that emit substantially less 
CO2 per unit of energy than conventional fossil fuels. Solar, wind, 
hydroelectric, and nuclear power fall under this category because 
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fossil fuels are used in the production and transportation of the 
products used in solar cells, wind turbines, and nuclear plants.
 ➤ Zero emissions refers to energy sources or systems that truly have 
zero associated emissions of CO2 and other greenhouse gases. This 
is an ideal that is not realized by any current energy sources, includ-
ing solar, wind, hydroelectric, and nuclear, but could be approached 
as associated emissions from manufacturing or transportation sys-
tems approach zero.
 ➤ Renewables are energy sources that are replenished naturally. Solar, 
wind, hydroelectric, and geothermal fall under this category.
 ➤ Carbon-neutral refers to energy sources or systems that absorb as 
much CO2 as they emit. An energy source that is derived from fossil 
fuels can still be carbon-neutral as a whole if the carbon released is 
captured and stored indefinitely.
As discussed in Section 4.1, climate studies and computer model 
projections make it clear that the only solutions pathway that sustain-
ably keeps warming below 2°C is one that combines mitigation of both 
SLCP and CO2 emissions. We will refer to these different mechanisms to 
reduce warming as levers to bend the warming curve. The Bending the 
Curve report, published in 2015, emphasized mainly the carbon and the 
SLCP levers because its goal was to keep warming below 2°C. Since 
the threshold for dangerous warming has been decreased to 1.5°C, 
we need to pull on a third lever, which we refer to as the atmospheric 
carbon extraction (ACE) lever. Numerous studies since 2015 have shown 
that we may have to extract as much 500 billion to 1 trillion tons of 
CO2 by 2100 to keep the warming below 1.5°C. We have modified the 
two-lever strategy of the Bending the Curve report to a three-lever strat-
egy as discussed below and shown in Figure 4.3.1 and Table 4.3.1:
The SLCP lever: take immediate action to cut emissions of 
short-lived climate pollutants.
Because SLCPs—methane, black carbon, and hydrofluorocarbons 
(HFCs)—have comparatively short lifetimes in the atmosphere, 
their mitigation provides a rapid reduction in temperatures 
relative to the business-as-usual path, helping to buy us time for 
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carbon dioxide mitigation. In particular, we must reduce methane 
emissions by 50%, reduce black carbon emissions by 90%, and 
phase out HFCs completely by 2030. Solution #9 specifies the 
measures needed to achieve these goals.
The carbon lever: drastically reduce emissions of carbon 
dioxide to near-zero levels well before the end of this century.
This lever, as well as the person pulling on it, is intentionally 
made larger than the SLCP lever in recognition of the immense 
challenges of making the planet carbon-neutral. Specifically, we will 
need to cut CO2 emissions approximately 40% by 2030 and 80% by 
2050, with emissions dropping to as close to zero as possible after 
that. Solutions #7 and #8 describe the technologies needed to 
achieve these reductions in emissions.
 The “CO2 + SLCPs” pathway in Figure 4.1.1 represents the 
combined effects of the carbon and SLCP levers. The SLCP lever 
should reduce projected warming of the planet by approximately 
50% by 2050, compared with business-as-usual projections.
The atmospheric carbon extraction (ACE) lever: remove carbon 
dioxide from the atmosphere, with removal efforts ramping up 
significantly over the course of this century.
Because carbon dioxide can remain in the atmosphere for 
centuries or millennia, keeping warming below dangerous levels 
for the long run requires this third lever. To give an idea of the 
enormous magnitude of this effort, it should be noted that to 
keep warming below 1.5°C throughout this century, as much as 1 
trillion tons of CO2 have to be extracted between 2030 and 2100 
(corresponding to a rate of roughly 15 billion tons per year), in 
addition to pulling on the SLCP and carbon levers. Accordingly, 
the ACE lever is shown with the person having to bend backward 
along with the backward bending of the lever.
A range of technologies can be used to remove carbon dioxide 
from the atmosphere, including reforestation and agricultural practices 
that restore degraded soils and enhance the ability of soil to store car-
bon. Solution #10 focuses on these measures. In addition, CO2 can be 
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Box 4.3.1  Your Goal: Winning the Relay Race
All of this sounds super complicated, so let us offer a metaphor: the three levers 
can be thought of as three runners in a relay team. Solving the challenge of cli-
mate change is like running a relay race, and time is against you. The SLCP runner 
is the starter who sprints forward quickly to gain some time for your team. The 
baton represents warming of 1.5°C or less. Assuming SLCP mitigation starts by 
2020 and is completed by 2040, the SLCP starter can take the baton (1.5°C or 
less) to the decade of 2040 to 2050. Around this time, the SLCP runner hands the 
baton over to the carbon runner. Provided your team achieves carbon neutrality 
(zero CO2 emissions) by 2050, the carbon runner can take the baton until 2070 
at least, with warming still hovering around 1.5°C. By then, despite the efforts 
of the first two runners to bend the warming curve, the cumulative emissions of 
CO2 (since 1850) will be working hard to bend the curve upward. This is when 
the baton is passed over to the finishing runner in your team, the ACE runner, 
who takes it to 2100 and beyond, still keeping the warming under 1.5°C.
It’s important not to confuse the timeline of when each runner begins to 
bend the curve downward with the time when that runner needs to get into 
action. For the carbon runner to take the baton around 2040, carbon mitiga-
tion efforts must begin immediately (by 2020 at the latest) and achieve carbon 
neutrality by 2050. The ACE runner has to be ready for action beginning around 
2030. Why? We may have to take out as much as 1 trillion tons of CO2 before 
2100. This amount is so large that it cannot be done in a few decades. We have 
to start taking out about 15 billion tons of CO2 by 2040 and continue at this rate 
until the end of the century.
Figure adapted from images in shutterstock.com.
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extracted from the air by a variety of chemical and biological processes. 
These measures are still under experimentation and are not yet scalable 
to the hundreds of billions of tons of CO2 removal that will be required. 
Atmospheric carbon extraction technologies are discussed in more de-
tail in Chapter 18.
Box 4.3.1 provides perspective on the three levers through the met-
aphor of a relay race.
II. The societal transformation cluster
Science can define the necessary pathways to avoid dangerous warming, 
but the pathways will not be realized if there is not broad understanding 
of the problem at all levels of society and a willingness to take the mea-
sures required. The solutions in this cluster focus on communication, 
education, and collaboration strategies to develop a culture of consen-
sus and support for climate action.
SOLUTION #2:  Foster a global culture of climate action 
through coordinated public communication and education 
at local to global scales. Combine technology and policy 
solutions with innovative approaches to changing social 
attitudes and behavior.
Increasing societal awareness of the impacts of climate change 
and the benefits of climate mitigation is critical to solving the climate 
problem. Building support for the actions necessary to combat global 
warming will require societal changes in attitudes toward our fellow 
human beings and toward nature. Solution #2 focuses on communi-
cation and education needed to foster these societal transformations. 
Efforts will include communications targeted toward key stakeholders, 
including decisionmakers and investors in low-carbon development, but 
also broad educational efforts at all levels, from kindergarten through 
college. While it’s important to make the severity and urgency of the 
climate problem clear, communications should focus on practical, 
achievable solutions. The goal of climate communication is to motivate 
action, not to create a sense that the challenge is too overwhelming to 
tackle. This book and its companion course are examples of the type of 
educational outreach recommended as part of this solution.
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Communication and educational initiatives should also consider the 
different needs, responsibilities, and abilities to access information of 
the world’s top 1 billion, middle 3.5 billion, and bottom 3 billion.
SOLUTION #3:  Deepen the global culture of climate 
collaboration. Design venues where stakeholders, community, 
and religious leaders converge around concrete problems with 
researchers and scholars from all academic disciplines, with 
the overall goal of initiating collaborative actions to mitigate 
climate disruption.
For a global culture of support to really take root, we will need to en-
gage in dialogue at all levels: international, national, city, and neighborhood. 
This dialogue will involve a wide range of stakeholders— decisionmakers; 
community members; researchers and academics; and business, commu-
nity, and religious leaders—in collaborative action, developing solutions to 
specific, concrete problems. An understanding of the local-scale impacts 
of climate change and development of localized mitigation interventions 
can help motivate participation by a wide spectrum of citizens.
Note the specific inclusion of religious leaders in the solution state-
ment. Religion is often overlooked as part of the solution to climate 
change, but religious leaders and religious communities can play a vital 
role. Both religions and climate scientists want to protect nature (or 
creation). Religious spaces can be natural venues to discuss the ethical 
issues raised by climate change. In addition, in the United States, where 
climate change has become extremely politicized, religious spaces offer 
scientists and climate solution seekers like you a nonpolitical forum to 
discuss the problem and its solutions. Climate change is also an issue 
where science, policy, and religion converge. While scientists and poli-
cymakers talk in terms of intergenerational equity and the protection of 
nature, major religious traditions often frame these same concepts in 
terms of a duty to care for our fellow human beings and for creation. An 
excellent example of the broader framing of climate change impacts in 
human terms is Pope Francis’s climate change encyclical, Laudato Si’: On 
Care for Our Common Home, published in 2015. Because of the broad and 
deep penetration of religious faith across the world, religious settings 
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can also facilitate dialogue between members of the top 1 billion and 
the bottom 3 billion on our planet.
Solutions #2 and #3 will be discussed in Chapters 5, 6, 7, and 8.
III. The governance cluster
In addition to a broad societal consensus for climate action, implementa-
tion of the recommended pathways will require support and coordination 
at all levels of government, from local neighborhoods to international 
coalitions.
SOLUTION #4:  Scale up subnational models of gover-
nance and collaboration around the world to embolden 
and energize national and international action. Use the 
California examples to help other state- and city-level jurisdic-
tions become living laboratories for renewable technologies 
and for regulatory as well as market-based solutions, and build 
cross-sector collaborations among urban stakeholders because creat-
ing sustainable cities is a key to global change.
With the 2015 Paris Agreement as a framework for international ac-
tion on climate, this solution focuses on governance models from cities, 
states, and regions that can be scaled up to national and global levels. 
Cities cover less than 2% of the Earth’s surface but produce more than 
60% of global CO2 emissions. States, cities, and other subnational jurisdic-
tions have the ability to develop innovative solutions that are responsive 
to local needs, implement them on a relatively short time scale, and make 
adjustments as needed. The C40 initiative (https://www.c40.org) and the 
Under2 Coalition initiated by the governor of California are exceptional 
examples of subnational activities that can leverage international agree-
ments at a local scale, as we’ll see in Section 4.4. In short, they can act as 
innovative, nimble living laboratories to test, refine, and promote gover-
nance and other solutions, which can then be adapted and expanded to 
strengthen and enhance national and global efforts. Actions under way in 
California provide particularly relevant examples of subnational models; 
we’ll take an initial look at some of these in Section 4.4.
Solution #4 will be discussed further in Chapters 9 and 10.
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IV. The markets and regulations cluster
To make mitigation a reality, policymakers need to send clear signals to 
companies and individuals. Appropriate economic and regulatory mea-
sures can encourage investment in existing low-emission technologies 
and innovation for the future. The next two solutions explore market- 
based instruments and direct regulation.
SOLUTION #5:  Adopt market-based instruments to 
create efficient incentives for businesses and individuals 
to reduce CO2 emissions. These can include cap and 
trade or carbon pricing and should employ mechanisms to 
contain costs. Adopt the high-quality emissions inventories, 
monitoring, and enforcement mechanisms necessary to make 
these approaches work. In settings where these institutions 
do not credibly exist, alternative approaches such as direct regulation 
may be the better approach—although often at higher costs than 
market-based systems.
Both economic theory and real-world experience indicate that the 
most economically efficient, lowest-cost way to achieve emissions re-
duction is through market-based incentives. Market-based mechanisms 
add a cost to emissions that reflect the long-term environmental dam-
ages they cause. Two major categories of market instruments are a 
direct carbon price, such as a carbon tax or fee on emissions, and a 
system of cap and trade under which total emissions from large sources 
are capped and allocated through a system of tradable permits. Cap-
and-trade systems for carbon dioxide emissions have been implemented 
in a variety of markets, including California, the northeastern US, and 
the European Union. In 2017, China initiated a national cap-and-trade 
market that began with its power sector and will gradually be expanded 
to other sectors of the economy.
While carbon prices and cap and trade could reduce emissions, 
current fossil fuel subsidies support production and consumption and 
incentivize CO2 emissions. Fossil fuel subsidies include tax advantages, 
low-interest loan guarantees, and access to public natural resources at 
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below-market rates. As estimated by the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF), global fossil fuel subsidies are as much as US$540 billion annually.
According to the IMF, when fossil fuel impacts on mortality due to air 
pollution (about 3.5 million premature deaths a year) are included, the 
total subsidy increases to as much as US$5 trillion annually. In compari-
son, the International Energy Agency estimates that the cost of changing 
the entire infrastructure of the world to zero-carbon emissions over a 
30-year period would only be about US$1 trillion dollars annually, about 
one-fifth of the subsidy cost.
A recent study estimated that the net effect of continued tax prefer-
ences and other subsidies in the US alone would be to increase domestic 
oil production by 17 billion barrels (equivalent to 6 billion tons of CO2 
emissions) through 2050, relative to a scenario with no subsidies. Re-
moving these subsidies, as well as providing subsidies for low- emission 
sources as appropriate, would create strong economic incentives to 
transition to low-carbon sources of energy.
One criticism of market-based initiatives is that added costs (for 
example, increases in fuel and energy costs) can be passed on to con-
sumers, with a potentially disproportionate impact on the least affluent. 
These negative impacts can be reduced if some portion of the revenues 
from cap-and-trade or carbon pricing mechanisms are used to reduce 
impacts on disadvantaged communities and others who are adversely 
affected by higher prices.
SOLUTION #6:  Narrowly target direct regulatory 
measures—such as rebates and efficiency and renewable 
energy portfolio standards—at high-emissions sectors 
not covered by market-based policies. Create powerful 
incentives that continually reward improvements to bring 
down emissions while building political coalitions in favor of 
climate policy. Terminate subsidies that encourage emission-
intensive activities. Expand subsidies that encourage innovation 
in low-emission technologies.
Regulatory measures are given lower priority than market-based 
incentives on our solutions list because they are generally less 
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cost-effective. However, direct regulations provide an alternative instru-
ment for emissions reduction, particularly where economic measures 
may not be technically or politically feasible. Where regulations are 
necessary, they should be targeted toward high-emission sectors to 
maximize their impact and designed to contain the costs of compliance.
Solutions #5 and #6 will be covered detail in Chapters 11 and 12.
V. The technology measures cluster
We have set the stage with broad public support for climate solutions 
along with governance, market, and regulatory instruments for their 
implementation; this cluster provides the technological means to make 
those reductions happen. Both wider use of existing technologies and 
future innovations will be required. The three solutions in this cluster 
focus on both carbon dioxide and short-lived climate pollutants. These 
represent the first two levers discussed above: the carbon lever and the 
SLCP lever. Solutions #7 and #8 represent two stages of pulling the car-
bon lever. Solution #7 pulls the carbon lever nearly halfway by 2030, and 
Solution #8 pulls it the rest of the way by 2050. Solution #9 represents 
pulling the SLCP lever by 2030.
To keep warming below dangerous levels, both of these levers will 
be required. Fully implemented, the CO2 reductions in Solutions #7 and 
#8 could reduce global warming by as much as 1.5°C by 2100, relative 
to a business-as-usual scenario. In combination with the SLCP reductions 
envisaged in Solution #9, this solutions cluster gives us a good chance of 
keeping warming below 2°C during this century and beyond.
SOLUTION #7:  Promote immediate widespread use of 
mature technologies, such as photovoltaics, wind turbines, 
battery and hydrogen fuel cell electric light-duty vehicles, 
and more efficient end-use devices, especially in lighting, 
air conditioning, appliances, and industrial processes. These 
technologies will have even greater impact if they are the target 
of market-based or direct regulatory solutions such as those 
described in Solutions #5 and #6 and have the potential to achieve 
a 30% to 40% reduction in fossil fuel CO2 emissions by 2030.
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Figure 4.3.2 shows the major global sources of fossil fuel and in-
dustrial carbon dioxide emissions, grouped by sectors. Many of these 
emissions can be reduced through expansion of currently available tech-
nologies, such as electricity generation by solar photovoltaics and wind 
turbines. Significant technical advances and decreasing costs have led to 
a rapid increase in the deployment of renewable electricity over the past 
decade, mostly from photovoltaic solar panels and wind turbines. How-
ever, reducing emissions from some sectors will be more challenging 
and will require innovative new technologies. These difficult-to-eliminate 
emissions, which account for just over a quarter of the global total, are in-
dicated by darker colors in Figure 4.3.2 and described under Solution #8.
Nuclear power has the advantage of generating on-demand electricity 
Figure 4.3.2 Global CO2 emissions from fossil fuels and industry, 2014. The 
darker colors indicate the emissions that are most difficult to eliminate; they 
account for just over a quarter of the global total. Data from Davis et al. 2018.
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with no direct carbon dioxide emissions, but it is controversial because 
of the possibility of nuclear accidents and concerns with storage of 
radioactive waste. Some countries, such as China, are expanding their 
nuclear power capacity, while others, like Germany, are phasing it out. 
In the US, there are currently (as of late 2018) only two new nuclear re-
actors under construction. The high cost of building new nuclear plants 
means that at present they are generally not economically competitive 
with alternatives such as solar or wind. However, new designs such as 
small modular reactors may provide for lower-cost nuclear power in 
the future, with less nuclear waste and a far lower risk of catastrophic 
accidents.
In the transportation sector, cars and light-duty trucks with electric 
motors powered by lithium ion batteries or hydrogen fuel cells could 
drastically reduce emissions if low-carbon sources were used for battery 
charging and hydrogen production. Emissions from homes and com-
mercial buildings could be reduced by use of energy-efficient heating 
and cooling systems, lighting, and appliances. It’s estimated that full 
implementation of strategies involving existing technologies has the po-
tential to achieve a 30%–40% reduction in fossil fuel emissions by 2030. 
We can think of this as pulling the carbon lever about a third of the 
way toward carbon neutrality. A combination of market and regulatory 
incentives, as discussed in Solutions #5 and #6, could help accelerate 
this technological transition.
SOLUTION #8:  Aggressively support and promote inno-
vations to accelerate the complete electrification of energy 
and transportation systems and improve building efficiency. 
Support development of lower-cost energy storage for appli-
cations in transportation, resilient large-scale and distributed 
micro-scale grids, and residential uses. Support research and 
development of a portfolio of new energy storage technologies, 
including batteries, supercapacitors, compressed air, hydrogen, and 
thermal storage, as well as advances in heat pumps, efficient lighting, 
fuel cells, smart buildings, and systems integration. These innovative 
technologies are essential for meeting the target of 80% reduction in 
CO2 emissions by 2050 and transitioning to zero emissions soon after.
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Moving away from fossil fuels will require electrification of nearly all 
end uses, including transportation and heating systems, with the elec-
tricity generated almost exclusively by carbon-neutral energy sources. 
Because wind and solar energy production are inherently variable, in-
creasing penetration of renewables depends on affordable systems to 
store energy during periods of excess power production and to feed 
it back into the grid when production falls; energy storage is a crucial 
area of innovation needed for the transition to low-carbon energy, as 
discussed in Box 4.3.2.
Power generation systems will also become more widely distributed, 
ranging in scale from large-scale utility power plants to rooftop solar for 
individual buildings. This will require the development of “smart” electri-
cal systems that can manage power from sources with variable produc-
tion and a variety of scales. Microgrids that can function independently 
of the main power grid when necessary would further increase the abil-
ity of the grid to handle variable electric generation and power outages. 
These ideas will be further discussed in Chapters 13 and 14.
SOLUTION #9:  Immediately make maximum use of 
available technologies combined with regulations to reduce 
methane emissions by 50% and black carbon emissions by 
90%. Phase out hydrofluorocarbons by 2030 by amending the 
Montreal Protocol. In addition to the climate and health benefits 
described under Solution #1, this solution will provide access to clean 
cooking for the poorest 3 billion people who spend hours each day 
collecting solid biomass fuels and burning them indoors for cooking.
As discussed in Chapter 1, black carbon, methane, ozone, and hy-
drofluorocarbons (HFCs) are referred to as short-lived climate pollutants 
(SLCPs) because their lifetimes in the atmosphere—from a few weeks to a 
few decades—are relatively short compared with that of CO2. They are also 
super pollutants with warming effects tens to thousands of times stron-
ger than CO2. This combination of short lifetimes and powerful warming 
ability means that targeting SLCPs for reduction can have a significant and 
comparatively rapid impact on global temperatures, as we saw in Section 
4.1. Solution #9 represents pulling the SLCP lever all the way.
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Box 4.3.2  Examples of Difficult-to-Eliminate Sectors of 
Carbon Emissions and Required Innovations
Providing reliable electricity 
As more sectors are electrified and as a greater portion of electricity 
is produced by intermittent renewable energy sources, there will be 
an increasing need to provide reliable, load-following electric sys-
tems that can be ramped up quickly to accommodate any mismatch 
between energy supply and demand. A key technological approach 
is improved energy storage. One alternative is to use excess electric 
power to produce hydrogen, which can then be converted back to 
electricity by using fuel cells. Hydrogen fuel cell technology is already 
in use to power vehicles, but the bulk of the hydrogen is produced 
from natural gas. CO2 emissions from hydrogen generation can be 
eliminated if hydrogen is produced by electrolysis (the splitting of 
water into hydrogen and oxygen) using renewable energy sources.
Aviation, shipping, and long-distance road transportation
Advances in battery technology and hydrogen fuel cells have made 
short-range battery electric and fuel cell vehicles commercial real-
ities. However, eliminating emissions from long-distance transpor-
tation will require new technologies. Improved hydrogen fuel cells 
may prove suitable for long-distance road transport, but aviation 
and shipping will require power sources with greater energy density 
(energy content per unit weight). Biofuels are promising candidates 
since they are carbon-neutral, but they are energy intensive to pro-
duce and can take up agriculturally valuable land.
Cement and steel
Cement and steel production are the two highest-emission industrial 
processes, generating 4% and 5% of global CO2 emissions, respec-
tively from the burning of fossil fuels to provide the high tempera-
tures required for production and from materials used in production 
(such as limestone for cement and coke for steel). Reducing CO2 
emissions from cement and steel production will require the devel-
opment of new chemical and industrial processes. In the case of 
cement production, it may also be possible to capture and store CO2 
directly from the kiln’s exhaust gases.
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Another advantage of SLCP mitigation is that SLCP emissions can 
generally be reduced more quickly and easily than CO2, and reductions 
in SLCP emissions translate into a more immediate impact on the cli-
mate than do reductions in CO2 (Chapter 1). Fossil fuels have been used 
intensively since the Industrial Revolution and are deeply embedded in 
a wide range of human activities. As discussed in Solutions #7 and #8, 
phasing out CO2 emissions will require several decades and new tech-
nological innovations. SLCPs, on the other hand, are generated by fewer 
sectors of society and can be addressed with existing technologies. 
Also, SLCP mitigation is often more easily accepted because many of the 
co-benefits (to health and agriculture sectors) accrue locally.
The two largest sources of black carbon (up to 95% of the total) are 
diesel vehicles and domestic cooking and heating, with 3 billion peo-
ple still relying on eighteenth-century technologies that burn firewood, 
dung, and coal. Black carbon emissions from diesel vehicles can be re-
duced by about 98% through adding diesel particulate filters. Replacing 
inefficient solid-fuel-burning stoves in India, China, sub-Saharan Africa, 
and many countries in South America with less-polluting models can 
reduce as much as 80% of their black carbon emissions. Such measures 
not only reduce the warming effect of black carbon soot, but also pro-
vide significant health benefits by reducing particulates that can cause 
respiratory illnesses. Worldwide, roughly 3 million people die prema-
turely each year because of indoor smoke from cooking, heating, and 
lighting with solid fuels.
Another major SLCP, methane, can be addressed through a variety 
of means, including capture and burning of methane emitted by coal 
mines, oil wells, gas production and distribution facilities, and landfills. 
Methane emissions from animal manure and wastewater systems can be 
controlled through anaerobic digesters. Mitigation of methane would 
avoid 0.5°C warming by 2050.
Ozone in the troposphere (the lowest layer of the Earth’s atmo-
sphere) is another important short-lived climate pollutant. It is not di-
rectly referenced in Solution #9, but decomposition of methane is an 
important source of ozone. Measures to mitigate methane would result 
in reduced tropospheric ozone as well. Like black carbon, ozone has 
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negative health impacts and can cause respiratory illnesses; moreover, it 
is a major source of agricultural crop losses.
HFCs are primarily used as refrigerants in air-conditioning systems, 
refrigerators, and auto cooling systems. Substitutes with far lower warm-
ing potential are already available. Left unchecked, HFC emissions alone 
would warm the planet by 0.1°C by 2050 and 0.5°C to 1.0°C by 2100.
Solution #9 will be covered in more detail in Chapter 15.
VI. The ecosystem management cluster
The previous five clusters focus on mitigating our emissions of climate- 
damaging pollutants. However, most projections indicate that for long-
term temperature stability we will also need to remove CO2 from the 
atmosphere. This cluster focuses on reducing emissions from managed 
ecosystems, particularly agricultural lands and rangelands, and managing 
ecosystems to enhance their ability to absorb CO2 from the atmosphere. 
This represents a portion of the third and last of our three levers, the 
atmospheric carbon extraction (ACE) lever. It should be noted, Solution 
#10 by itself cannot meet more than a third of the carbon extraction 
requirements of 500 billion to 1 trillion tons of CO2 extraction by 2100. 
We will most likely have to resort to direct capture of carbon dioxide 
from the air, using some of it for commercial and residential needs and 
sequestering the remaining carbon. However, thus far only pilot proj-
ects exist for direct capture, and there are yet no clear pathways to scale 
these up to the level of carbon capture required. These technologies are 
discussed in Chapter 18.
SOLUTION #10:  Regenerate damaged natural ecosystems 
and restore soil organic carbon to improve natural sinks 
for carbon (through afforestation, reducing deforestation, 
and restoration of soil organic carbon). Implement food 
waste reduction programs and energy recovery systems 
to maximize utilization of food produced and recover 
energy from food that is not consumed. Global deployment of these 
measures has the potential to reduce as much as 25% of the current 
annual emissions of about 40 billion tons of CO2. In addition, Solution 
4-34 Chapter 4: Overview of the Ten Solutions for Bending the Curve
#10 will help meet the recently approved sustainable development 
goals of the United Nations by creating wealth for the poorest 3 
billion.
After fossil fuels, the second largest anthropogenic source of CO2 is 
deforestation. Burning or clearing trees for agriculture and croplands is 
estimated to release about 2 billion tons of CO2 into the atmosphere an-
nually. Reducing deforestation would reduce these emissions; reforesta-
tion (restoration of forest cover in deforested areas) and afforestation 
(the planting of trees in areas that did not previously have forest cover) 
would actually remove CO2 from the atmosphere. Creating payment 
mechanisms for the environmental services provided by forest ecosys-
tems can be an effective mechanism to promote reduced deforestation, 
while providing an income source for forest-dependent communities 
around the world.
Restoration of degraded ecosystems, including wetlands and man-
grove swamps, and soil management and restoration can provide an-
other mechanism for CO2 reduction. Soils contain significant quantities 
of organic carbon in the form of plant matter, microbes, and other 
organisms. Intensive agriculture tends to disturb the soil, promoting 
CO2 release. Encouraging alternative agricultural and grazing practices, 
including reducing tillage of agricultural fields and promoting greater 
biodiversity, can promote CO2 absorption and storage in the form of 
organic carbon.
One caveat: the capacity of forests and agricultural soils to store 
carbon is not unlimited. For example, a 2018 study by the US National 
Academies of Sciences, Engineering and Medicine estimated that the 
capacity of agricultural soils to store carbon gradually drops to zero 
over two to four decades as the soils approach carbon saturation.
Reducing food waste is another key element of Solution #10 and 
one of the most significant actions we can take in addressing climate 
change. Globally, about one-third of food production is wasted; in the 
US, this figure rises to 40%. When food is wasted, the energy and as-
sociated emissions that went into its production, transportation, and 
storage are wasted as well. Further, food waste in landfills is a major 
source of methane emission.
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It’s estimated that combined, these measures for reduced defor-
estation, afforestation, reforestation, soil carbon restoration, ecosystem 
restoration, and reduced food waste could reduce greenhouse emis-
sions by about the equivalent of 10 billion tons of CO2 annually, about 
25% of our current CO2 emissions. This solution will be explored further 
in Chapter 16.
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4.4  Living Laboratories
As discussed in Solution #4, cities, states, and regions can serve as living 
laboratories to test climate solutions and apply the lessons learned to 
scale solutions up to national and international levels. This living labora-
tory approach applies not only to governance solutions, but also to the 
entire range of climate solutions we have discussed.
Mitigation efforts are already underway in a range of local and re-
gional jurisdictions worldwide and at a range of major corporations 
and universities. As described below, dozens of major cities worldwide 
have adopted climate action plans (CAPs), setting targets for mitigation 
and describing specific actions they will take to achieve those targets. 
Many of these CAPs include emissions reduction targets of 10%–30% by 
2030 and 80%–90% by 2050, consistent with the targets described in 
Solutions #1, #7, and #8.
Cities are well positioned to engage in climate action, as they are 
typically more responsive to the needs and demands of their citizens, 
and their smaller scale enables them to act relatively quickly, compared 
with national governments. Several major cities, including Stockholm, 
Oslo, Melbourne, and Seattle, have pledged to become completely 
carbon- neutral by 2050. Successful climate solutions can be scaled glob-
ally as cities share their solutions and best practices through networks 
such as C40 and the Under2 Coalition, as discussed below.
State and regional initiatives can provide a bridge between city-scale 
actions and national policies. In addition to cities, the Under2 Coalition 
includes both state and regional jurisdictions. Another example of state-
led initiatives is the US Climate Alliance of state governors, established 
in 2017 in response to the US federal government’s announcement of its 
intention to withdraw from the Paris Agreement. Member states have 
committed to greenhouse gas reductions consistent with the original 
US commitment to cut emissions 26%–28% below 2005 levels by 2025. 
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While the group is still in the early stages of development, its mem-
bership has grown to include 17 governors from both major political 
parties, representing roughly one-third of the US population and 40% 
of its economy.
Similarly, major corporations typically have greater autonomy to 
act on climate change than most national governments. Several major 
corporations have already achieved carbon neutrality or plan to reach 
carbon neutrality in the near future. Many of the companies that have 
become carbon-neutral or are close to achieving carbon neutrality are 
in the technology sector, such as Google, Microsoft, and Adobe; or in 
the financial sector, such as Goldman Sachs and Swiss Re. However, 
manufacturers such as Volvo and Siemens have also committed to car-
bon neutrality by 2040. These plans have impacts beyond the compa-
nies themselves; for example, local communities hoping to attract large 
companies such as Google may be motivated to invest in renewable 
energy to meet their corporate requirements.
In the following sections we’ll look at a few examples of groups and 
initiatives that are aimed at testing solutions in local or regional living 
laboratories and at sharing their results at national and international 
levels.
C40
The C40 Cities Climate Leadership Group (C40) is an international or-
ganization of cities committed to taking action on climate change. The 
group originated when Ken Livingstone, then mayor of London, called 
together representatives from 18 different cities to design an agreement 
to mitigate climate pollution. In 2006, the group merged with the Clin-
ton Climate Initiative, increasing the network to 40 cities. As of 2017, 
the C40 network included 96 of the world’s largest cities (Figure 4.4.1), 
representing over 700 million citizens and 25% of the global gross do-
mestic product.
To participate, a city must (1) set a target for reducing emissions, 
(2) develop a climate plan with concrete initiatives to meet its target, 
and (3) actively share best practices with other cities in the C40 net-
work. A new condition was added in 2017: by the end of 2020, every 
member city must have a comprehensive, measurable climate action 
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plan designed to provide low-carbon development that is consistent 
with the goal of limiting global warming to no more than 1.5°C above 
preindustrial levels, as recommended in the 2015 Paris Agreement. C40 
indicates that cities have the potential to carry out more than 40% of the 
emissions reductions required to achieve this target.
Through C40, city officials are linked to a range of collaborative 
networks that share knowledge on best practices and data metrics that 
advance climate actions and inspire their city peers. Thirty percent of 
all climate actions in C40 cities are being delivered thanks to city-to-city 
collaboration. The networks cover topics of high priority to C40 cities 
and are categorized under five initiative areas: adaptation implemen-
tation; air quality; energy and buildings; food, waste, and water; and 
transportation and urban planning. C40 also provides financing for tech-
nical assistance to help cities in Africa, Asia, and Latin America develop 
climate action plans.
Under2 Coalition
Like C40, the Under2 Coalition is a prime example of efforts to scale 
up local and regional solutions to the national and international levels. 
Initiated by California and the German state of Baden-Württemberg in 
Figure 4.4.1 Map of C40 member cities. Reproduced with permission from 
C40.
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late 2015, the coalition grew to 205 members in 43 countries by late 
2017, representing more than 1.3 billion people and 40% of the world’s 
economy (Figure 4.4.2). Members have committed to plan for emissions 
reductions of 80% below 1990 levels by 2050 and have agreed to work 
in partnership to learn from each other’s experiences. The coalition has 
set a goal of including the most significant subnational governments 
from all parts of the world by 2020, with every member government 
actively participating in the coalition’s work.
California as a living laboratory
The state of California is well positioned to act as a living laboratory for 
climate solutions. California is a large and diverse state, with a popula-
tion of nearly 40 million and the fifth-largest economy in the world. The 
state encompasses major urban centers but also large areas dominated 
by agriculture and forestry, providing the ability to test a wide range of 
climate solutions.
Moreover, California is regarded as a global leader in addressing cli-
mate change. The centerpiece of California’s climate policies is Assembly 
Bill 32, the Global Warming Solutions Act, enacted in 2006 and extended 
through subsequent legislation.
Figure 4.4.2 Map of Under2 Coalition members as of late 2017. Reproduced 
with permission from Under2 Coalition.
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The policies employed by California to meet its climate goals span 
most of the six clusters and ten solutions introduced in the previous sec-
tions, including increased building energy efficiency, renewable power 
generation, increased vehicle fuel efficiency, and low-emission vehicles 
(Figure 4.4.3). California has adopted the three-lever approach recom-
mended in Solution #1, targeting emissions of both CO2 and super- 
polluting SLCPs and promoting carbon sequestration in soils. California 
has also established a market-based cap-and-trade emissions permit 
system (discussed in Chapter 9).
As seen in Table 4.4.1, California has defined emissions targets for 
three time periods. The first target, established by executive order in 
2005, is a return to 1990 emissions levels by 2020, with 33% of elec-
tric power generated from renewables. California is well on the way to 
meeting its 2020 goals. Analysis shows that the state achieved its emis-
sions target in 2016, 4 years early, and generated 32% of its electricity 
from renewables in 2017.
The state also established a goal of cutting emissions to 80% below 
Figure 4.4.3 California’s climate strategy. Reproduced with permission from 
the California Air Resources Board.
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1990 levels. In 2015, new legislation set an intermediate target to cut 
emissions to 40% below 1990 levels by 2030 and to generate 50% of 
electricity from renewables. In 2018, California added a new goal, pass-
ing legislation that requires 100% of its electricity to be generated by re-
newables by 2045. These targets are ambitious but highlight California’s 
strong and ongoing commitment to leadership in climate mitigation.
Fears that California’s ambitious emissions targets might inhibit eco-
nomic growth have so far proved to be unfounded. Between 2000 and 
2014, California cut its emissions by 5%–10% while its gross domestic 
product (GDP) grew by over 25%. This example clearly shows that we 
can decouple economic growth from CO2 emissions.
University of California Carbon Neutrality Initiative
Universities typically have access to a wealth of policy and technical 
expertise and are well positioned to act as living laboratories. One 
particularly noteworthy example is the University of California (UC) 
Carbon Neutrality Initiative. Under this initiative, announced in 2013 by 
UC president Janet Napolitano, the ten UC campuses have pledged to 
become carbon-neutral by 2025, with net zero greenhouse emissions 
from their buildings and vehicle fleets. Many UC campuses are purs-
ing innovative climate solutions. For example, UC Irvine has adopted a 
Campus as a Living Laboratory for Sustainability model and is pursuing 
a range of mitigation options, including energy-efficient buildings, wide-
scale adoption of solar power, buses powered by hydrogen fuel cells, 
and the development of its own microgrid. In addition, UC San Diego 
has created its own microgrid, which supplies more than 90% of campus 
power needs.
Table 4.4.1 California climate targets
Year
Targets
Greenhouse Emissions Electricity from Renewables
2020 Return to 1990 levels 33%
2030 40% below 1990 levels 50%
2050 80% below 1990 levels 100% (by 2045)
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Learning Objectives
1. Understand climate change as a multidimensional problem of 
power. We will learn how social solutions, social movements, and 
social transformation can help us confront climate change.
2. Examine the role that collective action plays in social 
transformation. We will reflect on the theories of change that 
we bring to problems of power and on why problems of power 
require social solutions.
3. Understand the role leadership plays in social movements. 
Leadership is one of those words that people use all the time, but 
it is often unclear what it means. We will define leadership in the 
context of social transformation and climate solutions.
4. Reflect on your own ability to call other people to action. In other 
words, no matter where you come from, what can you do in your 
own life and your own communities to engage other people in this 
project of creating climate solutions?
Overview
This chapter was originally transcribed from a lecture that Hahrie Han 
gave as part of the University of California’s Bending the Curve course. 
In this chapter, we will explore the role that social movements can play 
in tackling climate change. Why social movements? This book examines 
a wide variety of climate solutions—scientific solutions, technological 
solutions, and economic solutions. Where do social movements and 
social solutions fit in?
This chapter argues that climate change is not only a scientific, 
technical, and economic problem, but also very much a problem of 
power. And problems of power require social solutions. This chapter 
shows how and why climate change is a problem of power and how 
social movements—along with scientific, technological, and economic 
solutions—can help confront it. We will examine examples drawn from a 
wide range of social movements, past and present, to understand how 
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we can apply what we know about successful social movements to the 
problem of climate change.
We will also focus on the role you, as students, can play as climate 
champions. Some of you are computer science majors; some of you 
are biology majors; some of you are English majors. You come to this 
course (or perhaps subject) from a wide variety of different disciplines, 
backgrounds, and places. But social movements bring people in no mat-
ter where they start. As we will see, that is one of the key features of 
social movements. What can you do in your community, no matter what 
your background and interests are?
In the first section of this chapter, we will focus on why climate 
change is a problem of power and how to understand it as such. Why 
do we need collective action to address climate change? How can bring-
ing people together in social movements help create climate solutions?
If we want to bring people together, then we have to understand 
how to do that. So in Section 5.2, we will examine what a social move-
ment is. How do social movements bring people together? How do they 
aggregate individual people’s actions in a way that creates social change?
In Section 5.3, we will turn to the role that leaders play in social 
movements. What is leadership? How do leaders create social move-
ments and make them effective?
The last two sections focus on the nuts and bolts of leadership. In 
the fourth section, we will examine the role that leaders play in building 
up the power that social movements need to make the change that they 
seek.
Finally, in Section 5.5, we will investigate how leaders of social 
movements take the resources that they’ve built and use them for social 
transformation.
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Why do we need collective action, anyway? Why don’t we let the scien-
tists, policymakers, and business leaders solve the problem of climate 
change for us? There’s an important reason that we need collective ac-
tion: it has to do with what some scholars call a theory of change. Our 
theories of change shape how we think we can create the change we 
need; as a result, they inform the actions we take.
Let’s start with a story that has nothing to do with politics or social 
movements, to explain what theories of change are. Imagine that you 
are taking a class and the professor changes the date of the exam at 
the last minute. You thought the exam was going to be 2 weeks away, 
and all of a sudden the professor tells you it is going to be next Thurs-
day. Dismayed by the sudden change, maybe you and several of your 
classmates stand outside talking about the dilemma after class. You are 
all upset, but what can you do? People will have different ideas. “Let’s 
send the professor an email asking to stick with the original date.” “Oh 
no,” someone might say. “It’s much better to talk about this in person. 
Let’s go to office hours.” “But wait,” someone else might say. “If the 
professor thinks it’s only four of us who are upset, nothing will change. 
Should we send a note to the whole class to see how many other peo-
ple agree with us?” “Nah,” the fourth person might say. “The professor 
was clear. Nothing we do can make a difference.” And so on. Each of 
these students has a theory of change in mind. The first student’s theory 
of change is, If I send an email, then the professor will respond. The 
second student’s theory of change is, If I only email, then the professor 
will not respond, but if I show up in person, then the professor cannot 
ignore me. The third student believes, If we show that we have a lot of 
support, then the professor will listen and things will change. The fourth 
student thinks, If we take action, then we will have no impact. Each of 
these students would take a different action based on a personal theory 
of change.
5.1   Theories of Change, Problems of Power, 
and Collective Action
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Of course, theories of change are not just for students trying to 
influence their professors. Whenever we try to solve problems, we are 
relying on some kind of theory of change. Whenever we create a solu-
tion, it’s based on a theory about how our actions will change a partic-
ular situation or address a particular problem—regardless of whether 
we pause to consciously reflect on that theory. Because climate change 
is a complex, multifaceted problem—some scholars call it a “wicked” 
problem—it is especially important to pause and examine the theories 
of change that underlie the solutions we’re pursuing.
What theories of change do we bring to the problem of climate 
change? For example, if we consider technological innovation a solution 
to climate change, then our theory of change treats it as a technical 
problem that we lack the expertise to solve at present. Our theory of 
change suggests that if we can only develop the right skills or technol-
ogy, we’ll solve the problem.
Many problems have been solved through technology. For exam-
ple, when polio was a rampant disease and a major societal problem, 
the solution was developing a new technology—a vaccine—that could 
eradicate polio. Sometimes the trick is developing a new technology 
that solves one problem without creating others. An example of this is 
the so-called hole in the ozone layer, a much-discussed environmental 
problem in the 1980s and 1990s. The “hole” was caused by chloroflu-
orocarbons (CFCs) and other chemicals used in refrigeration and air 
conditioning that thin or deplete the ozone layer that protects humans 
and other forms of life from harmful radiation. When scientists identi-
fied the problem, national and international leaders came together to 
solve it, signing the Montreal Protocol, an international agreement that 
phased out CFCs and similar chemicals, in 1987 (Chapters 10 and 15).
The Montreal Protocol is a strikingly successful example of turning 
scientific knowledge into effective global environmental policy, but it 
required a replacement for CFCs. The companies that dominated the re-
frigeration and air-conditioning industries insisted that hydrofluorocar-
bons (HFCs) were the only feasible option. But HFCs, while safe for the 
ozone layer, are potent greenhouse gases and have made the climate 
change problem worse—they solved one problem at the expense of an-
other. In response to this situation, German scientists and Greenpeace 
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joined together to develop and promote new coolant technology using 
ozone-safe hydrocarbons, which have much less impact on climate 
change than HFCs. Their GreenFreeze refrigerators have captured a 
substantial share of the market around the world, though they have not 
yet succeeded in North America, where the major companies still sell 
refrigerators that use HFCs.
Similarly, we’ve developed a whole host of technologies that re-
spond to the problem of climate change—from wind and solar power 
to electric vehicles and trains, from increasing the energy efficiency of 
buildings to reducing fossil fuel emissions from agriculture. In fact, we 
already have a great deal of the technological innovation that we need. 
Some scientists, such as Mark Jacobson and Mark Delucchi, have es-
timated that the developed world has the technology to be feasibly 
carbon neutral by 2050. The developing world can leapfrog many fossil 
fuel technologies by skipping over them and adopting renewable energy 
technologies directly.
But even though we have the technology, we are still not solving 
the problem of climate change. That suggests a flaw in our theory of 
change. Though climate change does require us to make deliberate 
choices about the technologies we use, maybe it is more than a technical 
problem that can be solved entirely through technological innovation.
Let’s explore some other theories of change. Often, people think 
climate change is an information problem—that is, people do not have 
the information they need to reduce their greenhouse gas emissions. In 
that case, our theory of change says that if only people had the right 
information, they would act to solve the problem of climate change.
Accurate information has, in fact, helped people solve a host of 
problems. One example has to do with the effort to reduce SIDS, or 
sudden infant death syndrome, in the mid-twentieth century. In the past, 
pediatricians used to tell parents to put their babies to sleep on their 
stomachs, because they thought that reduced spit up and helped the 
babies (and their parents!) sleep better. They discovered, though, that 
for very young babies, sleeping on their stomachs could contribute to 
SIDS because young babies did not have the neck control or muscles 
to be able to move their heads if their mouths and noses got buried 
in blankets or the mattress. They realized that if babies slept on their 
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backs, they were much less likely to suffocate and, therefore, much 
more likely to survive. Pediatricians began a campaign—Back to Sleep—to 
tell parents to put their babies to sleep on their backs, reversing their 
previous recommendations. Once they sent this information out to the 
public, parents made different choices and began to put their babies 
to sleep on their backs. The data show that spreading this information 
significantly reduced rates of SIDS. In other words, SIDS is an example 
of a problem where people acted differently once they were given the 
information they needed.
Unfortunately, however, scholars have found that there is a gap be-
tween opinion and action when it comes to climate change. Even though 
more and more people understand that climate change is a problem and 
think that we should do something about it, there’s a big gap between 
those who believe that climate change is a problem and those who 
actually take action.
Misinformation exacerbates that gap. For example, because of mis-
information about climate science, the public thinks that only about 
55% of climate scientists agree that global warming is occurring, when 
in fact it’s 97% or more of climate scientists. Almost all climate scientists 
agree that the climate is changing because of greenhouse gas emis-
sions caused by human activities. But because of misinformation, 59% 
of Americans say that they’re still unsure about whether climate change 
is happening and whether humans are causing it, as Anthony Leiserowitz 
and colleagues at the Yale Program on Climate Change Communication 
have found.
If there’s so much misinformation out there, shouldn’t we correct 
that by giving people more of the accurate information? In fact, research 
on misinformation in politics has shown that confronting people who 
believe misinformation with more information is not always productive. 
When people believe that climate change is not real and you try to 
disprove their ideas with information and evidence, it usually does not 
persuade them. Instead, it often entrenches them in their original beliefs 
and makes it harder to change people’s minds. Sometimes, just trying to 
win the argument with the best data is not the best strategy.
Though there are some problems that we can solve simply by in-
forming people, climate change does not seem to be one of those. 
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People do not always perceive the information we give them in the 
way that we expect. And even those who know that climate change is a 
problem don’t always take action on it.
What about market solutions? Isn’t climate change really a problem 
for businesses to solve? What if we could convince all the corporations 
to reduce their greenhouse gas emissions sharply? The theory of change 
underlying market solutions is that if we could only give people who run 
companies the right set of incentives to behave the way that we want 
them to behave, then we could solve the problem.
Indeed, many capable people have developed incentives for individ-
uals, families, and businesses to take action on climate change. But even 
though incentive programs have been set up, they are not scaling up 
enough to address the problem effectively. For example, carbon pricing 
is an important solution that is often discussed, but as of 2015, the 
World Bank reported that only 12% of global greenhouse gases are 
subject to carbon pricing (Chapter 12).
When we put all of these theories of change together—science, 
technology, communications, markets—we have to confront a difficult 
question. Climate science, technological innovation, communicating ac-
curate information, and economic incentives are all essential to tackling 
climate change, but they’re not solving the problem on their own. In 
particular, they are not yet transforming key behaviors by corporations, 
governments, and societies at the scale required to mitigate or slow 
climate change. So what else do we need?
That’s where collective action comes in. Collective action, of which 
social movements are one form, involves people coming together to 
transform society and is most useful when we’re trying to solve prob-
lems of power. More information, a better piece of technology, a catch-
ier message, or more streamlined incentives won’t solve a problem of 
power on their own. We can define a problem of power as one where 
the people who are most directly affected don’t have the authority or 
ability to make the necessary change.
Ordinary people are being affected by climate change now. Those 
of us who are affected by climate change urgently need to protect the 
world that we and our children, grandchildren, and great-grandchildren 
will live in—but we don’t have the authority or the power to make the 
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changes we need on our own. It is true that individuals can reduce their 
carbon footprints through everyday choices, such as eating less meat, 
using less energy to heat or cool their homes, and biking, walking, or 
taking public transportation instead of driving. But individual action is 
not even close to enough: action on a much larger scale than anything 
you or I alone can do is required to solve the problem of climate change. 
Instead, those who have the power to change the structural drivers 
of our dependence on fossil fuels must act. Our national governments 
and international bodies must make decisions that set the world on a 
different course.
If people don’t have the power to make the change that they need, 
then how do they acquire that power? First, they have to consider what 
their resources are. A famous organizer named Saul Alinsky once said 
that when you’re trying to make political change, there are two sources 
of power: organized money and organized people. And if you’re not on 
the side of organized money, what you need is organized people.
Because climate change is a problem of power, we need to adjust 
our theory of change. Technological innovation, climate science, accu-
rate information, and market mechanisms are essential but will not be 
enough on their own. Our theory of change also has to include some 
way of moving power. In other words, we have to get those in power 
to adopt all the climate change solutions that have already been devel-
oped—all the solutions outlined in this book—on a scale large enough to 
make a difference. Acquiring that power is what collective action and 
social movements do.
To address multidimensional societal problems like climate change 
that are in some part problems of power, where the people who need 
change the most don’t have the power to make it, bringing people 
together is necessary. Social movements are a way to do that. Social 
movements are a type of collective action in which the people who want 
change the most also work with others to acquire the resources they 
need to make the change that they want. The rest of this chapter will 
examine how leaders and ordinary people in social movements acquire 
the resources and power to make the change that they want.
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5.2  Defining Social Movements
What are social movements? As you might imagine, many social sci-
entists have studied this. One scholar, Edwin Amenta, defines a social 
movement in a simple, clear way: “a set of actors and organizations 
that are seeking to alter power deficits and to effect social transfor-
mation through the state by mobilizing regular citizens for sustained 
political action.”
As the last section showed, when it comes to problems of power, 
people who want change the most cannot make the change that they 
want, given the situation as it currently stands. That’s a lack of power. 
Sometimes people think power is a scary word. But here it only refers to 
this question about whether ordinary people who want change have the 
ability to make the change that they want.
Social movements are efforts to solve problems of power. To do 
that, social movements have to face two challenges. First, how do you 
get ordinary people involved in sustained political action? Second, how 
do you translate that political action into the kind of influence or power 
necessary to make the change that you want to see?
Social movements address these challenges by fundamentally trans-
forming people and their resources. Sometimes people think social 
movements just bring people together to do something. But there are 
many examples of bringing people together to do something that we 
wouldn’t call social movements. For instance, companies try to convince 
you and many other people to buy ketchup. And many people do buy 
ketchup of one brand or another, but we don’t call that a social move-
ment, because buying ketchup is not a fundamentally transformative act.
In the 1830s, a French diplomat and historian named Alexis de 
Tocque ville toured the United States. He was trying to understand how 
American democracy worked. At the time, democracy was a new exper-
iment around the world. No one thought that it would really work. But 
5-12 Chapter 5: Your Leadership
over in North America, people were trying it out, and de Tocqueville 
investigated their democracy and observed it from all angles.
One of the strange things that de Tocqueville noticed was that 
Americans, weirdly, get together to do everything. They get together 
to drink beer. They get together to garden. They get together to talk 
about politics. At first, he just dismissed it as a funny little cultural habit 
that Americans had. But over time, he realized that this habit of coming 
together was fundamental to the way democracy worked. As he wrote 
famously in his book Democracy in America, the process of joining with 
others is fundamentally transformative.
How is it transformative? De Tocqueville argues that joining with 
others is fundamentally transformative in three ways. First, when people 
come together, inequality of resources becomes equality of voice. Even 
though people start with different kinds of resources, they all have an 
equal voice in the process if they join with others to make change.
Second, he realized, when people join with others, their individual 
self-interest is transformed into collective interest. In other words, when 
I first join a group, I might only be thinking about my own desires. 
For example, I might want to build a garden so that I can have more 
tomatoes to eat. But then I realize that the garden is not just about 
my tomatoes. It’s about feeding my entire community. In this way, an 
individual’s self-interest is transformed and she comes to understand 
and care about the broader collective interest.
Third, de Tocqueville argues, the process of joining together is 
transformative because it teaches people how to work with others. We 
all know that working together is not easy; it requires particular skills, 
capacities, and even motivations. As students, you have undoubtedly 
done group projects that made you tear your hair out because it’s so 
hard to work with others. De Tocqueville points out that the process 
of learning to work with others transforms people because it forces 
them to learn how to navigate their differences, speak up for what they 
believe in, and understand the power of working together.
How does this relate to social movements? Social movements make 
the political change they want by transforming the individuals who are 
part of them. And then social movements take those transformed indi-
viduals and translate their resources into political voice.
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From talking with people about this process of transformation, we 
know that they’re often skeptical. The first question they ask is, Can so-
cial movements really transform people that way? A sociologist named 
Ziad Munson did a fascinating study of the “pro-life” movement against 
abortion in the United States. He was trying to understand how the 
people who are most active in the movement first got involved. Munson 
did long, 3-to-4-hour interviews with people on the very front lines of 
the pro-life movement—people who organize pro-life groups in their 
communities. They not only attend the rallies and the marches, but also 
spend a lot of time trying to get other people involved. Munson asked 
them, among other things, what they were doing before they became 
activists in the pro-life movement.
One of Munson’s most interesting findings undercuts a key assump-
tion about social movements. Usually we assume that people join a 
movement because they believe strongly in the issue or cause it is cen-
tered on. According to that assumption, people would join the pro-life 
movement because they believe strongly that abortion is wrong. And 
people would join environmental movements because they are environ-
mentalists—they already believe that it is important to address climate 
change, conserve resources, protect biodiversity, and preserve wild 
lands.
However, Munson found that almost half of the people he inter-
viewed were either pro-choice or indifferent to issues of abortion when 
they first joined. That’s a surprising finding, because we presume that 
social movements draw in people who already support the cause for 
which they advocate. But in fact, Munson found that half the people on 
the front lines of the pro-life movement didn’t get involved because they 
believed in it. They got involved for a variety of other reasons. Maybe 
a working woman became a stay-at-home mom and was looking for 
something to do outside the house. Maybe someone had just moved to 
a new community and was trying to meet people. Maybe someone had 
just joined a new church and wanted to get involved in church activities. 
Or maybe a friend invited me to come to a meeting and I just felt bad 
saying no.
In other words, people came into the movement for a wide variety 
of reasons—often social and biographical reasons having to do with an 
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individual’s particular situation. But then, once they came to that first 
meeting, something happened that made them want to keep coming 
back. That’s the process of social transformation. Social movements 
begin to change people’s minds—not only in terms of what they believe, 
but also in terms of what they think they have to do because of what 
they believe. It wasn’t just that those who joined went from being pro-
choice or indifferent to abortion to being anti-abortion. It was more that 
they also thought, “Wow, now that I understand these issues, I’ve got 
to act on them. I’ve got to organize a group in my community. I have to 
attend these rallies. I have to attend these marches.”
That is how social movements work. They start by transforming the 
individual, and by transforming the individual, they begin to transform 
society.
Figure 5.2.1 This view of the crowd at the March on Washington for Jobs 
and Freedom on August 28, 1963, where Dr. Martin Luther King Jr. gave his 
famous “I Have a Dream” speech, embodies our usual assumptions about what 
social movements look like. Photograph by US Information Agency, Press and 
Publications Service. Reproduced from Wikimedia Commons.
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Social movements are not all about marches and protests. Some of 
you might be thinking, “I’m not really an activist. I’m just a science major. 
And I’m not sure if I’m the kind of person who can stand up in front of 
a group of people and attend rallies.” It is easy to assume that social 
movements are nothing more than the large protests and rallies that we 
see covered in the media—that only a March on Washington with hun-
dreds of thousands of people counts (Figure 5.2.1). But those of us who 
study social movements understand them as complex ecosystems. They 
are constellations of what some scholars would call arenas and players.
Social movements operate in many different arenas. That is, they 
happen in a variety of places and through a variety of forums—orga-
nizations, companies, government bodies, neighborhood associations, 
schools and universities, and so on. In those arenas, there are a variety 
of people who all play their own roles. The players might be movement 
insiders, like the activists whom Munson interviewed in his study, but 
they can also include the heads of corporations, directors of nonprofit 
foundations, professors, union leaders, intellectuals, teachers, and 
journalists.
Teach-ins are an example of the role that teachers and students can 
play in social movements. Organizers of the first Earth Day, including 
Wisconsin Senator Gaylord Nelson, wanted to plan one day of action—
April 22, 1970—to raise awareness about environmental issues. Earth 
Day has expanded in subsequent years to include marches, tree plant-
ings, and community cleanups, but in those early years, “environmental 
teach-ins” all over the United States were a big part of it (Figure 5.2.2).
Nowadays, the work of building the environmental movement hap-
pens all over, in places that we may not even think about as political. 
It happens in people’s living rooms as they discuss ways to take action 
with their neighbors. It happens in churches where religious leaders 
teach people the importance of being stewards. It happens in educa-
tional settings where children learn about the impact of human activity 
on the natural world. All of these people have a role to play.
In the next three sections of this chapter, we will turn to leadership. 
All of you climate champions have a role to play as leaders.
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Figure 5.2.2 The first Earth Day, in 1970, was a nationwide “teach-in” that 
involved much more than marches, as this November 1969 issue of Senator 
Gaylord Nelson’s newsletter shows. Reproduced with permission from 
the Wisconsin Historical Society and the Nelson Institute for Environmental 
Studies, University of Wisconsin.
Chapter 5: Your Leadership 5-17
5.3  The Role of Leadership
Leadership is one of those words that people like to use all the time. In 
this section, we will examine what leadership is in the context of the 
kind of social movement that we need to address climate change.
Social movement leadership is a particular kind of leadership. Mar-
shall Ganz, a longtime organizer who is now a scholar, argues that 
 leadership is “enabling others to achieve purpose in the face of un-
certainty.” There are three parts of his definition that are important to 
notice.
First, you need leadership when you face uncertainty. We don’t need 
leadership to do many ordinary things in our everyday lives, like getting 
up each morning, having breakfast, getting the kids to school, and going 
to work. At work, you might have an annual budget review, or a weekly 
meeting on Fridays. You don’t need leadership for those, either; you 
need managers. Someone has to manage the process of the annual 
budget review. But when you face a situation that is uncertain—like when 
you’re trying to make some kind of social change—that’s when you need 
leadership.
Second, leadership is not about doing something yourself. It’s about 
enabling others. Leaders are not people who do all the work them-
selves. Instead, they make it possible for others to do the work that 
they need to do.
And third, leadership helps others achieve their purpose. Leaders 
do not necessarily designate the end point or set the destination that 
the movement tries to reach. Rather, leadership is about figuring out 
how to enable others to achieve the purpose that they want and to 
navigate the uncertainty that they face.
Let’s make that broad but vague definition of leadership more 
concrete. In the last section, we said that leaders of social movements 
confront two main challenges: how to get people involved in sustained 
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political activism and how to translate that activism into the political 
influence or power that can make change.
So, first, as a leader, how do you get people involved in sustained 
activism? Think of all the people out there that a social movement might 
want to engage, and then picture them as a tree with some low-hanging 
fruit and some high-hanging fruit. The low-hanging fruit are the people 
who, for whatever reason, have some kind of latent motivation to get 
involved. Maybe their parents are environmentalists, and they’re already 
on board with the idea that we need to create climate solutions. Or 
maybe someone took a class about bending the curve and decided to 
become a climate activist. These kinds of people know they want to do 
something, but they need an opportunity to get involved. They’re the 
low-hanging fruit because they’re the easiest to engage.
Other people, up near the top of the tree, are much harder to 
engage, sometimes for reasons unrelated to the movement itself. For 
example, at the very top of the tree, we might imagine that there are 
people who, even if they were motivated, don’t have the capacity to 
get involved. They might not have much free time because they have 
to work multiple jobs to make ends meet. Or maybe they have never 
even heard of climate change. Or maybe they have heard about it, but 
they don’t feel like they can act on it, because that would go against the 
social norms of their community.
About halfway up the tree, you might find some people who are 
motivated to get involved but don’t really know how. Maybe they don’t 
feel comfortable talking about their political views in front of other peo-
ple. Maybe they don’t feel comfortable talking about science in front 
of other people. They need to develop some particular capacities and 
skills.
Leadership means figuring out how to engage both the low-hanging 
fruit and the high-hanging fruit. The most successful social movements 
in history not only grabbed that low-hanging fruit and pulled in people 
who were already motivated, but also figured out how to draw in the 
people who weren’t motivated at first.
How do the leaders of social movements do that? Social move-
ment leaders push people up a ladder of engagement. In any kind of 
movement or organization, there are different tiers of involvement. At 
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the very bottom of the ladder, there are people who say, “Hey, I think 
climate change is a problem, and I’m going to sign up for an email list 
so you can send me information about climate issues.” At the next tier 
of involvement are the people who say, “I’m not just going to sign up for 
your email list, I’m also going to give you 2 hours a week of my time to 
act on it. If you send me alerts, then I’ll call my legislators. If you send 
me petitions, I’ll sign the petitions. If you want, maybe I’ll even come 
into your office and I’ll stuff envelopes for 2 hours a week.” People at 
this level of involvement are willing to do certain kinds of tasks, but they 
don’t want to take any responsibility for outcomes.
As we continue up the ladder, we find people who not only are 
willing to give some time or be responsible for particular tasks, but 
also want to take responsibility for outcomes. Taking responsibility for 
an outcome might involve someone saying, “Hey, I’m not just going to 
come to your meeting on Friday; I’m going to be responsible for getting 
20 other people to come to that meeting too. And if it takes me 5 
minutes to send an email and get those 20 people, that’s great. But if 
it takes me 10 hours of knocking on doors, I’ll do the 10 hours.” Their 
commitment no longer depends on how much time something takes; 
instead, they are committed to achieving a particular outcome.
Social movements need people at all levels of that ladder of en-
gagement. They need a lot of people at the bottom, but they also need 
people at the top. Scholars have found that social movement leaders 
push people up that ladder of engagement by cultivating what we call 
their agency. What is agency? Martin Luther King Jr. famously defined 
agency as a person’s own power, or their ability to achieve purpose. If 
I have the capacity to achieve the purpose that I want to achieve, then 
I have agency.
Often, we assume that agency is just a belief. But social psycholo-
gists have found that agency is not just about whether people believe 
they can achieve their purpose—and that it’s not just about competence 
either. It’s also about whether someone has the autonomy or the space 
to act. Agency requires both competence and autonomy.
Social movement leaders not only help activists cultivate that sense 
of competence, that sense that they can do what they’re trying to do, 
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but also give them the autonomy and space to act on their goals. What 
does that look like?
This is a question that Hahrie Han, an author of this chapter, set 
out to study in her research lab. She asked: Why are some organiza-
tions and movements better than others at getting people involved, and 
keeping them involved, in ways that cultivate their sense of their own 
agency and push them up that ladder of engagement? After a multi-
year, multimethod comparative study, Han’s lab found that the strongest 
movements understood that it is not just about getting people involved, 
but it is how you get them involved that matters. Not every form of 
participation is the same.
In fact, many movements make the distinction between mobiliz-
ing and organizing. Mobilizing involves trying to get as many people 
involved as possible by making it as easy as possible for them to take 
action. While that can build numbers, it often does not build agency. 
Organizing, on the other hand, is about constantly designing ways for 
people to take action that push them up that ladder of engagement by 
cultivating their sense of agency.
The difference between mobilizing and organizing is not simply 
semantic. In fact, Han’s research lab has found that organizers and mo-
bilizers have different theories about how to do the work. On the one 
hand, mobilizers reach out to as many people as possible and ask them 
to take a simple, quick action, so that they can convince more and more 
people to do more and more things. On the other hand, organizers have 
a theory of building power that involves developing leaders who will, in 
turn, motivate others.
Han’s lab found that mobilizers only convinced the low-hanging 
fruit, the people who were already motivated, to do something quick 
and easy. We call this transactional mobilizing because the actions 
taken, such as sending an online petition or signing up for an email list, 
are a simple exchange of resources like a transaction—like going into a 
store and buying something. You give your money to the store and walk 
out with your ketchup and there are no strings attached.
Organizers, in contrast, asked people to do things that were not 
quick or easy but that would put them into relationships with other peo-
ple. For example, instead of asking people to write letters to the editor 
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by filling out a template online and pushing a button to send it, orga-
nizers asked people to join with others in their community, compose a 
letter together, and then send it off to the local newspaper. According 
to the organizers’ theory, by working with others, people develop both 
the motivation and the capacities that de Tocqueville identified many 
years ago as fundamental to making democracy work—and that are fun-
damental to making social movements work as well.
Mobilizers and organizers differ not only in the kinds of things that 
they ask people to do, but also in how they structure their organiza-
tions. Mobilizers tend to concentrate all the responsibility in the hands 
of just a few people, whereas organizers distribute that responsibility 
across a broad group of people. We found that by distributing that 
responsibility, organizers were more likely to create social movements 
that transformed people. Through this transformational organizing, 
social movement leaders are able to engage people in the sustained 
political activism that leads to the kind of change that they are seeking.
The challenge, of course, is that asking people to take small, trans-
actional steps is a lot easier than asking people to transform them-
selves, take responsibility for outcomes, and become leaders. Leaders 
turn transaction into transformation and make it possible to build social 
movements and create change.
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5.4  What Can I Do? Building Power
In this section and the next one, we will turn to a set of leadership prac-
tices that you can use to build power and engage people around you in 
the kinds of social movement that we need to address climate change. 
Most of the leadership practices discussed here were developed by 
Marshall Ganz, who was a longtime organizer with the civil rights and 
migrant farm workers’ movements and now teaches at Harvard. Ganz 
has developed a set of leadership practices that takes the mystery out of 
how social movements are able to engage people in sustained activism.
Leadership practices separate organizations that don’t work from 
organizations that do work.
You can surely think of organizations that you’ve been a part of 
that have worked and organizations that you’ve been a part of that 
haven’t worked. Just take a minute to reflect on the differences between 
those kinds of organizations. We have all been part of teams, groups, 
organizations, and clubs that don’t really seem to work—and they have 
some characteristics in common. Organizations that don’t work tend to 
be divided. People don’t agree. They tend to be passive and reactive. 
Instead of thinking ahead about what they want to do, they just wait 
until things happen to them and then they react.
In contrast, organizations that work tend to be full of people who 
are motivated and committed to the cause. Their members are unified, 
all working together, and that makes it possible for them to be pur-
poseful and proactive. Individuals within the organization can work on 
the agenda that they are all trying to achieve without waiting for other 
people to delegate tasks to them and define their work.
Social movement organizations try to engage people in sustained 
activism in order to build the power they need to make the change they 
want, through creating organizations that work. According to Marshall 
Ganz, there are three important leadership practices that help to build 
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power: creating shared purpose, building relational commitment, and 
developing a clear structure.
First, how do you create shared purpose? In social movements, it is 
essential to make sure that everyone is engaged with the same agenda 
and has a sense of shared purpose. Often, we tend to try to persuade 
people with scientific or policy details. We try to explain exactly how 
a carbon tax will work, or we tell people what we know about human- 
caused climate change. That is important because it speaks to our heads 
and helps us develop a strategy for how to take action.
But we’ve learned from decades of research in neuroscience, psy-
chology, and other fields that human action is not only about the how, 
but also about the why. The why is about the heart—the values that 
move us to take action. And we communicate our values not through 
arguments, details, or abstract statements, but through stories.
Someone could stand up and say, “I believe in equality” or “I be-
lieve in freedom,” and that wouldn’t really mean much to you on its 
own. It wouldn’t move you to take action. But if someone stood up 
and told you a story about a particular injustice that they witnessed 
and explained how they took action to counter it, then you might have 
some insight into their commitment to equality. You might have a more 
concrete sense of why equality is important, and that concrete sense 
could motivate you to take action as well. Through stories, we’re able to 
communicate what we value.
Sometimes the concept of stories can seem abstract. But, as Mar-
shall Ganz teaches, for decades, film makers in Hollywood have known 
that there is a formula for telling stories, and it’s not that complicated. 
What you need is a character who faces a challenge that puts her in a 
place of uncertainty. Then, she has to make a choice, and that choice 
has an outcome. By telling a story with that clear formula—character, 
challenge, choice, outcome—we can communicate what we believe in 
through the choices we make. We can tell stories about ourselves, our 
organizations, and our movements. That’s how we use stories to help 
create shared purpose.
The second leadership practice is building relational commitment—
that is, building people’s commitment to their relationships with oth-
ers in the movement. Organizers often say that it is important to have 
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one-to-one meetings. That’s where a casual social relationship, a per-
sonal relationship, or a new relationship turns into a public relationship.
Relationships become a source of power when two people ex-
change their interests and resources and make a commitment to acting 
together. People who come into a new setting or a new relationship 
bring their own set of interests. They might want to start a new club 
around climate solutions or talk to their local elected officials about 
climate issues. And people bring their own sets of resources as well. 
Maybe one person has taken the Bending the Curve online course and 
now understands climate science, while another is really good at social 
media. Maybe someone else is a visual artist and a wonderful designer. 
These are all resources that people bring to the table.
In a one-to-one meeting, people build relational commitment by 
exchanging their interests and their resources with each other. In doing 
so, they create a new set of shared interests and shared resources, and 
those become a source of power for the movement.
From decades of research in social movement studies by scholars 
such as Meredith Rolfe and Betsy Sinclair, we have learned that when 
the going gets tough, people don’t stay committed because of their 
commitment to the issue. They stay committed because of their com-
mitment to each other. When it’s Thursday night and I have an exam the 
next day and I’m not sure if I want to go to that meeting, I don’t go to 
that meeting because I’m so committed to the issue. Usually I go to that 
meeting because I don’t want to let my friend down. In other words, it 
is important to build relational commitment because that is the glue that 
holds social movements together.
The third leadership practice is developing clear structures. Let’s 
say an organization has people who are committed and who share a 
purpose and a narrative. Then how should that organization structure 
its work so that the whole is greater than the sum of its parts?
We can imagine three different leadership structures. The first one 
is a dependent leadership structure where you have one leader who’s in 
the middle and all the work has to pass through that one leader (Figure 
5.4.1). The leader organizes everything. Those of you who have been 
part of organizations like that know what goes wrong. The person in 
the middle gets overwhelmed, stressed out, and burned out, and the 
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organization is only as strong as that person. If that person gets sick or 
doesn’t have enough capacity, the organization can’t do any work. And 
the people on the outside feel unmotivated because they don’t have any 
real say in how things work.
Another structure is the opposite of that: an independent leader-
ship structure. Some organizations don’t want to have a situation where 
there’s only one leader, so they decide to make everyone a leader. The 
problem then becomes that, even though everyone is motivated, they 
are going in 24 different directions. It’s difficult to build a movement that 
makes sustained change if everyone is working on 15 different things.
Social movements usually work best with an interdependent lead-
ership structure where everyone is working on the same vision and 
in the same direction, but the work is chunked out into pieces so that 
it can be distributed. Though each person is working with others for a 
shared purpose, each person is also responsible for a specific piece of 
that work. Because the meaningful work is distributed, individuals have 
autonomy and agency; they themselves are transformed by working 
with others toward the common goal of transforming society.
Figure 5.4.1 Dependent (top), independent (left), and interdependent 
(right) leadership structures. Images from Hahrie Han based on Ganz 2014.
DEVELOPING CLEAR 
STRUCTURES
How do we harness our work so that the whole is greater 
than the sum of its parts? We need interdependent 
structures. Allow the vision to be shared, but the work to 
be distributed.
Figures by Marshall Ganz
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5.5   What Can I Do? Developing Creative 
Strategies and Taking Effective Action
In this final section, we turn from leadership practices that you can use 
to build your power to a second set of leadership practices that you can 
use to deploy your power. These leadership practices continue to draw 
on Marshall Ganz’s work. We will focus on two different practices he 
identifies: developing a creative strategy, and taking measurable, effec-
tive action.
Imagine that you’re a social movement leader and you have used 
the leadership practices we discussed in the previous section to create 
shared purpose, build commitment, and develop a structure through 
which you organize all the activists whom you have engaged. The next 
question is, How do you turn that sustained activism into power? You 
do that through strategy and action.
Developing strategy
Let’s start with developing a creative strategy. Strategy is fundamen-
tally the process of turning what you have into what you want—in other 
words, turning your resources into your goals. One thing scholars have 
learned from research on social change and political change is that sim-
ply having more of something—whether it’s money or people—doesn’t 
necessarily result in achieving a particular purpose. It doesn’t mean that 
you’re going to win.
Sometimes people say, Of course the fossil fuel companies win be-
cause they have more money. But researchers found that, when we look 
at different kinds of political or social change efforts, the side that has 
more money only wins 50% to 53% of the time. It’s little better than 
flipping a coin. Simply having more money doesn’t mean that you’re 
going to achieve your goals. Instead, the extent to which a movement 
or organization develops creative strategies that help them achieve their 
purpose separates those who reach their goals from those who do not.
How do social movements develop strategy? Scholars have found 
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that one of the key ways in which social movements develop creative 
strategy is to reflect on their outcomes on multiple levels at key points 
in the trajectory of their work. Most movements organize their work 
into a campaign with a variety of peaks. A movement might be building 
toward a peak, like a rally or a march, or maybe a media event or a 
meeting with an elected official. Activists do a great deal of work leading 
up to that peak. Then the work will slow down a bit afterward, and it will 
go back up before the next peak.
At each peak, social movements measure their outcomes at several 
levels. Leaders ask the obvious questions about immediate outcomes: 
did we bring out the number of people we wanted to the march? Did 
we convince the elected official to support our proposals? But leaders 
also reflect on three other outcomes. They ask themselves: First, did 
we make the change in the world that we want to see? Second, did we 
make that change in a way that built greater capacity for the movement? 
And third, did we develop individual leaders in the process?
The analogy of a company clarifies why those last two questions 
matter. At the end of the year, a company sends its investors an annual 
report. Their annual report says not only what their profits were for the 
past year, but also what their assets are going forward. For a company 
like Boeing, their assets might include their engineering crew, their pat-
ents, the quality of their airplane designs, and so forth.
What are a social movement’s assets going forward? They include 
the movement’s leadership capacity and organizational capacity. So after 
any campaign peak, social movements develop strategy by thinking 
about how to make the change in the world in a way that also builds the 
individual and organizational skills, capacity, and motivation that they 
need.
Taking measurable, effective action
The second leadership practice Marshall Ganz identified to help you to 
deploy your power is taking measurable, effective action. Sometimes or-
ganizations become caught in a snare of preparation. It’s easy to spend 
all of your time developing strategies and plans and making sure that 
your plans are perfect—but never actually putting them into practice.
Scholars have found, perhaps unsurprisingly, that movements that 
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win are really good at taking action. They do so at the individual and 
local level, at the community level, and even at state, regional, and 
global levels. To address an issue like climate change, we cannot focus 
only on the local community. Movements also need to take action at 
national and international levels.
Social movements link together all the work at those different lev-
els, and a story about a woman named Frances Willard shows how. 
In the United States in the early twentieth century, Willard started the 
temperance movement—the movement against alcohol that eventually 
led to Prohibition. But she started out as an advocate against domestic 
violence. When Willard realized that alcohol was causing a great deal 
of domestic violence, she decided her goal was to pass a constitutional 
amendment banning alcohol.
In the United States, passing a constitutional amendment is quite 
difficult. That amendment has to be passed by a supermajority in both 
houses of Congress, and then three-quarters of the states have to agree 
to it as well. But that was Frances Willard’s goal, and she went about 
it by starting a social movement. She traveled all over the US by train, 
trying to identify people who wanted to join the movement. If someone 
wanted to join, the first thing she asked that person to do was take 
a pledge to swear off alcohol. She started with the individual’s own 
behavior.
Then, after a new member of the movement swore off alcohol, 
Willard asked the person to join with others in the local community to 
shut down a bar. She did this not because she thought that whether 
Joe’s Bar was open in Anytown, USA, mattered much for the movement, 
but because she wanted people to have the experience of working with 
others. She wanted them to realize what they could do when they came 
together with others to achieve a particular purpose, so that they would 
be committed to that process of collective action.
Finally, after they tried to shut down that bar—it didn’t matter if 
they had succeeded in doing so or not—she would invite them into 
the movement. By inviting a set of people into the movement who had 
developed those capacities of working with others, and who had been 
personally transformed in that way, Frances Willard was eventually able 
to get a constitutional amendment banning alcohol passed.
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We tell that story not to advocate for banning alcohol, but simply 
to make the point that whenever we take measurable, effective action, 
we need to think about how we can link individual action to community 
action to national or international action. A major question and chal-
lenge that we confront when we consider social movements to address 
climate change is: What is our Joe’s Bar? Where can we join with others 
to realize the power that we can have together—not study it by reading 
a book or taking a class, but instead believe it in our gut so that convic-
tion carries us forward into the work that we have to do? (Figure 5.5.1.)
By actually engaging in all of these leadership practices—creating 
shared purpose, building relational commitment, creating interdepen-
dent structures, developing creative strategy, and taking measurable, 
effective action—we come to realize that, whether we’re addressing 
climate change or any other kind of issue, the work begins with us, 
because we are the change that we need.
Figure 5.5.1 Finding our “Joe’s Bar”—the experience that teaches us to work 
with others—can be difficult, but people around the world are coming together 
to call for climate action, as these fossil fuel divestment activists did at the 
University of California in 2013. Photograph by Jamie Oliveira. Reproduced from 
Flickr.
5-30 Chapter 5: Your Leadership
5.6  Summary
We have taken a journey together over the course of this chapter, so let 
us pause here to summarize what we have learned. We started by rec-
ognizing that climate change is not a problem that can be solved by any 
one fix. Solutions that involve technological innovation, economic incen-
tives, communications, and information are all important in addressing 
it. But climate change is also a problem of power, so our efforts to 
confront it also have to include collective action and social movements. 
Sections 5.1 and 5.2 defined problems of power as those in which the 
people who need change the most don’t have the authority or ability to 
make that change.
Social movements and collective action help us address those 
power imbalances. Sections 5.2 and 5.3 discussed examples of social 
movements and examined the role that leadership plays in enabling such 
movements to make change. We focused on how social movements 
transform individuals and then society. Social movements address power 
imbalances by engaging people in political action that is fundamentally 
transformative—through transformational organizing, which differs from 
transactional mobilizing. In particular, Section 5.3 focused on the role 
that social movement leaders play in engaging people in ways that build 
their capacity for sustained activism.
Finally, in Sections 5.4 and 5.5, we ended by looking at a particular 
set of leadership practices that enable transformation. Leadership prac-
tices that are focused on building power include developing relational 
commitment, creating shared purpose, and building interdependent 
structures. Social movement leaders then take all the power that they’ve 
built and deploy it to create political influence by developing creative 
strategy and taking measurable, effective action.
We hope that this chapter has shown how you, as climate cham-
pions, can embrace opportunities to join with others to build social 
movements that can enable and demand action on climate change. 
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Remember that social movements are much more than marches, and 
seek out your Joe’s Bar—the local place that can serve as a focus for your 
actions on this global problem.
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Learning Objectives
1. Understand why integral solutions, including social and behavioral 
change, are necessary for tackling climate change.
2. Understand why local solutions are often most effective in 
producing social change.
3. Examine several exemplary Latin American urban case studies in 
which social transformation was a key strategy.
4. Prepare to think about what universities and colleges can do to 
cultivate social transformation in their own communities.
This chapter has four goals. First, it will show why integral solutions—
including changing social attitudes, norms, and behaviors—are essential 
for tackling climate change. Second, you will learn why localizing and 
personalizing the impacts of climate change are the most effective strate-
gies for changing social attitudes, norms, and behaviors. Third, you’ll be 
exposed to several exemplary case studies in which social transformation 
played a key role in efforts to address climate change in Latin American 
cities. And fourth, you’ll be prepared to think about how universities and 
colleges can cultivate social transformation in their own communities.
Overview
This chapter will explore the importance of transforming social attitudes 
and behavior, locally and globally, as an essential strategy for tackling 
climate change.
Clean energy technologies and climate-forward public policy are 
essential tools for tackling climate change, but they are not enough. The 
most exciting innovations in green technology will not matter if people 
are not willing to use them and to integrate these technologies into their 
lives and livelihoods. Likewise, the best policy proposals, at home and 
abroad, will only take root and grow if publics are willing to support 
these policies through political processes. Social attitudes, norms, and 
behaviors typically determine whether a new technology will succeed 
in practice, or whether a policy proposal will ever see the light of day.
The chapter will proceed in four sections. Section 6.1 explores 
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climate change as a complex, integral challenge that requires equally 
complex, integral solutions. Our emphasis will be on the importance of 
integrating social transformation into integral solutions thinking and ac-
tion. Section 6.2 focuses on strategies of social transformation, demon-
strating that we are likelier to produce changes in social attitudes and 
behavior by “going local” and making impacts “personal” in order to mo-
tivate public interest and investment in solving the problem of climate 
change. Section 6.3 explores cities as living laboratories for thinking and 
action based on integral solutions. We will highlight several exemplary 
case studies in Latin American cities where social transformation played 
a central role in creating not only more green cities, but more equita-
ble ones as well. Our discussion emphasizes the significance of local 
action. Section 6.4 introduces a social transformation experiment at UC 
San Diego, called the UCSD Community Stations. It is a new model 
of university- community partnership for local social transformation 
through climate education and participatory climate action that can be 
replicated at universities and colleges everywhere.
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When we speak of the “environment,” what we really mean is a 
relationship existing between nature and the society which lives in it. 
Nature cannot be regarded as something separate from ourselves or as 
a mere setting in which we live. We are part of nature, included in it and 
thus in constant interaction with it. Recognizing the reasons why a given 
area is polluted requires a study of the workings of society, its economy, 
its behaviour patterns, and the ways it grasps reality. Given the scale of 
change, it is no longer possible to find a specific, discrete answer for 
each part of the problem. It is essential to seek comprehensive solutions 
which consider the interactions within natural systems themselves and 
with social systems. We are faced not with two separate crises, one 
environmental and the other social, but rather with one complex crisis 
which is both social and environmental. Strategies for a solution demand 
an integrated approach to combating poverty, restoring dignity to the 
excluded, and at the same time protecting nature.
His Holiness Pope Francis, Laudato Si’, ch.4: 139
Integral ecology
In Laudato Si’, Pope Francis’s 2015 encyclical on climate change, he 
described the relationship between humans and the natural world as 
an “integral ecology.” With the word integral, he means to emphasize 
that human well-being and environmental well-being are inherently in-
tertwined. We cannot speak of one without necessarily implicating the 
other. Caring about human health and prosperity entails caring about the 
environment in which all human life takes place. The concept of integral 
ecology has been used for decades by environmentalists to describe the 
inherent interdependence of humans and nature, but it has taken on a 
particular salience and urgency in our era of rapid global warming.
In Laudato Si’, Pope Francis emphasizes two dimensions of this 
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interdependence between humans and nature. The first relates to the 
environmental impacts of human action. There is no longer any doubt that 
human activities—especially the energy consumption and production 
habits of the wealthy minority across our planet—are rapidly acceler-
ating climate change. There is also no doubt that together we must 
change these behaviors if warming is to be slowed down. The second 
dimension relates to the human impacts of climate change. Climate change 
is inflaming human suffering across the world, particularly among the 
world’s poorest and most vulnerable populations, exacerbating poverty, 
dislocation, disease, and mortality. What this means for Pope Francis 
is that climate change and poverty must be tackled together, as an in-
tegral two-headed beast. He wrote: “Strategies for a solution demand 
an integrated approach to combating poverty, restoring dignity to the 
excluded, and at the same time protecting nature.”
The culpability of our planet’s wealthy minority in exacerbating cli-
mate change, and in the consequential suffering of the poor and vulnera-
ble majority, raise important issues of climate justice and the imperative 
for urgent adaptation strategies across the world, which are explored 
in Chapter 2. Here, we are focused on designing effective strategies to 
rapidly mitigate climate change, which will alleviate longer-term impacts 
on us all, rich and poor, born and not yet born.
Tackling a challenge as deep, complex, and urgent as climate change 
requires new strategies of lateral collaboration across diverse knowl-
edges and capacities. Natural scientists and social sciences need to join 
forces. Economists, policy experts, and public health researchers must 
come together with inventors of new technologies and philanthropists 
who have the capacity to invest in them. But integral thinking requires 
more than getting experts and elites around a table to share their knowl-
edges and strategies.
Tackling climate change in an integral way also requires vertical 
collaboration between the politicians and researchers and the grass-
roots organizations, religious leaders, educators, and cultural producers 
who are closer to what is happening on the ground. These community 
leaders are essential partners in designing more effective strategies to 
transform social attitudes, norms, and behaviors among the young and 
the old from the bottom up and in cultivating new habits of climate 
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action among the general public. In other words, the “experts” need 
to figure out how to mobilize and democratize scientific knowledge to 
inform public opinion.
The University of California’s Bending the Curve report of 2015 was a 
bold experiment in integral thinking that convened diverse knowledges 
and capacities in both lateral and vertical ways. Under the leadership of 
UC San Diego climatologist V. Ramanathan, the report drew upon the 
scientific, technological, economic, social, and policy innovations that 
have made the state of California a global environmental leader over the 
past decades. Bending the Curve summoned 50 researchers from across 
the University of California system—from the sciences, social sciences, 
finance, public health, and the humanities—to identify ten integral and 
scalable solutions to climate change drawn from the California experi-
ence (Figure 6.1.1). Bending the Curve marked a powerful moment of 
unity and vision for the public university. California governor Jerry Brown 
helped to launch the report, and he carried it with him to COP21—the 
2015 United Nations Climate Change Conference in Paris—with the idea 
that California’s successes could be a model for the world.
COP21 was a historic moment for global cooperation on climate 
Figure 6.1.1 A diagram 
of the integral climate 
change solutions proposed 
in the 2015 Bending 
the Curve report. From 
Ramanathan et al. 2016.
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change solutions. The goal of the conference was to create a universal, 
binding agreement to reduce greenhouse emissions across the planet. 
On December 12, 2015, the 196 participating countries arrived at a 
consensus and signed the Paris Agreement, which stipulated that each 
country agreed to do what was necessary to reduce carbon emissions 
and keep global warming “well below 2 degrees Celsius.” The agreement 
went into effect on November 4, 2016. Thirteen months later, President 
Donald Trump withdrew the United States from the Paris Agreement, 
claiming that it was a “bad deal” for America. But the story is not yet 
over. We still have time to act together on integral solutions to climate 
change.
Culture of collaboration
Climate change is too big and too complex a problem for any single 
sector, discipline, or approach to solve alone. Climate change is not just 
a technological problem or a scientific problem or a medical problem 
or a finance problem or a policy problem. Pursuing only one dimension 
of the problem, or failing to understand how multiple dimensions are 
connected with each other, will not accelerate climate change solutions. 
We need to work together across all these disciplinary boundaries.
The 2015 Bending the Curve report’s third proposed solution focused 
on designing a new culture of collaboration around climate change:
Deepen the global culture of climate collaboration. Design venues 
where stakeholders, community and religious leaders converge 
around concrete problems with researchers and scholars from all 
academic disciplines, with the overall goal of initiating collaborative 
actions to mitigate climate disruption.
But recognizing that we should work together across disciplines 
is one thing; actually learning how to do so is quite another. Working 
across disciplines is not something people and institutions innately know 
how to do. Such cooperation needs to be designed and facilitated. Col-
laboration is a skill—something we must learn how to do. Therefore we 
must not only cultivate collaborative opportunities, but also develop the 
skills and habits of collaboration.
Universities tend to be very siloed institutions, which means that the 
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boundaries we have created between divisions, departments, and majors 
tend to be thick, with too few opportunities or incentives for movement 
and cross-disciplinary connection across them. Boundaries are effective 
tools for organizing complex institutions, but they are largely artificial. 
They typically don’t reflect the way the real world works, or the need 
to organize integral solutions to our most challenging social problems.
Universities often talk about the value of “interdisciplinarity,” and 
there are certainly opportunities for undergraduates to pursue interdis-
ciplinary minors and take courses team-taught by faculty from different 
areas of the campus. But these opportunities are rare. They are not 
the norm on most college and university campuses. If we are serious 
about fostering cultures of collaboration, we must design new spaces 
for collaborative research, teaching, and learning around deep social 
challenges like climate change. No one discipline or way of knowing or 
doing can solve this problem alone. This means that we need to rethink 
university culture itself, including the way we conduct our research and 
our teaching.
University of California’s Bending the Curve course provides an ex-
cellent model of how universities can create spaces for integral research 
and education. One of the major benefits of this course is that students 
come from a great variety of disciplines and together learn how to view 
the challenges of climate change, and to think about solutions, through 
multiple lenses. Some students who take this course are required to de-
velop team-based projects on “living laboratories.” Through this exercise, 
they come to recognize the value of distributing tasks to team members 
who have diverse skills and varying bodies of knowledge. Additionally, 
these students learn how to communicate their diverse knowledges and 
skills to classmates in other fields in clear and accessible ways.
Beyond creating new spaces for collaboration across disciplines 
within the university, however, researchers also need to rethink how 
we engage people outside the university, in the so-called real world. 
Universities too often think of themselves as bearers of knowledge and 
truth, and of the world as lacking knowledge. Universities, like other 
institutions of power, often see their relationship to the world in vertical 
terms, with all knowledge flowing downward. When universities engage 
other sectors and publics, they too often forget how much knowledge 
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exists outside of formal educational institutions, and how much univer-
sity researchers can learn from that knowledge. This becomes particu-
larly true and ethically problematic when universities approach disad-
vantaged communities as empty receptacles waiting to be filled with 
“our” knowledge. Academic research is often infused with assumptions 
that “we” know more, that we are “trained experts,” that only we have 
languages to convey complex ideas—in short, that we enter the world 
to save it, not to learn from it. However, engagement with worlds of 
practice reveals that these assumptions are just wrongheaded, that ac-
ademic researchers do not know everything they think they know, and 
that they have as much to learn from the world as it does from them—
and possibly more.
We need a more horizontal model of collaboration between scien-
tists, designers, and the people who are the intended users of new tech-
nologies. There are both pragmatic and ethical reasons for this. Consider 
the challenges of technology transfer. Technology transfer refers to 
the processes by which innovative designs in science and technology are 
translated from concept into practice. What might appear to be a good 
solution to the scientist or designer in the lab may not actually work in 
practice. We cannot simply design solutions out of whole cloth, drop 
them down on the world, and expect that they will work. Technology 
transfer needs the bottom-up participation of intended users, both in 
the design of new technologies and in the social strategies for adopting 
and integrating new technologies into existing practices.
Technology transfer has important ethical dimensions as well. From 
an ethical perspective, people need to be the stewards of their own des-
tiny and to understand and embrace the technologies that will change 
the way they live, the way they move from place to place, communicate, 
cook, and so on. This ethical imperative is most profound when engag-
ing the bottom 3 billion—that is, the 3 billion people who are especially 
vulnerable because of their reliance on natural resources and are already 
disproportionately harmed by climate change.
Project Surya, led by UC San Diego professor V. Ramanathan, pro-
vides a powerful example. This project is committed to tackling both 
the impact of short-lived climate pollutants on the Earth’s atmosphere 
and their more immediate impact on public health, particularly among 
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women and children. Project Surya is an integral intervention—involving 
scientists, designers, economists, and social scientists—that designs and 
deploys low-carbon-emission cookstoves in the villages of rural India 
(Figure 6.1.2).
Project Surya is also an ethical intervention because it engages in-
tended recipients of the stoves as participants in designing, using, and 
distributing the stoves. It does not drop new technology down upon 
the poor as if they were passive subjects. Respecting the agency and 
dignity of these women means listening to their accounts of how new 
cookstove technology will affect their lives and how it might disrupt 
their current cooking practices, which are typically deeply rooted in cul-
tural norms and practices. The scientist cannot assume that resistance 
is a manifestation of ignorance. A woman in rural India might not want 
to use a clean-burning cookstove because it doesn’t work well for her, 
because it makes her chores more difficult, because her family does not 
like how the food tastes when she uses it, and so forth.
Ethical technology transfer entails respecting these local responses 
and integrating them into an iterative design process in which designers 
take such concerns seriously and continue revising and improving their 
technologies accordingly. This kind of give-and-take cultivates genuine 
social receptivity to the new technologies. From the perspective of 
Figure 6.1.2 Project Surya: women in a rural Indian village discuss the 
benefits of adopting a cleaner cookstove. Reproduced with permission from 
Project Surya.
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climate justice, the participation of vulnerable people in designing cli-
mate change solutions is essential.
But there are pragmatic considerations as well. Without social ac-
ceptance and buy-in from the bottom up, climate mitigation strategies, 
like the introduction of clean cookstoves, will be less effective. Climate 
action in sites of scarcity is best achieved through bottom-up climate 
education and avenues for participatory climate action that stimulate in-
dividual and collective agency, capacity, and hope. If the scientist doesn’t 
take existing cultural practices and constraints into account when de-
signing new technologies and social adoption strategies, levels of adop-
tion may be disappointing. The technology must either accommodate 
local preferences and practices, or else come with additional incentives 
that make it attractive to potential users despite any trade-offs.
The conclusion is that researchers, innovators, and climate activ-
ists need to be closely attuned to the needs and preferences of in-
tended users for both ethical and pragmatic reasons. Collaborating with 
intended- user communities is an integral and ethical social strategy for 
designing more effective and sustainable solutions.
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6.2   Social Innovation: Get Personal, Go Local
Social transformation
The 2015 Bending the Curve report’s second solution focuses on trans-
forming social attitudes, norms, and behaviors around climate change, 
and cultivating support for the policies, technologies, and actions that 
are necessary to accelerate a low-carbon global economy:
Foster a global culture of climate action through coordinated public 
communication and education at local to global scales. Combine 
technology and policy solutions with innovative approaches to 
changing social attitudes and behavior.
In other words, innovations in technology and policy are not enough 
to change our world. They must be accompanied by social transforma-
tion at varying scales, from the global to the local, from the very wealthy 
to the very poor. From the perspective of climate justice, the wealthy 
global minority must change its energy consumption and production 
habits as well as invest in sustainable development across the globe. The 
vulnerable global majority must be welcomed into climate action less 
as voiceless recipients of charity than as active participants in solutions.
Just as we need innovative clean energy technologies, policies, and 
financial tools to bend the curve of greenhouse gas emissions down-
ward, we also need innovative and ethical social technologies to change 
attitudes, norms, and behaviors regarding climate change and how to 
tackle it. Just as our new technologies must draw on the best science 
and our new policies must be grounded in the best economic and policy 
research, our social strategies need to be grounded in the best social 
science research on climate communication and climate education.
Changing hearts and minds is not easy. According to a 2017 Gal-
lup poll, only 42% of Americans believe that climate change will pose 
a serious threat in their lifetimes. There is much public apathy and a 
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human tendency to see other social and economic pressures, closer to 
home, as more urgent. There is also significant public hostility to the 
idea of climate change and the politicians and scientists who warn us 
about it. Willful misinformation and distortion in public discourse—often 
motivated and funded by those invested in the status quo—stoke this 
hostility. The orchestrated denial of science in recent years has obscured 
a clear message about the reality of climate change and its projected 
harms. Additionally, the politicized clustering of contentious social issues 
has undermined the formation of broader coalitions. Bundling climate 
change with other policy agendas like abortion, LGBTQ rights, and gun 
control has forced a wedge between otherwise potentially like-minded 
publics who could unite to conserve our Earth.
How do we intervene? How do we change attitudes and behaviors 
around climate change when there are so many conflicting agendas and 
ideologies, so many counterpressures and disincentives? Research on 
the most effective strategies of social transformation makes it clear that 
providing better information alone will not work. Changing attitudes 
and behaviors is not like pouring knowledge into an empty vessel. Edu-
cating people about the facts will not necessarily produce new attitudes 
and behaviors, since individuals live in social and political contexts in 
which their beliefs and behaviors are mediated by others. What those 
around us think and do has a great influence on what we think and do. 
Through his research, social psychologist Robert Cialdini shows that we 
must recognize the role that social norms play in motivating our beliefs 
and actions regarding many policy issues, including climate change.
Moreover, social science research demonstrates that when peo-
ple understand precisely how climate change will affect their personal 
well-being, the well-being of their loved ones, and their own cities and 
neighborhoods, their minds open and their attitudes begin to change. 
Focus group research demonstrates that when people understand in 
more particular ways what’s at stake for them, they become more recep-
tive to climate-friendly public policy. We will explore this focus group 
research further below, but for the climate communicator, it means that 
presenting climate change in terms of melting ice caps and polar bears 
far away will not have the same transformative impact on attitudes as 
emphasizing the local urgencies for a particular audience.
Chapter 6: Social Transformation 6-15
However, changing attitudes is not the same thing as changing be-
haviors. We need to distinguish them. How can people be moved from 
changing what they know to changing what they do? Social science has 
important things to say here. We will see in the same focus group re-
search that attitudes are likelier to inspire new behaviors when concrete 
opportunities for local climate action are made apparent and available 
to people. The likelihood of behavioral change increases further when 
these pathways for action are collective and participatory in nature 
and pursued in concert with one’s friends and neighbors rather than 
individually.
In this section we will further explore the strategies of “getting per-
sonal” and “going local.” In our discussion of getting personal, we will 
consider public health and well-being as a lever for social transforma-
tion. In our discussion of going local, we will focus on cities as living 
laboratories for successful social transformation.
Get personal
Too many people today are insufficiently moved by climate science to 
support climate change mitigation policies, technologies, and actions. 
Too many people are also immune to the ethical imperatives of climate 
justice: that we must mitigate warming for the unborn and for the most 
vulnerable people on our planet. This book identifies what we might 
think of as “levers” that can be pulled to bend the curve of global warm-
ing. Is it possible to identify a lever to move people who are largely re-
sistant to arguments based in science, ethics, or the public good? How 
do we rouse people from the status quo and move them to question 
political agendas and ideologies that deny the reality of climate change? 
Is it possible to instigate a change in attitudes, norms, and behaviors?
The 2015 Bending the Curve report explored the disproportionate 
public health impacts of climate change. But at that time, we had not yet 
investigated the value of public health predictions for communicating 
climate change. Public health itself can be a lever to change people’s 
minds and raise awareness about the urgent problems everyone on this 
planet is facing. Most individuals are typically most interested in what 
affects them, their families, and their communities. Most of the time, 
they are not motivated by the interests of others. One important reason 
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why climate change has not gotten more social traction is because it 
can seem remote, spatially and temporally, from the everyday interests 
of most people. People are less likely to make personal sacrifices when 
climate change is framed as a threat to polar bears or to people on the 
other side of the planet.
To bring climate change home for people, we must show that its 
impacts are personal and highly relevant to an individual’s understanding 
of her own interests and well-being. The public health risks of a warming 
planet—which can cause stroke, cardiovascular disease, and respiratory 
disease, for example—make it clear that climate change will harm in-
dividuals all over the world. This knowledge will give those individuals 
reason to become personally invested in solutions.
As you know from reading this book, “mitigating climate change” 
should be synonymous in people’s minds with “preserving my health and 
well-being.” But this is not yet the case, and communicating it entails 
a strategic shift in the language we use to characterize the impacts of 
climate change. We need to shift from a collective, ethical language 
about the well-being of the planet and the commons to an individualist 
language about the well-being of the self—from a language of dispropor-
tionate impacts on the distant and the poor to a generalized language 
of public health risks for all. Even though we know that climate change 
disproportionately impacts the poor and vulnerable, it will nevertheless 
affect everyone. It is essential in our public communications to gen-
eralize impacts, to expand the circle of potential victimhood, and to 
stimulate a broader sense of public urgency. Because we are all in peril, 
regardless of our wealth and social position, public health becomes an 
important social lever for social change.
The early modern idea of enlightened self-interest is instructive 
here. Economist Albert Hirschman characterized this idea as a substitute 
for ethics. Enlightened self-interest helps explain why individuals using 
reason sometimes sacrifice immediate pleasures for social or collec-
tive ends, even though they are not motivated by social or collective 
reasons to do so. There is a rational calculation behind such a trade-
off: an individual can be motivated to support climate-friendly policy, 
technologies, and actions through nothing but the prudent exercise of 
her own self-interest. Prudence in the pursuit of something one loves or 
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wants can restrain present gratification (in this case, unimpeded energy 
consumption and carbon production) for a greater benefit in the future 
(health and well-being). Enlightened self-interest serves as a proxy for 
ethical motivation and demonstrates how individual and collective ends 
can converge.
Trade-offs are obviously not new to discussion about climate change 
solutions. The effectiveness of incentives—of using carrots rather than 
sticks to stimulate climate-friendly choices—is an important public policy 
lever. One of California’s sometimes controversial success stories (cap 
and trade) highlights the ethical compromises incentives always entail. 
Along these lines of thinking about carrots, we ought to think strategically 
about how to communicate the public health risks of climate change.
Faith leaders have sometimes been effective messengers about 
climate change, depoliticizing the issue through scriptural inspiration, 
Figure 6.2.1 This image is from a protest that occurred in New York 
City while the COP21 meetings took place in Paris. The message here has 
been shifted from a conventional ethical mode (protect others, protect the 
environment) to a prudent mode—one should protect one’s own interests, the 
things that one loves. Photograph by Joe Brusky on Flickr.
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respect for Mother Earth, and divine compassion for our fellow crea-
tures. Religious communities can help to promote new social norms—an 
important dimension of sustainable behavioral shifts. Public health may 
have the capacity to transform attitudes and behaviors at even broader 
scales by moving people to protect what they love—not Mother Earth 
primarily, not all humanity primarily, but people’s personal well-being 
and the well-being of their families, friends, and communities (Figure 
6.2.1).
To communicate the public health risks associated with climate 
change, perhaps doctors and health practitioners can be effective mes-
sengers. Perhaps they are less susceptible than politicians, journalists, 
scientists, and intellectuals to being characterized as biased in political 
rhetoric. They certainly are capable of engaging people where they are—
in the intimacy of an examination room—and personalizing the impact of 
climate change. It may be that the general practitioner, the pediatrician, 
the obstetrician/gynecologist, the midwife, and the nurse practitioner 
are among our most important climate communicators and educators 
right now. This entails, then, that we shift how we train our health 
professionals today. Medical schools will need to become increasingly 
more collaborative, interdisciplinary, community engaged, and better 
insulated from corporate agendas. They need to commit themselves to 
integrating environmental health, education, and policy agendas more 
explicitly into their mission.
Go local
“Getting personal” has a lot to do with place. One way to get personal 
is to help people understand the risks of climate change for their own 
cities and neighborhoods. The social science research also tells us to “go 
local”: people are more receptive to climate-friendly public policy when 
they better understand the specific impacts of climate change on their 
own communities. A study of attitudes and behaviors among residents 
of low-lying coastal communities in south Florida, commissioned by 
the Union of Concerned Scientists, found that climate-friendly attitudes 
are likelier to take root when the impending negative effects of climate 
change are made concrete and relevant for people, rather than abstract 
like far-off melting ice caps and polar bears.
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Proximity matters! Focus group research has found, for example, 
that when people understand precisely how sea level rise will affect 
their own city, neighborhood, or block, their attitudes change (Figure 
6.2.2). They are likelier to become receptive to the idea that global 
warming is a problem and supportive of local climate-friendly public 
policy. This is even true for a majority of individuals who describe them-
selves as politically conservative. This study also found that people are 
likelier to change their behaviors when concrete opportunities for local 
climate action are made available to them. Knowing the risks without 
having opportunities to act can produce paralysis.
When people are provided with pathways for action, they are like-
lier to act and to develop new habits of climate action. The likelihood of 
behavioral transformation increases when those opportunities for action 
are collective, participatory actions involving neighbors, friends, fellow 
congregants, and others in a person’s immediate social reference group. 
This research has been reinforced by the success of neighborhood-based 
participatory climate action projects across the world, documented by 
organizations like Climate Action Network International and the Climate 
Figure 6.2.2 Miami Beach residents crossing flooded streets, an accelerating 
impact of sea level rise in south Florida. Photograph from siralbertus on Flickr.
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Justice Alliance. These observations are also consistent with network 
theory in the social sciences, which claims that social behavior is infec-
tious, that people are likelier to engage in a particular behavior when 
their social reference group (that is, their peers, friends, and neighbors) 
engages in that behavior. This is true of harmful behaviors like smoking 
and excessive drinking. But it is also true of positive, pro-social behav-
iors like seat belt usage, vaccination, and climate action.
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6.3  Cities as Living Laboratories
In this section, we further explore the value of “going local” by investi-
gating cities as living laboratories of social transformation. Political theo-
rist Ben Barber founded the Global Parliament of Mayors, which is ded-
icated to swift, coordinated global action around social challenges that 
nation-states have often been too slow and clumsy to tackle effectively. 
He believed this was particularly true with regard to climate change. As 
Barber put it, “cities are the coolest political institutions on earth.”
In the United States, most of the action on reducing emissions and 
on coping with climate change generally has not taken place at the fed-
eral level. States, localities, and corporations have done much more 
than the national government. This is true across the world as well. 
There has been deeper commitment to coordinated climate action at 
the municipal level than at the national level. Agile, environmentally pro-
gressive mayors have coordinated integral collaborations and regional 
coalitions to produce rapid change.
After the release of Laudato Si’ in spring 2015, Pope Francis called for 
urgent, coordinated action, and he began by summoning mayors. The 
mayors who convened at the Vatican in July 2015 urged world leaders to 
pass a “bold climate agreement that confines global warming to a limit 
safe for humanity, while protecting the poor and the vulnerable from 
ongoing climate change that gravely endangers their lives,” according to 
a New York Times story about the meeting.
The Pope is from Argentina, of course, and there is perhaps some-
thing distinctively Latin American about why the Pope began with may-
ors. Latin American cities in recent decades have been particularly suc-
cessful at transforming attitudes and behaviors around climate change 
and environmental health while producing more equitable outcomes for 
urban residents. Many Latin American cities have become almost myth-
ical as living laboratories of equitable green urbanization, committed to 
advancing social justice and climate justice together.
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A good place to begin is Bogotá, Colombia, in the 1990s. Philoso-
pher Antanas Mockus became mayor of Bogotá during its most intense 
period of violence in the late 1990s and early 2000s. It was a scene of 
social chaos and urban breakdown, unemployment, poverty, and chok-
ing air quality—the worst anywhere on the continent. People referred to 
Bogotá as the most dangerous city on the planet; it seemed a Hobbesian 
war of all against all was underway there.
Mockus declared that urban transformation begins not with “law 
and order” and not with new infrastructure—that would come later—but 
with civic strategies designed to transform social attitudes, norms, and 
behavior, to change hearts and minds collectively and individually. He 
became legendary for the distinctive ways he intervened in the behav-
ioral dysfunction of urban Bogotá, using the arts, culture, and some-
times outrageous performative interventions to dramatically reduce 
violence and lawlessness, reconnect citizens with their government and 
with each other, increase tax collection, reduce water consumption, and 
ultimately improve quality of life for the poor.
One particularly well-known example was the citizenship cards proj-
ect. Soon after taking office, Mockus distributed small cards across the 
city, hundreds of thousands of them, each depicting a thumb (Figure 
6.3.1). He encouraged people to use the thumb card to express ap-
proval and disapproval toward one another as they moved through the 
city. So when you saw something that violated your sense of urban 
dignity, you’d show the card thumbs down. At first, people thought this 
was crazy. But what happened was that people began to look at each 
Figure 6.3.1 Placards used by Mayor 
Antanas Mockus in 1995 to stimulate a 
sense of mutual responsibility among the 
citizens of Bogotá. He encouraged people 
to use the thumbs to express approval and 
disapproval of one another’s behaviors. 
Reproduced from CÍVICO Bogotá.
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other again, and they began to recognize how their actions affect others 
and how the actions of others affect them. Through this performative 
gesture, people were deciding together on the kind of city they wanted 
to inhabit. Social norms began to change; public trust began to emerge.
These cultural changes paved the way for Mayor Enrique Peñalosa’s 
renowned green infrastructural interventions in the succeeding admin-
istration. Sometimes called the world’s most transit-friendly mayor, 
Peñalosa launched a multinodal transportation network comprising bus 
rapid transit, bicycle hubs, ciclovia (bikeways), and dedicated walking 
paths that stitched sprawling Bogotá together. This project involved 
massive cross-sector collaboration and helped to revolutionize public 
transportation in Latin America (Figure 6.3.2). In other words, shifting 
Figure 6.3.2 Bogotá’s Transmilenio bus rapid transit (BRT) system in the 
early 2000s became a model for BRTs. Photograph by Felipe Restrepo Acosta on 
Wikimedia Commons.
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social norms came first, and the transit interventions followed. This is an 
important insight for us today as we think about developing sustainable 
solutions for cities.
Like Mockus before him, Peñalosa understood that changing so-
cial norms was essential to his egalitarian transportation agenda. He 
famously said, “A developed country is not a place where the poor 
have cars; it is a place where the rich ride public transportation.” Like 
Mockus, Peñalosa was committed to modeling positive behavior and 
rode a bicycle wherever he went. He often claimed that a citizen on a 
$30 bicycle is as important as one in a $30,000 car, bringing social equity 
together with environmental and climate justice.
Mockus and Peñalosa emerged from a long tradition of participa-
tory urbanization across Latin America, stewarded by climate-forward 
mayors who were inspired by Brazilian educator and philosopher Paulo 
Freire and his “critical pedagogy” for reclaiming the humanity of the 
colonized. These mayors committed to robust agendas of civic partici-
pation in order to ignite a sense of collective agency and dignity among 
the poor and, ultimately, to produce greener and more equitable cities. 
For example, in the 1980s, Workers’ Party mayors in Porto Alegre, Brazil, 
experimented with participatory budgeting, in which communities got 
to decide together how to allocate a percentage of the municipal budget 
for their own neighborhoods. In the same decade, Mayor Jaime Lerner 
pioneered bus rapid transit and dozens of green interventions across 
Curitiba, Brazil. In the early 2000s, the “social urbanism” of Mayor Sergio 
Fajardo of Medellín, Colombia, transformed public spaces and green 
infrastructure into sites of education and citizenship building—and made 
Medellín a global model of urban social justice. This tradition still thrives 
in cities across the continent, from La Paz to Quito to Mexico City, 
and carries important lessons for equitable green urbanization in cities 
across the world today.
Researchers at UC San Diego have been inspired by these Latin 
American models of participatory green urbanization and are working 
to adapt these lessons to disadvantaged areas in the neighboring cit-
ies of San Diego, USA, and Tijuana, Mexico. In the final section of this 
chapter, we will explore the UCSD Community Stations as a model of 
integral, university-community partnership for local climate action.
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6.4  The UCSD Community Stations
Social science research confirms that individual and collective behavioral 
change in disadvantaged communities begins with community-based 
education and that successful educational initiatives localize climate 
change by linking global challenges to concrete local conditions. In dis-
advantaged neighborhoods plagued by poverty, violence, failing schools, 
and failing infrastructure, climate can seem remote from the acute chal-
lenges of everyday life. Disadvantaged urban populations are likelier to 
change consumption and production habits when they understand the 
linkages between climate and local effects in their neighborhoods and 
when opportunities for participatory action with local impact are made 
available to them.
Led by UC San Diego political science professor Fonna Forman (the 
author of this chapter) and UC San Diego visual arts professor Teddy 
Cruz, the UC San Diego Community Stations are a network of field 
stations located in disadvantaged neighborhoods across the San Diego 
and Tijuana region. In the stations, university researchers and students 
partner with community-based nonprofits on projects involving environ-
mental literacy and climate action. We have three stations distributed 
throughout the region (Figure 6.4.1).
The Community Stations are committed to three main climate 
change agendas: (1) providing community-based climate education for 
undergraduate and graduate students on our campus, teaching them 
to become effective climate educators; (2) increasing climate literacy 
among adults and especially children in the communities we partner 
with; and (3) stewarding high-impact participatory climate action proj-
ects at neighborhood scales. These projects range from small-scale 
activities like community workshops and demonstrations to designing 
and financing net zero retrofits of homes, schools, and businesses. Each 
summer, through the Blum Summer Field Internship, we fund dozens of 
UCSD students from 15 majors and minors across the campus to work 
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on integral, team-based research projects on climate change, sustain-
ability, and environmental health in the UCSD Community Stations.*
Take, for example, UC San Diego’s EarthLab Community Station, a 
partnership with the environmental nonprofit Groundwork San Diego, 
which is located in Encanto, San Diego’s most challenged inner-city 
neighborhood, near Chollas Creek, the city’s most polluted waterway. 
EarthLab is a 4-acre outdoor environmental classroom and climate ac-
tion park, equipped with community gardens, water-harvesting facilities, 
a solar house, an energy “nanogrid,” and other green infrastructure, all 
designed by university researchers as learning tools for the six public 
schools in walking distance of the site. Thousands of low-income youth 
and their families circulate through EarthLab each year, learning about 
the impacts of climate change and environmental degradation in their 
own neighborhoods and participating locally in climate action in con-
crete ways (Figure 6.4.2). 
We’re now in the process of designing a master plan for the Earth-
Lab to increase its capacity into the future, focusing on food, energy, 
and water, the major challenges of environmental justice in underserved 
communities today. And we’ve been recognized by the California En-
ergy Commission for our potential to change behaviors and attitudes 
*The Blum Summer Field Internship was made possible by University of California 
Regent Richard C. Blum and the Andrew W. Mellon Foundation.
Figure 6.4.1 The UCSD 
Community Stations Network. 
Reproduced with permission from 
Teddy Cruz and Fonna Forman.
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in this community. In 2017, we received an Electric Program Investment 
Charge (EPIC) grant to design a “near-zero net energy community” for 
the surrounding neighborhood. EarthLab will serve as a base for the 
solar power and energy storage infrastructure that will make this possi-
ble. This project demonstrates how the university can use its leverage to 
partner with local nonprofits not only to change attitudes and behaviors, 
but also to facilitate high-impact climate action projects in underserved 
neighborhoods.
The UCSD Community Stations also focus on climate change and 
poverty in the neighborhoods that flank the US-Mexico border sepa-
rating San Diego and Tijuana. Given UC San Diego’s proximity to the 
international border, we’ve come to understand this region as a local 
site for research on the disproportionate impacts of climate change on 
vulnerable people across the globe. We also believe we have an ethical 
duty, given our proximity, to figure out how to mobilize our research 
and capacity to assist these vulnerable communities.
Figure 6.4.2 The UCSD EarthLab Community Station, image tiles. Reproduced 
with permission from Teddy Cruz and Fonna Forman.
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Our UCSD-Divina Community Station is located in an informal can-
yon settlement of 85,000 people on the periphery of Tijuana that butts 
up directly against the wall marking the international border. We work 
in a neighborhood called Divina Providencia, in close partnership with 
a nonprofit called Organización de Colonos de la Divina Providencia 
(Figure 6.4.3). Together, we design and lead environmental literacy 
programming to help children and their families understand the impact 
of climate change and environmental degradation on their health and 
the well-being of their communities (Figures 6.4.4 and 6.4.5). Again, it’s 
not just about filling empty vessels with knowledge. It’s about hands-on 
learning and participatory climate action. When we get people involved 
at an early age, they come to value the environment and to appreciate 
its direct impact on their lives and their communities.
We conclude our chapter on social transformation with the UCSD 
Community Stations because we believe they provide a highly replicable 
and scalable model of local climate action. Universities everywhere are 
Figure 6.4.3 Local youth in the UCSD-Divina Community Station, learning 
through doing. Reproduced with permission from Teddy Cruz and Fonna Forman.
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positioned to do this kind of collaborative work in their local commu-
nities, training our students across disciplines to become the climate 
educators and communicators of the future and mobilizing university 
resources for the public good, locally and for the planet.
Figure 6.4.5 The UCSD Blum Summer Field Internship, Summer 2015, 
Tijauna, BC, Mexico. Reproduced with permission from Teddy Cruz and Fonna 
Forman.
Figure 6.4.4 Local youth in the UCSD EarthLab Community Station, 
environmental literacy in situ. Reproduced with permission from Groundwork San 
Diego, Chollas Creek.
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6.5  Summary
This chapter on transforming social attitudes, norms, and behaviors has 
asserted four main claims. First, tackling climate change requires integral 
solutions that combine innovations in technology, finance, and policy 
with transforming social attitudes and behavior. Second, we’re likelier 
to produce changes in social attitudes and behavior by localizing and 
personalizing the impacts of climate change and providing concrete 
opportunities for participatory climate action. Third, many cities have 
developed compelling models of participatory green urbanization that 
tackle both climate change and social inequality. We explored several 
Latin American urban “living laboratories.” Finally, universities and com-
munities can be meaningful partners in changing attitudes, norms, and 
behaviors around climate change. We enjoin you, as climate champions, 
to think about how organizations you are involved in—whether it’s your 
university or college, city, town, or community group—can do this too.
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Learning Objectives
By reading this chapter, you will learn
1. Why it is important to understand climate change as a moral issue.
2. How a variety of religions are addressing climate change as an 
ethical dilemma.
3. How religious organizations and communities can help develop 
climate change solutions.
4. How the academic field of religion and ecology brings science, 
religions, and environmental ethics together to help us understand 
climate change as a moral issue that requires moral responses.
Overview
Humans are currently immersed in a global environmental crisis that has 
various manifestations, such as climate change, deterioration of eco-
systems, massive loss of species, and pollution of air, water, and soil. 
The effects of this crisis on human health and planetary well-being are 
increasingly evident, but the moral response to it has been muted.
Until recently, degrading nature for human use—clear-cutting for-
ests, strip-mining mountains, depleting fisheries—was not considered a 
critical ethical issue. For many economists, for example, polluting the 
atmosphere, soil, or waters was simply an external consequence of in-
dustrialization and the necessary cost of economic growth. But now our 
industrializing powers and economic systems are disrupting the carbon 
cycle and causing the entire planet’s climate to change.
Several questions come to mind: Is climate change not a moral chal-
lenge? Who will suffer most from the effects of climate change? Do we 
have an environmental ethics that is broad enough and inclusive enough 
to respond, especially to the needs of the poor? If nature is not fully 
valued, how can we develop a robust environmental ethics?
It may be the case that—as with the abolitionist movement in the nine-
teenth century and the civil rights movement in the twentieth century—we 
will not respond at the scale and speed required until we see climate 
disruption as an ethical challenge. The integration of the moral issues 
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of ecological degradation and climate justice into social consciousness, 
political legislation, and international negotiations remains to be realized.
Two interrelated questions arise: Where do we begin, and what can 
we build on? For each part of the world the response will be different, 
as ethics will be based in different cultural, philosophical, and religious 
worldviews. For the United States, the task is far from easy, and one 
of the main messages regarding consumption may be dismissed or ig-
nored. For the hard truth is that our hyperinflated lifestyle—our massive 
consumption of energy and goods—is having adverse effects on people 
and the planet, both at home and abroad. With only 4% of the world’s 
population, the United States consumes 25% of the world’s resources. 
Moral awakening, while still elusive, is critical.
It is clear that we in the United States are, and have been for some 
time, a source of the destruction of the environment, both its intricate 
ecosystems and its myriad species. Whether intentionally or uninten-
tionally, we are also increasing inequity and injustice for the poor, the 
vulnerable, and climate refugees who are now suffering from the devas-
tating effects of climate change. This is true in Central America as well as 
in Africa and the Middle East where refugees are fleeing drought-stricken 
lands. Even insurance companies, such as Chubb, are recognizing the 
existential threat of climate change. The US Department of Defense sees 
it as a national security threat. We are indeed confronting the existential 
threat of climate change, and what to do still eludes us as the demands 
of intergenerational justice loom on the horizon.
In Section 7.1, this chapter will indicate the possibilities for and bar-
riers to a new alliance between science and religions to address climate 
change. In Section 7.2, I will outline the academic field of religion and 
ecology as well as the moral force of grassroots religious environmental-
ism. Section 7.3 acknowledges the problems and promise of religions for 
tackling environmental issues. In Section 7.4, I will outline how religions 
contribute to a broad moral sensibility for the flourishing of life. Section 
7.5 discusses Journey of the Universe, a multimedia project, including a 
book and a film, that aims to develop a comprehensive cosmological 
story for a vibrant Earth community. Finally, Section 7.6 will highlight 
key principles, strategies, and tactics for an ethical response to climate 
change.
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While climate action on a significant scale is still lacking, one way for-
ward is to see climate change as an issue that brings science and reli-
gion together as never before. We need both scientific knowledge and 
environmental ethics to confront this massive problem. The challenge 
is, How can we break through scientific complexity to the moral insight 
that gives rise to social and political change?
But first there are problems with science and with religion that we 
need to identify. Clearly a tension between science and religion exists 
in universities and schools and in churches, synagogues, and mosques 
across the United States. This is one reason that the moral dimensions 
of climate change are still invisible, both in academia and in society at 
large. There are many reasons for this: namely, that religion and ethics 
are marginalized in secular academia, that schools of theology have not 
made ecological issues and environmental ethics central to their cur-
ricula, and that religion and ecology is still a new field in academia. Yet 
it is fair to say that this field has significant potential for encouraging a 
moral environmental force in society. Indeed, grassroots religious envi-
ronmentalism is growing significantly. The Pope’s 2015 encyclical on the 
environment, Laudato Si’, has done much to encourage this by making 
action on climate change a moral imperative. The Ecumenical Patriarch 
Bartholomew of the Eastern Orthodox Christian Church has also led the 
way in highlighting the sacredness of creation and in hosting religion, 
science, and environment symposia focused on water. He speaks of the 
degradation of nature as “crimes against creation” and “ecological sin.”
Linking spirituality and ecology is not wholly new, of course. In-
digenous people’s worldviews have been based on this understanding 
for millennia. Moreover, in the nineteenth century, John Muir fought to 
preserve the Sierra Nevada in California by representing the wilderness 
as a temple in his writings. He helped to establish Yosemite and fought 
to preserve Glen Canyon for its aesthetic and spiritual merit. His feeling 
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for the spiritual dimensions of nature makes him one of the most widely 
read and admired environmentalists of all time (Figure 7.1.1). This sense 
of spiritual ecology was an inspiration for him in forming the Sierra Club, 
which has become the largest environmental group in the United States.
Figure 7.1.1 John Muir advocated environmental preservation, in part 
because he saw nature as sacred. This portrait of him was taken in about 1902. 
Reproduced from Wikipedia.
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7.2   Religion and Ecology:  
Academic Field and Moral Force
Our attitudes toward nature have been consciously and unconsciously 
conditioned by our religious worldviews. Over 50 years ago the UCLA 
historian Lynn White Jr. observed this when he noted: “What people do 
about their ecology depends on what they think about themselves in 
relation to things around them. Human ecology is deeply conditioned by 
beliefs about our nature and destiny—that is, by religion.” White’s 1967 
article in Science marked a watershed in contemporary reflection on how 
environmental attitudes are shaped by religious worldviews. He critiques 
Christianity for losing a sense of the sacredness of nature by banishing 
animism and elevating humans above nonhumans. He cites the Genesis 
passage (1:26) in which God gives humans dominion over nature and 
other species. Such dominion, he observes, led to overexploitation of 
the natural world and to anthropocentrism, or human-centered ap-
proaches to ethics and daily life. White calls for making St. Francis a 
patron saint of ecology for his love of nature and his kinship with all 
species, such as birds and wolves.
Christian theologians pushed back against White’s argument and 
began to develop forms of eco-theology, which emphasizes environ-
mental ethics, stewardship, and creation care. Claremont theologian 
John Cobb helped to lead the way, publishing a book titled Is It Too Late? 
A Theology of Ecology in 1972. Among his many writings is a book with 
economist Herman Daly, For the Common Good: Redirecting the Economy 
Toward Community, the Environment, and a Sustainable Future. Theologians 
such as Rosemary Ruether, Sallie McFague, and Catherine Keller took up 
ecofeminism, which links the exploitation of the Earth to the degrading 
treatment of women. These ecofeminist theologians called for a new 
understanding of the Earth as sacred, indeed as God’s body.
In the last two decades, other religious traditions were drawn into 
the search for a broader environmental ethics. Indeed, through the 
work of hundreds of scholars and theologians, a new field of religion 
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and ecology has emerged within academia. Its rapid growth has been 
nothing less than remarkable, and its potential to affect change is sig-
nificant because of the institutional dimensions of the world’s religions, 
which engage 85% of the world’s people. This field has undertaken se-
rious reflection on views of nature from the different world religions. 
For example, John Grim and I organized a 3-year research project of 
ten conferences at the Harvard Center for the Study of World Religions 
(1996–1998), resulting in ten edited volumes. The project culminated 
in two conferences in 1998 in New York at the United Nations and the 
American Museum of Natural History, attended by over 1,000 people. 
The Forum on Religion and Ecology was born from these conferences, 
and we now direct it at Yale University.
The assumption of the Harvard research project was that environ-
mental attitudes and ethics are predominantly shaped by religious and 
cultural contexts. These are vastly different in China and India than in 
the West. Indeed, our initial impetus was in large measure to highlight 
the traditions of China and India, knowing that their rapid development 
and industrialization would change the face of the planet—as it is already 
doing. It was also important that we raise up the voices of Indigenous 
peoples in a conference and a volume. Our conviction was that under-
standing these varied cultural values and religious ethics will contribute 
to environmental solutions that include both humans and nature.
That is what the Forum on Religion and Ecology set out to do, begin-
ning with a group of some 800 scholars and environmentalists. We now 
have a network and email list of some 12,000 people. We have also cre-
ated a comprehensive website where we have collected the statements 
of many of the world’s religions and annotated the literature published in 
English on this topic: http://fore.yale.edu. One of our early projects was 
an issue of the academic journal Daedalus, titled “Religion and Ecology: 
Can the Climate Change?” (2001), which arose out of two conferences 
at Harvard. Our Forum website highlights various statements on climate 
change and grassroots projects to address it by the world’s religions.
The academic field of religion and ecology makes a number of as-
sumptions, including these:
 ➤ Religion and ecology is a newly emerging academic field not more 
than 20 years old; environmental ethics, on the other hand, coming 
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out of Western philosophy, is 40 years old. Scholars of religion and 
theologians have a great deal of work still to do.
 ➤ Religious and ethical perspectives have only recently been invited 
into the arena of “sustainability sciences” and sustainability forums, 
which are arenas within academia and, beyond that, are trying to 
respond to climate change and other environmental problems.
 ➤ While academia is somewhat comfortable with environmental ethics 
arising out of Western philosophy, it is perplexed by, or adverse 
to, the study of religion in universities. This is because it confuses 
religious studies and history of religions with theology that has been 
largely carried out within a framework of Christian confessional as-
sumptions, beliefs, and practices.
 ➤ Religious studies and the history of religions are not theology. They 
are the study of the unfolding of various religious traditions, in-
cluding changes and continuities over time. These studies are more 
indebted to history and the social sciences (especially the study 
of culture and anthropology) than theology, which has developed 
primarily at Christian seminaries. The history of religions identifies 
ethics within the context of world religions and cultures, not simply 
within a Western Christian framework. Until recently, Christian eth-
ics has focused primarily on social ethics, not environmental ethics. 
But important contributions are now being made in this arena.
 ➤ As scholars, we do not assume that religions are unproblematic 
entities. We recognize the havoc they have caused, historically and 
at present. However, we are suggesting that they are necessary, 
although not sufficient, partners in seeking environmental solutions. 
Religions need to be in dialogue with science, policy, and econom-
ics. We hope this interdisciplinary dialogue gains further traction 
through efforts such as this book and course.
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7.3   The Promise and Problem of Religions
The problems and promise of religions should be clearly identified (Table 
7.3.1). Those in the field of religious studies, in positions of religious 
leadership, in religious communities, or in divinity schools also need 
humility to enter the environment and climate field. Important work in 
these areas has been going on for decades without us.
Religions are indeed late, but their contributions may be indispens-
able for realizing a sustainable future for the planet. That is our challenge 
in the years ahead: to contribute to a moral awakening regarding the 
planetary emergency that faces us. Religions must develop an ethics that 
not only deals with moral issues among humans, such as homicide or 
suicide, but also imagines ethical relations with nonhumans and moral 
responses to biocide or ecocide. 
Table 7.3.1 A summary of some of the key problems with and promises of 
religions
Problems Promises
1. Rigid, dogmatic Flexible
Bound by tradition Changing over time
Afraid of modernity Embracing modernity
2. Exclusive claims to truth Broad moral reach
Looking inward to orthodoxy Looking outward to practice
3. Otherworldly concerns Valuing this world
Salvation in heaven Creation-centered spirituality
4. Hierarchical, patriarchal Equity, fairness, justice
5. Present sectarian concerns Future generational concerns
Preserving church membership Supporting the full community of life
6. Human rights Rights of nature or creation
7. Anthropocentric Anthropocosmic
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7.4   Engaging Religions:  
Toward Economic and Ecological Flourishing
Despite the problems with religion, there is great promise in a partner-
ship between religion and science around climate change. This is vital 
because we need to encourage a new sense of progress, one that is 
concerned not just with economic growth, but with the genuine flour-
ishing of the Earth community. The world’s religions may offer some 
ethical norms for enhancing this larger flourishing of life. For example, 
this is the work of the Interfaith Center on Corporate Responsibility, 
which urges businesses toward social and environmentally responsible 
investment and models this in the investment portfolios of religious 
congregations. To approach investing this way, shareholders have to 
consider the long term and future generations—that is, broader interests 
beyond weekly stock market indices and quarterly financial reports.
Such ways of thinking involve enhancing the quality of life, not the 
quantity of material possessions. In this framework, economic progress 
should be measured not by a nation’s gross national product (GNP), but 
rather by gross national happiness (GNH) indicators such as those the 
government of Bhutan has developed. Based on Buddhist principles of 
right livelihood and well-being, GNH is part of the Bhutanese constitu-
tion and is implemented by a GNH Commission (Figure 7.4.1). Religions 
can assist in such endeavors, as they are well equipped to point toward 
more lasting values and sources of deeper happiness. They understand 
the efficacy of long-term thinking and have been attending to this for 
centuries. Religious communities are active in the fossil fuel divestment 
movement, and some, such as the United Church of Christ, have led 
the way. Union Theological Seminary in New York, the Pacific School 
of Religion in Berkeley, and the Jesuit-based Seattle University have all 
divested from fossil fuels.
Many religious communities are concerned about the long-term com-
mon good and the ecological flourishing of the Earth community—land, 
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Figure 7.4.1 The Paro Taktsang, or Tiger’s Nest, a Buddhist monastery built 
in 1692 on a sheer cliff at an elevation of 10,000 feet, expresses the spiritual 
values to which Bhutan’s gross national happiness (GNH) measures also attest. 
Photograph by Baron Reznik via Flickr.
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water, air, soil, and all species, human and more-than-human. They aim 
to uphold the wonder, beauty, and complexity of nature for present 
and future generations. This sense of wonder is shared by religion and 
science and can help reorient our lives by grounding us in gratitude. 
Life is an extraordinary unfolding process of which we are a small but 
indispensable part. 
Our essential ethical question, then, is What does the ecological 
flourishing of the Earth community require in the face of climate change? 
World religions need to develop a moral framework for responding 
to climate change that allows for common but differentiated respon-
sibilities. The developed world has different responsibilities from the 
developing world, and yet we must all work together to create the basis 
for a shared and vibrant future.
I am suggesting that ethical responses to environmental issues such 
as climate change involve reimagining human-Earth relations on a scale 
Figure 7.4.2 Hassan II Mosque, Casablanca, Morocco, is part of the country’s 
effort to green its mosques. Reproduced from Milamber via Flickr.
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that is locally differentiated, culturally sensitive, ethically grounded, and 
globally attuned. An awareness of place-based local concerns is indis-
pensable, as is sensitivity to particular cultures and religions. From this 
basis an ethics can emerge that is grounded in place and culture, but 
also globally aware.
Box 7.4.1  Greening Mosques
Morocco has undertaken a project to green its 15,000 mosques, 
starting with 600 by 2019 (Figure 7.4.2). Through a partnership with 
Germany’s international development agency, GIZ, the Moroccan 
government aims to make mosques and other buildings more energy 
efficient and increase their use of renewable energy, particularly solar 
power. The project’s other key goals include raising public awareness 
about renewable energy, creating new jobs, and training people to 
fill such jobs.
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7.5   Journey of the Universe:  
A Shared Evolutionary Story
Our biggest challenge to realizing this broader perspective in the United 
States and some other Western-influenced societies is hyper- individualism 
and an elevation of personal liberties over a sense of the common good. 
The unanswered question is how to move from a narrow devotion to 
individual rights toward embracing a larger sense of responsibility for 
the flourishing of life. We need to articulate and imagine a common 
well-being that is not hegemonic or totalizing, but inviting, energizing, 
inclusive, and participatory.
Journey of the Universe has this possibility of bringing humans together 
Figure 7.5.1  An anthropocosmic worldview puts humans within a broader 
cosmos, not at its center. Still from the film Journey of the Universe.
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Box 7.5.1  Journey of the Universe
Journey of the Universe narrates the 14-billion-year story of the universe’s de-
velopment, from the great flaring forth at the universe’s inception to the 
emergence of simple molecules and atoms to the evolution of galaxies, stars, 
solar systems, and planetary life of greater complexity and consciousness. 
This is a story that inspires wonder as we begin to understand such complex-
ity through science and appreciate such beauty through poetry, art, history, 
philosophy, and religion.
Journey of the Universe is a cosmology, although not just in the scientific 
sense of the study of the early universe. Rather, it is a cosmology in the sense 
of being an integrated story that explains where both humans and other life-
forms have come from. All cultures have had such stories. We now have the 
capacity to tell a comprehensive story drawing on astronomy and physics to 
explain the emergence of galaxies and stars, geology and chemistry to under-
stand the formation of Earth, biology and botany to envision life’s evolution, 
and anthropology and the humanities to trace the rise of humans.
Journey draws on all these disciplines to narrate a story of universe, Earth, 
and human evolution that is widely accessible and allows for a comprehen-
sive sense of mystery and awe to arise. This is in alignment with the call of 
the environmental ethicist J. Baird Callicott to “reintegrate science and its 
epistemology into the wider culture by expressing the new nature of Nature 
as revealed by the sciences, in the grammar of the humanities.” Such an ap-
proach expands the human perspective beyond an anthropocentric world-
view to one that values life’s complexity and sees the role of humans as critical 
to the further flourishing of the Earth community. While humans are gifted 
with the creativity of symbolic consciousness, we know that different kinds 
of self-organizing creativity abound in the universe and Earth—the formation 
of galaxies and stars, the movement of tectonic plates, the chemistry of cells, 
the biological complexity of photosynthesis, the migrating patterns of birds, 
fishes, turtles, and caribou. Creativity is also closely aligned with chaos and 
destruction as the universe unfolds on the edge of a knife.
Such a cosmological perspective is both ancient and modern—embedded 
in certain aspects of world philosophies and religions and revealed anew in 
the scientific story of the universe. Thus science along with philosophy and 
religion help us to recognize ourselves as participating in a larger integrated 
whole. In this spirit, images and metaphors from the wisdom traditions of the 
world religions and philosophies are woven into Journey of the Universe.
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in a shared evolutionary story that respects differences. Journey is a mul-
timedia project created over 10 years by Brian Thomas Swimme, John 
Grim, and me; it consists of an Emmy award–winning film, a book from 
Yale, a series of 20 conversations with scientists and environmentalists, 
and online courses. This project acknowledges that we humans are part 
of a vast unfolding universe, dwelling in a living Earth community, and 
ideally contributing to its continuity. Journey embraces an anthropocos-
mic worldview in which humans are seen as belonging to and dwelling 
within the cosmos and the Earth (Figure 7.5.1). It begins with the “great 
flaring forth” 14 billion years ago and traces the emergence of Earth, of 
life, and of humans. It concludes with our current ecological challenges.
Journey of the Universe thus weaves together scientific discoveries 
in astronomy, geology, and biology with humanistic insights concerning 
the nature of the universe. It is in the lineage of Thomas Berry’s call for 
a “New Story.” Berry felt we needed to bring science and the humanities 
together in an integrated cosmology that would guide humans into the 
next period of the flourishing of human-Earth relations. This perspective 
affirms that “the universe is a communion of subjects, not a collection 
of objects,” as Thomas Berry often observed.
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7.6  Principles, Strategies, and Tactics
Here are some suggestions, then, of principles, strategies, and tactics 
that the world’s religions and environmental ethicists could promote 
toward the flourishing of people and planet in the face of rapid and re-
lentless climate change. This section is adapted from an article I wrote in 
Zygon in 2015. First I explain two foundational principles—valuing nature 
and honoring humans. Then I explore two key strategies—thinking con-
sequentially and integrating solutions. Finally I examine two interrelated 
tactics—restraint and law.
First foundational principle:  
valuing nature as source, not resource
Intrinsic value of nature We are moving from viewing nature  simply 
as a resource for our own use to seeing it as the source of life and 
creativity. Instead of valuing nature from a utilitarian perspective, we 
are learning to appreciate it for its intrinsic beauty and complexity. 
As  Journey of the Universe makes evident, Earth is a source of dynamic 
change and transformation, bringing forth life over billions of years of 
evolution. Participating in the flourishing of life’s creativity is a major 
fulfillment of human destiny. Destroying that creativity is diminishing the 
possibility for life’s continuity, as Thomas Berry noted in The Dream of 
the Earth.
Environmental degradation as an ethical issue Until recently environ-
mental degradation was seen as an inevitable consequence of economic 
growth and industrial progress. This view is being called into question in 
many circles, especially those of ecological economists. To stem the tide 
of destruction will require a new economics and the extension of ethical 
concerns to nature as a whole and to individual species in particular. 
The role of humans in causing climate change through greenhouse gases 
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is finally being acknowledged as ethically problematic. Our emissions 
(especially in developed countries) have adversely affected ecosystems, 
caused biodiversity loss, contributed to species extinction, and affected 
millions of people around the globe. There have been moral responses 
to this by the US Catholic Bishops in 2001 and the Canadian Conference 
of Catholic Bishops in 2006. Canadian Bishop Luc Bouchard’s pastoral 
letter in 2009 is a unique example of a powerful critique of the problems 
caused by the extraction of oil in the tar sands in Alberta (Figure 7.6.1).
Many other bishops’ conferences around the world have issued 
statements on the environment and climate change, calling for care for 
the poor and vulnerable, noting the need for a change in lifestyle among 
the wealthy, and holding corporations responsible for despoiling the 
Figure 7.6.1 This photo shows the extraction of oil from the tar sands in 
Alberta, Canada, in 2008. Reproduced from Howl Arts Collective via Flickr.
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Earth. Pope Francis refers to several of these documents in his landmark 
encyclical on the environment, Laudato Si’, issued in 2015. 
Second foundational principle:  
honoring humans—our rights and responsibilities
Environmental rights: present and future generations It is neces-
sary to expand the notion of human rights to include environmental 
rights to a healthy atmosphere and biosphere for present and future 
generations. To do this, we need to consider the rights to information, 
public participation, and justice regarding environmental issues. This 
Box 7.6.1  From a Pastoral Letter on Fossil Fuel Extraction as 
a Moral Problem
In 2009, Bishop Luc Bouchard of Alberta, Canada, issued a pastoral let-
ter, The Integrity of Creation & the Athabasca Oilsands. Here is an 
excerpt from his letter:
The moral problem does not lie in government and industry’s lack of 
a sincere desire to find a solution; the moral problem lies in their rac-
ing ahead and aggressively expanding the oilsands industry despite 
the fact that serious environmental problems remain unsolved after 
more than forty years of on-going research. The moral question has 
been left to market forces and self-regulation to resolve when what 
is urgently required is moral vision and leadership.
I am forced to conclude that the integrity of creation in the 
Athabasca oilsands is clearly being sacrificed for economic gain. The 
proposed future development of the oilsands constitutes a serious 
moral problem.
Environmentalists and members of First Nations and Metis com-
munities who are challenging government and industry to adequately 
safeguard the air, water and boreal forest eco-systems of the Atha-
basca oilsands region present a very strong moral argument, which 
I support.
The present pace and scale of development in the Athabasca 
oilsands cannot be morally justified. Active steps to alleviate this en-
vironmental damage must be undertaken.
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was set forth in the Aarhaus Convention in 1994, which called for access 
to information, participation in decision-making, and access to justice 
in environmental issues. But clearly those families and individuals who 
are exposed to pollution from petrochemical and coal power plants 
and those who are affected by mountaintop removal mining were never 
given information to ensure their health and safety or to guarantee their 
environmental rights. Faith-based religious initiatives in Appalachia, in 
Flint, Michigan, in Baltimore, and in Mississippi are trying to help such 
communities by calling for creation care and for environmental justice. 
Moreover, a landmark climate lawsuit, Juliana v. United States, brought 
by 21 young people from across the United States, is making its way 
through federal court. The suit alleges that the US government, through 
actions that cause climate change, has violated young people’s constitu-
tional rights to life, liberty, and property.
Figure 7.6.2 (above left) In India, the Yamuna River 
is considered sacred. Reproduced from Melenama via 
Flickr.
Figure 7.6.3 (above right) But the Yamuna River 
is also polluted with sewage and trash. This view of 
the Yamuna River at Agra was taken in 2008 during 
a trash cleanup event. Reproduced from India Water 
Portal via Flickr.
Figure 7.6.4 (right) The Ganges is also both 
sacred and polluted. In this 2013 photo, pilgrims’ 
offerings of flowers and coconuts float together with 
plastic trash on the surface of the river. Photograph 
by Massimiliano Sticca via Flickr.
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Box 7.6.2  Legal Personhood for Sacred Rivers
In India, a legal case on the rights of rivers suggests that new forms of 
Earth jurisprudence are emerging that are expanding the moral compass 
of the law to include nature and a sense of the sacred. Legal rights are 
often granted to entities and organizations that are not human individu-
als; in the United States, for example, corporations are considered legal 
persons. But recently, some nations, such as Bolivia, Ecuador, Australia, 
and New Zealand, have begun granting nature in general or specific nat-
ural entities legal personhood.
The state of Uttarakhand, India, contains part of the Himalayas and 
the headwaters of the Ganges River. In 2017, a high court there ruled 
that “the Rivers Ganga and Yamuna, all their tributaries, streams, every 
natural water flowing with flow continuously or intermittently of these 
rivers, are declared as juristic/legal persons/living entities having the sta-
tus of a legal person with all corresponding rights, duties and liabilities 
of a living person.” The court based its decision in part on the fact that 
these rivers are “sacred and revered . . .  central to the existence of half 
the Indian population.” Because environmental damage threatens “their 
very existence . . .  [this] requires extraordinary measures to be taken to 
preserve and conserve Rivers Ganga and Yamuna” (Figures 7.6.2, 7.6.3, 
and 7.6.4).
The court’s decision established the rivers as legal persons but as 
minors under the law, thereby recognizing that the rivers cannot speak 
for themselves. The court also designated specific positions in the Ut-
tarakhand state government to act for the rivers. Though the ruling has 
been appealed and is still working its way through the courts, it shows 
not only how legal thought about the rights of nature is beginning to 
change, but also that religion and the sacredness of particular natural 
entities are central to that shift.
In 2011 the Forum on Religion and Ecology along with TERI Univer-
sity in Delhi and the Radha Raman temple in Vrindavan sponsored a con-
ference in India titled Yamuna River: A Confluence of Waters, A Crisis of 
Need. It brought together scientists, hydrologists, political scientists, re-
ligious leaders, and scholars to find ways to meet the difficult challenges 
of pollution of this sacred river: fore.yale.edu/yamuna-river-conference/. 
The conference highlighted how climate change affects rivers in a variety 
of ways, including higher temperatures causing algae blooms and fish 
kills as well as unpredictable patterns of drought and flooding.
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Environmental responsibilities: distributive justice With environ-
mental rights come moral responsibilities toward those most vulnerable 
to the effects of climate change, such as the millions of impoverished 
people in the coastal region of Bangladesh, the thousands of African 
Americans in New Orleans after Hurricane Katrina, and those in Darfur 
and Syria suffering from climate-related drought and subsequent famine. 
The concept of distributive justice clearly requires further reflection re-
garding our moral obligation to people at a distance in space (in other 
countries) and time (in future generations).
As the oceans rise and their countries become endangered, the Al-
liance of Small Island States in the United Nations is considering suing 
developed countries for causing this catastrophe. Their citizens are be-
coming climate refugees; the population of Tuvalu is being relocated to 
New Zealand. Indigenous peoples in the Torres Strait of Australia have 
sued the government on the basis that climate change is threatening 
their traditional culture and religion. How many hundreds of thousands 
of people will have to be relocated from islands and coastal regions 
where most of the world’s largest cities are located and a quarter of 
the world’s population lives? Jakarta, a sinking city of over 10 million 
people on the world’s most populous island, is already making plans to 
evacuate and move.
Many religious leaders are now speaking out on the need for climate 
justice, especially for the poor and vulnerable most affected by climate 
change. Rabbi Arthur Waskow of the Shalom Center in Philadelphia and 
Reverend Dr. Gerald Durley of Providence Missionary Baptist Church 
are leaders here, while United Church of Christ minister Jim Antal and 
Episcopal priest Margaret Bullitt-Jonas have written books on the topic 
(Figure 7.6.5). The Evangelical Environmental Network is also working 
on climate justice. A leading evangelical scientist, Katherine Hayhoe, has 
been speaking out on the importance of understanding the science and 
responding to our growing climate crisis.
First key strategy:  
thinking consequentially, short term and long term
Precautionary principle In his 1971 book The Closing Circle, biologist 
Barry Commoner made the commonsensical point that we ought to 
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stop pollution at its source. This can be seen as an early iteration of the 
precautionary principle or principle of prudence. We should invoke this 
principle as a means of stemming climate change. We need to suggest 
that rather than argue about some of the details of the science or ask 
for further studies, the precautionary principle requires us to act now. 
Future generations and the future of life depend on various kinds of 
preventive action. Cap-and-trade or a carbon tax are no doubt neces-
sary economic incentives for change, but we need to develop a deeper 
sensibility regarding cutting back emissions at the source and seeing 
this as a moral responsibility. The Keep it in the Ground movement, for 
example, maintains that a viable ethical position is restraint in extracting 
fossil fuels in the first place.
Unintended consequences We must not only reduce emissions now, 
but also consider the long-term effects of our decisions. We know we 
are already compromising the quality of life for many people—including 
our children and grandchildren. The consequences of our actions, inten-
tional and unintentional, need to become more visible. This is especially 
Figure 7.6.5 Rev. Dr. Gerald L. Durley, Rev. Margaret Bullitt-Jonas, and Rev. 
Dr. Jim Antal. Photograph by Robert A. Jonas. Reproduced with permission.
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Box 7.6.3  Responding to Climate Change Locally
Religious communities in many parts of the world are responding to the par-
ticular challenges climate change is bringing to their area. For example, the 
Higher Ground Initiative of Temple Solel, a Jewish synagogue in Hollywood, 
Florida, is confronting the problem of rising seas. Members of the synagogue 
educated themselves on sea level rise, investigated local areas that flood 
during very high spring tides called king tides, took action to bring attention 
to the issue, made efforts to reduce their synagogue’s carbon footprint, and 
expanded their initiative to other Reform Jewish congregations.
There are many ways to take action on climate change. If you’re involved 
in a religious community, find out if it has a climate change committee; if 
not, see if you can start one. Here are some resources to draw on:
• Interfaith Power and Light (IPL) leads religious communities’ efforts to 
improve energy efficiency and conservation in the United States. IPL has 
worked for two decades to establish branches in over 40 states and fo-
cuses on several areas, including the reduction of carbon footprint in 
places of worship, educating congregants, environmental justice for the 
poor, liturgical renewal to include the environment, and work for policy 
changes in national and local governments: https://www.interfaithpower 
andlight.org.
• The Shalom Center, based in Philadelphia, leads many Jewish environmen-
tal efforts: https://theshalomcenter.org.
• Eco-Justice Ministries works with a range of Christian denominations in 
the United States on greening churches, taking action on climate change, 
and transformational ministry: www.eco-justice.org.
• Earth Ministry undertakes “faithful advocacy” on environmental issues in 
Washington state, where the organization is based, as well as on climate 
change: https://earthministry.org.
• Green the Church leads African American Christian churches to become 
more sustainable, develop green theology, and advocate for political 
change: greenthechurch.org/.
• GreenFaith is an interfaith coalition for the environment that works with 
houses of worship, religious schools, and people of all faiths to help them 
become better environmental stewards: https://greenfaith.org.
• Interreligious Eco-Justice Network has been working on the intersection 
of ecological understanding and social justice for many years, focusing on 
key issues such as climate change and pollution: irejn.org.
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true as the unintended outcomes of various proposed solutions to 
climate change are becoming evident. For example, geoengineering 
schemes, such as seeding the oceans with iron to increase phytoplank-
ton and draw down carbon, may inadvertently disrupt the food web. A 
2019 white paper by Gary Gardner and Forrest Clingerman highlights 
religious responses from Judaism, Christianity, Islam, Hinduism, and 
Buddhism to geoengineering. This report recognizes that many peo-
ple feel geoengineering may be necessary to halt climate change, but 
they call for precaution in light of the unknown consequences of these 
procedures. This is an example of religions contributing an ethics of 
long-term thinking about the health and well-being of future generations 
beyond uncertain “technological fixes.”
Second key strategy:  
integrating solutions—energy and technology
Renewable energy The development of safe renewable energies is 
of utmost importance as we shift from fossil fuels to energy from the 
sun, wind, water, and geothermal power. Indeed, many are suggesting 
we are in the midst of an energy revolution. While we have much of 
the technology to make this change, this shift needs to be scaled up so 
that it can be done without adversely affecting those most vulnerable. 
This will require making renewable energy economically viable and thus 
providing economic incentives and investing in more research and de-
velopment. The shift from nonrenewable and polluting energy sources, 
such as coal and oil, to renewables is one of the largest transformations 
in human history, and is now a moral imperative. Fracking for natural 
gas is harming our ecosystems, polluting our waters, and causing social 
disruptions in the United States and around the world. Several European 
countries have outlawed fracking on environmental grounds.
Many religious communities, especially Native Americans in the 
United States and First Nations peoples in Canada, have rallied to stop 
pipelines, often joined by other religious communities. The most prom-
inent example is the Lakota Sioux at Standing Rock in North Dakota and 
their many allies who tried to prevent a pipeline from passing under the 
Missouri River next to their reservation. This is an example of a precau-
tionary principle being invoked to prevent pollution before it happens. 
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The Lakota drew on their traditional belief that “water is life” and must 
not be put at risk of pollution. Native Americans and other Indigenous 
peoples embrace a cosmovision that considers all of life sacred, includ-
ing the elements of earth, air, fire, and water (Figure 7.6.6). Humans are 
seen as kin to all other species who dwell in the living Earth community.
Technology transfer and efficiency Along with the large-scale move 
to renewable energy is an obligation to transfer appropriate technology 
to developing countries to assist with climate change mitigation and 
adaptation. As we improve alternative energy and green technology in 
the United States and the developed world, how can we find the eco-
nomic means and political will to transfer this knowledge to developing 
countries? This is a justice issue, not simply an economic issue, as the 
developing world by and large does not have the capital to create or 
invest in these technologies without assistance. Large-scale funds need 
Figure 7.6.6 Stand with Standing Rock, November 14, 2016. Photograph by 
Leslie Peterson via Flickr.
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to be set aside to allow this to happen. Such help has been promised in 
the past but not delivered.
First tactic:  
ensuring restraint—curbing consumption and population
Consumption and affluence A key justice issue is that of overcon-
sumption and the high levels of affluence in the developed world as 
factors that contribute to climate disruption. How can lifestyle change 
(using and consuming less) be seen as a moral issue? This will involve 
reexamining our carbon footprint, our building patterns, our transpor-
tation systems, our development plans, our clothing manufacturing, and 
most especially our agricultural processes, which depend on fossil fuels. 
The factory farming of animals and the destruction of rain forests to 
raise crops to feed animals is contributing to climate change (Figure 
7.6.7). Many religious communities are suggesting that eating less meat 
will help reduce greenhouse gases. See, for example, CreatureKind: 
www.becreaturekind.org.
Population growth How can the difficult topic of population growth 
be raised as a moral issue in relation to global warming? The planet 
Figure 7.6.7 Raising livestock on a large scale in factory farms like this one 
contributes to climate change—both because pigs and cows emit methane 
and because rain forests are destroyed to grow crops to feed these animals. 
Reproduced from Wikimedia Commons.
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clearly has limits to what it can support. By exploding from 2 billion to 
7 billion people in one century, we have caused massive disruptions to 
Earth’s ecosystems and natural cycles. While China adopted a national 
policy to control population, this still remains controversial in some 
quarters. However, as UN agencies have observed, educating women 
for jobs and empowering women by providing birth control and repro-
ductive health care are assured means of population reduction. These 
need to be seen as moral rights that will ensure that children are wanted, 
nourished, educated, and cared for. We cannot avoid focusing on this 
issue in conjunction with consumption, for a person in the developed 
world will consume considerably more than a person in the developing 
world. Again, invoking the principles of justice and equity is critical.
Second tactic:  
creating law—global governance and global ethics
Global governance To be able to draft and enforce binding treaties 
on climate change, we need to ensure democratic participation, ac-
countability, and transparency. This requires the development of a new 
stage of global governance that will be bound by international law and 
enforced by institutions such as the World Court and the United Na-
tions. While we are a long way from such global governance, the foun-
dations of such a system are being established. This is sorely needed 
as environmental problems such as climate change transcend national 
boundaries and thus call for international cooperation that is binding, 
both legally and ethically.
Global ethics The Earth Charter, a comprehensive global ethics doc-
ument, was initiated by Mikhail Gorbachev and Maurice Strong, who 
chaired the UN Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED) 
held in Rio de Janeiro in 1992. They felt that an ethical document of prin-
ciples was needed to adjudicate the contentious issues of environmen-
tal protection and economic development. An Earth Charter drafting 
committee was established with a broad spectrum of representatives; 
Earth Charter commissioners, prominent global citizens, were named 
from every continent; and an Earth Charter Initiative Secretariat was 
established at the University for Peace in Costa Rica. The Charter was 
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drafted in the decade following the Earth Summit in 1992 and released 
at the Hague in 2000 with the assistance of the Dutch government. I 
was a member of the drafting committee of 25 people from around the 
world, representing key sectors such as politics, economics, education, 
and religion. The committee included a wide range of nationalities, of 
women, and of nongovernmental organizations.
Our question here is, How can the Earth Charter contribute to a 
more comprehensive ethical framework for envisioning solutions to 
climate change? The three sections of the Charter can be used as a 
context for refining moral responses to climate change. These sections 
include valuing (1) ecological integrity, (2) social and economic justice, 
and (3) democracy, nonviolence, and peace. This integrated framework 
of principles is critical to encouraging moral responses that are com-
prehensive enough to address the global nature of climate change and 
also to establish the conditions for the flourishing of local communities.
In addition, the 2010 Universal Declaration of the Rights of Mother 
Earth was drafted by Indigenous peoples at a gathering in Cochabamba, 
Bolivia. They contend that their rights and nature’s rights have been vi-
olated in many parts of the world. The rights-based approach to nature 
may gain some traction in circles that hope to force action on climate 
change and other environmental issues. It may also be resisted by those 
who are hesitant to grant nature rights but nonetheless wish to address 
Box 7.6.4  From the Earth Charter
We stand at a critical moment in Earth’s history, a time when human-
ity must choose its future. As the world becomes increasingly inter-
dependent and fragile, the future at once holds great peril and great 
promise. To move forward we must recognize that in the midst of 
a magnificent diversity of cultures and life forms we are one human 
family and one Earth community with a common destiny. We must 
join together to bring forth a sustainable global society founded on 
respect for nature, universal human rights, economic justice, and 
a culture of peace. Towards this end, it is imperative that we, the 
peoples of Earth, declare our responsibility to one another, to the 
greater community of life, and to future generations.
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climate disruption and the degradation of nature. It is increasingly clear, 
however, that a new Earth jurisprudence is needed. This is what Thomas 
Berry called for in a statement drafted as early as 2001 that was pub-
lished in Evening Thoughts.
In this moment of great transition, science and religion need to work 
together as never before for the flourishing of the Earth community. 
Moral voices must respond to the “Cry of the Earth, the Cry of the Poor,” 
as does the Papal Encyclical Laudato Si’. While the challenges are great, 
the call to create the foundations for an integral ecology, including re-
spect for both people and the planet, is growing. As Pope Francis writes:
The urgent challenge to protect our common home includes 
a concern to bring the whole human family together to seek a 
sustainable and integral development, for we know that things can 
change. . . .  Humanity still has the ability to work together in building 
our common home. (Laudato Si’, Introduction, 13)
Supplementary Readings
Books and Articles on Climate Change, Religion, 
and Ecology
Articles on climate change and religion compiled by the Forum on Religion 
and Ecology: http://fore.yale.edu/climate-change/articles-on-religion 
-and-climate-change/.
Berry, T. 1999. The Great Work. Bell Tower, New York, NY.
Berry, T. 2009. The Sacred Universe: Earth, Spirituality, and Religion in the Twenty-
First Century, Tucker, M. E. (ed.). Columbia University Press, New York, 
NY.
Douglas, P., and Hecox, M. 2016. Caring for Creation: The Evangelical’s Guide to 
Climate Change and a Healthy Environment. Bethany House, Bloomington, 
MN.
Grim, J., and Tucker, M. E. 2014. Ecology and Religion. Island Press, 
Washington, DC.
Jenkins, W., Tucker, M. E., and Grim, J. (eds.). 2016. Routledge Handbook of 
Religion and Ecology. Routledge, New York, NY.
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Northcott, M. 2013. A Political Theology of Climate Change. Eerdmans, Grand 
Rapids, MI.
Pew Research Center. 2015, October 22. Religion and Views on Climate 
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Court, Chicago, IL.
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50(4).
Statements on Climate Change from the World’s Religions
http://fore.yale.edu/climate-change/statements-from-world-religions/
Ecology and Justice Series from Orbis Books
https://www.orbisbooks.com/category-202/
Indigenous Environmental Network
http://www.ienearth.org
Journey of the Universe
Film, book, conversations: https://www.journeyoftheuniverse.org.
Massive Open Online Classes (MOOCs): https://www.coursera.org/
specializations/journey-of-the-universe.
United Nations Environment Programme
Earth and Faith: A Book of Reflection for Action: https://wedocs.unep.org/ 
bitstream/handle/20.500.11822/25988/Earth%20and%20Faith.pdf 
?sequence =1&is Allowed=y
Faith for Earth Initiative: https://www.unenvironment.org/about-un -environ 
ment/faith-earth-initiative.
Interfaith Rainforest Initiative: https://www.interfaithrainforest.org.
Interreligious Programs and Websites on Religion and 
Ecology
Blessed Tomorrow: https://blessedtomorrow.org.
Earth Ministry in Seattle: https://earthministry.org.
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Faith in Place in Chicago: https://www.faithinplace.org.
Forum on Religion and Ecology at Yale: http://fore.yale.edu.
GreenFaith: https://greenfaith.org.
Interfaith Center on Corporate Responsibility: https://www.iccr.org.
Interfaith Power and Light: https://www.interfaithpowerandlight.org.
Interreligious Eco-Justice Network: https://irejn.org.
Parliament of the World’s Religions Climate Commitments Project: https://
parliamentofreligions.org/project-home/climate-commitments-project.
Denominational Websites on Climate Change
Catholic Climate Covenant: https://catholicclimatecovenant.org.
Evangelical Environmental Network: https://www.creationcare.org.
Franciscan Action Network: https://franciscanaction.org.
Global Catholic Climate Movement: https://catholicclimatemovement.global.
The Shalom Center: https://theshalomcenter.org.
Educational Programs in Religion and Ecology
Center for Earth Ethics at Union Theological Seminary: https://centerforearth 
ethics.org.
Green Seminary Initiative: https://www.greenseminaries.org.
Yale Climate Connections: Faith & Ethics: http://www.yaleclimateconnections 
.org/topic/faith-ethics/.
Yale Divinity School MAR in Religion and Ecology: https://divinity.yale.edu/
academics/degree-and-certificate-requirements/concentrated-master-arts 
-religion-mar/religion-and -ecology.
Yale School of Forestry and Environmental Studies and Yale Divinity School 
Joint MA in Religion and Ecology: http://fore.yale.edu/yale-ma/.
Climate Change Communications
Center for Climate Change Communications at George Mason University: 
http://www.climatechangecommunication.org.
Yale Center for Climate Change Communication: http://climatecommunication 
.yale.edu.
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Learning Objectives
1. Be able to list at least four terms that have different meanings for 
scientists and the public and provide a better choice for each of 
them.
2. Be able to explain at least four important scientific findings that 
illustrate our understanding of recently observed and predicted 
climate change.
3. Be able to describe for nonscientists at least four kinds of 
observational evidence that show that the global climate has 
recently experienced warming.
4. Be able to use stories, metaphors, and vivid language effectively to 
help explain the importance of addressing climate change.
5. Be able to have constructive and civil conversations about climate 
change with people who do not accept the fundamental findings 
of climate change science.
Overview
This chapter is divided into five sections, which can be thought of as 
five important steps on the path to becoming a skillful and effective 
communicator of climate change science:
8.1. Preparation—Preparing well is the first step to communicating 
well. Preparation includes knowing general principles of 
communication and having access to valuable resources. It also 
includes acquiring an adequate knowledge of the science of climate 
change.
8.2. Stories—Stories are a wonderful way to engage an audience. In 
this section, you will meet “Uncle Pete,” a fictional character closely 
based on fact. Uncle Pete does not accept climate change science. 
Many people know a real person who strongly resembles Uncle Pete.
8.3. Metaphors—Metaphors and comparisons can be superb 
communication tools. In communicating the science of climate change, 
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powerful metaphors compare climate science with medical science 
and call carbon dioxide the steroids of our climate.
8.4. Language—Language is a critical aspect of communication. It is 
very important to match the language that you use to the audience you 
want to reach. Try to avoid depressing language and scientific jargon, 
and know the tricky words that have more than one meaning.
8.5. Solutions—Nobody wants to feel helpless. People should know 
the reasons for optimism. We have the tools to prevent the worst 
kinds of climate change. We urgently need to act.
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8.1  Preparation
Preparing well is the first step to communicating well. Preparation in-
cludes knowing general principles of communication and having access 
to valuable resources. It also includes acquiring an adequate knowledge 
of the science of climate change.
Susan Joy Hassol is a communication expert who for more than 25 
years has been my partner in communicating climate change science. 
The website https://www.climatecommunication.org contains detailed 
information about the key lessons we have learned. This is a website 
I strongly recommend to you. It is a rich resource for information on 
communicating climate change science. Here in 12 words is the guiding 
philosophy that underlies our approach to climate science communi-
cation: Use simple clear messages, repeated often, by a variety of trusted 
messengers.
Many people, when attempting to communicate complex subjects, 
typically fail to craft simple, clear messages and repeat them often. In-
stead, they overdo the level of detail, so people have difficulty sorting 
out what is most important. In short, the more you say, the less they 
hear. Climate scientists often fall into this trap when trying to explain 
what they have learned to the broad public. They know a lot, so they 
want to say a lot. That’s a mistake. Think about the experts in various 
fields whom you may know, such as your doctor. He or she has spent 
many years learning a great deal about medical science, but only a very 
foolish doctor would try to tell you everything relevant to your health 
that medical science has discovered. Instead, a wise doctor speaks to 
you in simple clear terms.
I think that those who have studied this subject most seriously and 
carefully have now awakened to the complex challenges of communi-
cating about climate change, when much more than the science is at 
issue. Our awareness now includes cultural and psychological issues. 
8-6 Chapter 8: Communicating Climate Change Science
Still, most people say they need more information about the science, 
so scientists and others are challenged to deliver scientific information 
in more accessible and effective ways. Much of what I summarize in 
this short chapter is based on the resources available on the website 
https://www.climatecommunication.org. This chapter reflects the ideas 
and recommendations on that website for combining accurate science 
with effective techniques for communicating with the public.
Trusted messengers can have an enormous impact and can motivate 
people to bring about change. Think of Mahatma Gandhi, or Nelson 
Mandela, or Martin Luther King Jr. Sharing a stage with colleagues at 
my university, UC San Diego, a few years ago in front of thousands of 
students, discussing climate change with the Dalai Lama, was a privilege 
for me and a memorable day in my life. You don’t have to be a Tibetan 
Buddhist to understand that the Dalai Lama is respected and revered 
worldwide. When he speaks, millions listen. The Dalai Lama is an excel-
lent example of a trusted messenger whose statements about climate 
change can profoundly affect public opinion worldwide. He and I are 
shown in Figure 8.1.1.
Some messengers have strong credibility with specific groups of 
people. For example, professor Katherine Hayhoe is a climate scientist 
who is also an evangelical Christian, and she is an especially effective 
communicator to her co-religionists because they share her convictions 
and values. The idea that humans should be faithful stewards of God’s 
gift of a beautiful and valuable planet Earth to humankind—which is at 
Figure 8.1.1 Richard C. J. 
Somerville and the Dalai Lama 
speaking about climate change to 
a large audience on April 18, 2012, 
at UC San Diego. Reproduced with 
permission from Sylvia Bal Somerville.
Chapter 8: Communicating Climate Change Science 8-7
heart a moral and ethical concept—resonates with many evangelical 
Christians. 
Climate change is much more than a scientific topic. I am convinced 
that confronting climate change is fundamentally a moral and ethical 
issue. It involves considerations of intergenerational equity. What do 
we owe to people who will come after us? Speaking as just one citizen 
of the Earth, I suggest that, at a minimum, we owe our descendants a 
planet that is as undamaged as the one we inherited from previous gen-
erations. It’s also a matter of North-South equity. What do we in the rich 
nations owe to the billions of people now alive who do not yet enjoy 
what we would consider a bare minimum of rights and privileges? These 
include adequate food, access to clean water, decent health care, edu-
cation, security, and, not least, the material comforts that come from a 
certain level of affordable energy. Our own prosperity has been built on 
having such energy, but we have used the atmosphere as a free dump 
for the waste products from our energy system, such as carbon dioxide 
(CO2). We now realize these waste products can produce horrific side 
effects. And finally, what do we human beings owe to the natural world, 
now threatened with unprecedented levels of species extinctions?
Scientists and everybody else can improve their communication skills 
by considering their audience, knowing who the audience members 
are, and learning what they care most about. Why is climate change 
important to them? This approach to communication often means em-
phasizing impacts of climate change happening now, here in our own 
backyards, rather than impacts far away and in a distant future. It can 
also mean making connections between climate change and what peo-
ple are experiencing in their daily lives, such as increases in extreme 
weather.
In addition to knowing your audience, it is important to know your-
self. Analyze your own strengths and weaknesses as a climate change 
communicator, both in general terms and for each audience you face. 
Showing that you are interested in what your audience cares about, and 
showing that you are a warm, likable, knowledgeable, and trustworthy 
person, can make you a much more effective communicator. Seek feed-
back from your audience. Learn what others think of your abilities as a 
communicator of climate change science.
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Knowing your subject matter is crucial. Being well informed about 
the science of climate change is an obvious step in preparing to com-
municate it. For example, you can and should learn the most common 
myths and falsehoods about the science, and you can be prepared to 
refute them convincingly. Become something of an expert yourself first, 
at least in certain areas of climate change science, and only then try to 
communicate what you have learned. When answering a question, if 
you don’t know the answer, say so. Don’t guess. You’re not expected to 
know everything.
Facts matter. Here are some facts: The world is warming. It’s not a 
hoax. We measure it. The warming has not stopped. All the warmest 
years are recent years. The evidence for warming is not a weak thread. 
It’s a strong rope. The atmosphere is warming. So is the ocean. Sea 
level is rising. Ice sheets and glaciers are shrinking. Rainfall patterns and 
severe weather events are changing. Climate change is real and serious. 
It’s not a remote threat for the distant future. It’s here and now. Figure 
8.1.2 depicts the observational evidence that our climate is warming. 
Figure 8.1.2 Ten different types of observations that contribute to the 
scientific evidence that the global climate is warming. White upward arrows 
indicate increasing quantities. Black downward arrows indicate decreasing 
quantities. From US Global Change Research Program. 2014.
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All ten of the illustrated changes are consistent with a warming climate. 
Climate science communicators should be familiar with these aspects of 
the findings of climate research, and they should know important details 
about how these observations are made and why they are trustworthy.
The best summary of climate change science is the assessment re-
ports of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, or IPCC. Five 
such reports have been published between 1990 and 2013. They are 
published in hard copy by Cambridge University Press, and the more 
recent ones are also available free online at the IPCC website, https://
www.ipcc.ch. These assessment reports are written by climate scientists 
and extensively reviewed. I’m an IPCC author. The most recent IPCC 
assessment report is the fifth. It was published in 2013. At this writing 
(2018), the sixth is in progress. We will consider the report of Working 
Group I of the IPCC, which covers the physical science of climate change. 
There are two additional working groups, devoted to topics such as 
climate change impacts, vulnerabilities, adaptation, and mitigation. The 
latest Working Group I IPCC assessment report is scientifically definitive, 
but it is long, about 1,500 pages, full of charts and graphs, and not easy 
reading. For this chapter, I’ve composed brief statements in plain English 
to summarize this IPCC report in only 12 points. These are scientific 
findings, well supported by extensive research and endorsed by every 
relevant major scientific organization in the world. The 12 points are 
shown in Figure 8.1.3 and listed here:
1. It’s warming. We’ve just seen a summary of the many kinds of 
evidence for that.
2. It’s us. We’ve done the detective work. It’s not natural like ice 
ages. It’s human-caused.
3. It hasn’t stopped. The warming is continuing. The warmest years 
on record are recent years.
4. The heat is mainly in the sea. Over 90% of the heat added to the 
climate is in the oceans.
5. Sea level is rising globally. The rate of this rise is increasing. The 
rise is not uniform globally.
6. Ice is melting. Ice sheets on Greenland and Antarctica, as well as 
glaciers, are all shrinking.
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7. CO2 absorbed by the oceans makes them more acidic. That can 
affect the marine food chain.
8. CO2 amounts in the atmosphere are about 45% higher than in 
the 1800s, due to human actions.
9. The amount of CO2 in the atmosphere now is the highest it has 
been in millions of years.
10. Cumulative emissions of CO2 and other heat-trapping 
substances set the amount of warming.
11. Reducing emissions of CO2 and other heat-trapping substances 
will limit the warming.
12. Climate change, because it takes so long for CO2 amounts to 
decrease, will last for centuries.
Figure 8.1.3 My summary of the key results of the Working Group I (physical 
science) portion of the IPCC’s Fifth Assessment Report, published in 2013. 
Climate science communicators should be able to explain these key points and 
the scientific evidence for them. Image: R. C. J. Somerville.
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8.2  Stories
Stories are a wonderful way to engage an audience. Scientists are 
widely admired, scientific research has clearly brought many benefits 
to humanity, and you might naively think that most people would be 
inclined to accept the main findings of climate science. Yet many peo-
ple, including “Uncle Pete,” a fictional character closely based on fact, 
strongly disagree with climate scientists. When Uncle Pete comes to 
dinner, he ruins the meal for everyone else by loudly proclaiming that 
climate scientists are dishonest or incompetent, and climate science 
is fraudulent or a hoax or simply incorrect. Pete insists on frequently 
repeating several climate myths and falsehoods, which he believes are 
true. He may have heard them on a talk radio show or seen them in 
some dark corner of the internet. Many people know a real person, 
perhaps a friend or colleague or family member, who closely resembles 
Uncle Pete.
Uncle Pete’s myths and falsehoods include claims such as the world 
isn’t warming; or the warming is natural and not human-caused; or vol-
canoes produce more carbon dioxide than people do. In a moment, 
I will explain why Uncle Pete’s favorite and most frequently repeated 
claims are simply wrong. I don’t have enough space to cover all of them, 
and I recommend the website https://skepticalscience.com for the rest 
of the story. That website is a collection of the most commonly heard 
climate myths, and why they are all dead wrong. Skepticalscience.com 
is a useful resource in refuting your own Uncle Pete. For up-to-date 
scientific information on climate change, I also highly recommend the 
website www.realclimate.org, which is run by excellent climate scien-
tists. The main postings by these scientists on realclimate.org are usually 
outstanding, but the comments on the site by bloggers and other view-
ers vary greatly in quality.
Start with the myth that the warming we have observed in recent 
decades is natural and not human-caused. First, let’s be clear that the 
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climate has indeed changed naturally in the past, with ice ages being an 
obvious example. But natural causes simply cannot explain the recent 
warming. How do we know that? It’s much like the story of wildfires, 
which can be caused naturally, by lightning. But they can also be caused 
by people, either by carelessness or by arson. As you know, wildfire 
experts can investigate after a wildfire and can frequently determine 
exactly what caused it. They know how to do the detective work.
We climate scientists are good detectives too. We have discovered 
what paces the ice ages. It is the slow changes in the Earth’s orbit 
around the sun, which affect how sunlight is distributed over the Earth’s 
surface in the different seasons. Over many thousands of years, these 
effects are strong enough to trigger the transitions between ice ages 
and the warmer periods between them. However, over short time peri-
ods, such as decades, the orbital changes have much too small an effect 
to produce the observed large warming that has occurred in recent 
decades.
Through this kind of research, we scientists have also quantitatively 
ruled out all the other natural processes known to affect climate. For 
example, the sun powers the entire climate system, and the amount of 
energy given off by the sun does vary. The biggest variation that has been 
measured on decadal time scales is only about 0.1%, and that variation 
is due to the 11-year solar cycle, often called the sunspot cycle. We can 
measure this decadal-scale energy variability very accurately, and we 
can demonstrate convincingly that the measured changes are much too 
small to have caused the observed warming. As for the claim that the 
extra carbon dioxide added to the atmosphere by human activities is 
tiny compared with the amounts produced by volcanoes, that too fails 
quantitatively. Measurements show that human activities, mainly burning 
coal and oil and natural gas, produce about 100 times more carbon 
dioxide than volcanoes do.
Thus, we humans have taken over the dominant role of deciding 
what the climate in coming decades will be. We are no longer passive 
spectators in the global climate change pageant. We have become the 
primary actors. To climate scientists, whose goal is to discover the truth 
about climate change, it really doesn’t matter whether or not some 
people find this discovery believable. Science is based on facts and 
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evidence, not on beliefs. Most people have a very vague conception 
of what science is and what scientists do. People often recall their high 
school chemistry course, for example, as a boring exercise in memoriz-
ing useless things, like the periodic table of chemical elements, and then 
forgetting them as soon as possible after the exam. Most people have 
never met a scientist. It’s not just that people don’t know elementary 
facts, such as that the Earth goes around the sun once a year. It is that 
they have no idea how such facts were discovered. There is nothing 
wrong with belief; indeed, it’s important for people to believe that it is 
good to treat other people well. But in some domains, there is another 
way to find out what is true. That is to compare one’s beliefs with facts 
and evidence. Science is the name we give to doing that.
Science provides extremely persuasive evidence that the heat- 
trapping atmospheric gases and particles produced by human activities 
such as fossil fuel burning are the main cause of the warming observed 
in recent decades. This aspect of climate science is very firmly estab-
lished, going back to definitive laboratory experiments in the 1850s. 
Those scientific experiments showed clearly that carbon dioxide and 
other gases, present in small quantities in the atmosphere, have pow-
erful heat-trapping properties. In recent decades, the fingerprint of the 
observed warming, such as how it varies with altitude and geography 
and season, matches the pattern that we expect from human activi-
ties adding heat-trapping gases to the atmosphere. We have found the 
enemy. He is us. Figure 8.2.1 symbolizes the profound and disturbing 
truth that we people are now the main actors in climate change. Our 
choices will determine the future climate. The destiny of the planet is 
indeed in our hands.
Here are some of Uncle Pete’s favorite myths and falsehoods.
Uncle Pete asks, How can you forecast climate for a century if you 
can’t even forecast the weather for next week? Answer: Climate is sta-
tistics, and that is much more predictable than daily weather, just as we 
can skillfully forecast mortality statistics for large populations, but not 
the lifetime of a specific person.
Pete claims that in the 1970s, climate scientists predicted global 
cooling. That’s simply not true. We’ve checked. Global cooling was 
prominent in some media articles and popular books, but not in the 
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scientific research publications of the 1970s. The great majority of cli-
mate scientists in the 1970s were already focused on warming.
Pete has heard about certain satellite data that seemed to show a 
lack of warming. We have known for many years now that those data 
were simply wrong. Measuring atmospheric temperatures from satel-
lites is technically very difficult. It took time to learn how to do it right.
Pete says changes in the sun cause climate change. That is true for 
some past climate changes but not for the warming observed in recent 
decades. We measure the sun and its variability. The effects of the sun’s 
changes in recent decades are tiny compared with effects caused by 
humans.
Pete claims that the atmospheric CO2 amount increased from nat-
ural causes, like volcanoes. That’s just plain wrong. It did not. We can 
measure volcanic emissions. We also measure human-caused emissions. 
Human activities produce about 100 times more CO2 than volcanoes do.
Pete says errors in the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 
(IPCC) reports show that the science is wrong. Not true. A few small 
mistakes did get into the reports, but none of them is important.
All of Uncle Pete’s claims are simply not true. They are falsehoods, 
not facts.
There are similar convincing refutations of all the other common cli-
mate myths. That’s why many studies have shown that about 97% of the 
climate scientists who are most active in publishing research on climate 
change agree that the observed recent warming is real and serious and 
overwhelmingly human-caused. Nevertheless, Uncle Pete remains un-
convinced. He continues to repeat the myths. You might well ask, Why 
Figure 8.2.1 The warming 
climate observed in recent 
decades is not natural. Human 
activities, such as extensive use 
of fossil fuels, are causing it. We 
people are now the main actors 
in climate change. The destiny 
of the planet is in our hands. 
Reproduced from clipartimage.com.
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is Uncle Pete so stubborn and so resistant to overwhelming scientific 
evidence? That’s a very good question, and here is my answer.
For many skeptics or contrarians, like Pete, the climate change issue 
is not a science topic at all. For Pete, climate change is simply an op-
portunity for the government, and for liberals and environmentalists, to 
make rules and regulations, to interfere with markets, and to diminish 
the personal freedom of individuals. For Pete, climate change is just one 
more excuse for the authority of the state to control the lives of citizens. 
This view of Pete’s has nothing to do with science, and no argument 
based only on science can change it. Uncle Pete, like some actual people 
I know, may seriously fear that the government will not only claim the 
right to decide what kind of car he will be allowed to drive, but will 
ultimately want to force him to limit his individual carbon footprint, that 
is, to ration his personal emissions of heat-trapping gases.
Uncle Pete invariably has a high opinion of the free market. He is 
confident that government actions, such as taxes and regulations, tend 
to hinder free markets and thus have the effect of limiting economic 
progress. He is also suspicious of subsidies for renewable energy. He is 
sure that renewables will never be feasible without big subsidies. Uncle 
Pete couches his opposition to carbon taxes or fees in statements such 
as “If you let people keep more of their money, they will invest it in the 
future.” Once again, science is irrelevant here, and no claim that science 
has discovered or proven this or that fact will change Uncle Pete’s mind.
Research showing that some 97% of active climate experts agree 
with the mainstream scientific consensus does not impress Uncle Pete. 
Instead, he is convinced that many climate falsehoods and climate myths 
are true. Uncle Pete may be a fictional character, but almost everybody 
seems to know people who closely resemble him. Some well-known 
public figures and some high officials in the government of the United 
States apparently agree with Uncle Pete. If you want to have any hope of 
changing the opinion of your own Uncle Pete, you need to understand 
why he rejects the science of climate change.
It’s sad but true that most Americans have never met a scientist. 
Uncle Pete may have his own somewhat strange ideas about how sci-
ence works and what scientists do. Peer review, the elaborate and 
thorough formal process by which other scientists carefully evaluate 
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new scientific research before it can be published in technical journals, 
carries no weight at all with Pete. In fact, he can easily imagine a corrupt 
and powerful scientific establishment, conspiring to deny research fund-
ing to scientists who disagree with prevailing opinions, and to prevent 
them from publishing. Pete likes to mention Galileo as an example of an 
outlier in science who turns out to have been correct. He forgets that 
real geniuses like Galileo are extremely rare and that almost everybody 
who considers himself a Galileo is very badly mistaken. Pete may cite 
past errors made by scientists as evidence that the scientific mainstream 
is indeed sometimes badly mistaken. Pete is very suspicious of us scien-
tists, and he may think that government support of research in climate 
science is a waste of taxpayers’ money.
Social science tells us that people tend to trust those who share 
their values and to distrust those who do not. We know that contro-
versial issues, such as abortion and evolution and gun control, bitterly 
divide the United States, and we ought to realize that climate change is a 
very big issue for Uncle Pete. His natural distrust of academics and elites 
generally is increased if he thinks climate scientists are arrogant people 
who are scornful of his opinions, who mock his values, and who dismiss 
his most firmly held convictions.
I urge each of you to engage with the Uncle Pete whom you may 
know. Have a civil conversation. In his heart, Uncle Pete would probably 
admit that everybody is entitled to his own opinions, but not to his own 
facts. When it comes to facts, we scientists have the high ground. The 
world is warming. It’s not a hoax. We measure it. The warming did not 
stop in 1998 or any other recent year. All the warmest years are recent 
years. The atmosphere is warming, and so is the ocean. Sea level is 
rising. Ice sheets and glaciers are shrinking. Rainfall patterns and severe 
weather events are changing. Climate change is real and serious, and it 
is happening here and now. It is definitely not caused by natural pro-
cesses. Human activities are clearly the dominant cause of the climate 
changes we have observed in recent decades.
None of these facts tells us exactly what we should do about climate 
change. Science can inform wise policy, but it cannot decree or prescribe 
what the best policies will be. There is no silver bullet, but there is lots 
of silver buckshot. The main barrier to action is a lack of political will. In 
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deciding climate policy, science matters, but so do values, priorities, and 
political convictions. Given the same facts, different reasonable people 
can easily prefer different policies. For Uncle Pete, attacking climate 
science and scientists is simply a disguise for what really concerns him 
most, which is the prospect of liberals and environmentalists dominating 
policy, and of a government spinning out of control, a government that 
in Pete’s view seizes power, limits freedoms, increases taxes, regulates 
markets, and diminishes prosperity.
We do not yet have national agreement on climate change. Despite 
the strong scientific consensus, climate change policy is contentious 
politically.
One option is to do nothing. Uncle Pete may well favor that option, 
because it appears to fit well with his sincere conviction that “if you let 
people keep more of their money, they will invest it in the future.” On 
the option of doing nothing, I may be able to help Uncle Pete think a bit 
more clearly. I do not claim to be an expert on energy policy or taxes, 
but as a climate scientist, I can say something with very high confidence 
about what will happen if we do nothing. Deciding to do nothing about 
climate change is like deciding not to have serious elective surgery, such 
as declining a coronary artery bypass operation that your cardiologist 
recommends. The operation will involve risks and costs. But declining it 
will also involve risks and costs, including the risk of a fatal heart attack.
Sadly, most of us do not have enough conversations about climate 
change. The mainstream news media largely avoid the subject, and so 
do many politicians. Today the fact is that we—you and I and the other 
7.7 billion living people (as of November 2018)—now have our hands on 
the thermostat that controls the climate of our children and grandchil-
dren. A considerable portion of the carbon dioxide we emit will remain 
in the atmosphere for centuries and longer. Thus, it accumulates. There 
is a given allowed amount of CO2 in the atmosphere that we must not 
exceed if we want to limit warming to any target we pick. Science can 
now provide fairly accurate estimates of that allowed amount. For the 
warming target of the Paris Agreement, signed by almost every country 
in the world in late 2015, we’re already about halfway to that allowed 
amount of atmospheric CO2, and we do not have much time left to 
bring global emissions to nearly zero. That’s why it’s urgent to drastically 
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reduce global CO2 emissions and to do it quickly before we exceed the 
allowed amount.
It’s important to realize that once a political process such as the 
one at Paris in 2015 has occurred, and the world has agreed on a target 
of how much warming is to be allowed, science can then say approx-
imately how much more CO2 can be emitted to allow a reasonable 
probability of meeting the warming target. Given the warming target, 
the urgency of reducing emissions is thus based directly on the physics 
and chemistry of the climate system. It has nothing to do with politics 
or ideology, once the warming target has been agreed to.
Mother Nature, which we may use as one name for the physical 
climate system, reacts to the total amount of CO2. The more carbon 
dioxide there is in the atmosphere, the greater the climate change will 
be. If we who are alive today do nothing about climate change, and if 
the world continues to use the atmosphere as a free dump for carbon 
dioxide and other waste products of an energy system based on fossil 
fuels, then we are effectively sentencing future generations to the con-
sequences of a severely disrupted climate. Also, the disruption will not 
be brief. It will take many thousands of years for the climate to recover 
after we stop emitting CO2. Thus, it’s a long sentence. This is not a par-
tisan opinion or a political statement. It is well-supported solid science.
Figure 8.2.2 illustrates the uncomfortable fact that the Earth is now 
warming, just as surely as if it were immersed in a warm bath. In fact, 
the Earth is surrounded by an atmosphere, which acts much like a warm 
Figure 8.2.2 The 
Earth is warming, just 
as surely as if it were 
immersed in a warm bath. 
Reproduced from Pixabay.
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bath, and the atmosphere has been altered by human activities. As a 
result, the atmosphere now traps significantly more heat than it did in, 
say, 1800, before human activities adding heat-trapping substances to 
the atmosphere began to increase dramatically.
Military experts take this issue very seriously, and they have repeat-
edly characterized climate change as a threat multiplier. In the decades 
and centuries ahead, doing nothing would ensure that the world will 
inevitably see devastating climate change, including agricultural disasters 
on an immense scale and coastal cities abandoned worldwide because 
of sea level increases of many feet. If we do nothing, then because of 
devastating climate change, vast numbers of people will become envi-
ronmental refugees, and we will see the destabilization of governments, 
especially in failed and failing states. In wealthy and powerful countries, 
like the United States, governments coping with severe climate change 
would surely have to act forcefully, including using emergency powers as 
in wartime, to preserve order and to minimize chaos and damage. Iron-
ically, doing nothing at all about climate change, Uncle Pete’s preferred 
policy, is thus likely to force governments to do exactly what Uncle Pete 
fears most: seize power and limit freedoms. Doing nothing, whether 
intentionally or by neglect, is a truly disastrous policy option.
In your civil and mutually respectful conversation with your own 
Uncle Pete, I hope you can help him think seriously about the prospect 
of such a horrible, but very preventable, future. We are at a critical 
crossroads. If the world decides very soon to act decisively, we still have 
time to reduce emissions rapidly and drastically. We still have a chance 
of limiting climate change to a tolerable level, a level that offers some 
realistic chances of successful adaptation. Our window of opportunity is 
still open. But it won’t stay open much longer.
In my view, and that of many other climate scientists, we must act. 
We can’t dither any longer. If Uncle Pete wants to avoid the government 
controlling his life and diminishing his freedom, as all of us do, then we 
all need to learn about and accept the science. We all need to take the 
threat of climate change seriously. We all must act wisely, and urgently, to 
minimize it. For me, the best reason for communicating climate change 
science widely and accurately is that doing so can inform people and in-
crease the likelihood that the world will act promptly, wisely, and forcefully.
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8.3  Metaphors
Metaphors can be superb communication tools. A metaphor compares 
one thing to another thing, often in a way that brings out hidden similar-
ities or reveals unexpected resemblances that can aid our understand-
ing. “We have our hands on the thermostat that controls future climate” 
is an effective metaphor because we are not used to thinking about 
thermostats and global climate together.
Here’s another useful metaphor. Imagine you are watching a major- 
league professional baseball game. The slugger who is thought to be 
on performance-enhancing drugs hits a home run. Did the steroids 
cause it? Wrong question. You can’t be sure they caused it, because he 
was already a big-league slugger when he was clean. And even with the 
drugs, he can still strike out now and then. But at the end of the season, 
you see in his statistics that he hit more homers than he used to. The 
drugs increase the odds of home runs. If baseball does not interest 
you, other sports can be equally effective vehicles for this metaphor. A 
bicycle racer on illegal drugs does not win every race, but his chances 
of winning are increased.
Climate is the statistics of weather, and CO2 is the steroids of cli-
mate. The odds are higher now for all sorts of extreme weather because 
climate change has altered the environment in which all weather occurs. 
The entire hydrological cycle has sped up, there is more water vapor in 
the atmosphere, and so on. That’s why observations show that more 
precipitation now falls in heavy precipitation events than was the case 
a few decades ago. That’s also the reason for more high-temperature 
records being broken now than low-temperature records. After all, if 
the climate were not changing, neither warming nor cooling, but just 
randomly varying around a constant state, we would expect equal num-
bers of new high and low records to be set.
Figure 8.3.1 illustrates the catchy metaphor that carbon dioxide is 
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the steroids of our climate. This metaphor is “sticky,” meaning that it is 
effective and easy to remember. Climate is a subject in which statistics 
and probability play a key role. Climate change involves changes in the 
odds of many weather phenomena, such as heat waves and heavy pre-
cipitation events. Communicating the science of climate change is aided 
by using metaphors that are widely understood and easily remembered. 
Baseball fans understand that a player using performance-enhancing 
drugs such as steroids doesn’t always hit home runs, but the drugs 
increase the odds of the player hitting home runs. A bicycle racer on 
illegal drugs does not win every race, but the drugs increase his chance 
of winning. In a similar way, adding heat-trapping substances such as 
carbon dioxide (CO2) to the atmosphere increases the odds of heat 
waves and heavy precipitation events.
We climate scientists sometimes think of ourselves as planetary phy-
sicians. I had a fascinating experience not long ago. My regular doctor 
retired. I had to choose a new doctor. When we met for the first time, 
my new doctor said, “Sit down. Let me tell you how I practice medi-
cine. First, I’m competent. I know what I’m doing. Second, I’m honest. If 
there’s something I don’t understand, I’ll tell you. Third, I’m here only to 
advise you. You will make all the decisions.”
I was impressed. No doctor had ever talked to me like that. We 
Figure 8.3.1 The catchy 
metaphor that carbon dioxide 
is the steroids of our climate is 
“sticky,” meaning that it is effective 
and easy to remember. Adapted 
from Shutterstock.
Carbon dioxide 
is the steroids 
of our climate
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climate scientists are planetary physicians. We are also competent and 
honest and here only to advise. We have learned many things about 
climate, but we still have a lot to learn. Like the findings of medical sci-
ence, our understanding of climate, incomplete though it is, is already 
highly useful.
For example, the fundamental question—whether all of us, some 7.7 
billion humans as of late 2018, have caused the world to warm up in 
recent decades—has already been answered. The answer is yes. We’ve 
settled that issue. At least, an overwhelming majority of the most active 
climate scientists involved in research consider it settled. Some other 
people may choose not to believe it. There are people, like Uncle Pete, 
who are unwilling to believe things that they wish were not true, or who 
just don’t trust experts.
The public has come to respect medical science, however. Although 
there will always be gullible people, most of us know there’s a difference 
between real experts and charlatans. Most people won’t listen to, or act 
on, medical advice from a quack who can talk about medicine but who 
isn’t really a physician. Everybody accepts this situation. Even the least 
enlightened members of Congress don’t hold hearings to denounce 
modern medical science as a hoax. Yet, a few politicians and others do 
denounce climate science in exactly this way.
Medicine is different. At your annual checkup, if you’re sensible, 
when the doctor tells you to lose weight and exercise more, you don’t 
argue. You don’t complain that medical science is imperfect and can’t 
yet prevent cancer or cure AIDS. You don’t label your doctor a radical 
alarmist. You know, and your doctor knows, that medical science, while 
imperfect and incomplete, is still good enough to provide advice well 
worth following.
Of course, some people just don’t do what experts tell them. Not 
everybody takes the medications their doctor prescribes. “Noncompli-
ance” by some patients can be a big problem for physicians. We should 
keep all this in perspective. Lest we fall into the trap of thinking that 
medical science is a perfect role model for us climate scientists who 
crave more public esteem, it is also good to remember that it took a 
long time for many medical results to acquire widespread acceptance. 
Some scientists in the 1930s already suspected that tobacco caused 
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cancer. The evidence was widely known to be strong by the 1960s. Yet 
the high-profile anti-tobacco lawsuits in the United States began only in 
the 1980s. Even today, many people still smoke.
The biggest single problem in human-caused climate change is car-
bon dioxide. We produce it when we burn oil and coal and natural 
gas to generate energy. It traps heat in the atmosphere, adding to the 
natural greenhouse effect and causing climate change. A few farseeing 
scientists realized more than a century ago that this might happen. Yet 
accurate measurements of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere began 
only in the late 1950s. Thus, we have known for only about half a cen-
tury that the amount of atmospheric carbon dioxide is increasing. We 
ought to remember this half-century time scale when we get impatient 
about the slow pace of progress in action against human-caused climate 
change.
I would say that we scientists have known about the urgency of 
climate change for about 40 years. I have one especially important sci-
entific research paper in mind, among many others. That paper, which 
is not very famous, is by Ulrich Siegenthaler and Hans Oeschger and was 
published in 1978 in the journal Science, which is often said to be the 
most prominent scientific journal.
The paper concluded that carbon dioxide emissions would have to 
peak and then quickly decline early in the current (twenty-first) century 
in order to limit global warming to moderate or tolerable levels. This 
1978 result came from the simple models and the limited data available 
in the 1970s. We know much more today about the quantitative as-
pects of this prediction and many other details. However, the essential 
scientific foundation was already clear 40 years ago—or at least it was 
clear to two insightful Swiss scientists, Siegenthaler and Oeschger. That 
is the message I try to emphasize: the need to drastically reduce global 
heat-trapping gas and particle emissions is urgent, and the urgency is 
scientific, not political.
Incidentally, like many climate scientists, I don’t fully approve of the 
catchy term “global warming,” although I realize it’s in the language to 
stay. It’s an oversimplification. Climate isn’t just temperature. Climate is 
a rich tapestry of interlinked phenomena, multifaceted and inherently 
complex. The important aspects of climate change are local, not global, 
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and are not confined to warming. Global warming is just a symptom of 
planetary ill health, like a fever.
You and your physician both know that fever is important but not 
the whole story. At your annual checkup, you don’t confine yourself to 
body temperature when discussing your health. Even the most ignorant 
patient realizes that measuring temperature alone doesn’t enable the 
physician to diagnose an illness and prescribe treatment.
Instead, everybody knows that a body temperature only a few de-
grees above normal is a symptom that can indicate health problems that 
may have serious consequences, including death. Yet we still  haven’t 
educated most Americans to understand that a planetary fever of a few 
degrees can mean melting ice sheets, rising sea level, massive disrup-
tions in water supply in the arid American west, increased risk of wild-
fires, killer heat waves, and stronger hurricanes on the Atlantic and Gulf 
coasts of the United States.
Figure 8.3.2 shows the Earth in space, beautiful and fragile and vul-
nerable. Climate change threatens the well-being of all its plants and 
animals, as well as that of its 7.7 billion human passengers. The most 
important function of climate scientists and climate science communi-
cation is to inform people and to motivate them to act promptly, wisely, 
and forcefully.
What can we say about hurricanes and their possible connection 
to an altered climate? The short answer is that you have to think about 
probabilities when you think about this connection. A warmer climate 
means that the strongest hurricanes may become even stronger, on 
Figure 8.3.2 We climate scientists 
are planetary physicians. The decisions 
about caring for our patient, the 
Earth, will be made by its people and 
their governments. Climate science 
communicators must inform people 
and motivate them to act promptly, 
wisely, and forcefully. Reproduced 
from NASA.
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average. It does not mean we can definitely prove that any particular 
hurricane owes its strength to climate change, only that the odds of very 
strong hurricanes have gone up.
A hurricane is essentially just a heat engine with sea surface tem-
perature as an approximate indicator of the fuel supply. The higher the 
temperature of the ocean surface, the more energy is available to power 
the hurricane. There is a critical sea surface temperature of about 80°F, 
below which hurricanes generally do not form. Because their destructive 
power increases as the sea surface temperature does, and especially 
because of the big recent increase in population and development in 
hurricane-prone areas in the United States, our vulnerability to hurri-
canes has increased strongly.
Scientists are cautious people, skeptical to a fault, fond of caveats, 
and not given to sweeping statements. We prefer to make claims only 
when we can back them up with solid data. We know that hurricanes 
are highly variable, no two are alike, and next year’s hurricane season 
might be very different from this year’s. It’s our natural inclination to 
wait a few more years, observe more hurricanes, improve our theories 
and models, until we have an airtight case to present.
Nevertheless, the best current research tells us that the oceans 
have recently warmed substantially, that human activities are the pri-
mary cause of that warming, that an increase in the intensity of strong 
hurricanes is the expected result, and that we have indeed observed an 
increase in the numbers of the strongest hurricanes. No amount of waf-
fling over probabilities and statistics can obscure these sobering results.
Many intelligent people still laugh at the small numbers we use and 
think a global warming of a few degrees is trivial. They may say that mov-
ing from a colder city to a warmer one involves a much greater warming 
and is actually quite pleasant. These people just don’t grasp the crucial 
difference between local changes and global ones. They don’t realize 
that when the climate of the entire planet changes by a few degrees, 
enormous changes happen. Going into an ice age, to pick one example, 
involves a global cooling of only a few degrees.
Some people really think that a rapidly warming climate is just a 
minor inconvenience that can be handled by air conditioning and other 
minor technological fixes. This massive degree of misunderstanding may 
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be due in part to a failure to educate people about science. It may 
also be the case that people have become confused by the widespread 
misperception that the science of climate change is immature, uncer-
tain, characterized by raging controversy, and not to be trusted. An 
effective campaign of deliberate disinformation about climate science 
has helped spread this false impression.
Medical science has achieved a measure of pervasive respect that 
climate science can only envy. Journalists covering a medical discovery 
don’t mistrust researchers and don’t inevitably insist on hearing from 
“the opposing view.” When reporting on research showing the need 
for Americans to eat more sensibly and be physically active, the media 
doesn’t treat these advances in medical science in terms of a dispute. 
Journalists don’t feel obliged to seek out medical contrarians “for 
balance.”
There are many parallels between the climate change issue and 
medical topics. Maybe some can be useful in educating people and 
politicians. It has turned out to be frustratingly difficult to get people 
and their governments motivated to act to avert climate change. Yet 
people are intensely interested in threats to their own health. Many 
Americans have improved their health by making major changes in their 
personal lives, changes that are directly attributable to the results of 
medical science. Real progress has been made in making Americans, 
and their government, more aware of unhealthy behavior. The media, 
including public service advertising, together with organizations such 
as the American Medical Association and the American Cancer Society, 
have succeeded in raising many people’s consciousness about health.
In climate change, the comparable scientific organizations have 
made very little progress in persuading people. In fact, most of the pro-
fessional societies that scientists like me belong to exist mainly to serve 
the scientific community. They organize conferences of researchers. 
They publish highly technical journals that only scientists can read. These 
societies have low profiles and are essentially invisible to the public. 
Most of these societies have tiny budgets and devote very little effort 
to outreach of any kind. Many appear to be politically inactive or naive.
It is also true that some powerful segments of industry vigorously 
oppose efforts to act and to publicize the scientific facts about climate 
Chapter 8: Communicating Climate Change Science 8-27
change. However, business and industry are not monolithic in this re-
spect. There are outstanding corporate champions of sound climate 
science, and we know that even the most retrograde segments of indus-
try can change and become forces for progress, as notably happened 
in the ozone issue, for example. There, after it was scientifically proven 
that human-made chemicals were the culprit that caused the ozone 
hole, the industry that manufactured these chemicals changed its tune 
and developed safe substitutes for them. Governments and science and 
businesses cooperated, and humanity benefited.
In other cases, science and public concern have eventually triumphed 
over misguided opposition and propaganda. Numbers of smokers and 
deaths from smoking have been significantly reduced. Most Americans 
realize that smoking is dangerous and kills many thousands of people 
every year. They have learned this despite a highly professional and well-
funded disinformation campaign mounted by portions of the tobacco 
industry.
Quitting smoking, like quitting using fossil fuels, is not easy to do, 
and in both cases the difficulty in quitting is immediate, while the most 
important benefits are all long-term.
The widespread public concern about the health consequences of 
smoking tobacco has led to political action, including warning labels on 
cigarettes, restrictions on advertising, and bans on sales to minors. The 
tobacco industry has repeatedly been defeated in court cases and has 
already paid large amounts of money as a result.
We see too the results of governments responding to public con-
cern in the arena of promoting healthier food choices, including laws 
mandating truth in labeling and other actions to increase public aware-
ness. These examples, and many more that could be cited, are direct 
results of medical science affecting public policy. People are persuaded 
that the science is right, and governments react to concern and pres-
sure from citizens.
Science seems mysterious to many people, and it is not easy to pen-
etrate the barriers of jargon and mathematics to explain the intricacies 
of computerized climate models or satellite climate measurements to a 
lay audience. Although very few people have a deep understanding of 
science or indeed any detailed familiarity with what researchers actually 
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do, the public generally respects scientists and has confidence in the 
validity of their results. In fact, polls consistently show that scientists are 
among the most widely admired people in our society.
Risk is an inevitable aspect of life. Medicine involves risk. People tend 
to be realistic about the consequences of serious medical problems. 
They know that a bypass operation is major surgery. They accept the 
cost and the risk, understanding clearly that doing nothing also entails 
real costs and dangerous risks. They don’t expect that a simple bandage 
will cure a potentially fatal disease. As a climate scientist, I sometimes 
fear that we are wasting time arguing about which type of bandage is 
most attractive as a climate remedy, instead of facing the hard decisions, 
and the risks, that climate change demands of us.
You can’t fool Mother Nature. The climate system responds to 
changes in the levels of heat-trapping gases. The climate system is indif-
ferent to economic concerns, political considerations, or societal impli-
cations. The climate system does not care about the details of cap-and-
trade agreements, and it knows nothing about diplomatic niceties like 
protocols and framework conventions. The amount of carbon dioxide in 
the atmosphere is what matters to climate.
The laws of atmospheric physics, unlike government reports, are 
absolutely immune from political tampering. If humanity insists on add-
ing heat-trapping gases to the atmosphere, there will be consequences. 
That’s just a fact. We scientists are busy researching the quantitative 
details, but we already know the big picture pretty well. If you see that 
a glib climate contrarian isn’t at all worried about doubling the amount 
of carbon dioxide in the Earth’s atmosphere, then start to think about 
tripling, quadrupling, and beyond. That is where we are headed, and 
our speed on this wrong road is actually still increasing. To have an 
effect, we simply must do more than make small token reductions in 
greenhouse gas emissions.
One of the towering heroes of climate science, my colleague at 
Scripps Institution of Oceanography and my friend, was Charles David 
Keeling, who died in June 2005 after nearly half a century of precisely 
measuring the amount of carbon dioxide in the global atmosphere. 
He was one of the greatest of planetary physicians. His legacy is sum-
marized in a famous graph, the Keeling Curve, showing atmospheric 
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carbon dioxide inexorably increasing, decade after decade. Those data 
are rock solid, real science, unassailable.
In the 1950s, at about the same time that Keeling’s measurements 
began, another renowned Scripps scientist, Roger Revelle, famously 
wrote that humanity is doing an inadvertent and unrepeatable geophysi-
cal experiment in moving so much carbon to the atmosphere so quickly. 
That perception, visionary at the time, seems obvious now.
What is still not obvious to many is that all of us are now engaged 
in a second global experiment, this time an educational and geopolitical 
one. We are going to find out whether humanity is going to take climate 
science seriously enough to act meaningfully, rather than just waiting 
around until nature ultimately proves that our climate model predictions 
were right.
In the end, our success or lack of it will be measured by whether we 
as a global society can change the Keeling Curve, bending it downwards, 
and whether we can stabilize the amount of carbon dioxide in our at-
mosphere in time to avoid the most dangerous climatic consequences. 
Whether that will turn out to be possible is not yet known. I hope so. I 
think it is the single most important question in planetary public health: 
armed with impeccable science, can humankind muster the wisdom and 
the will to make difficult changes? With many other medical decisions, 
the outcome is ultimately in the hands of the patient. In this case, it 
depends on all of humanity.
The biggest unknown about future climate is human behavior. Every-
thing depends on what people and their governments do. For centuries, 
we humans were passive spectators at the global climate change pag-
eant. Not any longer! We have become the dominant actors. You and 
I, and all 7.7 billion people who are alive today (late 2018), do indeed 
have our hands on the thermostat that will control the climate of our 
children and grandchildren. “The thermostat” is a powerful metaphor, 
illustrated in Figure 8.3.3. It is very useful in climate change science 
communication. People know that a household thermostat enables a 
person to control the temperature of the interior of a building. Yet many 
people do not realize that human activities are now a dominant factor in 
controlling climate change. We humans have caused the world to warm 
in recent decades. We human beings now have the power to limit the 
8-30 Chapter 8: Communicating Climate Change Science
warming, to turn down the thermostat, and to avoid some of the most 
disruptive consequences of severe climate change. The big question is 
whether we together can muster the will to act promptly, wisely, and 
forcefully. 
Figure 8.3.3 We have our hands 
on the thermostat that will control 
the climate of our children and 
grandchildren. Reproduced from 
Fotosearch.
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8.4  Language
Language is a critical aspect of all communication, written or oral, on 
every topic. When the topic is science, especially climate change sci-
ence, some aspects of language become especially important. My first 
bit of language advice to anyone communicating about climate change 
science is to avoid the mistakes that climate scientists themselves often 
make. If you read enough research articles written by scientists, you 
are certain to discover that they tend to follow a peculiar format, one 
that is quasi-chronological. They typically start with background infor-
mation, such as summarizing what previous research has been done on 
the particular topic being investigated. After that, the usual research 
paper moves on to an account of all the preparations that were made to 
start the research project being reported. Perhaps scientific instruments 
were procured or constructed, and then tested. Perhaps an expedition 
to a remote location had to be arranged. Perhaps computer programs 
had to be written and revised. Measurements or observations may have 
been taken, then processed and analyzed. At the end of this very long 
story, the authors present their results and conclusions.
Having read thousands of scientific research articles myself, I some-
times think that scientists force themselves to follow this structure, even 
though the way the research was actually carried out may have been 
very different. It has been said that making a scientific discovery and 
finding new knowledge is like climbing a treacherous mountain trail on 
a pitch-dark night. The climber stumbles and falls often, suffers many 
severe bruises from rocks and many sharp cuts from thorny plants, then 
is forced to turn back several times and try alternative routes, and finally 
reaches the top of the mountain, exhausted and in pain. Only then, as 
the sun comes up, is the climber able to see a smooth and gently sloping 
path, the route to success that should have been taken, a path that leads 
easily and painlessly from the bottom of the mountain to the top. When 
writing the article reporting the research, it is that smooth path that the 
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scientist describes, starting with a calm and thorough search of previous 
work, then the making of orderly preparations for the research, and 
finally the logical carrying out of a swift and successful project, leading 
triumphantly to important new results. There is not a word about the 
long nightmare on the mountain and the many cuts and bruises endured 
on the route actually taken.
Don’t follow the example of the scientist who communicates all the 
details and background first and then announces the results and con-
clusions at the end. In journalism, this sin is called “burying the lead.” 
Reporters learn to compose a lead, the first sentence of a news story, 
in a way that conveys the main point of the story and also captures the 
reader’s attention and motivates the reader to continue reading. We 
are speaking here of written stories and articles, but the point applies 
to oral presentations of all kinds too, including informal conversations. 
Figure 8.4.1 is taken from an article that my climate communication 
partner, Susan Joy Hassol, and I published, in which we urged climate 
change science communicators to start with the important result, not 
with background information. If a communicator has the scientist’s habit 
Figure 8.4.1 From Somerville and Hassol 2011.
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of giving a lot of unimportant details first, and the important main result 
last, we say, “Turn your world upside down.” Everyone should remem-
ber, “Don’t bury the lead.”
Scientists in any specialty tend to speak to one another in a strange 
and private language that seems bizarre to nonscientists or even to 
scientists in other specialties. Jargon and mathematical terms are part 
of normal conversational usage for scientists. Words that are unfamil-
iar to the wider world should be avoided. They always have clear and 
simple substitutes. Rather than “anthropogenic,” scientists could say 
“human-caused.”
Be sure to use units that are familiar to your audience. Scientists 
everywhere use metric units in their work, and they often publish arti-
cles using these units. When speaking to or writing for a nonscientific 
audience in the United States, remember that metric units will be both 
unintelligible and frustrating to the audience. Instead, use feet and miles 
rather than meters and kilometers, use pounds instead of kilograms, 
and use degrees Fahrenheit rather than Celsius.
Scientific jargon refers to a type of language used by scientists in 
communicating efficiently and precisely with one another. Most scien-
tists realize that jargon will not be understood by the public. However, 
there is an insidious trap involving common everyday terms that are not 
jargon, and that many people use, but that scientists use to mean some-
thing completely different from what everybody else means. There are 
hundreds of such terms, and they should be avoided by anyone wishing 
to communicate climate change science effectively.
Many climate scientists are shocked to learn that people misinter-
pret the term positive feedback, which scientists always use to mean a 
self-amplifying process. Here’s an example: a warming Arctic causes less 
snow and ice, and so it makes the surface of the Earth darker. That darker 
surface is then less reflective, so it absorbs more sunlight, increasing the 
warming. This process is one of the main reasons why Alaska and other 
locations in the Arctic have warmed much more in recent years than the 
global average. For scientists, such a “positive feedback” increases global 
warming or climate change and thus is clearly bad. These scientists have 
temporarily forgotten that it is normal for people to be delighted when 
their boss praises their work, thus giving them “positive feedback”!
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Similarly, when human activities add heat-trapping gases to the at-
mosphere, climate scientists frequently refer to the consequence as an 
“enhanced greenhouse effect.” They mean that the natural greenhouse 
effect is increased in strength, producing more warming in the atmo-
sphere and causing climate change. In using enhanced to mean “intensi-
fied,” these scientists overlook the everyday meaning of enhanced, which 
is “improved,” as when attractive clothing or good health is said to 
enhance a person’s appearance. Thus, just as in the case of positive feed-
back, scientists intend to describe something harmful and undesirable 
with the word enhanced, but their use of the term is confusing and cre-
ates misunderstanding because normally enhanced describes something 
beneficial and desirable. Figure 8.4.2 lists a few other terms that scien-
tists often misuse, along with suggestions for improved communication 
of these concepts. There are many more such terms. Climate science 
communicators need to realize that such words should be avoided. 
They can always be replaced by better choices. 
Figure 8.4.2 A sample of words that are not scientific jargon, but that are 
used differently by scientists and the public. From Somerville and Hassol 2011.
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Much of my advice on language is not confined to this section but 
can be found throughout this chapter. I urge every climate change sci-
ence communicator to compose messages that are simple and memo-
rable, to repeat them often, and to partner with trusted messengers. I 
heartily endorse the use of metaphors and other vivid imagery. If climate 
change is very important to you, do not speak or write about it in 
dry and unemotional language that conveys boredom and resignation. 
Instead, let your passion show. Seize opportunities to learn from ex-
pert communicators and to get useful feedback from your audiences. 
Nobody is born knowing how to ski or play chess or drive a car. Like all 
these skills, communication skills can be taught, developed, practiced, 
and improved.
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8.5  Solutions
When you communicate climate change science, be sure to include in-
formation on solutions. Nobody wants to hear about hopelessness, and 
in the case of climate change, there are many reasons to be hopeful. 
Climate change poses difficult problems and challenges, but there are 
lots of solutions that are both creative and practical and that can help 
solve the problems and overcome the challenges of climate change.
I think the main barriers to action today are not technical or finan-
cial. They are a lack of widespread political will and a lack of wise and 
inspiring political leadership. Science can help to inform policy, but only 
concerned people and responsive, capable governments can decide 
what policies are best, and then implement them.
In the United States today, we clearly do not yet have national agree-
ment on climate change. Some people in the federal government sound 
just like Uncle Pete. Despite the strong scientific consensus, climate 
change is controversial politically. Incidentally, there are many lawyers in 
Congress, but as this is written (2018) only one member of Congress is 
a PhD scientist. Maybe that should change!
There is no silver bullet that solves all the challenges of climate 
change, but there is lots of silver buckshot, including increased energy 
efficiency and energy conservation and much more use of sun, wind, 
and water to provide the energy the world needs. These renewable 
resources are widely available now and already cost-competitive with 
fossil fuels. We have the technology. We lack the political will to act. At 
least, that has been true for decades, but there is evidence that a change 
is occurring now.
Faced with the very real threats of climate change, the nations of the 
world agreed in Paris in late 2015 to limit the warming to a specific max-
imum amount. That amount is 2°C, or 3.6°F, above the average global 
temperature in the early 1800s, before human activities began to have 
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a large effect. At the urging of the most vulnerable countries, delegates 
in Paris also agreed to “pursue efforts to limit the temperature increase 
even further to 1.5 degrees Celsius,” although it was widely understood 
that successfully meeting this aspirational goal would be much more 
difficult than meeting the 2.0°C target.
After Paris, is the glass half empty or half full? I am guardedly opti-
mistic. I see many reasons for optimism, and I encourage all of you to 
learn about them and communicate them to your Uncle Pete and your 
audiences:
 ➤ World leaders are engaged; at least almost all of them are.
 ➤ Emissions of heat-trapping gases have begun to decline in some 
countries.
 ➤ Solar and wind energy have dropped drastically in price and con-
tinue to become cheaper.
 ➤ Renewable energy use in many countries is increasing rapidly.
 ➤ Many corporations are now acting to reduce emissions.
 ➤ States and localities are acting too.
 ➤ Many countries are showing rapid progress.
I’m also encouraged by recent polling that shows that in the United 
States, more people accept the science and are very concerned about 
global warming than was the case only a few years ago. However, when 
virtually the entire leadership of the Republican party in the United 
States rejects the findings of mainstream climate change science and 
considers climate change to be a hoax, we clearly have a long way to go. 
In the United States, climate change has become a very partisan issue.
Fortunately, it is quite possible to power the entire world on carbon- 
free energy. The technology is available today and continues to improve 
rapidly. In this country, even without decisive action by the federal gov-
ernment, I am guardedly optimistic. Figure 8.5.1 illustrates wind power. 
Wind and solar power are both already cheaper than fossil fuel power 
in many areas, even without subsidies and when the many hidden costs 
of fossil fuel power, such as health effects of air pollution, are not taken 
into account.
Market forces now favor carbon-free energy. Coal companies are 
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going bankrupt. Renewable energy gets cheaper every year. Electric ve-
hicles are happening fast. Much energy policy in the United States is set 
at state and local levels, not in Washington.
Uncle Pete needs to know that free-market, small-government mech-
anisms, ones he may prefer and approve of, such as revenue- neutral 
carbon fee-and-rebate plans, can work. Some have been advocated by 
leading conservatives, who argue that it is sensible insurance, hedging 
against climate change risk, whether one accepts climate science or 
not. Pete should study this approach. I urge you to study it and then talk 
about it to your Uncle Pete.
Leaving a healthy climate to your children and their descendants is a 
worthwhile goal, and a realistic one. It won’t be easy, but it can be done.
We need to help people realize that not acting is also making a 
choice, one that commits future generations to serious climate change 
impacts. Research suggests that messages that may invoke fear or dis-
may are better received if they also include hopeful messages. Thus, we 
can improve the chances that the public will hear and accept the science 
if we include positive messages about our ability to solve the problem. 
For example, we can explain that future climate is in our hands; lower 
Figure 8.5.1 An array of wind turbines on a dike in The Netherlands. 
Renewable energy, typified by wind and solar power, is a key part of efforts to 
wean the world from fossil fuels. Reproduced with permission from Sylvia Bal 
Somerville.
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emissions of heat-trapping gases will mean reduced climate change and 
less severe impacts. We can point out that addressing climate change 
wisely can yield a variety of benefits to the economy and quality of life. 
We can explain that acting sooner is preferable to delaying. We can all 
rise to the challenge of helping the public understand that science can 
illuminate the choices that we face.
Whether to act to limit global warming to tolerable levels should 
not depend on your politics. We have only one Earth. Everybody should 
want to avoid polluting and contaminating this magnificent world, and 
everybody should agree that we need to protect and preserve our 
amazing planet. Your policies and values and politics have a role to play 
in deciding which actions are best, but any rational policy begins by 
accepting the science.
The world needs to take firm action about the threat of human-caused 
climate change within the next decade. Research shows that global 
emissions of heat-trapping gases must peak and decline quickly—within 
a few years, not a few decades or centuries—if global warming is to 
be limited to a level that avoids severe climate disruption. Meanwhile, 
a well-funded and effective professional disinformation campaign has 
been successful in sowing confusion, and many people like Uncle Pete 
mistakenly think climate change science is unreliable or is controver-
sial within the scientific expert community. Thus, an urgent task for us 
scientists and for all communicators of climate change science may be 
to give the public guidelines for recognizing and rejecting junk science 
and disinformation. If students today, who will be adults tomorrow, can 
understand and apply these guidelines, they may not need a detailed 
knowledge of climate change science. To that end, I offer the following 
six principles.
1. The essential findings of mainstream climate change science 
are firm. The world is warming. There are many kinds of evidence: 
air temperatures, ocean temperatures, melting ice, rising sea 
levels, and much more. Human activities are the main cause. The 
warming is not natural. It is not due to the sun, for example. We 
know this because we can measure the effect of human-made 
carbon dioxide and it is much stronger than that of changes in the 
sun, which we also measure.
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2. The greenhouse effect is well understood. It is as real as gravity. 
The foundations of the science are more than 150 years old. 
Carbon dioxide in the atmosphere traps heat. We know that, 
because careful laboratory experiments prove it and theoretical 
physics explains it. We know carbon dioxide is increasing, because 
we measure it. We know the increase is due to human activities 
like burning fossil fuels, because we can analyze the chemical 
evidence for that.
3. Our climate predictions are coming true. Many observed 
climate changes, like rising sea level, are occurring at the high end 
of the predicted range. Some observed changes, like melting sea 
ice, are happening faster than the recently anticipated worst case. 
Unless humankind takes strong steps to halt and reverse the rapid 
global increase of fossil fuel use and the other activities that cause 
climate change, and does so in a very few years, severe climate 
change is inevitable. Urgent action is needed if global warming is 
to be limited to moderate levels.
4. The climate change myths and falsehoods that Uncle Pete 
believes in have been refuted many times over. The refutations 
are on many websites and in many books. For example, the 
mechanisms causing natural climate change like ice ages are 
irrelevant to the current warming. We know why ice ages come 
and go. That is due to changes in the Earth’s orbit around the 
sun, changes that take thousands of years. The warming that 
is occurring now, over just a few decades, cannot possibly be 
caused by such slow-acting processes. However, it can be caused 
by human-made additions of heat-trapping substances to the 
atmosphere.
5. Science has its own high standards. Science does not mean 
unqualified people, who do not carry out scientific research, 
making unsubstantiated claims on television or the internet. Science 
means expert scientists doing research and publishing it in carefully 
reviewed research journals. Other scientists examine the research 
and repeat it and extend it. Valid results are confirmed, and wrong 
ones are exposed and abandoned. Science in the long run is 
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self-correcting. People who are not experts, who are not trained 
and experienced in this field, who do not do research and publish it 
following standard scientific practice, are not doing science. When 
they claim that they are the real experts, they are not being truthful.
6. The leading scientific organizations of the world, such as 
national academies of science and professional societies of 
scientists in fields relevant to climate change, have carefully 
examined the results of climate science and endorsed these 
results. It is silly to imagine that thousands of climate scientists 
worldwide are engaged in a massive conspiracy to fool everybody. 
It is also silly to think that a few minor errors in the extensive IPCC 
reports can invalidate the reports. The first thing that the world 
needs to do to confront the challenge of climate change wisely is 
to learn about what science has discovered and accept it.
One last time: Always remember why we want to communicate 
climate change science. We want to inform people. We want to mo-
tivate them. We want them to act. The biggest unknown about future 
climate is human behavior. Figure 8.5.2 is a good illustration of the main 
take-home message from climate change science communication. These 
projections show that with lower global emissions of heat-trapping 
Figure 8.5.2 Reproduced from US Global Change Research Program. 2014.
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gases—that’s the map on the left—we can limit warming in the contigu-
ous United States late in this century to about half of what it would be if 
we continue to rely on fossil fuels for the world’s energy—that’s the map 
on the right. The choice is up to us. Everything depends on what people 
and their governments do. 
Supplementary Readings
www.climatecommunication.org
www.realclimate.org
www.richardsomerville.com
scrippsscholars.ucsd.edu/rsomerville
https://skepticalscience.com
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Learning Objectives
1. Understand the historical foundation for California’s climate 
policy. You will learn how local concerns—primarily air pollution 
in Southern California, but also public opposition to nuclear 
energy—built the institutional structures, technical capacity, and 
legal framework that the state later employed to tackle greenhouse 
gas emissions. You will also learn how a combination of public, 
legislative, and business support has maintained and extended 
California’s climate policies.
2. Understand and identify the policy tools used to achieve cleaner 
air and a more energy-efficient economy. You will learn about the 
mix of regulatory, incentive-based, and market approaches that 
California has developed to reduce emissions and improve energy 
efficiency. You will also learn how the state has built on experience 
from elsewhere—for example, through designing a cap-and-trade 
system to avoid the problems experienced in Europe—and how it 
has responded to concerns about the equity and environmental 
justice impacts of climate policy tools.
3. Critically analyze the progress that California has made and the 
work that remains to be done. You will learn about the degree 
to which California has achieved its near-term objectives and the 
challenges that lie ahead as the state looks toward its goals for 
2040 and beyond. You will be able to analyze why progress in 
some sectors has been rapid and identify the barriers that have 
hampered progress in other areas—particularly land use policies 
to reduce vehicle travel. You will also learn about the influence of 
California’s policies beyond its boundaries and about how the state 
has served as a climate policy laboratory.
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Overview
This chapter introduces the steps that one climate change leader, 
California, has taken to reduce its greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions 
across a wide range of economic activities. Given the magnitude of the 
climate change challenge, it’s easy to conclude that brand-new or as-
yet- undiscovered mitigation and adaptation policies will be needed. But 
California’s experience shows that decades-old policies and programs 
designed to improve air quality and energy efficiency, as well as spur 
large-scale use of renewable power sources, can all be used to combat 
climate change. So, climate change policies are neither unknown nor 
untried; indeed, many of the required policies simply build on existing 
efforts that are widespread and well understood.
The chapter begins with some history, discussing how very poor 
air quality, especially in the Los Angeles basin, spurred activists, scien-
tists, and policymakers to act. The chapter then focuses on California’s 
innovative climate policies. We do not aim to provide a comprehensive 
guide to all of the state’s efforts. Rather, we selectively review some 
of the most innovative and far-reaching policies, and chart the steady 
ratcheting up of its targets for greenhouse gas reductions and renewable 
energy. The first law explicitly requiring greenhouse gas reductions—
anywhere in the country—targeted cars and other light-duty vehicles. 
The resulting regulations were adopted by 14 other states, accounting 
for almost 40% of US new vehicle sales. Later, the federal government 
worked with California to develop even more aggressive regulations. 
Thus, vehicle GHG emission standards were an early example of how 
California’s policies could spur climate action beyond its boundaries.
Subsequent laws went beyond the transportation sector to require 
economy-wide greenhouse gas reductions. Most notably, Assembly Bill 
32 (AB 32), the California Global Warming Solutions Act of 2006, set 
a target of reducing greenhouse gas emissions to 1990 levels by 2020, 
which in practice meant a reduction of 25% to 30% below business-as-
usual emissions. A statewide vote highlighted the depth of California 
voters’ support for climate policy; a ballot measure that would have 
effectively repealed AB 32 lost by more than 2 million votes.
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Section 9.3 analyzes one of the centerpieces of California’s plan to 
achieve the AB 32 target—cap and trade, which sets a limit on emissions 
and allows firms to trade emission allowances in order to reduce overall 
mitigation costs. California’s experience with cap and trade has gen-
erally been a success. Emissions have fallen while the state’s economy 
has prospered, and auctions of emissions permits have generated more 
than $10 billion for the state’s Greenhouse Gas Reduction Fund.
Despite the high-profile nature of cap and trade, California has also 
relied on more traditional “command and control” regulations and per-
formance standards, as well as other types of market instruments, to 
achieve its goals. The energy sector is a case in point. The state has 
continued to expand requirements for utilities to generate a certain 
portion of their electricity from renewables—by 2045, electricity must 
be 100% carbon free—and set energy efficiency standards. These energy 
gains have resulted in a state whose carbon footprint, in tons of CO2 
equivalent per capita, is much lower than that of the rest of the US, but 
still higher than the world average.
Section 9.5 discusses one area where the state’s climate policies 
have had more limited results—encouraging more transit-oriented land 
use patterns that reduce vehicle travel and emissions from the transpor-
tation sector. The state has no authority over local land use decisions—
that is, what gets built where. These decisions are jealously guarded by 
cities and counties as their own prerogative and determine whether and 
how far California residents have to drive.
In the final section, we’ll go beyond AB 32, discussing how the 
state’s targets have gradually increased in ambition. A 2016 law (SB 32) 
enshrines a target of reducing GHG emissions 40% below 1990 levels by 
2030, and a subsequent executive order from the governor sets an even 
more ambitious goal of carbon neutrality by 2045. A key conclusion is 
that the politics of the state are favorable to climate policy. The lack of 
coal reserves and limited heavy industry, together with a business com-
munity that benefits from clean energy and environmental protection, 
have ensured that climate mitigation rests on a broad base of support.
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Urban smog in the Los Angeles basin is legendary. On many days, 
downtown skyscrapers and even the Hollywood sign blur into a dirty 
haze (Figure 9.1.1). Geography plays an important role; the San Gabriel 
Mountains create what is known as an inversion layer of warm air that 
traps the smog-laden cooler air below and prevents air pollution from 
dispersing. However, the region’s air quality problems are rooted in the 
sheer number of cars and industrial pollution sources.
Southern California smog paradoxically laid the foundation for Cal-
ifornia’s ambitious climate policy agenda and helped the state become 
one of the most energy efficient and least polluting in the country. The 
severity of air pollution forced a response that led to the creation of 
the institutional and legal framework that would later be harnessed in 
the fight against climate change.
A Dutch-American chemist, Arie Haagen-Smit, was the first to 
demonstrate, in the 1940s and 1950s, that Southern California smog 
was being caused by tailpipe emissions and smokestack gases. In 1968, 
Haagen-Smit became the first chair of the California Air Resources Board 
(CARB), a state agency that was created to help Californians address the 
problem of air pollution. Over the years, CARB developed and enforced 
air quality regulations, often acting earlier or more aggressively (some-
times both) than the federal government and other states. Indeed, 
California’s tailpipe standards for automobiles, controlling hydrocarbons 
and carbon monoxide (CO), took effect in 1966—2 years before the first 
federal standards.
In the 1970s and earlier, officials in the Los Angeles basin issued 
many smog alerts when ozone concentrations reached 0.20 parts per 
million (ppm), warning residents to limit their physical exertion and 
sometimes even to stay indoors. Air quality staff recorded a maximum 
1-hour ozone concentration of 0.58 ppm in 1970, nearly five times higher 
than the 0.12 ppm health-based standard that would be adopted later 
9.1  Air Quality as the Genesis for Climate Policy
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that decade. As late as 1975, the South Coast Air Quality Management 
District issued smog alerts on 118 days. But air quality started getting 
better in the 1980s and has improved steadily ever since. By 1990, there 
were only 42 alerts, and there were none by 2000. These marked im-
provements came despite enormous population growth in the greater 
Los Angeles area, from around 10 million people in 1970 to around 17 
million people in 2015.
One regulatory approach used by CARB and its federal counterparts 
in the 1970s and 1980s is known as command and control—the gov-
ernment commands firms and individuals to behave in a certain way, or 
to adopt a certain technology, and controls or monitors compliance. 
For example, bans on lead in gasoline, first implemented by CARB in 
1992, 3 years in advance of the federal government, fall into this cate-
gory. A closely related approach is called performance standards—the 
Figure 9.1.1 Smog in downtown Los Angeles, circa 1995. California’s 
experience since the 1940s in combating air pollution laid the groundwork 
for climate policy. Reproduced with permission from the Dorothy Peyton Gray 
Transportation Library and Archive at the Los Angeles County Metropolitan 
Transportation Authority.
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government sets a limit on how much pollution can be produced for a 
given amount of activity but does not specify the precise technologies 
that must be used to achieve the standard. Auto tailpipe standards that 
dictate acceptable pollution releases in grams per mile are a good ex-
ample of the performance standard approach that California has used.
Over the same period, California’s environmental policy began to ad-
dress broader questions of energy, normally using the same framework 
of command and control and performance standards. Through uniform 
building codes, appliance standards, and power plant requirements, the 
state steadily cranked down its per capita energy consumption and as-
sociated air emissions. While it’s exceedingly difficult to show precisely 
how any particular environmental or energy policy affected pollution or 
consumption levels, many of California’s trends (discussed in Section 
9.4) are very encouraging.
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9.2  California’s Climate Legislation
California’s recent wave of legislative efforts on climate change, summa-
rized in Table 9.2.1, was built on the air quality and energy efficiency 
regulation described in the previous section and can be traced back 
to 2000. In a piece of legislation authored by state senator Byron Sher, 
California created the California Climate Action Registry to enable major 
sources of greenhouse gases to report their emissions and gain credit for 
“early action” to reduce CO2 and other greenhouse gases. These efforts 
to collect baseline data helped build technical expertise, as California’s 
regulators partnered with other regions, cities, states, and countries 
around the world to pool information and refine the methodologies for 
counting greenhouse gases.
Cleaner cars
The first major step toward regulating emissions, rather than just count-
ing carbon, came in 2002, with the passage of a bill (AB 1493) from 
assembly member Fran Pavley to regulate the climate impact of motor 
vehicles. At the time, advocacy group Environmental Defense called it 
“the most important climate bill passed anywhere in the U.S. in the 
past two decades.” Prior to the “Pavley bill,” as it came to be known, 
emissions regulations for cars and light trucks had been limited to the 
pollutants that affect local air quality, such as carbon monoxide, oxides 
of nitrogen, and hydrocarbons. Carbon dioxide was not considered a 
“pollutant.”
Car and light truck emissions are regulated by the Environmental 
Protection Agency (EPA). Because of long-standing smog in Southern 
California, however, California has a unique position under the federal 
Clean Air Act and can set its own, more stringent standards subject to 
a “waiver” from the EPA. Other states can follow California’s stricter 
standards or default to the EPA rules. It was California’s special status 
that the Pavley bill made use of, in order to add greenhouse gases to 
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Table 9.2.1 Major climate policy legislation in California
Year 
Enacted Bill Key Provisions
2000 SB 1771 Established the California Climate Action Registry to 
enable polluters to report their emissions
2002 AB 1493 (Pavley 
bill)
Required CARB to adopt regulations that achieve the 
“maximum feasible and cost-effective reduction of 
greenhouse gas emissions” from cars and light trucks
2002 SB 1078 Required 20% of retail electricity sales to come from 
renewables by 2017 (Renewables Portfolio Standard) 
2006 AB 32 (California 
Global Warming 
Solutions Act of 
2006)
Set target of reducing greenhouse gas emissions to 
1990 levels by 2020, required CARB to develop a plan 
to achieve that target, and authorized the use of cap 
and trade
2008 SB 375 (Sustain-
able Communities 
and Climate 
Protection Act of 
2008)
Required CARB to develop regional targets for green-
house gas emissions and required regional agencies to 
develop integrated land use and transportation plans 
to achieve those targets
2011 SB 2-IX Increased Renewables Portfolio Standard to 33% by 
2020
2012 SB 535 Required at least 25% of cap-and-trade revenue in 
the Greenhouse Gas Reduction Fund to be spent on 
projects that benefit disadvantaged communities
2015 SB 350 (Clean En-
ergy and Pollution 
Reduction Act of 
2015)
Increased Renewables Portfolio Standard to 50% by 
2030
2016 SB 32 Set target of reducing greenhouse gas emissions to 
40% below 1990 levels by 2030
2016 AB 197 Required CARB to prioritize regulations that result in 
direct emission reductions (implicitly, command and 
control)
2017 AB 398 Extended cap-and-trade program through 2030
2017 AB 617 Required CARB to monitor and address local air 
pollution in the worst-affected communities, address-
ing some environmental justice concerns from cap 
and trade 
2018 SB 100 Increased Renewables Portfolio Standard to 60% by 
2030 and set goal of zero-carbon retail electricity by 
2045
Source: Adapted from California Air Resources Board. California Climate Change 
Legislation. https://www.climatechange.ca.gov/state/legislation.html.
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the list of regulated pollutants. The Bush administration first delayed and 
then rejected California’s waiver request, which would have allowed the 
new standards to take effect, but the waiver was quickly approved in 
2009 once the Obama administration took office. Thus, while California 
continued to be at the forefront of national climate policy efforts, it 
could be most effective when its policies had the support of—or at least 
no opposition from—the federal government.
In what would become a common refrain for California’s climate 
legislation, the Pavley bill did not set specific mandates for emission 
reductions. Instead, it required CARB to “develop and adopt regulations 
that achieve the maximum feasible and cost-effective reduction of GHG 
emissions from motor vehicles.” Under the subsequent regulations, 
CARB required manufacturers to reduce per-mile emissions by about 
30% by 2016, and by about 45% by 2020. Most of this reduction was to 
be achieved through improved fuel economy—for example, using turbo-
chargers and more efficient transmissions in new cars—but the targets 
could also be satisfied through reductions in hydrofluorocarbon (HFC) 
emissions from air conditioners. HFCs are an important short-lived cli-
mate pollutant, as discussed in Chapter 15.
While the direct effect of the bill was limited to vehicles sold in 
California, 14 other states, accounting for almost 40% of US new vehicle 
sales, followed suit and adopted the Pavley standards, and several more 
were poised to do so. More importantly, the Obama administration 
later used them as the basis for even more aggressive federal regula-
tions—negotiated together with California. Thus, California’s law ended 
up influencing greenhouse gas limits for new vehicles for the entire 
United States. Without California’s initiative, which demonstrated how 
ambitious reductions were technologically possible at a reasonable cost, 
federal regulation may well have been more limited.
Assembly Bill 32
While the Pavley standards were confined to the transportation sector, 
economy-wide greenhouse gas reduction goals followed soon after. An 
executive order from Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger set targets of 
returning to 2000 levels by 2010, to 1990 levels by 2020, and to 80% 
below 1990 levels by 2050—some of the most ambitious goals in the 
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country. “I say the debate is over. We know the science. We see the 
threat, and we know the time for action is now,” said the governor when 
signing the executive order.
Subsequent legislation gave the 2020 target the force of law and 
provided the mechanisms to achieve the emission reduction goal. Co-
authored by Fran Pavley and Assembly Speaker Fabian Núñez, Assembly 
Bill 32 (AB 32), named the California Global Warming Solutions Act of 
2006, was the centerpiece of the state’s early climate change legislative 
efforts.
AB 32 is a short and simple bill, coming in at just 13 pages. (For 
comparison, the Waxman-Markey bill to introduce a federal cap-and-
trade system, which passed the US House of Representatives but failed 
in the Senate, ran to more than 1,400 pages.) The main requirement 
of AB 32 was simply to return California’s greenhouse gas emissions to 
1990 levels by 2020, which in practice meant a reduction of 25% to 30% 
below business-as-usual emissions. The bill said very little about how to 
do that and did not even specify what “1990 levels” meant in terms of 
the number of tons of CO2. The bill authorized, but did not mandate, 
Figure 9.2.1 Fran Pavley. As a state assembly member and senator, Fran 
Pavley authored several key pieces of climate legislation. Photograph by 
Jonathan Van Dyke, UCLA. Used by permission. 
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a “market-based compliance mechanism” (that is, cap and trade) and 
more generally did not concern itself with the details of how to reduce 
greenhouse gas emissions.
Instead, the bill gave CARB responsibility for determining the 1990 
baseline and developing a strategy to achieve the emission reduction 
target. The bill set a series of interim deadlines and specified objectives 
such as cost-effectiveness, technological feasibility, and equity. However, 
it said nothing about the types of regulations and other policies that 
should be implemented to meet the emissions goal.
CARB’s blueprint to achieve the AB 32 goal is detailed in the Climate 
Change Scoping Plan, adopted in December 2008 after extensive techni-
cal analysis and public process and updated in 2014 and again in 2017. 
The first Scoping Plan set out both previously approved and new mea-
sures to reduce emissions by 174 million metric tons of CO2 equivalent 
Box 9.2.1  Promoting Low-Carbon Fuels
The Low Carbon Fuel Standard (LCFS) is a good example of one 
of the hybrid policies pursued by CARB to achieve the AB 32 goal. 
Here, hybrid means that the LCFS combines regulations with market 
mechanisms to achieve its goal of reducing the carbon intensity of 
transportation fuels.
The initial LCFS regulation, adopted by CARB in 2009, required 
a 10% reduction in the greenhouse gas intensity of transport fuels 
by 2020. In 2018, the program was extended with a target of a 20% 
reduction by 2030. These targets are the heart of the regulatory por-
tion of the standard.
The market mechanisms allow the targets to be met at lower 
cost and with increased flexibility. Oil companies that find it difficult 
or expensive to reduce carbon intensity can purchase credits from 
other fuel suppliers, such as electric utilities or biofuel producers.
The LCFS factors in the full life cycle emissions of different fuels. 
Those include emissions from oil extraction and refining, from com-
bustion (burning) of the fuel in a motor vehicle, and from growing 
the raw materials for biofuels. For example, oil from the Canadian 
tar sands has a higher carbon intensity than conventional crude oil, 
while biofuels such as ethanol tend to have a lower carbon intensity, 
as does electricity.
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(MMT CO2e). The largest cuts (Figure 9.2.2) were to be achieved 
through the Pavley vehicle emissions standards; a new Low Carbon Fuel 
Standard (Box 9.2.1); energy efficiency regulations; requirements for 
33% of electricity to come from renewable sources (the Renewables 
Portfolio Standard, or RPS, discussed in Section 9.4); and cap and trade, 
which is discussed in Section 9.3.
Leaving the details of how to achieve the AB 32 goal to a techno-
cratic process within an existing regulatory agency brought many advan-
tages. To some extent, it depoliticized decisions over specific emission 
reduction measures—in stark contrast to the federal Waxman-Markey 
proposal, which included intricate side deals negotiated with seemingly 
every affected industry. AB 32 allowed lawmakers to focus on the overall 
goal rather than the details of how it would be achieved. And it took 
Figure 9.2.2 Planned sources of emission reductions in California’s first 
Climate Change Scoping Plan. The reductions are those counted toward the 
2020 target. Values indicate MMT CO2e. Data from California Air Resources 
Board 2008. 
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advantage of the institutional capacity of CARB, which as discussed in 
Section 9.1, had grown into one of the country’s most technically adept 
regulators since the 1970s.
The successors to AB 32
More recent legislation has built on the foundation of AB 32. In partic-
ular, SB 32, enacted in 2016, ambitiously and vastly extends the state’s 
targets beyond the 2020 horizon of AB 32, to enshrine a target of reduc-
ing emissions to 40% below 1990 levels by 2030. To the extent that AB 
32 picked the low-hanging fruit, SB 32 represents an even greater com-
mitment by the state. Most radically, outgoing Governor Jerry Brown 
issued an executive order in 2018 committing California to attain total, 
economy-wide carbon neutrality by 2045 and to achieve and maintain 
“net negative emissions” thereafter.
More-specific laws have also taken aim at specific sectors or focused 
on specific policies. The Sustainable Communities and Climate Protec-
tion Act of 2008 (SB 375) targets emission reductions from integrated 
Figure 9.2.3 California emissions trends and targets. Reproduced with 
permission from the California Air Resources Board. 
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transportation and land use planning; this effort is discussed in detail in 
Section 9.5. AB 398 extends the cap-and-trade program to 2030, and the 
accompanying AB 617 seeks to ensure that the benefits are distributed 
equitably throughout California (Section 9.3). Meanwhile, requirements 
for renewable energy have been ratcheting up (Section 9.4).
Thus, in the last two decades California’s climate goals have become 
more ambitious. Not only have the targets been extended and deep-
ened, but they go far beyond aspirational rhetoric and are accompanied 
Figure 9.2.4 Voting patterns to suspend AB 32. The colors indicate the 
percentage in each county voting “Yes” on Proposition 23, which would 
have suspended and effectively repealed AB 32. Note that the support for 
suspension was strongest in the more remote northern and mountainous 
counties and was weakest on the coast, including in cities such as San Francisco 
and Los Angeles. Data from California Secretary of State. Map by Jesus Contreras, 
UC Santa Cruz. 
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by extensive analysis and an effective implementation mechanism. The 
AB 32 target for 2020 seems likely to be achieved. By 2016, emissions 
had already fallen to below the required level (Figure 9.2.3), and so, pro-
vided that emissions do not tick up between 2017 and 2020, California 
will attain this major landmark.
California’s steadily increasing commitments may seem inexo-
rable, given the progressive political climate in the state and strong 
support from successive governors, the legislature, and the voters. 
Both AB 32 and the earlier Pavley clean-cars legislation were passed 
by a  Democratic-controlled legislature, with support and leadership 
from Democratic and Republican governors, Gray Davis and Arnold 
Schwarzenegger. However, they did not become law in a political vac-
uum or in the absence of political opposition. The car industry vocally 
opposed the Pavley bill to limit emissions from motor vehicles, on the 
Figure 9.2.5 Anti–Proposition 23 campaign rally. The “No” campaign against 
AB 32 suspension focused on the fact that the initiative was backed by out-of-
state oil companies such as Valero. This rally took place at UC Santa Barbara. 
Photograph by Ron V. Ocampo, The Bottom Line. Used by permission. 
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grounds that it was a “veiled attack on California’s family vehicles,” such 
as SUVs and pickup trucks. AB 32 itself was the subject of a referendum 
(Proposition 23) in 2010, which would have effectively repealed the law 
by suspending its provisions until the statewide unemployment rate fell 
to 5.5% for a full year. (Rarely has statewide unemployment fallen that 
low for that long; at the time of the campaign, it was about 12%. Thus, 
“suspension” would have meant effective repeal.)
The Proposition 23 campaign, however, ended up highlighting the 
depth of California voters’ support for climate policy and its air quality 
co-benefits. The anti–AB 32 measure lost by more than 2.2 million votes, 
with 38% in favor and 62% against (Figure 9.2.4). Campaign contribu-
tions from some mainly out-of-state oil companies were outweighed by 
pro–climate policy donations from individuals, nonprofit organizations, 
and labor unions. Many key organizations, including electric utilities, the 
California Chamber of Commerce, and oil companies such as Chevron, 
remained neutral or were opposed to the repeal measure. Partly, this 
broad support reflects California’s low-carbon economy; indeed, “green 
jobs” were a key message of the “No on Proposition 23” campaign. But 
the referendum also reflected the political interests of many businesses, 
whose leaders evidently decided that energy conservation, low-carbon 
fuels, and CO2 mitigation are the route to a profitable future.
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9.3  The Cap-and-Trade Experiment
Cap and trade is one of the highest-profile features of California’s emis-
sion reduction efforts. In the 2008 Scoping Plan, it accounted for 34.4 
of the 174 MMT CO2e of estimated reductions. These reductions would 
come about as cap and trade put a price on carbon, giving firms and in-
dividuals the financial incentive to reduce emissions. Just as importantly, 
cap and trade provided assurance that the AB 32 target would be met, 
assuming that the system functioned as intended. Should one of the 
other measures in the Scoping Plan fall short of expectations, cap and 
trade would soak up the shortfall.
During the debates over AB 32, cap and trade was a point of con-
tention. From an economic point of view, cap and trade allows a given 
emission target to be achieved in the most efficient way possible (Chap-
ters 11 and 12 for a more in-depth analysis). However, California was 
emerging from a bruising experience with a cap-and-trade program for a 
different pollutant—the RECLAIM program for nitrogen oxides in South-
ern California, which was partially suspended after permit prices rose 
from about $2,000 to more than $120,000 per ton during California’s 
electricity crisis. Another set of concerns related to environmental jus-
tice. Because cap and trade does not specify where and how emissions 
will be reduced, it is possible for an inequitable outcome to occur, with 
middle-class, majority-white, higher-income communities benefiting the 
most.
Design of cap and trade in California
The compromise was for AB 32 to authorize, but not require, CARB 
to implement “market-based compliance mechanisms”—in other words, 
cap and trade. CARB ultimately opted to use this authority, and the 
detailed system design was informed by a market advisory committee 
of prominent academics, state and local officials, and other parties. 
However, most of the emission reductions in the Scoping Plan were to 
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be achieved through more-traditional command-and-control regulatory 
measures rather than the cap-and-trade system—effectively mandating 
many of the reductions that would have occurred anyway through the 
market-based approach of cap and trade. This hybrid system—part mar-
ket based, part regulatory—may have reflected a lack of confidence in 
cap and trade, the political realities, and/or CARB’s traditional regulatory 
expertise. In 2016, new legislation (AB 197) reaffirmed the role of com-
mand and control in California’s climate policy.
When launched in 2013, the cap-and-trade system covered large 
electric power plants and industrial facilities. In 2015, it was extended to 
apply to fuel distributors, meaning that the heating and transportation 
sectors would be covered as well and that the program would encom-
pass nearly 85% of California’s emissions. Cap and trade for transporta-
tion does not mean that individual drivers need to buy and sell carbon 
allowances. Rather, this task is handled by fuel distributors, and the cost 
is passed on at the pump. In practice, cap and trade has added about 
14 cents to a gallon of gasoline, providing a small incentive for drivers 
to choose more fuel-efficient cars and to drive less.
The cap in cap and trade refers to the limited number of emission 
allowances that are issued. One allowance gives the right to emit 1 
ton of CO2, and a polluter subject to the cap must purchase or oth-
erwise obtain enough allowances to cover its emissions. The number 
of allowances issued by CARB each year is planned to gradually fall to 
334 million in 2020—achieving the 2020 emissions goal, provided that 
sufficient emission reductions are also achieved by “non-capped” pollut-
ers, that is, those that remain outside the cap-and-trade system. These 
non-capped pollution sources include hydrofluorocarbons and other 
“super pollutants” (Chapter 15), emissions from agriculture and land 
use change, and methane emissions from the decomposition of organic 
waste in landfills.
CARB’s decisions regarding the distribution of emission allowances 
internalized the lessons learned from problems with previous cap-and-
trade programs, such as the European Union Emissions Trading Scheme 
(EU ETS) and the RECLAIM program for nitrogen oxides in Southern Cal-
ifornia. In particular, two innovations aimed to avoid the price volatility 
Chapter 9: Lessons from California 9-21
experienced in Europe (where the prices of allowances have on occa-
sion fallen to near zero) and in Southern California’s RECLAIM program:
 ➤ An auction reserve price—this is the minimum price at which CARB 
will sell allowances. It started at $10 in November 2012 and rises 
each year at 5% plus inflation. The reserve price ensures that cap 
and trade will always provide a financial incentive to reduce emis-
sions, and it avoids the risk that the price will fall to zero.
 ➤ An allowance reserve or “safety valve”—this is an extra pool of al-
lowances that CARB only issues if the price rises above a given level.
Together, the reserve price and the allowance reserve make the 
price of carbon more predictable, enabling firms to plan their invest-
ments with greater confidence.
California’s cap-and-trade experience
In general, California’s experience with cap and trade has been a success 
and has avoided many of the pitfalls of trading programs in Europe and 
the northeastern US (Chapter 12). Emissions have fallen while the state’s 
economy has prospered. The auction price has normally been slightly 
above the reserve price, and statewide emissions have declined along 
with the cap. Several major criticisms, however, remain.
One concern relates to the reshuffling of electricity contracts. That 
is, California’s electric utilities have swapped out purchases of out-of-
state coal-generated electricity in favor of cleaner sources elsewhere 
on the western electricity grid, which extends far beyond the state’s 
borders. However, some of these coal-fired power stations have con-
tinued to sell electricity to consumers in other states, swapping out 
contracts in the opposite direction. Thus, while California reports lower 
emissions, the net reduction—considering emissions in other western 
states—is more limited. Coal plants simply sell their power to customers 
in Nevada, Arizona, or New Mexico instead.
Another concern for cap-and-trade integrity is carbon offsets. An 
offset is a certified emission reduction from a project that is not subject 
to the cap-and-trade program. In California, offsets allowed by CARB 
mainly come from forestry and agriculture, such as projects to reduce 
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methane emissions from flooded rice fields. Polluters can use an offset 
credit in place of an emission allowance. If all offsets were “real” and 
“additional,” there would be no cause for concern, but in practice many 
offset projects may have been undertaken anyway.
A third potential challenge is the volume of allowances that firms 
have accumulated. More than 200 million allowances have been banked, 
or held by polluters for future use or sale. Such banking means that 
emissions are lower in the short term, but this practice may threaten the 
state’s ability to achieve longer-term reductions.
A broader criticism of the cap-and-trade program relates to equity 
and environmental justice. As noted above, while cap and trade provides 
a price signal to reduce emissions and it limits overall emission levels, 
it does not prescribe where those reductions take place. In the first 3 
years of California’s trading program, some polluters increased emis-
sions, while others reduced emissions. Those that increased emissions 
tended be located in places with more people of color, lower-income 
people, and other marginalized groups (although this analysis excludes 
emissions from transportation, which account for the majority of local 
air pollution impacts). This would not be a problem if the pollution were 
confined to CO2 alone—while a major cause of climate change, CO2 does 
not have any direct adverse health impacts. However, factories, power 
stations, and other sources of CO2 also tend to emit other pollutants, 
such as sulfur dioxide and particulate matter, that do have health con-
sequences for people nearby. At least in its early years, cap and trade 
seems to have done little to realize the hopes of improved air quality 
in the state’s most vulnerable communities. Many of the co-pollutant 
reductions occurred out of state, as California’s electric utilities reduced 
their purchases of imported coal-generated power, while in-state emis-
sions saw more-limited changes and even increased in some places.
The equity situation may improve as the cap declines and polluters 
in all parts of the state begin to reduce their emissions. However, a 
more direct approach to address environmental justice concerns is to 
strengthen even further the regulation of local air pollution (where lo-
cation matters) separately from greenhouse gas emissions (where the 
global concentration matters, not the location of the source). Indeed, 
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this direct approach was the tenor of the state legislature in Assembly 
Bill 617 (AB 617) in 2017, which was enacted as a parallel measure to 
the extension of the cap-and-trade system. AB 617 requires CARB and 
its local counterparts to implement additional air quality monitoring in 
heavily polluted communities, to accelerate the introduction of pollu-
tion control technologies, and to develop a statewide strategy to reduce 
local air pollution in the worst-affected communities.
Another positive contribution to equity—and to other state goals—
comes from the revenue generated by auctioning a portion of the emis-
sion allowances. Through early 2019, the auctions have generated $10.3 
billion for the state’s Greenhouse Gas Reduction Fund. By law, at least 
35% must be spent on projects that benefit and are located within (or, in 
a few cases, within a half mile of) low-income neighborhoods and disad-
vantaged communities that are disproportionately affected by pollution. 
Figure 9.3.1 shows how the money raised to date has been used. Some 
Clean energy and
energy efficiency
Natural resources and waste diversion
Other transportation
and sustainable
communities
Affordable housing
and sustainable
communities program
Low-carbon transportation
High-speed rail
Figure 9.3.1 Use of revenues from cap and trade. Figures show 
appropriations from the Greenhouse Gas Reduction Fund ($ million) through 
fiscal year 2018–2019. Data from California Air Resources Board. 
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projects focus on general emission reductions—for example, high-speed 
rail, encouraging housing close to public transit, water efficiency, and 
manure management. However, other projects specifically target low- 
income communities, such as the Low-Income Weatherization Program 
that funds energy-efficient appliances, new windows, water heaters, and 
other improvements that both reduce emissions and reduce household 
energy bills.
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9.4  Energy
Many of California’s climate policy efforts have been economy-wide—
that is, they aim to reduce greenhouse gas emissions in many different 
sectors, such as industry, electricity generation, and transportation. 
However, legislators have also pursued more-focused efforts aimed 
at increasing energy efficiency and the use of renewable energy in the 
state. These efforts, which have led to California’s having one of the 
least-carbon-intensive electricity supplies in the United States (Figure 
9.4.1), date back to the 1970s, before climate change became a major 
issue. Instead, the original motivations included the oil crisis and fears 
over nuclear power.
To understand California’s energy policy history, you have to under-
stand the state’s geography, its development history, and a little bit of 
its political culture. First, let’s think about the geography. California is a 
large state in terms of land area—a state that’s as big as many countries 
around the world. It has no coal, which has significantly influenced its 
energy pathway. Otherwise, however, it has an abundance of energy 
resources. It has a lot of oil, especially down in Southern California. It 
has a little bit of geothermal. Unlike the other western states or Ap-
palachia, California has a large volume of water runoff from the Sierra 
Nevada, which has been tapped for hydroelectric potential. There’s a lot 
of wind power, especially around Altamont Pass, near San Francisco, and 
down south in the Tehachapi Mountains, just north of Los Angeles. And 
California receives many hours of sunshine, with concomitant potential 
for solar power.
But renewable energy was not on the minds of energy planners 
around the middle of the twentieth century, when California’s popula-
tion and economy were rapidly growing. At the time, the assumption 
was that electricity generation capacity had to keep pace with pop-
ulation and economic growth—they were coupled together. Nuclear 
power was seen as the best way to scale up the supply to meet the 
9-26 Chapter 9: Lessons from California 
Wyoming
West Virginia
Kentucky
Indiana
Missouri
Utah
Hawaii
North Dakota
New Mexico
Ohio
Colorado
Wisconsin
Nebraska
Montana
Arkansas
Alaska
Texas
Iowa
Michigan
Louisiana
Delaware
Minnesota
United States
Tennessee
Florida
Oklahoma
Kansas
Georgia
Arizona
Mississippi
Maryland
Rhode Island
Illinois
Massachusetts
Alabama
North Carolina
Pennsylvania
Virginia
Nevada
South Carolina
New Jersey
South Dakota
Connecticut
California
New York
Maine
Oregon
New Hampshire
Idaho
Washington
Vermont
2000
Pounds CO2 per MWh
150010005000 2500
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forecast demand; a series of planned nuclear plants on the coast from 
Southern California all the way up to the north would cool their reactors 
with the abundant waters of the Pacific. However, public opposition—
partly due to the risks posed by earthquakes, and partly because of 
consciousness around the disposal of radioactive waste—frightened the 
public, prompting many to say, well, we don’t want nuclear either. In 
1976, state legislators placed a moratorium on new plants, pending a 
permanent solution to nuclear waste.
Energy planners were then faced with the dilemma of how to in-
crease generation capacity without relying on nuclear, coal, or oil. Nu-
clear had been ruled out because of safety and waste concerns; the 
state had few reserves of coal; and oil, which in any case is a poor 
fuel for producing electricity, was in question following the embargo of 
1973. Moreover, plentiful supplies of natural gas were not yet available 
in California.
In response, the legislature passed the Warren-Alquist Act in 1974 to 
create the California Energy Commission (CEC). While this might seem 
like a trivial move—yet another bureaucracy—the CEC created the frame-
work to plan for energy in a comprehensive manner. The CEC preceded 
the federal Department of Energy (which was founded in 1977) and had 
the money and staff to plan in a systematic way, rather than lurching 
from one project to another.
Renewable energy was one area of policy that the CEC pushed 
forward, with large-scale wind energy projects as the initial focus. Sub-
sequently, the state’s Renewables Portfolio Standard (RPS) required 
utilities to source a certain proportion of retail sales of electricity from 
renewables. The first RPS, in 2002, was set at 20% by 2017. Over the 
years, the targets have ratcheted up, with a 2018 law setting an RPS 
of 60% by 2030 (Table 9.2.1). The same law sets a goal of carbon-free 
electricity by 2045, although the carbon-free definition encompasses sev-
eral sources that do not qualify as “renewable” under the RPS, such as 
nuclear and large hydroelectric dams.
The state is already much of the way toward the 2030 and 2045 
goals. On a sunny day—not too hot, not too cool—in March of 2017, 
40% of the state’s electricity was being generated by utility-scale solar, 
that is, large installations such as solar farms in the desert. Adding in 
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the solar panels that are dotting thousands and thousands of rooftops 
throughout California, that number came to about 50%. Figure 9.4.2 
charts the dramatic growth in solar capacity, and Figure 9.4.3 illustrates 
the evolution of energy policy in California over the last 50 years.
Local governments, meanwhile, have been pushing forward with 
Figure 9.4.2 Interconnected solar in California. Through 2016, solar energy 
grew almost exponentially. In 2017, capacity reached almost 6,000 megawatts 
(MW), up from 228 MW just 10 years earlier. Residential rooftops account for 
most of the capacity. Reproduced with permission from Next 10. 
(right y-axis)
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even more ambitious plans for renewable energy. Community choice 
aggregation (CCA) allows cities and counties to make energy supply de-
cisions for their communities, taking over from investor-owned utilities. 
CCA programs have been launched in San Francisco, Los Angeles, and 
many other parts of the state and have normally aimed for higher shares 
of renewable power than the state-mandated minimums. Collectively, 
CCA programs are likely to mean that the targets in the state’s RPS are 
exceeded by 9% in 2025, equivalent to 1–2 MMT CO2e. 
Figure 9.4.3 Rancho Seco. The decommissioned Rancho Seco nuclear 
power plant in Sacramento County now hosts a solar farm and is under 
contract to the Golden 1 Center, the home of the Sacramento Kings. At full 
build-out, the facility will provide up to 100 MW of power, taking advantage 
of the transmission lines and other infrastructure built for the nuclear plant. 
Photograph by Hajhouse from Wikimedia Commons. 
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Less visible than wind turbines or solar panels, but just as effective 
in reducing carbon emissions, have been the CEC’s efforts to promote 
energy efficiency. Partly, the CEC acted through direct regulation, set-
ting efficiency standards for refrigerators and, later on, for such varied 
appliances as swimming pool heaters, furnaces, and computers. But 
the CEC and its partner agency, the Public Utilities Commission, also 
worked to transform the motives of utilities. Before, the more electricity 
they sold, the more money utilities made. They had a vested interest 
in encouraging profligacy. Under the state’s new model, utilities were 
rewarded for weatherizing residences and commercial facilities and for 
promoting more-efficient heating and cooling equipment. In effect, utili-
ties were allowed to charge ratepayers for not just megawatt hours, but 
negawatts, or negative watts—the energy savings from efficiency. This 
model of decoupling their profits from growth in energy consumption 
transformed the utilities overnight. Overnight, they became indifferent 
to sales—it was just as profitable for them to weatherize homes as to 
build new power plants.
Today, California ranks fiftieth among US states in per capita elec-
tricity consumption. The US per capita annual residential electricity 
consumption in 2011 was 4,566 kilowatt hours (kWh); California’s was 
2,346. Taking all consumption together (residential and commercial), 
the US per capita electricity consumption in 2016 was 11,634 kWh, but 
California’s was only 6,536 kWh. Whether measuring just residential or 
all end use, the national average is almost twice that of California; a 
remarkable statistic, even accounting for California’s mild climate—Cali-
fornians use less air conditioning than residents of most other southern 
and western states. Most (64% in 2017) homes in California are heated 
with natural gas, a far more efficient form of home heating than electric-
ity, and Californians also heat their water mostly with natural gas. Fully 
14% of homes were not even heated in 2009. The state ranked thirtieth 
in its average annual per capita residential natural gas use in 2011.
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9.5  The Land Use Problem
Shortly after AB 32 was passed, there was a growing realization that 
CARB had few tools to bring about emission reductions from regional 
land use planning and transit-oriented development patterns that re-
duce vehicle travel. Such plans would encourage denser, mixed-use 
development in urban centers and in other places well served by public 
transit, in contrast to the sprawl that has characterized much postwar 
development in California.
However, in considering land use planning, CARB ran up against 
the limits to its regulatory authority. While CARB had achieved success 
through command-and-control policies and performance standards 
such as the Pavley clean car standards, and through market-based ap-
proaches such as cap and trade, it had no authority over local land use 
decisions, which are jealously guarded by local governments—that is, 
cities and counties—as their own prerogative. And in contrast to out-of-
state car manufacturers and oil companies, which had little clout with 
decisionmakers, local governments wielded substantial influence in the 
state legislature. Given that transportation accounts for more than 40% 
of California’s greenhouse gas emissions, not including a further 7% 
from petroleum refining and hydrogen production, this was a major gap 
in the state’s climate policy arsenal.
The legislative compromise was for CARB to set regional targets 
for emission reductions from the transportation sector but to avoid 
imposing any mandates on local governments. Senate Bill 375 (SB 375), 
the Sustainable Communities and Climate Protection Act of 2008, makes 
the state’s 18 metropolitan planning organizations (MPOs)—regional 
agencies that plan for freeways and public transit expansions and make 
other large-scale transportation spending decisions—responsible for de-
veloping plans to meet these targets. Each MPO was asked to develop 
a sustainable communities strategy to demonstrate the combination of 
land use patterns and transportation policies that would allow it to meet 
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its regional target. When it was passed, SB 375 was billed by Governor 
Schwarzenegger as the “nation’s first law to control greenhouse gas 
emissions by curbing sprawl.”
The process of setting the targets involved detailed modeling work 
and a negotiation between CARB and each metropolitan region. Some 
regions went beyond CARB’s initial proposal, while other regions were 
more recalcitrant. The most recent (2018) round of targets call for re-
ductions in per capita passenger vehicle emissions of 3% to 15% be-
tween 2005 and 2020, and 4% to 19% between 2005 and 2035. The 
Figure 9.5.1 Regional greenhouse gas reduction targets. Targets refer to the 
reduction in per capita passenger vehicle emissions between 2005 and 2035, as 
adopted in 2018. The four largest regions (Southern California, San Francisco 
Bay Area, San Diego, and Sacramento) each have a 19% reduction target. 
Smaller regions have reduction targets ranging from 4% to 17%. Data from 
California Air Resources Board 2019. Map by Jesus Contreras, UC Santa Cruz. 
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more limited reductions apply to smaller regions such as Monterey Bay 
and Shasta, while the most ambitious apply to the four largest metro-
politan areas (Figure 9.5.1).
So far, SB 375 has led to incremental progress, but it is far from a 
revolution that is overturning entrenched patterns of urban sprawl. On 
the positive side, each region has developed a sustainable communities 
strategy that, according to its modeling, will meet its target. The law 
has changed the way that planning is done in many regions, leading to 
a greater emphasis on climate change and integration of transportation 
and land use planning efforts. And some regions have responded enthu-
siastically. In the San Francisco Bay Area, for example, regional agencies 
introduced a new grant program that rewards cities for building housing 
close to transit and implementing affordable housing policies.
Overall, however, Californians have increased their driving, meaning 
that fuel-efficiency gains from the Pavley clean car standards have been 
Figure 9.5.2 Vehicle travel and CO2 trends in California. The orange line 
indicates vehicle miles traveled per person, and the blue line shows emissions 
from gasoline-fueled vehicles in California. The green dots indicate the modeled 
outcomes from the regional sustainable communities strategies, which, if 
current trends continue, will not be achieved. Reproduced with permission from 
California Air Resources Board 2018. 
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outweighed by a greater number of miles driven (Figure 9.5.2). Transit 
ridership has declined in major metropolitan areas, and the proportion 
of funding dedicated to highways has changed little. There has been no 
dramatic shift in funding priorities toward public transportation, walking, 
and cycling. Overall, CARB’s 2018 progress report finds that “California 
is not on track to meet greenhouse gas reductions expected under SB 
375.” The modeled reductions have yet to materialize in practice.
At root, SB 375 does not provide a way to coerce or incentivize 
recalcitrant cities into curbing car use through increasing densities and 
reducing parking next to transit. Cities still have incentives to be free 
riders. That is, city governments want tax revenue from car-oriented 
shopping centers and low-density, high-end housing within their own 
borders while relying on their neighboring cities to provide space for 
new housing next to transit. In contrast to the strong regulatory power 
that CARB wields in many other domains and the clear price signal pro-
vided by cap and trade, land use planning shows the limits of the state’s 
climate policy power.
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9.6  Conclusions and Outlook
California is one of the country’s climate mitigation success stories. 
By many measures, it ranks among the least greenhouse-gas-intensive 
states in the US. On a per capita basis, only New York and Vermont rank 
lower, and the average Californian emits just 53% of the national average 
amount of greenhouse gases. California’s large metropolitan regions also 
score well compared with their counterparts elsewhere. In popular per-
ception, Los Angeles might be the poster child for unsustainable excess. 
But when measured by household greenhouse gas emissions per capita, 
the region is one of the greenest in the nation. San Diego, San Francisco, 
and San Jose claim the top three spots in one metropolitan-level ranking, 
while LA comes in at number five, after Providence, Rhode Island.
Most impressively, California’s greenhouse gas reductions have not 
come at the expense of its economy. Figure 9.6.1 shows that the state’s 
per capita GDP (roughly equivalent to average income) has grown even 
while emissions per capita have fallen. Indeed, some of the strongest 
supporters of AB 32 and other climate legislation have been clean en-
ergy firms and other businesses that see environmental protection as 
beneficial for the economy rather than a drag on performance.
California’s success is partly an accident of geography. The largest 
cities lie near the coast where, for most of the year, homes achieve a 
pleasant temperature with neither air conditioning nor heating. About 
40% of the state’s electricity comes from low-carbon sources such as 
renewables, hydro, and nuclear—that is in part the result of deliberate 
policy, but also the product of federal subsidies for dams and the lack of 
large coal deposits in the state. Most of the remainder of the electricity 
is generated from natural gas.
Low emissions are also a product of a service-based economy with 
little heavy industry. California ranks among the lowest five states in 
terms of the emissions intensiveness of the economy, although this is 
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partially offset by “embedded” emissions in imported products, which, 
perhaps misleadingly, are not captured in the state’s emissions inventory.
The nature of California’s economy means that political support is 
easier to gather for wide-ranging climate change policy. In districts with 
low per capita emissions, politicians are more likely to support climate 
legislation. A reduction in power generation from coal, for example, will 
affect mining employment in neighboring states but cost few jobs in 
California. Fossil fuel extraction and automobile manufacturing are only 
minor players in California’s economy. In contrast, sectors that would 
be harmed by climate change, such as agriculture and tourism, or that 
would benefit from efforts to reduce emissions, such as renewable 
energy technology, have a much larger presence on the West Coast. 
One of the main economic powerhouses of the state, the technology 
industry and associated venture capitalists centered in Silicon Valley, also 
tends to be a strong supporter of GHG mitigation. Energy costs for their 
Figure 9.6.1 Greenhouse gas emissions and economic growth. Between 1990 
and 2016, California’s economy grew while greenhouse gas emissions declined 
in per capita terms, indicating that climate mitigation does not have to be at 
the expense of economic growth. Reproduced with permission from Next 10.
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California operations are minimal (most server farms and data centers 
are located elsewhere), and many firms invest in innovations to improve 
energy efficiency or otherwise reduce emissions. Thus, California gover-
nors and legislators have shown a willingness to enact climate legislation 
far ahead of the federal government and most other states.
The political attitudes that favor climate change action in the state 
legislature and governor’s office also permeate through many of the 
state’s counties, cities, water and transit districts, and other local and 
regional agencies. Many officials, such as former San Francisco mayor 
and now California governor Gavin Newsom, have sought to portray 
themselves as leaders on climate policy—in part in an effort to pressure 
the federal government into action. San Francisco is rated the most 
progressive large city in the country, and Oakland the fourth.
The legacy of the air quality and energy efficiency programs from the 
1970s and 1980s has also played a part. California regulators have been 
accustomed to taking action on air quality, renewable energy supply, 
and other environmental issues, which in other states might be left to 
the federal government. CARB, which has assumed the primary role in 
California’s climate efforts, already had a depth of technical, regulatory, 
and legal expertise that positioned it well to respond to climate change 
policy imperatives.
What lies next for California? While the state is likely to achieve 
its 2020 goals, the 2040 target (a 40% reduction below 1990 levels) 
is much more ambitious, and the goal of carbon neutrality by 2045 
even more so. Many of the low-hanging fruits (such as switching away 
from out-of-state coal generation) have already been picked. One key 
challenge is the number of “banked” allowances (Section 9.3) that may 
reduce the effectiveness of cap and trade in the future. Another is the 
stubborn resistance of the transportation sector, where vehicle travel 
has ticked up in recent years and local governments have been reluctant 
to implement the land use changes called for in regional plans. And a 
third is the federal government. While the Obama administration was 
largely supportive, the Trump administration has signaled that it will 
throw up roadblocks to the state’s policies—for example, by threatening 
to revoke the waiver that California needs to enforce its more stringent 
clean car standards.
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If California were an independent country, it would rank as the 
world’s fifth-largest economy. This means that the action that California 
takes to reduce emissions is intrinsically important in terms of atmo-
spheric carbon concentrations. Fundamentally, however, California’s 
success should be measured not just by its ability to reduce in-state 
greenhouse gases, but also by its influence on energy efficiency and 
climate policy beyond the state’s boundaries, in what is often called the 
“California effect.” The Pavley clean car standards were adopted by 14 
other states, accounting for almost 40% of US new vehicle sales, and 
ultimately by the federal government. Its cap-and-trade system has been 
joined by the Canadian province of Quebec, with the two governments 
holding joint auctions (although earlier plans for Ontario and several 
US states to join never materialized). And California’s energy efficiency 
standards for everything from refrigerators to buildings have influenced 
policy elsewhere. Providing a laboratory to test and demonstrate the 
economic and technological feasibility of deep reductions in greenhouse 
gas emissions may be the state’s most significant contribution to con-
fronting global climate change.
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Learning Objectives
1. Cite the importance of international agreements.
You will learn why effective action on climate change is unlikely to 
arise from countries and firms acting alone. From that understand-
ing comes the need for cooperation and different strategies for 
achieving cooperation.
2. Understand the history and implications of the Paris Agreement.
You will learn the basic history of attempts at international cooper-
ation on climate change, starting with the negotiations leading to 
the 1992 Framework Convention on Climate Change followed by the 
1997 Kyoto Protocol to that Convention. You will learn why those 
earlier efforts did not have much practical impact and then look at 
the process leading up to the Paris Agreement. There are many excel-
lent resources online, including the texts of all these agreements at 
the Climate Change Secretariat (www.unfccc.int). There are also de-
tailed articles on the diplomatic history in the sources section of this 
chapter. The learning emphasis in this chapter will be on the political 
forces that explain why these different types of agreements exist.
3. Demonstrate the challenges to international agreements.
This chapter will offer many reasons to be optimistic about the fu-
ture for the Paris Agreement—even as the United States under the 
Trump administration begins the process of withdrawal. Nonethe-
less, it is important to understand the fundamental challenges to any 
international agreement—in particular, challenges related to whether 
countries will honor their pledges, and whether their actions will 
lead others to do more. A key learning objective is to develop the 
skills critical to understanding when agreements will be implemented 
(and not), and what will happen as key provisions are not honored.
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Overview
For nearly 30 years there have been international diplomatic talks on 
climate change. So far, those talks have had very little real impact on 
the emissions that cause climate warming. This chapter will explain why 
international cooperation is needed, along with different strategies for 
improving cooperation. Crucial to predicting the success or failure of 
cooperation is understanding the interests of countries and whether 
cooperation advances or undermines those interests. In general, the 
most ambitious agreements are those that will be seen by some coun-
tries as contrary to their interests, which is why there are so many bold 
statements and agreements to act on climate warming but little change 
in behavior. New technologies, which lower the cost of action, along 
with fuller political mobilization, can alter how countries calculate their 
interests and lead, over time, to more effective international coopera-
tion. With this theory of change in mind, the chapter will explain why 
the Paris Agreement is widely expected to be more effective than earlier 
agreements—because Paris allows countries to tailor their commitments 
to what they are willing and able to implement and because the Paris 
process has mobilized substantial political and technological attention 
to the problem of climate warming and the challenge of reducing emis-
sions. Nonetheless, none of the major Western countries that have been 
leaders on climate change are on track to meet the pledges they made 
under the Paris Agreement; worldwide, those pledges aren’t nearly 
robust enough to stop warming at 2°C, a widely discussed goal. The 
political reality of climate change is that policy action is unlikely to come 
fast enough to halt warming soon, and thus societies will be forced to 
make massive adjustments to climate impacts.
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10.1  Introduction
For decades, countries have not achieved much real cooperation on 
climate change, in part because there were too many players at the 
table and the interests of those players were divergent. Making complex 
deals has been exceedingly complex and vulnerable to vetoes by coun-
tries that abhorred cooperation on the issue. Diplomats have solved 
this problem by agreeing on what was agreeable, which usually meant 
broad, vaguely worded agreements that had little impact.
The Paris Agreement offers a new opportunity for serious efforts 
to achieve cooperation on climate change. Paris has set up a process 
through which national efforts become more transparent and may, over 
time, help governments achieve deeper cooperation. Although a global 
agreement, the Paris process also allows and encourages countries to 
work out solutions in smaller groups—often called clubs by scholars 
who study international cooperation. Those small-group “club” efforts 
can then deepen and diffuse more widely.
Paris creates an opportunity for doing better. That’s because Paris 
has a much more flexible framework than those of past agreements, 
one that allows countries to set their own obligations according to what 
they are willing and able to implement.
Evaluating the Paris Agreement, which is the core topic of this chap-
ter, requires understanding the incentives for countries to cooperate in 
the first place—the topic of Section 10.2. Failure to understand those 
incentives has led to many strategies for improving cooperation that, in 
practice, have not really worked. That reality is clear when looking at the 
full history of climate diplomacy, which is the subject of Section 10.3.
In Section 10.4 we explore how Paris might be different. One of the 
chief advantages of this new, more flexible approach to diplomacy is 
the ability to tailor diplomatic efforts around the countries that matter 
most and the countries that are most willing to take actions. (Those 
two groups are often not the same, which is one reason why effective 
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cooperation is so hard to craft. Often, the countries that are most will-
ing to act account for only a small share of the global emissions.) For 
too long, diplomacy has focused mainly on global agreements, but it is 
extremely difficult to reach agreements that have meaningful content 
when every nation must participate and any nation can, in effect, veto 
the result. A new reality is emerging that emphasizes the benefits of 
making progress through smaller club groups of countries. This chap-
ter will examine those benefits and also outline how such clubs could 
emerge.
Nearly all of the club literature has focused on clubs of sovereign 
nations. Research has revealed many of these climate-related clubs, 
and still more are forming. Arctic nations have a variety of clubs, no-
tably the Arctic Council, through which they can cooperate. Forested 
nations have still other clubs. The European Union has become a club 
for advancing climate policy. The seven industrialized nations have their 
club, the G7, and the big economies of the world have yet another club 
with overlapping membership, the G20. In the run-up to Paris, the most 
important club was the bilateral effort of the US and China, which a 
year before Paris led to high-level pledges for emission controls that, in 
effect, defined what both countries would offer in Paris.
This approach of looking at national governments and international 
cooperation is often called two-level bargaining because what is pos-
sible at the international level is constrained by what is feasible for na-
tional governments (and vice versa). But this two-dimensional approach 
prizes the actions of the nation-state itself when, in fact, much of the 
real effort at cutting emissions and inventing new technologies happens 
along a third dimension—within the nation-state, especially within firms 
and industries. Where national governments are strong and consolidate 
power, this extra dimension may add little to our understanding of be-
havior. But in modern economies, national governments are relatively 
weak; by design, most political and economic behavior is devolved away 
from the state to other actors.
Finally, we look ahead at what needs to happen to turn the prom-
ise of the Paris framework into a reality. The list of needed actions is 
long—much longer than diplomats can reasonably achieve—and success 
is far from guaranteed. The chapter will help explore which of these 
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Paris implementation efforts are most important. Success will require a 
careful strategy that focuses inside the formal Paris framework, which 
is part of the United Nations (UN), for the kinds of activities that are 
feasible in that framework. At the same time, leaders will need to work 
in parallel but formally outside the Paris framework to do some of the 
things that will not be agreeable by all nations and therefore infeasible 
in a consensus-based UN-based process. Those areas of key leadership 
include demonstrating new technologies for deep decarbonization and 
also imposing penalties on jurisdictions that fail to make an effort.
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10.2   Why Is International Cooperation Required?
Climate change politics, as currently structured, is not conducive to 
much cooperation. Because the pollutants that cause climate change mix 
across national borders in the atmosphere and because the economic ef-
fects of controlling those emissions are felt throughout the global econ-
omy, actions to protect the climate inherently involve the provision of 
what is often called a global public good. That is, a safe climate system 
is advantageous for everyone on the planet (to different degrees), but no 
party can be excluded from these benefits regardless of its own actions.
Public goods are typically underprovided in the absence of a well- 
organized government because each actor has an incentive to free 
ride—to gain a beneficial climate while failing to pay its share. It is per-
haps especially likely that the world, as a whole, will underprovide global 
public goods because there is no well-organized and highly effective 
global government. Indeed, in areas where international governance is 
weakest—for example, fishing on the high seas—the incentives for free 
riding create strong incentives for each party to take what it wants. 
Often these outcomes are called a “tragedy of the commons” because 
even when each party would benefit from better management, nar-
row self-interest leads to the opposite outcome. In the area of climate 
change, these problems of free riding are worsened by the fact that 
leaders of states think that cutting emissions will make energy more 
expensive, adversely affecting national economic competitiveness.
The effects of this malign structure help explain why emissions, 
for all the talk about action on climate warming, keep rising. Figure 
10.2.1, taken from the latest report from the Intergovernmental Panel 
on Climate Change (IPCC), shows emissions since 1970 for all the major 
warming gases. Since climate change has reliably been on the interna-
tional agenda, starting in the early 1990s, emissions have kept on rising 
because even as awareness of the problem has grown, the incentives for 
individual countries to alter course have not much changed.
Chapter 10: The Paris Agreement and Its Implementation 10-9
Global public goods are most easily provided when a single domi-
nant country, or a small group, takes the lead. That mode of cooperation 
is why, after World War II, so many effective international institutions 
were created—from the World Bank to the International Monetary Fund 
and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT, a precursor to 
the World Trade Organization). One country was dominant—the United 
States—and it created public goods that benefitted most nations, includ-
ing and especially the US. Even though the US often paid a dispropor-
tionate share of the cost of creating and sustaining these institutions, it 
also reaped a disproportionate share of the benefits.
In climate change today, however, no such dominant country or 
group exists that can readily solve the problem. The two largest emit-
ters—China (23%) and the US (12%)—together account for only about 
one-third of world net emissions of warming gases (Box 10.2.1 for a 
note on data sources). Global public goods can emerge, as well, when a 
Figure 10.2.1 Emissions of major warming gases. The chart shows emissions 
in common units (gigatons of CO2 equivalents per year) by converting the 
different warming gases via “global warming potentials,” a widely used method 
explained in Chapter 1. Emissions of CO2 are further divided into those that 
come from burning fossil fuels (CO2 energy), which are the majority, and those 
that emanate from industrial processes and changes in land use. From IPCC 
2014.
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global governing authority is already in place. Yet no such authority exists, 
although the Paris process or a successor to Paris may in time yield one.
Thus, because of the underlying structure of the problem itself, 
most states have strong incentives to avoid costly unilateral action, to 
wait for others to act, and to negotiate for self-interested advantages.
Political structure
Breaking the gridlock requires building international institutions that 
help promote collaboration.* Collaboration is the most encompassing 
concept to describe joint international action to achieve mutual gains. 
Collaboration can take many forms along a continuum from coordi-
nation to cooperation. In situations of coordination, agreements are 
self-enforcing: that is, once an agreement has been made, the parties 
do not have incentives to defect (fail to honor or withdraw from their 
commitments). For instance, once everyone in the US understands that 
Americans drive on the right-hand side of the road, no rational driver 
has an incentive to drive on the left; and vice versa for drivers in the 
UK. Agreements to use common frequencies and language (English) for 
*The text that follows relies heavily on two main sources that are good 
introductions to the logic of collective action applied to climate change: Victor 
(2011) and Keohane and Victor (2016).
Box 10.2.1  Emissions Data Sources
There are many different sources of data on emissions. I tend to rely 
heavily on the data set from EDGAR, the Electronic Data Gathering, 
Analysis, and Retrieval system of the US Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC), because it is regularly updated and includes not 
just emissions of CO2 from burning fossil fuels but also (after a year 
or two delay) other emissions. Moreover, the latest IPCC assessment 
report, for which I was one of the convening lead authors, used 
principally that data set. In addition, for data on energy production 
and consumption—the main source of CO2 and the largest source of 
greenhouse gas emissions—I find that the annual BP Statistical Review 
of World Energy is a reliable source.
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air traffic control provide another example—no pilot or airline wants to 
crash, so all, more or less, follow the rules. These kinds of agreements 
are quite rare in international politics. Cooperation, by contrast, is not 
self-enforcing. When one country lowers its trade and investment bar-
riers, others may not automatically see a benefit in doing the same. The 
deep coordination needed between states to provide public goods has 
a similar structure.
Two variables largely determine the prospects for collaboration. 
The first, shown in the rows of Table 10.2.1, concerns cooperation and 
coordination: whether joint action is self-enforcing. The second major 
variable, shown in the columns of Table 10.2.1, refers to the degree to 
which the potential joint gains from collective action are high or low. 
Where joint gains are larger, there are stronger incentives for collab-
oration—even if it is costly and difficult to create effective systems for 
working together.
The most important and interesting cases are in the left-hand col-
umn, where the potential joint gains are high. In the upper left quadrant 
are the crucial situations where there are large potential gains from 
cooperation but strong incentives for parties to shirk from doing their 
share. Deep mitigation of climate-warming emissions is a good example. 
As the gains from joint action on this public good rise, so does the 
temptation to defect. Effective action on mitigation of climate change 
Table 10.2.1 Four basic structures: prospects and strategies for coordination 
and cooperation
Potential joint gains are high. Potential joint gains are low.
Agreements are 
not self- enforcing 
(cooperation is required 
for collaboration).
Possible cooperation with 
high rewards, but with 
dangers of defection that 
rise with the depth of 
cooperation
Little incentive to seek 
to cooperate, although 
shallowness of cooperation 
limits dangers of defection
Agreements are self- 
enforcing (coordination 
is sufficient for 
collaboration).
Likely coordination, with 
limited but realizable gains, 
often leaving potential gains 
“on the table”
Easy coordination, limited 
by the low level of potential 
gains
Source: Keohane, R. O., and Victor, D. G. 2016, Cooperation and discord in global climate 
policy. Table 1. Nature Climate Change 6, 570–575. https://doi.org/10.1038/nclimate2937. 
Reproduced with permission of Springer Nature Publishing.
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requires policies and institutions that reduce that temptation. The es-
sence of the global political challenge in addressing climate change is 
the creation, implementation, and maintenance of those policies and 
institutions.
In the lower left quadrant, coordination is sufficient to achieve joint 
gains. Often, diplomats shift problems from the difficult cooperation 
box, in which incentives to defect are high, to the much easier coor-
dination box, which has low incentives to defect. Over the 60 years of 
international diplomacy on trade, for example, international agreements 
began by focusing on the highest tariffs whose reduction was clearly 
in the self-interest of countries and thus self-enforcing. As confidence 
grew, it became feasible to construct the World Trade Organization 
(WTO), with binding rules, adjudication, and enforcement mechanisms. 
The 1987 Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone 
Layer began as a prime example of successful coordination in which 
countries adopted national policies whose benefits to the US, the Euro-
pean Union, and Japan exceeded the cost by a wide margin. Thus these 
countries paid a large share of the costs (which proved to be relatively 
small) and the whole planet reaped the benefits. Deeper cooperation 
followed later. However, this strategy of shifting hard problems to an 
easier structure comes with risks if collaboration remains shallow, en-
abling the parties to capture only a portion of the potential gains that 
could in principle be available.
The right-hand column is somewhat less interesting but parallel. The 
November 2014 US-China bilateral agreement on emissions and coop-
erative research exemplifies easy coordination (lower right). The US and 
China announced individual as well as joint efforts to address a global 
problem. In effect, they made pledges to each other for action that 
aligned with their self-interests and initially provided small joint gains. 
Many initiatives announced in Paris—such as on innovation, protection 
of forests, and regulation of potent short-lived climate pollutants—can 
also be seen as examples of relatively easy coordination. When such 
easy but shallow coordination is unsatisfactory to participants, they have 
incentives to press for deeper cooperation. Here, as elsewhere, coop-
eration derives not from harmony but from discovering areas of discord 
where additional collaboration—moving up and to the left on Table 
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10.2.1—would provide additional gains. Insofar as this logic applies, co-
operation could arise from such coordination within small groups of 
countries and from other actors dissatisfied with the status quo. For 
example, the US-China accord of November 2014 was important in gen-
erating incentives for other countries to make meaningful pledges of 
action as part of the Paris process because it signaled to other countries 
that the two biggest emitters were beginning to tackle the problem.
In the upper right quadrant, cooperation is difficult and potential 
joint gains are low. In my previous research, I have argued that the Kyoto 
Protocol was an example of this kind of shallow dead-end coopera-
tion—a topic I explore in more detail below.
The situations in Table 10.2.1 are stylized, but they help explain a key 
distinction in diplomacy: the difference between shallow coordination 
and deep cooperation. That distinction helps to explain why there has 
been massive diplomatic activity on climate change but little progress on 
the difficult task of cutting emissions.
The coordination-cooperation distinction also suggests how prog-
ress could be made on climate change. If the toughest problems are 
tackled first, deadlock is likely to result. Examples include the failed 
effort by governments to reach agreement on a meaningful new treaty 
at the Copenhagen Conference in 2009 to replace the original Kyoto 
Protocol. Too many issues with too many fissures of disagreement were 
packaged into an accord that required too many countries to consent 
before it could become law. It is crucial to move from shallow coor-
dination toward deeper cooperation, while at the same time creating 
the conditions for favorable political coalitions within countries. Much 
of the enthusiasm around the larger role for bottom-up cooperation 
on climate change, as was on display in Paris, is rooted in this idea 
of building cooperation by working on smaller, easier problems where 
progress is feasible. Effective cooperation requires focusing on areas 
where agreement is feasible and then working to deepen and expand 
that cooperation into true collaboration over time. One of the many 
challenges in climate diplomacy is that that process of confidence build-
ing and learning is slow, whereas climate scientists, as outlined in other 
chapters of this book, are constantly warning that time is short.
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10.3   A Brief History of Climate Diplomacy
We now have a simple tool for understanding the history of climate 
change diplomacy. Real solutions to the climate change problem would 
offer huge joint gains, but those solutions would require deep collabo-
ration that could be, in reality or perception, contrary to the interests of 
important countries. Diplomats quickly learned that, and they focused 
mainly on producing agreements that aimed just at simple coordination 
with few joint gains. Put differently, the diplomats got good at crafting 
agreements that had little real impact on emissions and warming.
As the climate change issue emerged on the international agenda in 
the late 1980s, diplomats working on behalf of the dominant and most 
interested powers—the US and, increasingly, Europe, which about that 
time became the global leader on most international environmental is-
sues—quickly sought centralized solutions in the form of a global and legal 
binding agreement. They worked within the only institution that stood 
ready to help broker global solutions, the United Nations (UN). A sign of 
their confidence is that it took less than 2 years from the start of nego-
tiations early in 1991 until the finalization of the first global treaty on cli-
mate change: the 1992 UN Framework Convention on Climate Change 
(UNFCCC). That treaty had little real content—it was mostly an umbrella 
that committed the parties to share information, make efforts to reduce 
emissions, and attend future annual meetings for ongoing diplomacy.
The first formal follow-up meeting—known as the Conference of the 
Parties (COP), which convened in 1995 in Berlin with COP1—reached the 
conclusion that the UNFCCC by itself was inadequate. That conclusion 
launched a negotiating process that 2 years later begat the Kyoto Protocol 
of 1997. Formally a daughter of the UNFCCC, the Kyoto Protocol included 
a schedule of targets and timetables for the 38 advanced industrialized 
countries while imposing no emission control obligations on the rest of the 
world. By targets and timetables, I mean specific goals to reduce green-
house gas emissions (the targets) by specific dates (the timetable).
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In the years that followed, nearly all countries ratified the Kyoto Proto-
col because it did not require that they do much beyond what they would 
have done anyway—their diplomats ensured that schedule of targets and 
timetables mirrored what their countries were already on track to do. 
The one big exception was the US, where the economy in the late 1990s 
grew much more rapidly than expected (and with that growth came more 
emissions)—making it all but impossible to honor the Kyoto targets. The 
US never ratified the Kyoto Protocol, and when Canada (the largest com-
mercial trading partner of the US) saw that, Canada withdrew as well.
Figure 10.3.1 shows how this Kyoto approach, over time, became 
increasingly irrelevant to solving the climate problem. The left bar shows 
the fraction of world emissions that were included in the Kyoto targets 
and timetables in the year 1997—when the Kyoto negotiations formally 
concluded. The middle bar shows the fraction of emissions covered by 
those targets and timetables in the year 2010—after many years when 
countries outside the Kyoto strictures (for example, China) saw extraor-
dinary growth and two important countries that had been inside Kyoto 
(the US and Canada) exited. And the right bar shows the fraction of world 
emissions covered by Kyoto when the agreement was formally extended at 
the Conference of the Parties meeting in Doha in 2012. (At that extension 
point, the European Union agreed to continue, but Japan, under pressure 
Figure 10.3.1 The declining impact of Kyoto. Data from Victor 2011.
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to end a deal that was seen by Japanese industry as unfair, did not.) 
Put differently, Kyoto became a club of the highly converted, committed 
countries. But with political and structural changes in the world economy, 
that club accounted for a shrinking share of the global problem.*
As the US failed to ratify Kyoto, some of the flaws in this system 
became apparent—in particular, the problem of rigid, binding targets 
and timetables when countries, for the most part, don’t plan that way. 
New ideas surfaced, but none of them attracted much effort.
In 2001, just months after taking office, US President George W. Bush 
announced he would never submit the Kyoto Protocol for ratification; 
instead, his administration created a “coalition of willing supporters” of 
climate mitigation in an Asia-Pacific Partnership on Clean Development 
and Climate (APP). (The concept of a “coalition of the willing” was also 
how Bush’s team described the other countries that joined the US rein-
vasion of Iraq. When the Iraq war proved a fiasco, the term, although 
informative, fell out of favor.) While the Bush team correctly diagnosed 
some of the failings of the Kyoto Protocol, their favored alternative fared 
no better. The Bush team did little to invest in their alternative vision, 
other than hold meetings and commission a few studies. Most other 
countries stayed married to Kyoto-style targets and timetables.
Even the cleverest diplomacy aimed at more effective top-down 
solutions could not mask the failure of the Kyoto approach. Despite 
massive diplomatic effort, emissions trajectories barely changed. The 
good news in all this is that failure came with a bang, and the shock 
helped open diplomacy to superior, alternative ideas.
The bang was the 2009 Copenhagen Conference—an event convened 
with the goal of crafting a successor to the Kyoto Protocol but ending 
with the parties unable even to negotiate a formal plan for further ne-
gotiations. Without top-down agreement, what was left in the wreckage 
of Copenhagen was a loose bottom-up process that encouraged nations 
to outline their own national plans. These pledges, updated and elabo-
rated, would become the backbone of a new process set out in Paris.
The reasons for failure at Copenhagen were many, but the underly-
ing forces at work were familiar.
*For more on these problems with Kyoto, see Victor (2001). 
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The first was political: the fragmentation of power and authority 
in the international system and the corresponding absence of a leader 
that could reliably impose order on actors with sharply divergent in-
terests. Until the early 1990s, the US provided that function on most 
issues of economic and environmental organization. Since then, it has 
not played that role and no other actor has occupied that role, although 
the European Union has tried and China may yet step into that function. 
Europe, although increasingly unified at home on environmental issues, 
never had the power to convert its strong and growing environmental 
commitment into true global hegemonic leadership.
The second underlying force was cognitive: uncertainty about the 
cost and efficacy of reducing emissions through policy coordination. 
When the first global international agreement on climate change was 
penned—the UNFCCC in 1992—the joint obligations were so vague that 
the uncertainty in just how countries would cut emissions could be 
ignored. In a sprawling paragraph free of any definitive punctuation, 
Article 4.2 of the UNFCCC required industrialized countries to adopt 
policies to “demonstrate that developed countries are taking the lead 
in modifying longer-term trends in anthropogenic emissions. . . .  ” Diplo-
mats did what diplomats did best—they found ways to agree even when 
the underlying facts and interests made detailed agreement impossible.
As pressure to take more serious actions mounted, no country 
or firm that took deep decarbonization of emissions seriously could 
identify exactly which behavioral, technological, and regulatory commit-
ments would prove most effective. Indeed, the full text of the sprawling, 
punctuation-free paragraph in Article 4.2 made all commitments condi-
tional upon technological, political, and other developments.* All this 
diplomatic artistry made it possible to ignore for years the key reality of 
climate cooperation: the challenge in collective action was not merely 
that countries had diverging interests, but that even those that wanted 
*See the text of Article 4.2 that follows our earlier quotation, which includes this 
language: “taking into account the differences in these Parties’ starting points and 
approaches, economic structures and resource bases, the need to maintain strong 
and sustainable economic growth, available technologies and other individual 
circumstances. . . . ” 
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to act did not know which efforts would prove feasible, at what cost, 
and whether they would stay aligned with shifting national interests.
This veil of uncertainty about what true collaboration would cost—
and how it would affect organized interest groups within countries—has 
exacerbated the bargaining problems that arose as diplomats tried to 
craft international agreements. Uncertainty made it hard for governments 
and firms to understand their interests, because nobody really knew 
when (and at what cost) big reductions in emissions would be feasible. 
Because climate diplomacy was focused on reaching agreements that 
looked, at least on paper, ambitious, it was convenient to skirt around 
some of the central challenges. The diplomats driving the process—a 
mantle that European diplomats increasingly took for themselves—fo-
cused less on grappling with uncertainty and more on making sure the 
whole treaty was binding, that is, that it represented a commitment that 
countries were expected to honor as a matter of international law. The 
pursuit of binding law was based on the theory that binding law would 
be more effective—because most countries take their international legal 
obligations seriously, and some even allow those commitments to be 
enforced through national and other courts. Ironically, the desire for 
binding law helped guarantee that the entire effort would fall far short. 
Binding law made governments focus on agreeing only to what they 
were sure they could honor, which led either to agreements that were 
designed to have little or no impact on behavior (Kyoto) or deadlock 
(Copenhagen).* What was different about the Paris process that fol-
lowed was its explicit design to address these profound uncertainties in 
what countries were willing and able to implement.
*On countries taking their obligations seriously, see Chayes and Chayes (1998); 
it is a point underscored even in studies that are skeptical about the impact 
of international law (Goldsmith and Posner, 2006). On the trade-off between 
bindingness of commitments and depth, see Abbott and Snidal (2000). For the 
synthesis of these ideas, applied to climate, see Victor (2011).
Chapter 10: The Paris Agreement and Its Implementation 10-19
10.4  The Promise of Paris
When the Copenhagen conference failed in 2009, it opened a vacuum. 
The eventual design of the Paris Agreement was the result of active ef-
forts to fill that vacuum with new good ideas—including ideas that relied 
less on binding law and shifted to a more decentralized and flexible 
approach to bargaining.
At the core of the post-Copenhagen process was the idea that coun-
tries should set their own “pledges” for controlling emissions. In the 
run-up to Paris those pledges were called “Intended Nationally Deter-
mined Contributions” (INDCs), to indicate that these were pledges of 
what national governments intended to do and that these efforts were 
not centrally mandated but nationally determined. Once the Paris Agree-
ment came into force, the “intended” was dropped and the pledges 
were simply called Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs). 
The Paris process, by design, would begin with these NDCs that, over 
time, would be ratcheted tighter, and the overall progress of the system 
would be assessed.
The genius of this approach lay in its ability to engage many coun-
tries with diverse interests and capabilities. Before the Paris process, 
essentially all climate diplomacy focused on getting just the advanced 
industrialized countries to cut their emissions through binding accords, 
notably the Kyoto Protocol. Paris, by contrast, has the participation of 
almost every nation on the planet.
Several studies have tried to quantify the level of effort implied by 
different NDCs. While the results vary in detail, one pattern is most 
striking: the advanced industrialized countries are pledging the most. 
That’s because these countries have the highest incomes and are most 
responsible for historical emissions. Moreover, from the beginning of 
climate change diplomacy in the late 1980s, these countries were ex-
pected to take the lead and do the most to control emissions. Across 
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the emerging and least developed countries, by contrast, the level of 
effort—measured as the cost of the pledged policies—is often low or 
zero. That’s not because these countries are unconcerned about climate 
change but because they view climate policy efforts through the lens 
of other goals, such as cutting local air pollution and improving energy 
security. The other goals drive policy; protection for the climate is a 
co-benefit, that is, a side benefit that was not the main purpose behind 
the policy.
Figure 10.4.1 Progress by major industrialized countries in meeting their 
Paris pledges. Green lines show the path to the pledge. Red lines show 
business-as-usual trajectory without major new policies; blue and thin green 
lines show improved trajectories that depend on key policies, but none of the 
improved trajectories delivers the Paris pledge. Adapted from Victor et al. 2017.
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While the advanced countries have made bold pledges, a key chal-
lenge for the Paris process is that these nations are also falling short. As 
shown in Figure 10.4.1, all are bending their emission curves downward, 
but at a rate slower than needed to meet their NDCs.
The reasons for each country’s troubles vary. In the US, massive 
efforts by the Obama administration were unlikely ever to add up to 
honoring the goal of cutting emissions 26% to 28% below 2005 levels by 
2025. Even with heroic assumptions about improved technology costs 
and maximal sequestration from forestry mixed in, emissions would de-
cline at most 23%. Under Trump, the gap in US compliance with its own 
target has widened modestly as the federal government has sought to 
reverse the Clean Power Plan, which would reduce CO2 emissions from 
electricity generation, and other policies.
In Japan, where the economy is already extremely efficient, policy-
makers made pledges for still more emission reductions that far extend 
beyond what they can deliver at home. The EU also faces challenges in 
meeting its NDCs, although these are not as serious as those in Japan. 
The region’s Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS) has capped emissions in 
the power and industrial sectors since 2005 and will assure that the EU 
will meet its goal of cutting greenhouse gas emissions in these covered 
sectors 40% by 2030. (Chapter 12 for an explanation of cap-and-trade 
schemes such as the ETS.) The big problem in Europe lies with the 
60% of emissions that are outside the ETS—in the buildings, transport, 
agriculture, and waste sectors. Meanwhile, the share of EU emissions 
from agriculture, forestry, and land use is expected to double in the 
absence of additional mitigation that has been difficult to organize and 
implement. A shift to biomass for energy, for example, is merely moving 
emissions from the energy sector to land use without corresponding 
and sufficient mitigation in the latter.
These are serious problems, and the failures of leading countries to 
meet their pledges will lead many observers to declare Paris a failure. 
But a different reality is emerging—if the Paris framework works as de-
signed, it will be able to adjust in response to new information about 
country performance. In theory, that performance includes undershoot-
ing and overshooting targets. But actually creating that kind of flexible 
framework will require fleshing out and completing many elements of 
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the Paris framework for which the Paris diplomats did not reach final 
agreements. Over the next two subsections we look closely at that—first 
at why Paris worked when other efforts have failed, and second on the 
long list of items left unfinished at Paris.
Turning the corner at Paris
Why did Paris work when almost everything before it failed? The central 
answer lies in a new style of international cooperation. Instead of setting 
commitments through centralized bargaining, the Paris approach sets 
countries free to make their own commitments—the NDCs.
The flexibility of this pledge-and-review system helped transform 
climate diplomacy from the gridlock and impotence of the past. That 
made it easier for national governments to tailor their commitments 
to what they know they can deliver at home. (Or, more precisely, the 
system lets them tailor commitments to what they think will be politi-
cally helpful in pushing for climate policy at home. As shown in Figure 
10.4.1, many important countries are not on track to meet their pledges 
even as they undertake significant efforts to bend down their emissions 
curves.)
Most of the world’s emissions come from countries that aren’t wor-
ried (yet) about global climate change. Take China, the world’s biggest 
emitter. Its leaders have learned more about the dangers of unchecked 
climate warming, and that has made the country a bit more willing to 
act. But the nation still has other much more pressing priorities—like 
clearing the urban air of smog. Or take India, another big emitter, which 
is also mainly focused on priorities other than global warming, such as 
making the nation’s power grid more reliable. The pledging approach 
lets these countries offer packages of policies that align with their self- 
interests while also doing something to slow the growth of global cli-
mate pollution. When you look closely at the politics of the US, you see 
a similar story—outside the politically progressive coastal states, most of 
the nation is not seized by fear of global climate change.
Eventually a much more integrated global treaty will be needed to 
make major cuts in greenhouse gas emissions—one directly focused 
on the global goals. But the flexibility of a pledging system offers a 
way to get started and build confidence that, in time, will beget more 
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confidence and a willingness to do more. This is the same theory—with 
a similar approach—that guided the creation of the highly effective sys-
tem for international coordination of trade policy through the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and, since 1995, the World 
Trade Organization (WTO). Trade diplomacy began in the 1940s with 
simple, self-enforcing agreements that aligned with national interests; 
through successive rounds of bargaining, those national policies were 
ratcheted forward and integrated. Easier problems were tackled first, 
building confidence that made it possible to tackle harder diplomatic 
challenges. The Paris Agreement moves the world in that direction.
In addition to flexible commitments, the Paris approach also envi-
sioned a flexible geography for cooperation. Many diplomatic discus-
sions would be universal—involving all nations. But some would not. The 
more countries try to achieve deep cooperation with large joint gains, 
as outlined in Table 10.2.1, the harder it will be to craft the deal. All 
else equal, that crafting process will be aided if countries can pick and 
choose their partners—turning a problem of highly complex negotiations 
Figure 10.4.2 Rank order of global emissions, spending on energy-related 
R&D, and energy patents. Chart shows that the largest countries account for 
the vast majority of emissions and an even higher concentration of effort to 
control emissions. Data from Victor 2011.
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with nearly 200 countries into a much easier (but still difficult) task of 
working with a smaller club of the countries that matter most.
Figure 10.4.2 shows why this flexibility in the numbers of participat-
ing countries is so important. It shows a rank order plot for emissions 
of CO2 (the most important long-term warming gas) as well as two 
key elements for addressing the climate problem—spending on energy- 
related research and development (R&D) and successful outputs from 
that spending: new patents on energy innovations. The biggest country 
for each line is shown on the left, with the rank of 1. Then the line accu-
mulates with the first two countries (ranked 1 and 2) and so on. China 
accounts for about one-quarter of global emissions of warming gases 
(depending on the data set used for analysis). China and the second- 
largest country (the US) account for about two-fifths, and so on.
What is clear from Figure 10.4.2 is that there is massive inequality 
in the global system. A few countries account for most of the emissions 
and most of the effort. Politically, that inequality is potentially good 
news because it means that cooperation efforts can begin with just a 
few countries. The flexibility built into Paris allows and encourages these 
smaller climate clubs to form.
Challenges for putting Paris into practice
While reaching the Paris Agreement in 2015 was a huge accomplishment, 
that process left a long list of things undone. This is normal. The process 
of diplomacy often runs right to the deadline (and then some), agrees 
on what is essential, and leaves the rest to be filled in later (or never). 
When agreements are pretty simple, there isn’t much filling in to do—for 
example, the UNFCCC was essentially complete when signed in 1992. 
The Kyoto Protocol, which was negotiated past its deadline (workers 
were removing the chairs from the conference hall when the diplomats 
finally declared their work done on December 11, 1997), left holes on 
important concepts such as accounting systems. It took another 4 years 
to fill in those holes.
Now that we have explored what makes for successful cooperation, 
we can explore how the post-Paris process may unfold—and we can also 
help identify some priorities for the process of filling out the details left 
unfinished in Paris.
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First and most important is that the theory of cooperation that 
guides the Paris process is based on the idea that countries can best de-
termine what they are willing and able to do—and those determinations 
will vary over time with changes in technology, interests, and knowl-
edge. That theory of cooperation suggests that the process of making 
and adjusting pledges—the NDCs—is vital to the success of Paris. That’s 
why the news that the advanced industrialized countries aren’t on track 
to meet their pledges is so disturbing—because it is these countries that 
have the resources and motivation to lead in the effort to reduce global 
emissions.
It is crucial that leading governments—especially from the advanced 
industrialized countries that should be leading the efforts at coopera-
tion—shift the conversation away from compliance with numerical tar-
gets and toward the level, quality, and transparency of effort. Because 
there are so many confounding factors that affect emissions—such as 
economic growth, shifts in political winds, and technology—a country 
might achieve its numerical target by sheer luck and with minimal ef-
fort. Conversely, a country may make major, costly efforts but still fail 
to achieve its targets if (for example) economic growth is more rapid 
than forecast or new technologies don’t prove viable despite substantial 
investment. A flexible self-declaration approach to diplomacy ensures 
that leading countries keep their goals in line with what really matters: 
effort, or action. Europe, Japan, and the portions of the US that say they 
still honor their Paris pledges should begin the process of updating their 
goals to reflect the reality of what they are actually able to implement, 
even if that updating process reveals that real-world efforts fall short of 
fantasy-world goals. This process might also help provide cover for the 
Trump administration (or its successor) to reset the US national goal 
and rejoin the Paris Agreement fully.
Second, this pledge-driven process requires indicators and pro-
cesses to make it easier to determine which national policy efforts are 
really working. The logic of decentralized self-declaration of commit-
ments is partly rooted in the benefits of flexibility (as discussed above) 
and partly in the processes of learning that arise when there are large 
amounts of useful information on policy implementation available. 
That learning is partly technical—for example, if leaders in the process 
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of shifting power grids to renewables reveal information about what 
works, then followers can follow more quickly. Partly, the learning is 
about coalition formation. For example, environmental interest groups 
can gain information and examples that can make them more politically 
powerful by looking to the experiences in other markets where emission 
cuts have been successful.
So far, the picture on transparency is highly uneven. The NDCs for 
most countries are extremely short, and key assumptions that underlie 
the pledges are hard to pin down. Even the Obama administration, which 
initially vowed to set a high standard for transparency, did not disclose 
the crucial modeling assumptions it used to project future emissions. 
Transparency is vital to bottom-up diplomacy yet inconvenient for gov-
ernments that are focused on always looking good.
Getting quick agreement on the right indicators and the best con-
tent for NDCs will be impossible within the formal UN-based Paris pro-
cess because there are too many countries that don’t want high levels 
of transparency and the accountability that would follow. A solution to 
this problem is for countries that are committed to cutting emissions to 
volunteer themselves for detailed mutual reviews of their policy efforts—
much as China and the US did when they released in October 2016 
mutual peer reviews of their efforts, under the G20, to reform fossil fuel 
subsidies. If a few leaders demonstrate how to reveal useful information 
about their policy pledges and how to do transparent reviews of that 
information, then the rest will follow.
Many theories of international bargaining view the climate change 
problem as provision of a global public good for which most countries 
have a strong incentive to defect. That view suggests the need for strict 
monitoring and enforcement procedures. Such procedures would be 
needed, according to this view, because countries would not be willing 
to adopt costly mitigation policies unless their economic competitors did 
the same. This “verification and enforcement” view of cooperation sug-
gests that cooperation hinges on the ability to deter and punish defectors.
The theory of cooperation embodied in Paris is different. The Paris 
approach is based on the idea that, for now, the main impediment to 
cooperation is not knowing what to do—or how to demonstrate to oth-
ers that each country has a reasonable plan of action in place. In some 
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of my research with Columbia Law School professor Charles Sabel, we 
call this “experimental governance” because it is based on the idea that 
countries and firms are running, in effect, experiments—learning what 
works and then selecting superior ideas for scaling up. According to this 
view of cooperation, which is embedded into the logic of Paris, what 
matters most right now is maximizing the number of experiments and 
creating an information-rich process to help everyone learn what works.
The genius of the system adopted in Paris is that it could radically 
increase the supply of this type of information. An effective information 
regime will lower the costs for crafting collective agreements. According 
to this view, the top priority over the next few years is to identify coun-
tries that are willing to show how to improve their NDCs.
Over time, it will be important as well to lay the foundation for 
a future verification and enforcement system—so that, as cooperation 
deepens, there aren’t strong incentives for countries to avoid doing 
their fair share. One of the key elements in that will be dealing with 
trade effects, as shown in Figure 10.4.3. The figure shows the different 
emissions statistics that are based on where products are produced 
(using territory-based accounting) versus where they are ultimately 
Figure 10.4.3 Global trade in 
embodied carbon between highly 
industrialized countries (HIC), upper 
middle income countries (UMC), 
lower middle income countries 
(LMC), and lowest income countries 
(LIC). The figure shows the different 
emissions statistics that are based 
on where products are produced 
(territory-based accounting) versus 
where they are ultimately consumed 
(consumption-based accounting). 
From IPCC 2014 and Victor et al. 2014.
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consumed (using consumption-based accounting). For example, when 
a ton of steel is produced in China and sent to the US where it is used 
to construct a bridge, the emissions associated with that production are 
assigned to China under territory-based accounting but to the US under 
consumption-based measurement. Nearly all emissions statistics today 
are territory based, which creates incentives for firms and consumers to 
select products made offshore and then import the products, avoiding 
the costly emission controls that would be needed if the product were 
made at home. Over time, those incentives also result in new invest-
ment shifting to offshore locations where pollution controls are more 
lax. These mismatched incentives also encourage offshore producers 
to avoid signing up to emission control policies lest they suffer an eco-
nomic disadvantage. Fixing this problem will require adjustments at the 
border to compensate for the emissions embodied in traded products.
Third, the Paris process will move only as quickly as governments 
want to invest in deep decarbonization. Many governments are already 
making efforts because cutting emissions of warming gases overlaps 
with other goals, such as reducing air pollution or promoting energy 
security. That co-benefits approach to action can help get efforts under 
way, but they won’t be enough to make the deep reductions in emis-
sions needed to stop climate warming.
More political pressure will change how countries view their inter-
ests. Elsewhere in this volume you are reading about how interest groups 
can be mobilized and about how the spread of scientific information can 
help mobilize interest. All that is important, and there is something else 
that can help a lot as well: technological innovation.
Deep decarbonization of the economy implies a massive, transfor-
mative change—in particular, a transformation in how energy is produced 
and used. Figure 10.4.4 offers a sense of scale of the effort needed—the 
gray lines are published scenarios showing future emissions of green-
house gases without significantly new policies, and the blue lines are 
scenarios consistent with stopping warming at about 2°C. There is a 
massive difference between the two, and studies that look into the de-
tails of these energy systems (and agriculture systems, for a fraction 
of world warming emissions comes from changes in how land is used) 
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suggest that the energy system of the future may not look anything like 
the system of today.
A central element to that transformation is innovation. New energy 
systems won’t come into being entirely on their own—they require new 
ideas. And new ideas are, like a safe climate, a public good. They are 
available to everyone and can be excluded from none. Earlier in this 
chapter we learned that public goods require cooperation because 
countries and firms, if they think just about their narrow self-interest, 
won’t do enough to deliver those public goods.
Innovation is a global public good—new ideas for new energy sys-
tems, as they appear, will be available to everyone. A key challenge in 
the Paris framework is to ensure there will be enough investment in 
these global public goods. Figure 10.4.5 is not encouraging—it shows 
public sector investment in energy-related research, development, and 
Figure 10.4.4 Different visions for future emissions. The chart shows 
published “baseline” scenarios, for which governments do not introduce 
significantly new policies (gray lines, for which the highest lines yield more 
than 6°C of warming). Deep emission controls (blue lines) are consistent with 
stopping warming at about 2°C above preindustrial levels, a widely discussed 
goal. Reproduced from the Global Carbon Project, CC BY 4.0 license.
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demonstration (RD&D) for all the Western industrialized countries. 
(The data for these countries are relatively good, but this figure under-
states the world total investment, especially in recent years, because 
it excludes China.) Today, investment is barely back at the level of the 
late 1970s when the world was consumed with energy crises. The new 
energy crisis—the problem of carbon and other warming gases—requires 
a lot more effort.
On the first day of the conference that led to adoption of the Paris 
Agreement, nearly two dozen countries pledged to double their invest-
ment in public sector energy-related RD&D through a scheme known as 
Mission Innovation. Delivering on that mission is important not just for 
increasing the supply of new ideas from which real new decarbonized 
energy systems can emerge. It is also important politically because as 
the supply of new ideas for decarbonization rises, the cost of controlling 
emissions will go down. Less costly low-emission technologies will shift 
perceptions—away from the view that deep decarbonization is daunt-
ing and impossible, to the view that such decarbonization is feasible. 
That, along with new information about the harmful consequences of 
Figure 10.4.5 Public sector spending on energy-related research, 
development, and demonstration (RD&D). Data from the International Energy 
Agency.
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unchecked climate change, will alter how countries evaluate their inter-
ests, will help interest groups that favor decarbonization get stronger, 
and will make governments more willing to act within the Paris frame-
work (and within frameworks that emerge after Paris).
Fourth, the arguments made in this chapter suggest that a pledge-
driven approach to cooperation is the best feasible strategy. But realism 
is needed about the rate at which experiments can be implemented, and 
lessons learned and diffused. Because more than two decades passed 
without a serious strategy for addressing the climate problem, there is 
a lot of catching up to do—even if the Paris process unfolds effectively.
The trajectory of emissions in the absence of climate stabilization 
policies, such as the trajectories in the gray lines of Figure 10.4.4, gives 
a sense of just how much remains to be done. There is a huge gap 
between baseline levels of emissions and what would be needed to stop 
warming at about 2°C. The Paris pledges might have closed that gap by 
perhaps one-third to one-half, but as noted earlier, even those pledges 
aren’t being met by the countries that are expected to lead the global 
effort—the gap between emissions and stabilization that already existed 
in the Paris pledges is getting wider. Deeper pledges will be needed, 
although the feasibility of that effort to achieve greater ambition is hard 
Figure 10.4.6 California’s emissions trajectories and goals. Reproduced with 
permission from the California Air Resources Board.
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to assess. That reality suggests that the planet is likely to blow through 
the 2°C goal. New goals will be needed.
Fifth, and final, is the topic of leadership. There is much attention 
to the need for leadership, and the Paris process itself can’t do much to 
create leaders. The pressure for leadership must come from within key 
jurisdictions—countries, states, groups of firms, and even cities.
California has been a reliable leader in this area and has set ambi-
tious goals out to 2050, when the state expects to cut emissions 80% 
(Figure 10.4.6). Like all other leaders, California must grapple with the 
fact that leadership tends to come from economies that are already 
green and getting greener. Yet stopping global warming requires that 
the whole planet (especially the big emitters) get much greener. Lead-
ership requires followership. The Paris process might help on that front 
by creating more focus on the lessons that leaders learn—and helping 
others internalize those lessons. But for that to work, leaders probably 
need to invest not just in good-looking activities at home but in creating 
the conditions to help generate followership.
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10.5  Summary of Main Points
Paris was a huge step forward. But the framework remains young, 
incomplete, and fragile. In this chapter we have covered these main 
points:
 ➤ Failure to make progress on the climate problem is the result of 
many factors—each of which, on its own, could spell failure for in-
ternational cooperation. The structure of the climate problem does 
not lend itself to effective national politics, because the costs for 
action are visible and up front while the benefits are diffused far into 
the future and global.
 ➤ There are many different strategies for achieving cooperation, but a 
central challenge is creating deep cooperation—that is, cooperation 
in which parties do more to address a global public good (protect-
ing the atmosphere) than they would if they evaluated costs and 
benefits with reference just to themselves.
 ➤ The most important types of cooperation for climate change are 
those that create large joint gains and are not self-enforcing. As a 
general rule, self-enforcing agreements in the climate area have not 
involved much major change in behavior.
 ➤ The history of climate diplomacy involves many agreements that are 
largely self-enforcing but have little impact on emissions.
 ➤ The Paris Agreement may prove to be quite different because it 
sets up a process that requires countries to set their own commit-
ments (pledges, known formally as NDCs) according to what they 
are willing and able to achieve. That process, in theory, allows more 
flexibility and can encourage greater experimentation.
 ➤ While promising, the Paris process left may key elements incom-
plete. Particularly important is a mechanism for checking on the 
quality and content of the national pledges—the NDCs.
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 ➤ The engine for progress under the Paris Agreement will be leader-
ship by jurisdictions that have a strong incentive or inclination to 
lead. The strategy of leadership requires a strategy of followership, 
since most of the world’s emissions come from jurisdictions that 
won’t be leaders.
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Learning Objectives
1. Understand the mitigation challenge: What are we up against? 
In order to prevent more severe impacts from human-made 
climate change, we have to significantly reduce the emissions of 
greenhouse gases. In order to understand the magnitude of the 
problem, we will explore the sources of emissions historically and 
going forward.
2. Have a basic understanding of how economists think about 
climate change impacts: Climate scientists have developed 
advanced models of how the climate system functions and what 
the consequences of global warming are on the climate system. 
Economists have developed methods to help us quantify these 
impacts in welfare/monetary terms so one can compare the 
damages from climate change to the costs of preventing it by 
reducing emissions.
3. Have a basic understanding of the main policy options available: If 
we are to meet the ambitious emission reduction goals required 
to prevent significant climate change, policies will have to be put 
in place to reduce the growth and eventually the total amount of 
emissions. We will explore different approaches to doing so.
Overview
Climate change is the biggest environmental challenge of our and fu-
ture generations. More humans currently live on the planet than ever 
before, and population growth is anticipated to continue throughout 
the remainder of this century. More people, whose incomes are rising 
because of economic growth, will demand more goods and services 
(for example, cars, air conditioning, televisions) as well as diets richer 
in protein. This drives the first challenge discussed in this chapter—the 
so-called mitigation challenge. In order to produce the goods, services, 
and foods that current and future humans will want to consume, one 
requires more inputs to production or much more efficient technol-
ogy. Some of the inputs required are renewable (for example, lumber, 
fish, sunshine, wind), and others are nonrenewable (for example, coal, 
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natural gas, metals). The production of this portfolio of inputs is en-
ergy intensive and likely results in raised emissions of greenhouse gases. 
These emissions have been rising globally since the onset of the Indus-
trial Revolution in the eighteenth century and, absent policy interven-
tion, will continue to do so.
These rising emissions pose a challenge. If emissions continue in 
an unabated fashion, the planet will experience a significant degree of 
climate change. If we reduce, as has been argued by some nonecono-
mists, emissions to zero, one will prevent a significant degree of climate 
change—but also possibly forgo many of the benefits derived from the 
consumption of goods that will not be consumed because of the policy. 
Economists argue that in order to find the efficient degree of emissions 
reduction, one should compare the costs of reducing emissions with 
the benefits of doing so. This is the backbone of a formal methodology 
called benefit cost analysis, which compares the full damages from 
additional climate change to the costs of reducing greenhouse gas emis-
sions. In order to conduct such a benefit cost analysis, one clearly needs 
to have information on what it costs to reduce emissions and how big 
the damages from additional emissions leading to climate change are. 
In what follows, I discuss the emission reduction challenge and provide 
an overview of how economists attempt to quantify the damages from 
climate change in monetary terms.
The second part of the chapter assumes that we have decided as a 
society on how large emissions reductions should be. The question is 
how to get there? The problem here is challenging. First, I discuss this 
from a single country’s perspective. The problem is similar to losing 
weight. If you step on the scale and decide that you need to lose 20 
pounds, you have many ways to achieve this goal. You generally would 
like to choose the most efficient (for example, least painful) way to 
do so. Emissions reductions are similar. If we decided that we want to 
reduce our emissions by say 10%, we would want to achieve this in the 
most efficient or, as economists would say, “least cost” way. I outline 
the main approaches to reducing emissions and compare how efficient 
they are.
Now, let’s complicate the problem. Since greenhouse gases are 
global pollutants, meaning their geographic source of origin does not 
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matter, each country needs to do its part. But how do we get each 
country to do the right thing? Again, turning to losing weight, this is 
similar to having your extended family decide that you will collectively 
lose a total of 200 pounds. Each member of your family has an incentive 
to free ride on others’ weight loss, and your family will likely never 
achieve this common goal. This is essentially the problem behind the 
2015 Paris Agreement, where all countries decided to jointly reduce 
emissions but each country is “doing its own reducing.” Moreover, the 
Agreement does not contain significant penalties if a country fails to 
meet its emissions reduction plan. The chapter ends by briefly discuss-
ing the challenges of international cooperation in emissions reduction 
and the state of affairs. At the very end it lists a number of suggestions 
for accessible additional readings.
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There are few machines that have had a bigger impact on human devel-
opment than the steam engine. While the first steam engines go back 
to the first century AD, it was only in the 1700s that they were used in a 
production context. While at first they were used to pump water out of 
mines, by the late 1700s the Boulton-Watt engine was able to turn steam 
into rotative motion. This game-changing invention led to a massive in-
crease in the demand for steam, which was most easily generated by 
combusting fossil fuels (for example, coal, gas, oil) and renewables (for 
example, biomass, wood). This invention was instrumental in kicking off 
the Industrial Revolution, which led to a massive expansion in the de-
mand for fossil fuels. Further uses for fossil fuels came from the smelting 
of steel; the heating of homes, factories, and places of employment; 
and the arrival of the internal combustion engine, which enabled today’s 
main modes of transportation.
Where do the emissions come from?
The inventions powered by fossil fuels led to the explosive growth in 
emissions of greenhouse gases that continues to the present day. Figure 
11.1.1 displays the growth of CO2 emissions from fossil fuel combustion 
since the 1700s. The world essentially went from negligible emissions 
to 35 billion tons of CO2 in 2013. Most of this growth stems from the 
combustion of coal (solids), oil and its derivative products (liquids), and 
natural gas. There is a significant single use—the production of cement, 
which shows up in these graphs because the chemical process used 
to make cement generates CO2 directly. Finally, when oil and gas are 
produced, some gas escapes and is not captured, for cost-effectiveness 
reasons, and is flared (burned) off.
Instead of looking at emissions trends by fuels, it is instructive to 
break down emissions by region. Figure 11.1.2 replicates Figure 11.1.1 
11.1  The Emissions Challenge
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Figure 11.1.2 Global emissions by world region. For the latter part of the 
twentieth century, the United States was the leading emitter, but it has recently 
been overtaken by the People’s Republic of China. From Ritchie and Roser 2019. 
Figure 11.1.1 Carbon dioxide emissions by fuel source globally from 1750 
until 2014. Because of the long lifetime of CO2 in the atmosphere, it is not the 
level of emissions in any given year, but the area under the curve that matters. 
From Ritchie and Roser 2019. 
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but indicates the source region of the emissions. Three things stand out 
from this figure. First, most of the emissions growth until the end of 
the twentieth century came from high-income countries, with the Euro-
pean Union (EU) and the United States being responsible for the lion’s 
share of emissions. What we see in the twenty-first century, however, 
is that the most significant growth in emissions has come from lower- 
and  middle-income countries. Most notably, China became the biggest 
emitter (in total, not per capita terms) early in the twenty-first century, 
and we are observing significant growth in India’s emissions as well as 
those of the rest of Asia. Emissions in Europe and the United States have 
leveled off or stopped their significant growth path—for now.
What is driving emissions?
The question as to what is driving this growth is not as mysterious as 
one thinks. It has been formalized in what is called the Kaya identity. 
The identity states that CO2 emissions can be expressed as a product 
of population, GDP per capita, energy intensity per unit of GDP, and 
carbon intensity (carbon per unit of energy consumed). It hence sug-
gests that more populous, richer, more energy-intensive countries with 
a more  carbon-intensive energy sector will have higher emissions. This 
is not rocket science and has been confirmed across countries through 
a variety of research efforts. As this chapter focuses on the economic 
aspects of climate change, taking a closer look at the income-emissions 
relationship is instructive. As China has a much larger population than 
the US, for example, a meaningful comparison here is to look at the 
relationship between per capita GDP in a common currency and emis-
sions per capita. This gives us a snapshot of how average income and 
emissions correlate. Figure 11.1.3 plots this for the year 2016.
I find this figure enlightening. What we see here, albeit on a log-trans-
formed scale, is that there is a strong positive relationship between per 
capita income and per capita emissions. Some sub- Saharan economies, 
such as Burundi, which are among the poorest in the world, have GDPs 
below $1,000 per person per year and per capita emissions below 0.1 
tons per year. The world’s richest countries—the United States, for ex-
ample—have GDPs around $60,000 per person per year and have per 
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capita emissions north of 10 tons per year. Yes. Almost 100 times the 
emissions per person of the world’s poorest individuals.
While this graph is enlightening in the cross section, it is not surpris-
ing. Richer countries consume (and produce) more things and hence 
have higher emissions. This snapshot, by definition, ignores time. What 
if some or most of the bigger countries in the bottom left quadrant 
of Figure 11.1.3 migrate to the top right quadrant? Is this a bad thing? 
That depends on what you tend to worry about. The Kaya identity sug-
gests that if you get richer, you emit more, which is intuitive. Also, 
as your economy becomes more carbon intensive—as many economies 
transitioning from an agrarian economy to an industrialized economy 
have—you emit more carbon. At least that is what the historical record 
suggests. One hope is that the amount of energy needed to produce a 
unit of output will go down as technology becomes more efficient. We 
Figure 11.1.3 Per capita CO2 emissions plotted against per capita GDP 
(the value of goods and services produced per person) across countries. 
The relationship is plotted on a log scale, which gives the illusion of a linear 
relationship between the two variables, when in fact the relationship looks 
more like the right part of a parabola. From Ritchie and Roser 2019. 
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have observed this in many industries. One example is lightbulbs. Old 
incandescent lightbulbs used much more electricity and provided less 
light than new LED lightbulbs do.
One thing to wonder about, at least according to the Kaya identity, 
is whether rising incomes are a bad thing. If you were a development 
economist, you would be excited about rising incomes! Battling poverty 
is one of the main goals of development economists and practitioners. 
In fact, the first Millennium Development Goal (MDG) stated by the 
United Nations is to “eradicate extreme poverty and hunger.” This has 
historically come at an environmental cost—a rise in greenhouse gas 
emissions. If you read down the list of the MDGs, the seventh MDG is to 
“ensure environmental sustainability.” What this would suggest is that we 
are seeking a global transformation of human well-being, by eliminating 
suffering, all the while ensuring environmental sustainability. What this 
means is that we would like to move all countries to the right in Figure 
11.1.3, while ensuring that countries currently low on the y-axis remain 
there and, at the same time, bring the countries in the top right quadrant 
down into the bottom right quadrant by reducing their emissions but 
preserving their wealth. This is clearly not a small task and will require a 
Herculean effort by politicians and researchers across the globe.
The global nature of current and future emissions
While it is easy to start thinking about what is happening in individual 
countries after seeing Figure 11.1.3, it is important to remember that 
greenhouse gases are largely global pollutants. A ton of CO2 is roughly 
what you would emit by driving a Ford Mustang 5.0 (one cool car, espe-
cially the convertible) from San Francisco to Chicago. It does not matter 
whether that ton of CO2 is emitted in California or China—it causes the 
same amount of damage. Hence the global climate responds to global 
emissions, regardless of where they stem from. There are numerous 
efforts under way to draw different scenarios of global emissions for 
the next 100 years. As you can imagine, predicting what will happen 
hundreds of years from now is extremely challenging. Imagine trying to 
predict today’s economy and technology as a scientist living in the 1700s! 
These emissions scenarios are consistent with different versions of the 
Kaya identity. Figure 11.1.4 displays a set of future emissions scenarios.
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The top (peach-colored) band in Figure 11.1.4 displays a future 
where no climate policies are implemented—the status quo; the green 
trajectory shows a future where currently implemented climate policies 
are executed and adhered to. The purple band displays a future where 
all countries achieve their current targets/pledges set within the Paris 
Agreement. The red pathway corresponds to an aspirational goal of 
limiting emissions to a level where the global temperature only rises by 
2°C above preindustrial levels. This would limit damages to avoid some 
extreme and worrisome effects. Finally, the blue trajectory is for an aspi-
rational goal of limiting warming to 1.5°C. This scenario would require 
very urgent and rapid reduction in global greenhouse gas emissions. Fig-
ure 11.1.4 is just one example of a set of emissions scenarios produced 
in a very active academic literature. Of course, you and I could probably 
come up with alternate futures, which would look very different.
The emissions scenarios are used by physical climate scientists as 
Figure 11.1.4 Possible scenarios of greenhouse gas emissions for the next 
100 years. You can see that the scenario without climate policies is projected to 
cause significant warming, while the dark blue path is an extremely ambitious 
emissions scenario limiting warming to 1.5°C. From Ritchie and Roser 2019. 
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inputs into climate models (general circulation models, sometimes 
called global climate models [GCMs]). These models, as discussed in 
Chapter 1, translate changes in greenhouse gas emissions into impacts 
on physical dimensions of climate. These include, but are not limited to, 
surface temperature, precipitation, humidity, wind speeds, cloud forma-
tion, and sea level rise. These models hence produce different futures of 
planet Earth depending on what emissions pathway we follow. How big 
changes in the climate system will be depends critically on the emission 
path we will follow.
The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) generates 
the “official” climate scenarios, which are a synthesis of the mostly 
peer-reviewed scientific literature to date. Thousands of scientists re-
view tens of thousands of published papers to synthesize our collective 
understanding of the current and future state of the climate system. Fig-
ure 11.1.5 displays the projections from their Fifth Assessment Report. 
There are different scenarios of climate change, called Representative 
Concentration Pathways (RCPs), which are simply worlds with different 
degrees of greenhouse gas concentrations. The graphs on the left dis-
play temperature change, precipitation change, and Arctic sea ice under 
RCP 2.6, which is consistent with warming of roughly 1°C over tempera-
tures experienced in the late 1900s. Under this scenario the chance of 
exceeding 2°C is less than 33%. The graphs on the right show the same 
indicators (temperature, precipitation, and sea ice) under the high RCP 
8.5 emissions scenario, for which temperatures are thought to continue 
increasing and reach about 4°C higher than late-twentieth-century levels 
(the likely range of outcomes for 2100 is 3°C to 5.5°C higher).*
The figure shows a number of interesting things. First off, the im-
pacts on temperature are much more dire for the higher-emissions 
scenario (which is not that surprising) and for regions closer to the 
poles. Second, most climate models predict very similar increases in 
warming and distribution across space for temperature. The second 
row in Figure 11.1.5 indicates changes in precipitation. Two things stand 
*Note that we keep on using °C, which is the unit used in most of the literature 
(water freezes at 0°C and boils at 100°C). If you like Fahrenheit better, multiply the 
degree Celsius figure by 9, then divide by 5, and add 32 to what you get.
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Figure 11.1.5 Projected effects of climate change on temperature, 
precipitation, sea ice, and ocean acidity under lower (left) and higher (right) 
emissions scenarios. From IPCC 2013.   
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out here. First, the high-emissions scenario has very different patterns of 
drying in different areas, and those with the largest decrease in precip-
itation include some of the major crop-producing regions in the world. 
Second, the model agreement is much lower, with different models 
predicting very different precipitation changes, making this one of the 
most important uncertainties in the climate literature. Especially if you 
are an agricultural economist like me! Crops need water to grow, and 
what and where to plant is one of the key decisions a farmer has to 
make. The more uncertainty there is in what your rainfall patterns look 
like, the harder it gets to make the best planting decisions. The third row 
shows Arctic sea ice under the two scenarios. It shows that under both 
scenarios, sea ice shrinks. Most notably it disappears under the RCP 8.5 
scenario.
A pet peeve of mine is that funding agencies across the world have 
spent billions of dollars studying the physical aspects of climate change 
by collecting important data and supporting very complex computational 
models to study the future of the climate system. While this is clearly 
extremely important, much less attention (and, importantly, research 
funding) has been directed at studying the impacts of climate change on 
human and natural systems and translating these into monetary terms. 
Lack of funding notwithstanding, there has been a sparsely funded 
explosion in this literature recently, which led to the development of 
methods and insights that were not available as far back as 10 years. 
Much of this revolution in economics has been fueled by the availability 
of large data sets on the economy and detailed imagery data collected 
via high-resolution satellites.
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11.2   Quantifying the Economic Impacts 
of Climate Change
History of climate damages
The first evidence of reflection on an impact of climate on human/eco-
nomic activity goes back to Pythagoras’ disciple Parmenides, who divided 
the world into five zones: one torrid, two temperate, and two frigid. 
The torrid zones (which we call the tropics today) he thought were too 
hot to be inhabited. Aristotle later agreed with this view, for both the 
torrid and the frigid zones (the poles). He believed that the only areas 
on Earth habitable by humans were located between the tropics and the 
Arctic and Antarctic Circles—the area where he lived. The French phi-
losopher Montesquieu took a much more direct and controversial line 
on the causal relationship between climate and human ability, suggest-
ing that humans from colder climates were physically superior, braver, 
more honest, and more clever. This clearly incorrect perspective on the 
cross-sectional influence of climate on human well-being lacked any sort 
of empirical basis and led to a long discussion around environmental 
determinism.
Economic damages from climate change— 
why is this so difficult?
The emergence of climate change as a field of study in the physical sci-
ences in the late 1970s quickly led social scientists to think about what 
the possible consequences of a changing climate could be on economic 
sectors. This is a difficult problem, to say the least. Let’s think about 
what one would like to know in order to make good policy. One would 
like to get an estimate of the damage a ton of CO2 (or another greenhouse 
gas) causes after it has been emitted. Sounds simple, right? But this is 
where the heavy hand of physics presents the invisible hand of the mar-
ketplace with quite a challenge, which has to do with time and space.
First, CO2, for example, is a long-lived gas. Once emitted, it stays in 
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the atmosphere for hundreds and possibly thousands of years. Hence 
it continues to produce warming for a long time. That tank of gas you 
burned through getting home for the holidays was turned into CO2 
molecules that your great-great-great-[…]-great-great grandchildren 
will feel the consequences of. This means in order to figure out what 
the damage of that ton emitted is, you need to figure out the conse-
quences for the economy today, tomorrow, and the next few hundred 
years. This means you will have to put a dollar amount on the damages 
experienced by people (and critters and plants) living at the end of 
the century and beyond. We are again back to the problem of having 
to project the future state of the climate system and economy out 
hundreds of years.
The second challenge stems from the fact that the vast majority of 
greenhouse gases are global pollutants, as we discussed above. This 
means that the exact location of emissions is irrelevant to the damages 
they cause. Furthermore, one has to calculate the damages across the 
entire planet—not just at the point of emissions.
To summarize, so far the challenge seems pretty steep. You have 
to calculate global damages for the next few hundred years. But it gets 
harder when you contemplate the broad array of economic sectors that 
can be affected by climate change. The most obvious sector that will be 
affected by climate change is agriculture. Crops and animals largely live 
outside and exposed to the weather. If it gets hotter and drier, most 
plants and animals do not do as well. It has been shown, for example, 
that crop yields drop significantly if the number of days with tempera-
tures above 30°C rises, as most climate models predict. Another sector 
affected by climate change is the energy sector. When it gets hotter, 
people who have air conditioners turn them on and increase their en-
ergy consumption—often significantly. They also heat less in the winter, 
which is a good thing.
But you can probably already see it. Quantifying what will happen to 
crops across the world as well as energy use in developed and develop-
ing countries everywhere over the next few centuries is a daunting task. 
If you take into account that there are many other aspects of human 
society that are affected by the climate, this task becomes even trickier. 
It has been shown that mortality, morbidity, crime, conflict, productivity, 
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water consumption, migration, spread of disease vectors, air pollution, 
happiness, cognitive performance, reproductive ability, and suicide are 
all affected by climate—worldwide. The studies showing this are not just 
telling stories but are using actually observed data to establish statistical 
links between weather/climate and these outcomes.
The damage function
As mentioned above, the literature examining this function linking cli-
mate to economic outcomes has exploded over the past decade. So 
let’s take a look and examine what these studies do in practice. The next 
section draws heavily on an article I published in the Journal of Economic 
Perspectives in 2018 (listed in the Supplementary Readings section; it is a 
great, free resource written for a general audience).
Here is how economists have recently attempted to quantify the link 
between changes in climate and the consequent damages (and in a few 
cases the benefits). The mathematical relationship used to map changes 
in climate into damages is something fittingly called a damage function. 
This deserves some elaboration using an example. When you leave your 
apartment in the morning, you encounter the day’s weather. If you live 
in sunny San Diego (like Professor Ramanathan, who is the brains and 
soul behind getting this book over the finish line), the weather you 
encounter is likely sunny and a pleasant 22°C. If you live in Northern 
Bavaria as I used to do, in the winter you will encounter a day close 
to −10°C with thick clouds. You can think of climate as the average 
weather over a long period of time. There are many different measures 
of climate that may be relevant to you. For example, you may be inter-
ested in what the average weather (climate) in a location is like in the 
summer. This is essentially how we pick vacation destinations! We look 
at average temperatures during the season we intend to visit a location. 
There is no guarantee that the weather when we actually travel will be 
what we anticipated, though. Often you will have traveled to the beach, 
expecting sunshine, and you just got unlucky and encountered rain and 
fog. This is weather.
So, if there is climate change, the average weather you will encoun-
ter will shift. For those of you who remember your statistics training, 
it is not just the average weather that shifts, but the whole distribution 
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(which in some places can be approximated by what is commonly re-
ferred to as a bell curve). For example, the average temperature may 
increase, but at the same time, the variability of weather may also in-
crease. A shift in the average weather and possibly in its variability will 
lead to a higher frequency of “extreme events” such as heat waves and 
droughts. The issue is that these changes in weather—driven by climate 
change—affect outcomes of interest in unexpected ways. What I mean 
is that a 1°C increase in temperatures when it’s cool outside could have 
a much smaller impact on, for example, crop yields and energy con-
sumption than a 1°C increase when it’s hot outside. Some important 
food crops, for example, have been shown to react very negatively to 
temperature increases above 30°C but do not care much if it gets a little 
bit warmer at 20°C.
Hence, what we are interested in is how individuals/crops/animals/
plants respond to weather when the average weather (that is, climate) 
has changed in the long run. This response is likely different from the 
old response when the average weather had not changed. Let’s use an 
example close to my heart to help us clarify our thinking. Historically, 
a really hot day in the San Francisco Bay Area would lead to increases 
in ice cream consumption and lots of whining. Since San Franciscans 
historically knew that these hot days were extremely rare, almost no 
houses or apartment buildings had air conditioners. If, however, San 
Franciscans learn that there is such a thing as climate change, and that 
their summers will resemble Palermo’s unpleasant hot summers on aver-
age in the future, many will go ahead and install air conditioners.
Hence how the San Francisco hipsters react to a hot day after the 
climate has changed is different from how they would have reacted to 
the same hot day before climate change—because of the installation 
of “new gadgets,” that is, air conditioners. The future under climate 
change will hence likely result in higher electricity consumption due to 
the installation of additional air conditioners, which consumers will pay 
money to install. Complaining will likely increase as well, since we Cali-
fornians are a whiny bunch. But what about the people that already had 
air conditioners? The rational thing for them to do is to run their air con-
ditioners more frequently. So what we end up with is air conditioners 
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new and old being run more frequently using electricity, which costs 
consumers money and results in higher emissions of greenhouse gases.
While qualitatively the above example makes a great deal of sense 
(at least to me), we need to quantify the impacts—meaning putting ac-
tual numbers to the problem of how much electricity consumption will 
change. This is done by statistically estimating the damage functions 
discussed above. The trick is that these damage functions need to be 
calculated for all (or at least for the most important) sectors sensitive 
to weather under climate change. These damage functions are key to 
making smart policy decisions and allow us to identify the sectors most 
vulnerable to a changing climate. So what do these damage functions 
used in policy analysis of the economic impacts of climate change look 
like—at least in our perfect ivory tower world? Figure 11.2.1 helps to fix 
ideas.
The top left panel of Figure 11.2.1 shows weather generated in a set-
ting before climate change has occurred (light gray line) and one where 
the climate has changed (dark gray line). Here, we are only looking at 
changes in temperature. The post-climate-change temperature is warmer 
but also more variable. The top right panel of Figure 11.2.1 displays two 
damage functions (the smooth curves) that map weather into an out-
come, in this case temperature into household electricity consumption 
(measured in kWh). The damage functions, as has been confirmed in 
many empirical settings, are highly nonlinear—they are not straight lines. 
When it is cold and temperatures rise, electricity consumption falls, as 
people heat less. When it is warm and temperature rises, electricity 
consumption increases, as people air-condition their homes.
Back to our San Francisco example, this response without any adap-
tation (the solid line) is relatively shallow, as few people have air condi-
tioners. When the climate changes to become like that of Palermo, we 
assume that people eventually learn about this and will adapt. In this 
example they will do so by buying and using air conditioners, which 
changes the damage function to the dotted line. The response, espe-
cially at higher temperatures, is now much steeper, resulting in stronger 
post-adaptation increases in electricity consumption on a 1°C warmer 
day when it’s warm outside.
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The impact of this can be seen in the bottom panel of Figure 11.2.1 
very clearly. The solid light-gray series of electricity consumption shows 
consumption under the pre-climate-change weather with the no- 
adaptation response function. If the climate changes and we use the 
flatter (and wrong) pre-climate damage function, projected electricity 
consumption is the gray solid line. This is clearly incorrect, as one is 
using the right weather but the wrong response function. The correct 
response function is the dotted parabola, which results in the dark dot-
ted time series of electricity consumption in the bottom panel. It is 
much higher and much more variable than the no-adaptation prediction. 
One way to think about this is by simulating weather impacts “with and 
without a climate adaptation response.” Allowing for adaptation, in this 
example, leads to substantial changes in electricity consumption, which 
the damage function seeks to incorporate. This seems straightforward 
in the case of electricity consumption, since we know the likely adap-
tation technology and can observe how people use it in hotter areas. 
This is much more difficult for other sectors. Trying to estimate how 
crops will adapt, conflict will change, and species and disease vectors 
will adapt to climate change is very difficult. By that I mean you should 
contemplate working on these topics in your research!
Figure 11.2.1 Mapping weather 
into impacts—the importance of 
accounting for adaptation. From 
Auffhammer 2018. 
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dotted parabola (lab led “With adaptation”). The response, espe ially at higher 
temperatures, is now steeper—resulting in stronger  post-adaptation increases in 
electricity consumption on a  one-degree warmer day when it is hot outside. 
The effect can be seen in the bottom panel. If climate changes and we use the 
flatter (and wrong)  pre-climate-change response function, which ignores the exten-
sive margin adaptation, projected electricity consumption is the black solid line. 
This is clearly incorrect, as one is using the right weather but the wrong damage 
response function. The correct response function is the dotted parabola, which 
results in the dotted time series of electricity consumption in the bottom panel. It is 
much higher and much more variable compared to the no adaptation prediction. 
In the literature, this distinction is often referred to as the “weather versus climate 
response.” I think it a bett r way to phrase this is “the impacts of we ther simul ted 
with versus without an extensive margin adaptation response.” In a world changed 
by climate, we will still face weather when we walk out of our front door. As I will 
Figure 2 
Mapping Weather into Impacts—The Importance of Accounting for Adaptation
Source: Author. 
Note: The top left panel shows the weather pattern of temperature generated in two climate regimes. The 
light gray time series depicts a pre-climate-change world and the dark series shows a post-climate-change 
world, with a temperature series displaying higher mean and variance. The t p right anel displays two 
damage functions (the parabolas) which map weather into an outcome, in this case temperature into 
h usehold electricity consumption (measured in kilowatt-hours). The ffect can be seen in the bottom 
panel. 
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Environmental economists have been preoccupied with developing 
statistical methods to estimate such damage functions from observed 
data on outcomes of interest. There are a number of great review pa-
pers, which discuss methods and results in greater detail and are in-
cluded in the Supplementary Readings section. However, it is instructive 
to summarize where we are in terms of our understanding of damage 
functions and what is missing. Table 11.2.1 shows an overview of sec-
tors and what we know about economic damages from climate change.
So much work to do!
What is obvious from Table 11.2.1 is that we know next to nothing about 
a number of important sectors. First off, the literature putting a value 
on the damages to so-called non-market goods is small to nonexistent. 
Non-market goods are things that improve our well-being but that are 
not typically traded in markets, such as biodiversity and clean air. An ex-
ample helps to organize thoughts. If climate change wipes out a species, 
Table 11.2.1 Coverage of the damage function literature, showing what 
we do and do not know about damage functions for different sectors of the 
economy and beyond
Sector
Plausibly Causal 
Estimates
Adaptation 
Addressed
Global  
Coverage
Agriculture Yes Yes Yes
Forestry No No No
Species loss No No No
Sea-level rise Yes Yes No
Energy Yes Yes No
Human amenity Yes Maybe No
Morbidity and mortality Yes Yes Yes
Migration Yes No No
Crime and conflict Yes No Maybe
Productivity Yes No No
Water consumption No No No
Pollution Yes Maybe No
Storms Yes Yes No
Source: Auffhammer, M. 2018. Quantifying economic damages from climate change. 
Journal of Economic Perspectives 32(4), 33–52. Table 1. https://doi.org/10.1257/jep.32.4.33.
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say the bald eagle, is there an economic loss/damage? The answer is 
clearly yes. But what is the value of a bald eagle? Eagles are not traded in 
markets (unlike chickens—think Chicken McNuggets!). But just because 
you cannot buy an eagle in a store does not mean it does not have value.
Economists have developed a number of methods to value non- 
market commodities. One is to simply ask people how much they would 
be willing to pay in order to ensure that bald eagles are preserved—this 
method is called contingent valuation. You can then take these num-
bers, add them up across all people, and come up with a valuation. Often 
these numbers end up being unrealistically big. If you asked me what 
I would be willing to pay to preserve the bald eagle, I would probably 
say $200. If you asked me to pay up, I may have conveniently forgotten 
my wallet. Economists have developed methods to account for these 
issues, and contingent valuation has been used to assess damages from 
oil spills, for example. There are also other methods to value non-market 
commodities, such as the travel cost method that looks at how much 
people spend to go see a national park for example. You can in certain 
settings use this number as an approximation of the value people place 
on said national park. So yes, we need much more research on the value 
of biodiversity and non-market commodities, including exotic things like 
the nitrogen cycle.
The other thing that we know very little about is the damages in-
curred by extreme events. What is the damage caused by the West Ant-
arctic Ice Sheet melting? What is the damage caused by the thermohaline 
conveyer belt, which is the ocean circulation that gives Europe its gentle 
climate, shutting down? These are events that we have not experienced 
in human history, so it is hard to determine what the damage from such 
an event would be. This is where we turn to “experts.” We would call up 
world experts in ice sheet dynamics and sea level rise and ask how much 
sea level rise would be caused by the melting of the West Antarctic Ice 
Sheet. We would then talk to people who understand urban economies 
and come up with estimates of what it would cost to either protect or 
move certain coastal communities. Here we would have to rely on the 
assumption that experts actually know what they are talking about. In 
order to improve the quality of these expert assessments, we tend to 
not ask a single expert, but dozens or hundreds of them and average 
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across their answers. That said, the economic damage from extreme 
events is hard to estimate, and much work needs to be done by credible 
academics to push the envelope of our understanding.
The social cost of carbon
Let’s assume for a moment that you have done an amazing job (high 
fives!) and obtained a set of credible damage functions that satisfy the 
criteria set out above. What do you do with them? What you would 
want to do is calculate a number called the social cost of carbon (SCC). 
The social cost of carbon is maybe the most important number you have 
never heard of. The social cost of carbon is an estimate of the present 
value of the stream of global damages from one additional ton of CO2 
emitted at a point in time. In short, it represents the damage your ton 
of CO2 will do to all sectors everywhere over its lifetime.
In order to calculate this number, the literature has employed what 
are called integrated assessment models, which integrate simple mod-
els of the economic and climate system, as illustrated in Figure 11.2.2. 
These models start with assumptions (sometimes referred to as socio-
economic scenarios) about the evolution of global, and in some cases 
regional, income and population over the next 300 (!) years. The models 
then translate economic activity into emissions of greenhouse gases, 
most notably CO2, but in some cases other GHGs such as methane. 
(Methane is a short-lived but more potent greenhouse gas than CO2. 
It comes from natural gas wells, fermentation processes, and the back 
Figure 11.2.2 The social cost of carbon—what is needed to produce a 
number in one model? A lot. From Rose, Diaz, and Blanford 2017. 
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end of cattle.) These 300-year time paths of emissions are then fed 
into a very simple model of the global climate system, which translates 
emissions into surface temperature, precipitation, and sea level rise. 
These outputs are then fed to your amazing damage functions, which 
map the emissions path into economic damages. For example, a hotter 
state of Georgia due to climate change will likely use more electricity to 
cool the indoor environment. This is considered an economic damage. 
In order to calculate the effect that higher emissions have on outcomes 
of interest across many sectors of the economy, the integrated assess-
ment model is run with and without one additional ton of CO2. The time 
path of the difference in damages relative to the baseline represents the 
damages from that one ton for each year over the next 300 years. The 
stream of damages is then converted into a present value. This dollar 
amount is called the social cost of carbon and is measured in US dollars.
Some integrated assessment models are global and treat the world 
as a single region (for example, DICE by 2018 Nobel Laureate William 
Nordhaus), while others break out the world into very large regions 
Box 11.2.1  What Is Discounting?
Discounting translates the value of future consumption into  current-day 
dollars. You may value the consumption of a basket of goods valued 
at $10 that you get today more highly than the consumption of the 
same basket valued at $10 some 20 years from now. If you place a 
higher value on today’s consumption than future consumption, and 
we want to figure out the value of your consumption stream over 
a long time period, we need to translate the value of that stream of 
future consumption into current-day value. This is called discounting. 
The discount rate is your personal “interest rate,” and it reflects the 
relative value you place on current versus future consumption. The 
higher the discount rate, the less value you place on future consump-
tion. This concept is central in evaluating the benefits and costs from 
doing something versus doing nothing about climate change, since 
the costs of doing something are largely incurred in the near term, 
but the benefits (avoided damages) come much later in time.
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(for example, PAGE by Chris Hope; FUND by David Anthoff and Richard 
Tol). In the case of models with regional resolution, damages are then 
aggregated across regions to calculate the global social cost of carbon. 
This number represents the damages caused globally over time by one 
additional ton of CO2 emissions at a single point in time.
While there is not one official integrated assessment model that 
rules them all, the US federal government has attempted to estimate the 
social cost of carbon going back to the George W. Bush administration. 
Figure 11.2.3 shows a set of values used by the three last administrations 
in federal rule making. For comparability, the graphic shows values for 1 
ton of CO2 emitted in the year 2010 valued in 2007 US dollars.
In the early years of the Obama administration, the Interagency 
Figure 11.2.3 Sample of social cost of carbon (SCC) estimates used in 
federal rule making for three administrations. Estimates are in 2007 dollars 
for emissions of a ton of CO2 in 2010. DOE—Department of Energy; EPA—
Environmental Protection Agency; IWG—Interagency Working Group; NHTSA—
National Highway Traffic Safety Administration. The black diamond indicates the 
“central estimate,” if one was identified. The gray bars indicate selected upper 
and lower bounds used in regulatory analyses. From Auffhammer 2018. 
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more ton of emissions then becomes the social cost of carbon—essentially the 
external cost of one ton of additional CO2 emissions at a point i  time. There is a 
nascent literature calculating social costs of other gree house a es (for example, 
methane is a more potent greenhouse gas, but with a shorter atmospheric lifetime). 
A tremendous number of modeling assumptions need to be made to calculate 
the social cost of carbon for use in rulemaking. The modeler needs to decide on 
the time horizon to be considered, the approach to discounting and the rate to be 
used, the reflection of uncertainties, the changes to risks, which impacts can be 
includ d, the choice of reference conditions, whe her one should equity weight 
across countries, and what recent literature should be incorporated (Rose 2012). 
Among these, the three factors of possibly biggest consequence are the choice of 
discount rate, which sectors are omitted (for example, ecosystem services), and 
whether one should consider only domestic or global damages. The latter decision 
is really a legal question, as the externality is global and hence, from an economic 
point of view, the global number is the correct estim te of the externality. Figure 1 
shows the evolution of the social cost of carbon for a ton emitted in 2010 (measured 
in 2007 US dollars) in federal rulemaking for a sample of rules.
Figure 1 
Sample of Social Cost of Carbon Estimates Used in Federal Rulemakings
Sources: Rose (2012); Rose et al. (2014); IWG (2016); EPA (2018). 
Note: Estimates for the social cost of carbon are for emissions of a ton of CO2  in 2010 in 2007 dollars. 
NHTSA is National Highway Traffic Safety Administration; IWG is Interagency Working Group; EPA 
is Environmental Protection Agency; DOE is Department of Energy. The black diamond indicates the 
“central estimate,” if one was identified. The grey bars indicate selected upper and lower bounds used 
in regulatory analyses. 
Bush
Obama
Trump
2008 NHTSA
2008 DOE
2008 EPA
2009 EPA/NHTSA/DOE
2009 NHTSA
2009 EPA
2010 EPA/NHTSA/DOE
2014 EPA
2016 IWG
2018 EPA
0 20 40 60 80 100
Social cost of carbon (2010, 2007$/tCO2)
11-26 Chapter 11: Economics
Working Group* embarked on an effort to calculate an official social 
cost of carbon. The approach adopted, which is described in detail 
in Greenstone, Kopits, and Wolverton (2013), was to essentially em-
bark on the effort described by Figure 11.2.2: feed three integrated 
assessment models with a set of harmonized assumptions regarding 
the evolution of the economy and population, account for uncertainty, 
and provide a statistical distribution of the social cost of carbon across 
models. The most frequently cited number for the SCC was $42 per ton 
emitted in 2020 as measured in 2007. There were several updates to the 
social cost of carbon calculation, and the final available estimates are 
given in Table 11.2.2.
Table 11.2.2 displays the global SCC estimates using three different 
discount rates for emissions between 2015 out until the year 2050. Two 
*The IWG was composed of members from the president’s Council of Economic 
Advisers, Council on Environmental Quality, Department of Agriculture, Depart-
ment of Commerce, Department of Energy, Department of the Interior, Depart-
ment of Transportation, Department of the Treasury, Environmental Protection 
Agency, National Economic Council, Office of Management and Budget, and the 
Office of Science and Technology Policy. It was disbanded by President Trump.
Table 11.2.2 Social cost of carbon estimates by the Interagency Working 
Group
Year
Discount Rate and Statistic
5% Average 3% Average 2.5% Average
2015 $11 $36 $56
2020 $12 $42 $62
2025 $14 $46 $68
2030 $16 $50 $73
2035 $18 $55 $78
2040 $21 $60 $84
2045 $23 $64 $89
2050 $26 $69 $95
Source: US EPA. 2016. The Social Cost of Carbon: Estimating the Benefits of Reducing 
Greenhouse Gas Emissions. https://19january2017snapshot.epa.gov/climatechange/social 
-cost-carbon_.html.
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things stand out from this table. First, columns 2–4 display the average 
SCC across simulations using three different discount rates. A higher 
discount rate (5%) puts a lower value on future damages and hence 
results in a lower SCC. A lower discount rate places a relatively higher 
value on future damages and hence results in a higher SCC.
Second, one notices that for any chosen discount rate, the SCC is 
higher the later emissions are made. For example, 1 ton of CO2 emitted 
in 2020 using the 3% discount rate results in a $42 per ton SCC. A ton 
emitted in 2050, using the same discount rate, has an SCC of $69. This 
increase occurs for two reasons. First, as time goes on, the stock of CO2 
in the atmosphere is higher, as CO2 accumulates over time. Hence, each 
additional ton emitted at a later point in time arrives in an atmosphere 
with a higher stock of CO2 in it, adding additional warming into a more 
stressed system and leading to higher damages. Second, for some of the 
integrated assessment models used, damages are a function of income 
(for example, GDP). As the world grows richer over time, later emis-
sions arrive in a wealthier world, resulting in higher damages. An easy 
way to think about this is, for example, higher incomes result in more 
valuable infrastructure, which may be negatively affected by changes in 
climate.
There is much work to do in order to properly quantify the damages 
from climate change, and the economic literature on the social cost of 
carbon is a good literature to follow. One specific effort, which is push-
ing the frontier of this literature, is the Climate Impact Lab. It is driven 
by a collaboration of the University of California, Berkeley; the University 
of Chicago; Rutgers University; and the Rhodium Group. They have an 
extensive website documenting their research at www.impactlab.org.
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11.3  The Policy Challenge
In what follows, I discuss some economics of climate change policy and 
conclude by suggesting a path forward for international climate policy. 
A more extensive version of this discussion appears in Auffhammer et 
al. (2016).
Economic considerations when designing and evaluating 
climate policies
All undergraduate economics students are taught that under certain 
conditions, markets maximize social well-being and therefore do not 
require any government intervention—or even worse, government in-
tervention can make society worse off! You may have heard this line of 
reasoning from some serious-looking people on the news networks. 
This is true for so-called perfectly competitive markets. It turns out, 
though, that perfectly competitive markets are about as abundant as 
panda bears. Many real-world markets do not satisfy the idealistic as-
sumptions required, because of what we call market failures. There are 
numerous and well-studied types of market failures, but in the context 
of global climate change, two types of market failures reign supreme: 
negative externalities and public goods.
Negative externalities arise when individual agents do not internalize 
the full cost of their activities. In the absence of climate policy, individual 
consumers and firms do not pay for the negative effects of their green-
house gas emissions on the environment and economy. This results in a 
larger than optimal amount of greenhouse gas emissions.
The second major market failure, public goods, arises when a good 
in question is non-excludable and non-rival. Non-excludability means 
that no one can be technically excluded from the consumption of the 
good (for example, national defense). Non-rivalry means that one agent’s 
consumption does not diminish the amount of the good left over for 
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everyone else (for example, radio waves). If a good is public, it is both 
non-excludable and non-rival, and markets underprovide the good—and 
in some cases do not provide this good at all.
The public goods problem arises in two important ways in the con-
text of global climate change. The first good related to global climate 
change that has public characteristics is emissions abatement. If one 
country (or state) abates its emissions, all other countries (or states) 
also benefit from the reduction and cannot be excluded from these 
benefits. This results in an underprovision of emissions reductions by 
individual countries, which is consistent with the outcome of the United 
Nations climate change conferences that have for the past 30 years not 
been able to come together with a binding treaty including all nations 
committing to anywhere near the optimal reductions in greenhouse gas 
emissions.
The second good related to global climate change that has public 
characteristics is innovation. If one private firm obtains a technologi-
cal breakthrough in a renewable energy technology, unless intellectual 
property rights are well defined and enforced, other firms can copy the 
technology and capture some or all of the innovating firm’s profits. This 
leads to an underinvestment in innovation.
Owing to market failures related to global climate change, well- 
designed government policy is important for addressing global climate 
change. In order to determine the optimal level of policy intervention 
when market failures exist, basic economic theory mandates that one 
compare the benefits from a proposed policy to its costs. Regulators 
in many places are mandated to calculate a ratio of the benefits to the 
costs (often referred to as the benefit-cost ratio) and only pass policies 
when this ratio is greater than one. In the case of climate change, cal-
culating this ratio is especially complex, as damages occur globally and 
over a very long time horizon, while the costs of mitigation are incurred 
much earlier and in their majority by a small number of countries or 
regions. Hence localities often compare local benefits to local damages 
when deciding whether to pass climate policies. But fundamentally this 
is a global problem with a corresponding global benefit-cost ratio.
In addition, since the benefits and costs of climate change pol-
icy occur over a very long time horizon, the appropriate measure of 
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benefits is not the current benefits but rather the present discounted 
value of the entire stream of benefits over many years. Similarly, the 
appropriate measure of costs is not the current costs, but rather the 
present discounted value of the entire stream of costs over many years. 
Calculating the present discounted value of benefits and costs requires 
using an appropriate discount rate (Box 11.2.1). Moreover, since both 
investments in abatement technology and the damage from climate 
change are irreversible, there is a value to the option of waiting that 
should be accounted for when comparing benefits and costs. Estimating 
these benefits of greenhouse gas reductions is a complex undertaking.
While the social cost of carbon measures the marginal damage of 
emitting a ton of CO2 equivalent (or the marginal benefit of avoiding its 
emission), there are significant other benefits to greenhouse gas reduc-
tions, which stem from the fact that the combustion of fossil fuels results 
in the emissions of greenhouse gases as well as other local and regional 
pollutants. There is a large literature on quantifying these co-benefits at 
the sectoral level. For many policies these co-benefits are a significant or 
in some cases the main portion of the benefits from greenhouse gas reg-
ulation. Importantly, the type and value of co- benefits from greenhouse 
gas regulation vary drastically across countries. For example, reducing 
the combustion of biofuels and fossil fuels not only has significant local 
impacts in terms of improved health, but also has large-scale positive 
impacts on local climate as black carbon is a highly potent, yet not 
long-lasting greenhouse gas (Chapter 15). The quantification of these 
local co-benefits through their direct pollution impacts on health and 
agriculture as well as their indirect climatic effect through black carbon 
and aerosols are an active area of research.
The direct and indirect benefits of climate policies in terms of their 
impact on human health are especially important as climate change 
is now considered the biggest global health threat of the twenty-first 
century. Over 150,000 deaths annually are attributed to ongoing cli-
matic changes, and this toll is expected to grow by 250,000 additional 
deaths per year between 2030 and 2050, according to the World Health 
Organization.
Another challenge is to quantify the costs of greenhouse gas reg-
ulation, which in the economic literature is called the estimation of 
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abatement cost curves. In theory, each firm that reduces its emissions 
of greenhouse gases incurs a cost to do so. It can choose to reduce its 
emissions by producing less output, using new technology, or switching 
to lower-carbon-content inputs. A firm will compare the costs of the 
strategies. The least cost approach to reducing its emissions at each 
level of output is called the firm’s abatement cost curve. Since much of 
this information is private to the firm, regulators can have a difficult time 
determining what the true costs of abatement for a firm are. Anticipat-
ing a new policy, firms have no incentive to reveal the true abatement 
cost, yet they have every incentive to exaggerate the costs of abate-
ment. Hence, as the regulator attempts to determine the  benefit-cost 
ratio, there is significant uncertainty about the cost component, and 
regulators often have to rely on simplistic engineering calculations or 
educated guessing.
In order to design an optimal global climate policy, two market fail-
ures have to be addressed simultaneously. First, from a global perspec-
tive, since there is no global police person monitoring and enforcing a 
possibly agreed-to climate policy by all countries, individual countries 
will underprovide abatement or simply not agree to follow or join an in-
ternational agreement of cutbacks. This will lead to an ineffective global 
agreement on emissions reductions, which will fall short on what is 
required to stay under a maximum of 2°C warming. One example of 
this approach is the largely ineffective Kyoto Protocol; the reasons for 
its failure are discussed in Chapter 10. The subsequent Paris Agreement, 
under which individual countries proposed individual cutback plans up 
front, aimed to respond to some of Kyoto’s failings. In order to work, 
a type of agreement such as Paris will need to rely on climate “clubs,” 
which are regimes with small trade penalties on nonparticipants, to 
coordinate emissions reductions that are enforced with border tariffs 
(Chapter 10).
The second market failure that needs to be addressed is the gen-
eral externality problem once countries have agreed to an emissions 
target. To reduce emissions to address the externality, there are two 
types of approaches: (1) command and control and (2) incentive- or 
market-based approaches. Command-and-control approaches come 
in three flavors generally. The first type is an emissions standard, which 
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simply prescribes how much each emitter can emit. The second is an 
input target, which prescribes which type of input to production an 
emitter has to use, for example, low-sulfur coal. Another example of an 
input target is a low carbon fuel standard. The third type is a technology 
standard, which prescribes a specific technology, for example, electric 
vehicles.
Incentive- and market-based approaches also come in three flavors. 
The first is an emissions fee/tax, which charges an emitter the marginal 
external cost and makes the emitter internalize this cost. Hence the 
emitter is paying for the full opportunity cost of its activity. The second 
is a cap-and-trade system, which caps the total amount of emissions and 
issues a right to pollute for each ton emitted, which can then be traded. 
This approach essentially places a price on carbon, as the permits have 
a price. The final incentive-based approach is subsidizing certain low- 
carbon technologies or fuels, which artificially lowers their price in the 
market and increases the incentive for adoption.
The advantages and disadvantages of command-and-control versus 
incentive- and market-based approaches are discussed in more detail in 
Chapter 12. In brief, however, in order to determine which policy should 
be used, two criteria are usually applied by economists for evaluating 
policy: cost-effectiveness and efficiency. For a given emission reduc-
tion, a policy is cost-effective if it achieves this reduction at least cost. 
A policy is efficient if it maximizes net benefits, or total benefits minus 
total costs. From an economy-wide perspective, cost- effectiveness and 
efficiency make sense, as one would not want to spend scarce resources 
on meeting policies in an unnecessarily costly manner. Policies that put 
a price on carbon—carbon taxes and cap and trade—have been shown 
to achieve this goal of efficiency time and time again. In contrast, com-
mand-and-control policies have been shown to be very costly ways of 
meeting a given emissions target.
One argument often raised in support of command-and-control 
standards is the fact that they are more fair or equitable than price-
based policies. Under a standard, sources usually are subject to similar 
reduction targets, which is perceived to be fair. However, market-based 
policies can be made more equitable as they generate significant reve-
nue, which can be redistributed to increase fairness, all while minimizing 
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the cost of the emissions reductions. These revenues can also be used 
to address the innovation market failure, whereby tax revenue is used 
to enable research in promising future low-carbon technologies. One 
such example is research on carbon sequestration and storage, which 
carries a hefty price tag—in the billions of dollars for each experiment. 
Such large-scale projects are almost impossible to fund by the private 
sector and thus are likely to be a good place for the regulator to step in.
Where we are
Globally greenhouse gas emissions are the highest in human history. At-
mospheric concentrations worldwide are the highest they have been in 
thousands of years. Human population and incomes continue to grow. 
There is a clear trade-off. Pulling humans out of poverty is an unam-
biguously good thing. But it comes at a tremendous cost to the global 
climate and ecosystem. I would like to close with Figure 11.3.1, which 
shows us how far we have to go.
Figure 11.3.1 How much warming will we get for different policy scenarios? 
Reproduced with permission from Climate Interactive. 
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Even though all but a single country have signed on to the Paris 
Agreement, even if every one meets its target, we fall significantly short 
of the 2°C target. There is a long way to go to solve this major problem. 
Smart implementation of cost-effective policies is the key to getting us 
even close to the 2°C goal. There are some small beacons of hope. 
The Kigali Amendment to the Montreal Protocol on Substances that De-
plete the Ozone Layer (Chapter 15) has been an effective international 
agreement targeted at substances that deplete the ozone layer. The 
substances it covers suffer from the same externality and public goods 
problems as greenhouse gases do. Yet, it is effective. Some of that may 
have to do with the fact that the substances it controls (for example, 
hydrofluorocarbons) are very inexpensive and good alternatives exist. 
Carbon, in contrast, is everywhere and our economies have largely been 
built by injecting large quantities of it into the atmosphere.
The other beacon of hope is technology. Renewable energy sources 
such as wind and solar have come down in price in truly stunning ways 
and are now cheaper in many settings than natural gas and certainly 
coal. In order to truly decarbonize the electrical grid, we need to find 
cost-competitive electricity storage solutions (Chapter 13), as the pro-
duction profile of renewables does not match the consumption profile. 
So the hope for the future is a combination of engineering genius, smart 
economics, and savvy policymakers. It’s time for you to get to work!
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Learning Objectives
1. Identify policies that are market based versus command based 
in practice. What aspects of a particular environmental policy 
determine the kinds of change it will create?
2. Explain why command-based policies are not cost-effective. 
For any given command-based policy, be able to come up with 
examples of incentives that are missing or misplaced. Explain how 
a market-based policy could cost the same amount but accomplish 
a greater environmental goal.
3. Consider the role of consumer choice and behavior in the context 
of the two types of policy. Understand why command-based 
policies can sometimes be justified if consumers would otherwise 
make mistakes while shopping.
Overview
In practice, the control of greenhouse gas emissions takes one of two 
forms: market-based incentives (giving polluters a financial reason to cut 
back) and command-based regulation (requiring that emissions fall below 
a certain level, often through the use of specific technologies). Chapter 
11 lays out the basic economic argument: command-based approaches 
often pick inefficient levels of emissions for a particular source, technol-
ogies that are not cost-effective, or both. Incentive-based approaches 
(most importantly, a carbon tax) place many sources of emissions and 
many different technologies on the same playing field, such that only 
the most cost-effective reductions in the most cost-effective sectors 
are employed. The overall strength of the incentive to reduce carbon 
emissions can be adjusted up and down by varying the level of the tax.
This chapter outlines the incentives created by different types of pol-
icies and uses examples of real policies around the world to show how 
close or how far we are from the economic goal of cost-effectiveness.
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12.1   Incentives and the Source 
of Cost-Effectiveness
Understanding cost-effectiveness requires first that we understand the 
concept of an externality. The fundamental source of the climate prob-
lem in a market economy comes down to the idea of external cost. 
When you buy something in the market, you are paying for the labor, 
materials, capital, and technology that lie behind the final product. If in 
the process of making the product, or in the process of your using it, 
other people get hurt, an externality is created. The word comes from 
the idea that the damage is outside or “external to” the people buying 
and selling the product. For example, the tremendous damage that will 
be done to future generations as a result of climate change is external 
to the goals of many companies (profits) and consumers (individual 
well-being and low prices).
An important potential solution for externalities is to increase edu-
cation and awareness of the problem (one of the goals of this book!). 
Companies could give up some of their profits, and consumers could 
cut back on some of the products they had been purchasing, in order 
to protect the climate for future generations. Indeed, some of the most 
profound changes to our society (in terms of the environment, but also 
much more broadly) have been led by exactly this sort of movement. 
How should we think about the need for policy, and about what type of 
policy is best? I would argue that the role for policy is twofold: (1) to 
create more, or faster, environmental change than is happening through 
current actions and (2) to accomplish the change in a way that min-
imizes cost to all parts of society. Achieving cost-effectiveness in an 
equitable way across society, and especially protecting the most vulner-
able subgroups, requires careful consideration of policy design and the 
distribution of any revenues.
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Cost-effectiveness
The key to understanding cost-effectiveness begins with a thought ex-
periment. Imagine making a list of every opportunity available to reduce 
greenhouse gas emissions, being very specific. Next to each entry write 
down how many emissions are saved and what the activity will cost. The 
cost you enter for each item might not always be in dollars—sometimes 
it could be measured in terms of lost comfort, time, or convenience, 
for example. The list should be very specific: my walking to work instead 
of driving could involve a different cost (based on how far I live from 
my office, the local weather, how much I enjoy walking, and so on) 
than someone else’s walking to work. Your list of possible actions to 
help solve climate change, therefore, should have a different entry for 
“walking to work” for every person and every day; sometimes it will be 
expensive or uncomfortable, and sometimes it will be cheap and easy. 
Similarly, the cost of installing solar panels rather than buying electricity 
from the grid can differ greatly based on geography and the type and 
angle of the roof on a house. Therefore, your list needs a different entry 
for “rooftop solar panels” for every house in the world.
Notice that your list should also contain many different entries for 
things that companies can do, along with the cost of those actions. 
Google’s loss in profits (usually a good measure of cost for actions that 
companies take) from making its data centers carbon-free might be very 
different from Alcoa’s loss in profits from making its aluminum-smelting 
plants carbon-free. The carbon savings are probably very different as well.
Next in the thought experiment, sort your entire list based on 
the lowest cost per ton of greenhouse gas emissions avoided. With 
a complete, sorted list in hand, achieving cost-effectiveness becomes 
quite easy: simply start at the top of the list, require each individual or 
company to complete the listed task, and continue down the list until 
the climate challenge is solved. This will change the environment for 
the better, using only the very cheapest items on the list (because you 
sorted it before deciding which actions to require). That’s the definition 
of cost-effectiveness. If a government policymaker had access to the 
complete list and could enforce all the actions on it even when they 
occur inside people’s homes, then the government could do very well on 
a cost-effectiveness goal even if using command-based rules (rules that 
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mandate particular technologies or actions). The government would be 
able to mandate each successive item until the carbon goal was reached.
As you have probably guessed, the problem in real life is that we 
cannot make, or even come close to approximating, this master list. 
There are simply too many actions and too many different people 
and companies involved to figure out something like who should and 
shouldn’t be walking to work, which houses should have solar and which 
shouldn’t, which companies need to go carbon-free or not, and so on.
Happily, a market-based policy such as a carbon tax is capable of 
letting individuals and businesses in the economy reveal their own places 
on the list. For example, if the government raises the price of emitting 
carbon dioxide, it will make gasoline more expensive and some people 
will start walking to work. The people who start walking to work happen 
to be exactly the same people who would appear near the top of your 
imaginary list! The people who keep driving, on the other hand, will be 
the ones farther down on your list, whose actions would be more costly.
In contrast, a command-based policy to require people to walk to 
work (for example, by taking away parking permits or license plates) 
could never fully distinguish between people in different places on the 
list. No matter how much information government tried to get, it would 
almost certainly still “scramble” the list, taking away parking permits or 
license plates from some people who find it very hard to walk to work, 
while accidentally leaving parking permits and license plates in place 
for other people who would be perfectly happy walking to work if they 
were asked to.
The fundamental difference between command-based and market- 
based policies is in how government chooses who has to take which ac-
tions, and in the likelihood that that choice matches up with the people 
and actions at the top of the hypothetical master list. Command-based 
policy, by its very nature, does the picking and choosing within the law 
itself—regulators perform often very complicated analyses to decide 
who should be subject to a rule and who should be exempt and which 
exact actions should be taken. While such analysis and detailed lawmak-
ing can help get a little closer to matching the true list, there is simply 
not enough information available to do it very well.
Market-based policy, as championed by most economists, is easier 
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to create, easier to enforce, and better at matching the actions near the 
top of the cost-effectiveness list. Best of all, it can do this without even 
knowing which items are cheapest. Furthermore, it also adapts automat-
ically as technology changes. For example, swapping my gasoline car for 
an electric car might be expensive and difficult for me right now but a 
much better choice for me in 5 years. A carbon tax would automatically 
incentivize my purchase of an electric car at the right time for me, and 
my neighbor’s electric car at the right time for them.
There are several ways to create price signals to discourage green-
house gas emissions, but the one we will consider in our examples is the 
simplest, and most economists would say best, market-based policy: 
a carbon tax. How does a carbon tax work? Most companies are very 
good at maximizing profits and minimizing taxes and so will be able to 
figure out which of their possible actions to reduce carbon emissions 
will be cheaper (and thus result in more profits) than paying the car-
bon tax. Likewise, individuals make many decisions every day to make 
their lives better (maximizing “utility,” in the language of economics). A 
carbon tax creates a price signal that discourages people from buying 
products that are damaging to the climate and it incentivizes a whole se-
ries of small actions on energy conservation that, when taken together, 
can have a transformative effect on climate.
Individual choices and mistakes
The role of individual choices and actions in responding to a carbon tax 
raises an important potential problem with the policy: What happens 
when individuals can’t figure out which actions will save them money? 
They might see a high price for a carbon-intense product on the shelf 
(the high price would be caused by the carbon tax) but just keep on 
buying it anyway because they don’t know about alternatives with lower 
carbon intensity that are now cheaper than their old choice. Alterna-
tively, someone could be attracted by a small subsidy on a carbon-free 
product but later find that using it costs them a huge amount in incon-
venience and lost time.
Either of these two mistakes in decision-making could be corrected 
by a command-based policy that forces people to do items near the top 
of the cost-effectiveness list and prevents them from doing items that 
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are too far down on the list (and so are too expensive to be worthwhile). 
Such policy, of course, would be very difficult to write, since the correct 
decision could be different for different individuals. An impossibly large 
amount of data would be needed for the government to figure out the 
correct mandate for everyone. Finally, enforcement could be a problem 
because it is often impossible to observe everyone’s actions carefully 
enough to ensure compliance.
An increasing amount of work is being done in economics to better 
understand when consumers make good decisions and when they might 
need intervention that helps guide them toward the right choice. For 
example, suppose a consumer sees two nearly identical twelve-packs 
of tennis balls next to each other on the shelf. Brand A has a price of 
$9: it costs the company $5 to make the tennis balls, it has to pay $3 in 
carbon taxes to the government, and it wants to keep $1 in profit. Brand 
B has a price of $7: it costs the company $6 to make the tennis balls in 
its carbon-free factory, and it also wants to keep $1 in profit.*
If the tennis balls are the same quality, we would expect the con-
sumer to choose Brand B in order to save money. But, what if we ob-
serve that some (or even most) people are still buying Brand A?
Brand A was cheaper before the carbon tax, so maybe these people 
are just repeating habits from the past. Some authors have called this 
kind of mistake an “internality” (that is, losing money or utility because 
of an internal mistake) or referred to it as an issue of “inattention.” An-
other reason we might see people staying with Brand A is that they don’t 
know the two brands are the same quality and don’t want to take a risk.
If the two brands of tennis balls are in fact identical in every way ex-
cept for their carbon emissions, the government could fix any potential 
consumer mistakes by writing a command-based regulation to remove 
Brand A tennis balls from shelves, forcing people to make the correct 
choice. Under these circumstances, such a command-based rule would 
be more cost-effective than a carbon tax.
Of course, in the real world, the two brands might not be exactly 
the same quality. Furthermore, the aspects of quality that differ might 
*Notice that the company’s decision to build a carbon-free factory might have 
been prompted by the carbon tax. The incentives can operate simultaneously on 
both the consumer and producer sides.
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matter more to some tennis players than others. If this is the case, 
then neither the command policy nor the carbon tax could produce ex-
actly the right decisions. Some players should switch to Brand B to save 
money (and society would benefit because of the carbon reduction), 
while other players should stick with Brand A (because some aspect of 
quality is worth more to them than the $2 price difference).
In the application in Section 12.4 In Depth: Incentives in US Auto-
mobile Policy, we will consider the choice of which car to buy. This is 
a much more complex purchase decision than we make for a pack of 
tennis balls, and it is also much more consequential if a person makes a 
mistake and ends up regretting the choice.
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12.2   Current Policy: Market-Based 
and Regulatory Examples
New regulations aimed at climate change are rapidly appearing in both 
small and large communities around the world. They include an incred-
ible number and variety of command-based rules. Some of these rules 
ask for actions that are likely to be near the top of a cost-effectiveness 
list, while other command-based rules ask for actions that are quite 
expensive per ton of carbon saved. Simultaneously, an increasing num-
ber of market-based policies are being enacted in cities, states, and 
countries around the world. We now turn to two specific examples, first 
a command-based policy and then a market-based policy (in the form of 
a carbon tax), to think about how cost-effectiveness works in practice.
Lightbulbs
The old-fashioned incandescent lightbulb is still a staple in many homes, 
hungrily chewing up electricity and providing what many find to be a re-
liable and pleasantly colored source of light. Swapping out incandescent 
bulbs for energy-saving alternatives, such as the fluorescent or LED light 
sources pictured in Figure 12.2.1, is often a very cost-effective way of 
saving carbon. Remember, though, that the complete cost-effectiveness 
list has to be very specific: swapping each bulb is a separate activity and 
needs to be separately ranked. If such a master list existed, we would 
find that some old incandescent bulbs are very near the top—swap-
ping them out could be done with very little cost and would offer lots 
of carbon savings. We would also find, however, that other individual 
bulbs, such as those that are rarely turned on or are very costly to swap, 
appear in entries toward the bottom of the cost-effectiveness list.
Many command-based policies have been enacted that force light-
bulb swaps to occur as old bulbs burn out.* US law (specifically, Section 
*The command-based rules apply only to new bulbs manufactured after a certain 
date, so they don’t incentivize swaps before old bulbs burn out, which will also 
sometimes be cost-effective ways to save carbon.
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321 of the Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007) now requires 
that all new lightbulbs have a minimum amount of light output per watt 
of energy consumed, subject to a long list of exceptions. Here are some 
of the exceptions that lawmakers added: bulbs not intended for “general 
service,” bulbs that have an odd-shaped base (in fact, anything other 
than a standard E26 screw base), bulbs that are very dim, bulbs that 
are very bright, bulbs that are not a standard size, and bulbs that don’t 
operate on 110 volts AC. Why all the exceptions? When writing this rule, 
legislators no doubt realized that while lots of bulb replacements are 
excellent and cost-effective ways to save energy, they could at the same 
time accidentally be forcing other lightbulb replacements that wouldn’t 
be saving much energy or that would be very high cost and so not worth 
the effort. For example, bulbs in medical equipment, movie projectors, 
and model train sets are all exempt from this particular command-based 
rule. These exemptions perhaps seem reasonable: the first two likely 
have very high-cost or no LED alternatives, and it is safe to assume the 
last one isn’t a very large source of carbon emissions.
Now let’s consider one of the other exemptions—lightbulbs inside 
refrigerators. These bulbs are not a standard size (usually smaller than 
a regular lightbulb), and so they are exempt from the rule. For some 
refrigerators, there are no fluorescent or LED options on the market, 
and so banning these bulbs would have meant very expensive retrofits, 
Figure 12.2.1 Lightbulb technology. The old-fashioned incandescent bulb is 
on the left. The energy-saving LED is on the right. Image by Mark Jurrens from 
Wikimedia Commons.
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replacing entire refrigerators, or not being able to see which items are 
getting moldy. None of this is very appealing. However, what about 
refrigerators for which replacement LEDs are available (for example, the 
bulb in Figure 12.2.2)? Old-style incandescent refrigerator bulbs not only 
use a lot of electricity to make a little bit of light, they also add heat to 
the refrigerator. Many manufacturers of household refrigerators, and 
nearly all supermarkets (where the lights are on many hours a day), 
have already made the switch to LEDs for just this reason. Completely 
exempting replacement bulbs for old fridges, just to protect the few 
cases where no replacement is available, means missing out on many 
important, and very cost-effective, items on the master list.
We could perhaps write a more complicated command-based law 
to fix the refrigerator problem. It would need to have a precise list 
of exceptions to cover particular brands and models of refrigerator 
that have no available LED replacement, and the exception list should 
also get updated frequently as companies start to design different LED 
replacements and bring them to market. It is not just refrigerators, 
though. What about bulbs for other appliances, commercial lighting, 
and so on? You can see that it becomes almost impossible to write 
a command-based rule that correctly mandates cost-effective energy 
conservation for every size, shape, and application of lightbulb. Such 
complexity also dramatically increases the cost of enforcement.
Instead of trying to make the command-based regulation more com-
plicated than it already is, economists would recommend a market-based 
Figure 12.2.2 Appliance LED lightbulb. Image by Geoffrey Landis at English 
Wikipedia.
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policy. Most simply, imagine a carbon tax that raises the price of elec-
tricity. Not only would every individual and company get a reward (a 
lower electric bill) for making a lightbulb swap, there would also be 
incentives for engineers to come up with LED replacements for all dif-
ferent sizes and shapes of bulb. For specific bulb replacements that are 
too expensive per unit of carbon saved, people would keep buying the 
incandescent version. No lengthy list of exceptions would be needed.
The carbon tax
In January 2019, the Wall Street Journal published a letter calling for a 
carbon tax to be imposed in the United States. The letter was signed by 
more than 3,000 economists, including nearly every former chair of the 
Council of Economic Advisors (both Democrats and Republicans), every 
former chair of the Federal Reserve, and almost every living Nobel Lau-
reate in economics. In contrast to their deep disagreements on topics 
like minimum wages, budget deficits, and health care, there is an incred-
ibly strong consensus among economists that we must tax carbon.
The Wall Street Journal letter lays out some of the key advantages 
of placing a tax on carbon, mostly along the lines of the arguments in 
Section 12.1 Incentives and the Source of Cost-Effectiveness. A carbon 
tax puts an incentive everywhere and on every action possible. Unlike 
command- based regulation, the incentive is also uniform across all 
actions: saving a ton of carbon by turning down an air conditioner is 
rewarded exactly the same as saving a ton of carbon through buying 
more efficient cars, lighting, or any other activity that emits greenhouse 
gases. It would take a near-infinite number of command-based regula-
tions (plus an implausibly large enforcement effort to monitor people’s 
everyday actions) in order to accomplish this without using a carbon tax.
At the same time a carbon tax incentivizes carbon savings, it also 
brings revenue in to the government. What the government should do 
with this money is a source of much debate. Some people advocate 
using the revenue to pay down the national debt, while others suggest 
it should be spent on education or health care, and still others think 
that the government should not spend the money at all, but should 
return it as a direct dividend check to each household. This last option 
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is recommended in the economists’ letter and is perhaps the option 
most likely to be acceptable across different parts of the US political 
spectrum.
The British Columbia experience
It is something of a puzzle why most regulators remain reliant on 
command- based rules when economists agree that carbon taxes are 
simpler, are easier to enforce, and accomplish the environmental goal at 
much lower cost. Only a few jurisdictions around the world have imple-
mented carbon taxation. The Canadian province of British Columbia is 
one prominent example and also represents the first significant carbon 
tax imposed anywhere in North America. British Columbia’s carbon tax 
came into effect in 2008, giving us more than a decade of data that can 
be used to examine the impacts.
As with many environmental policies, British Columbia’s carbon tax 
was phased in. The 2008 tax was set at $10 (Canadian dollars) per ton 
of carbon, with increases of $5 per ton per year until the tax reached 
$30 per ton in 2012. It has been held fixed since then, and the incentives 
are now felt in nearly every sector of the economy.* Even if a product or 
service does not produce any carbon emissions directly, there is almost 
always some fossil fuel being used somewhere along the way in produc-
tion. Companies in British Columbia pass the carbon tax through each 
step of production, packaging, shipping, and so on until the final value 
shows up in the price tags seen by retail consumers.
The revenue from the carbon tax is returned to households, mostly 
in the form of tax cuts, rather than being used for increased govern-
ment spending.** This has likely been an important factor in the public’s 
growing acceptance of the tax. Low public opinion for the first several 
*The most notable exemption in British Columbia is agriculture, which is allowed 
to use fossil fuel and to produce nonfossil greenhouse gas emissions such as 
methane without paying the tax. This type of exemption reduces cost-effectiveness: 
many farmers have actions they could take to reduce carbon emissions for less 
than $30 per ton, but they are not currently incentivized to do so.
**Many economists have studied the choice between (1) simple “dividend checks” 
and (2) reducing existing taxes (like sales taxes or income taxes) as a way to return 
carbon tax revenue to the people. Reducing existing taxes is more efficient, since 
most of the taxes we currently use to raise revenue cause unnecessary distortions 
in the economy. 
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years of the tax, when people did not like seeing higher energy prices, 
gave way to popular support in more recent years as people realized 
their income and sales taxes were lower.
The goods that are most dramatically affected by a carbon tax are 
usually raw fossil fuels (for example, coal) and derivatives of fossil fuels 
(for example, gasoline). This makes sense: even though conserving a 
gallon of gasoline and buying a dog leash made in a solar-powered fac-
tory are both perfectly good ways to reduce your carbon footprint, and 
will both be incentivized by a carbon tax, saving the gallon of gasoline 
will be doing a lot more good for the climate. Table 12.2.1 shows how 
British Columbia’s $30 carbon tax changed the price of fuels faced by 
consumers. A gallon of gasoline, for example, became 20 cents more 
expensive. Filling a typical 20-pound propane tank for a patio grill went 
up by 64 cents. These are relatively small percentage changes (4% and 
7%, respectively) but enough to push people toward somewhat less 
wasteful habits.
Notice that the prices of natural gas and coal rose much more dra-
matically, by more than 30%. Much less of the cost of those fuels is 
related to refining and distribution, and so the raw carbon content ends 
up being a much larger component. These price changes are more likely 
to be felt by industry. Switching an industrial process from natural gas to 
solar, for example, became quite a lot more attractive after the carbon 
tax was implemented.
Table 12.2.1  Translating British Columbia’s $30 per ton carbon tax  
into fuel prices
Fuel Type Units for Tax Tax Rate
Carbon Tax as a 
Percentage of Final 
Fuel Price
Gasoline $/gallon $0.20 4.4%
Diesel $/gallon $0.23 5.1%
Propane $/20-pound tank $0.64 7.1%
Natural gas $/MMBtu $1.26 33.9%
Coal $/ton $48.60 54.7%
Source: Adapted from Table 2 in Murray and Rivers (2015).
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12.3  Cap and Trade
Many of the policies being undertaken around the world (Chapter 11) 
use another market-based approach—cap and trade. In this section, we 
focus on (1) why cap-and-trade policies are considered market based in 
terms of the tax-like incentives they create for climate action and (2) the 
main way they differ from a carbon tax.
Cap-and-trade policies tend to be fairly complex, first involving al-
location of carbon permits of different vintages (that is, for use during 
different years). Companies that release greenhouse gases to the at-
mosphere (and sometimes also financial firms and energy traders) are 
then allowed to trade these permits with one another. The cap takes 
effect as companies must periodically “true up” by matching the number 
of permits they have in their possession with the number of tons of 
carbon equivalent they have released over a particular period (for ex-
ample, during one calendar year). There are also rules that govern who 
can trade permits and when, as well as details to address companies 
that wish to borrow permits from the future or use permits from other 
countries or previous years.
The tax-like incentive provided by cap and trade
Return to the hypothetical list (sorted on cost-effectiveness) of all possi-
ble actions that lead toward a climate solution. A carbon tax encouraged 
people to undertake the cheapest, most cost-effective actions on the 
list because doing the action would be cheaper than paying the tax. In 
theory, cap and trade can create exactly the same incentive. Because 
the permits have value, companies should embed the value of carbon 
permits (that they could have sold if they had shut down their factories 
or power plants, for example) into their products’ price tags. This works 
in exactly the same way as the tennis ball manufacturer in the previous 
section embedded its carbon tax payment into the price of its product.
One potential difference in the practical functioning of the two 
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market-based incentives is that the carbon tax is a direct cost. Com-
panies must actually pay the carbon tax to the government, and so 
carbon-intensive companies are forced to pass on the tax in the price of 
the products they sell or take a loss on the sale. Other companies that 
make carbon-free products, and therefore don’t have to pay the tax, can 
now offer lower prices than the competition.
Under cap and trade, the value of permits is often an opportunity 
cost instead of a direct cost: Suppose a company has been allocated 
most of its carbon permits for free, so if it wanted to, it could keep on 
selling the same polluting product for the same price and not go bank-
rupt.* Fortunately, economic logic says that such a company should still 
raise prices even if it got its permits for free. The reason is that by raising 
prices, it will sell less of its product and so be able to close down part 
of its factory. It will then have extra carbon permits it no longer needs 
and can sell those to someone else. The idea is that by raising the price 
for its product (and reducing quantity) and by selling surplus permits, it 
could make even more profit than it would have made if it kept on op-
erating as usual. The concept of opportunity cost is central to the logic 
of how cap and trade works; it means that cap and trade can produce 
exactly the same price incentives as a tax, even if the permits are given 
to the company for free.**
Key difference relative to a carbon tax
One of the most important differences between a carbon tax and a 
cap-and-trade system is in how the size of the incentive gets set. With a 
carbon tax, the government gets to choose how big the incentive is. A 
$30 carbon tax raises the price of carbon-intensive products by a fixed 
amount ($30 per ton of carbon involved in the product’s production), as 
shown in the British Columbia example in Table 12.2.1.
Suppose that the government decides the $30 tax is not creating 
enough action on climate (for example, because of advances in climate 
*The free allocation of permits to polluting companies is often called grand- 
fathering.
**Incentives for entry (that is, starting up a new firm) and exit (going out of 
business) may be different, however. Notice that profits will be higher with a 
grandfathered cap-and-trade system than they would be with a carbon tax, and so 
exit of polluting firms is less likely.
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science, or when the extent of damages starts to be revealed). Ad-
justment to a tax policy is straightforward: government can raise the 
tax from $30 to $40. More emissions reductions will start to occur as 
carbon-free products become cheaper than carbon-intensive ones, and 
more of the long list of actions on the cost-effectiveness list will start to 
make sense, since the tax savings are now $40 rather than $30.
In contrast, under a cap-and-trade system the government chooses 
the number of carbon permits that will be allocated, and it typically 
commits to this choice for at least several years into the future. Figuring 
out how many permits to issue first involves trying to estimate how 
much carbon all the different companies covered under the program 
would release in the absence of any policy. Some of the carbon is then 
subtracted from this “business as usual” estimate, in the hopes that a 
nice-size incentive (neither too small nor too burdensomely large) will 
appear. The actual incentive that any particular cap-and-trade program 
produces in an economy is unknown. It depends on the price at which 
companies choose to trade permits, which in turn depends on factors 
like technological change and macroeconomic fluctuations. The final 
incentive to conserve that is produced by cap and trade can therefore 
be very large, if the permit price ends up being high, or very small if 
permits end up trading cheaply.
Key difference relative to a carbon tax: examples
Begin with the cap-and-trade system in the European Union, known as 
the Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS), as an example. The first wave of 
the ETS allocated permits over the period 2005–2007. Figure 12.3.1 dis-
plays the prices of these permits, beginning when they were first traded 
in 2005 and going through 2007 when the “true up” occurred and the 
permits were given back to the government in exchange for carbon 
emissions. What does this mean in terms of incentives and the hypo-
thetical list of actions to mitigate climate change? Toward the end of 
2005, permits traded for 22 euro, or about US $27, per ton. This would 
have worked just like a $27 carbon tax: a company that could take an 
action to save a ton of carbon for $15, for example, would do it, since 
it would then be able to sell a carbon permit worth $27 to someone 
else (making $12 profit in the process). Now consider early 2007: the 
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cap-and-trade price had fallen to about 1.5 euro, or $2. This worked just 
like a $2 carbon tax: the $15 action was no longer worth it and should 
be abandoned. In fact, all climate actions costing more than $2 per ton 
saved would no longer be profitable. By late 2007 the price had fallen to 
nearly zero, and so the incentive was gone altogether.
Did something change during those years that made climate action 
less important? Of course not—the climate change problem is global and 
long-term, and if anything, the urgency to take action was actually in-
creasing rather than decreasing. What this example shows is that permit 
prices can go up or down for many reasons, even if the true importance 
of taking action on climate hasn’t changed at all. In this case, the sharp 
reduction in the incentive most likely came from shifts in industrial com-
position and mistakes in the government’s forecast of how much carbon 
would have been released had no cap-and-trade system been in place.
Subsequent phases of the ETS have issued fewer permits and so have 
generated larger price incentives on average, but the system continues 
to experience dramatic price swings. When the EU issued a new round 
Figure 12.3.1 Market-based carbon incentives in the European Union. Price 
is in euro. Data from Point Carbon.
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of carbon permits for 2008, it greatly reduced the number of permits 
issued, and the price initially spiked to around 30 euro per ton. This gave 
European businesses and consumers a very strong incentive for reduc-
ing carbon emissions, the same as a carbon tax of 30 euro ($44) per ton. 
By 2013, however, the price had unexpectedly dropped to about 5 euro 
per ton, likely as a result of some combination of the great recession, 
rules on how international cap-and-trade permit markets could link with 
Europe, and renewable energy policy.* Again, we don’t think the value 
of taking action actually fell; the decrease in the incentive came instead 
from the inherent uncertainty of cap and trade.
European carbon incentives remained quite low for about 4 years, 
through 2017, and then swung sharply back up, with trades in late 2018 
again exceeding 20 euro per ton. It turns out to be very hard to predict 
economic conditions, technology, and permit trading patterns very far 
into the future.
Now let’s move to California’s experience (discussed in more detail 
in Chapter 9). The system was set up in a fairly standard way, with one, 
very important, change: a floor or reserve price was placed on the 
price of permits. If something happened in permit trading, and price 
started to fall dramatically, protections would kick in to hold the permit 
price (and therefore the incentive to take action on carbon) at a floor 
level. California set the floor at $10 per ton in 2012, with predetermined 
annual increases thereafter.
Figure 12.3.2 shows the time path of prices for carbon in California’s 
cap-and-trade market. What can we learn about incentives for Califor-
nians to conserve carbon? Early in trading, the carbon price was about 
$20, and so incentives in the economy were equivalent to a $20 tax. 
By the beginning of 2014, however, the carbon price had fallen and 
reached the floor. The protections kicked in, and the price was not 
allowed to fall below $11.34 (the assigned floor price for 2014). Since 
then, incentives have risen as the floor rises, periodically rising above 
the floor when changes in the local economy make demand for permits 
stronger. The price in 2018 was about $15 per ton (the floor in 2018), 
and so price incentives in California were about half as strong as they 
*For a summary, see Koch et al. 2014.
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were in British Columbia. This may be less than California lawmakers 
had hoped for when they set up the cap-and-trade system, but it is still 
greater than it would have been had the floor not been in place. The use 
of a rising price floor to combat the uncertainties associated with cap 
and trade has been a notable success of the program.
Uncertainty in emissions
While cap and trade produces uncertainty in the incentive to conserve 
(and historically this has sometimes resulted in very small incentives), it 
is often pointed out that a carbon tax will result in uncertainty in carbon 
emissions. During a year of weak electricity demand, for example, car-
bon emissions will go lower than expected, and during a year of strong 
electricity demand, they will be higher than expected.
Which would we rather have: variation from year to year in the 
incentive, or variation from year to year in carbon emissions? The eco-
nomics of cost-effectiveness suggest that variation in incentives from 
year to year (and place to place, if different economies have separate 
cap-and-trade programs) can be very expensive. In years when incentives 
under cap and trade are very low, society will be missing out on lots of 
Figure 12.3.2 Market-based carbon incentives in California. Data from 
California Carbon Dashboard and the California Air Resources Board.
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very cheap opportunities to save carbon. In years when cap-and-trade 
permits are selling for high prices, the economy instead undertakes very 
expensive actions to conserve. Bouncing back and forth between almost 
no action and then very expensive action adds up to considerable eco-
nomic losses because we are replacing missed low-cost opportunities 
to save (in the low-price years) with expensive opportunities to save (in 
the high-price years).
In contrast, the ups and downs in carbon emissions that appear 
with a tax-based incentive do relatively little damage. This is because, 
as discussed in Chapter 1, it is cumulative, global emissions that will 
have the greatest impact on climate damages into the future. Variation 
in emissions in any one year or country (either up or down, depending 
on which way local and global economic conditions are headed) matter 
relatively little in the context of the overall climate problem.
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12.4   In Depth: Incentives in US Automobile Policy
Transportation, mostly in the form of private cars, is the single largest 
source of carbon emissions in the United States. This is a sharp reversal 
from past decades, when electric power emissions were much larger. 
Figure 12.4.1 shows the history of these two sectors in the United 
States since the early 1970s, which is the last time that transportation 
emissions were larger than those from electric power. In this section, 
we take an in-depth look at the automobile sector to understand the 
Figure 12.4.1 United States emissions of CO2 from transportation and 
electric power. Data from the US Energy Information Administration.
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different incentives for reductions in carbon emissions when using a 
command-based approach versus a market-based approach.
Gasoline use is also an especially important example for considering 
the equity impacts of carbon taxation: lower-income households in the 
United States (and especially those located in rural areas) often need to 
drive many miles for work or school. They could feel disproportionate 
financial impacts from a carbon tax: Box 12.4.1 gives an example of one 
system that could counteract this effect.
History
Figure 12.4.2 shows the time path of fuel economy in the US since 
1955, measured in miles per gallon (MPG). The first interesting fea-
ture to note is that fuel economy declined steadily for almost 20 years. 
Technology was improving, so why were cars getting fewer and fewer 
MPG? Rising incomes meant that households could afford more power 
and weight, and they went for it. The low point was reached in 1973. 
Figure 12.4.2 The history of fuel economy in the United States. Data from 
the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration. CAFE = Corporate Average Fuel 
Economy.
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Box 12.4.1  Income Distribution and Gasoline Use
It is often noted that overall gasoline use in the United States does not 
respond very rapidly to gasoline price, and so perhaps quite a large carbon 
tax would be needed to create much change. This is almost certainly true if 
we want to make a big change in only a few years, as everything from the 
location of people’s homes to the number and size of highways and the im-
mense parking structures at many shopping malls seems designed to keep 
people driving. Change under a carbon tax will move slowly. However, it is 
important to note that all of the things a carbon tax would eventually affect 
(housing sprawl, parking garages, and so on) are important—perhaps even 
necessary—in terms of the long-run change needed to solve the climate 
problem.
What are the implications of having small short-term responses in 
transportation infrastructure? Carbon taxes, when they are passed through 
into gasoline, may be mostly unavoidable in the short term before housing 
options and infrastructure design start to change. Lower-income house-
holds will feel these (unavoidable in the short term) taxes most acutely, 
since gasoline is a much larger share of their budget, especially for those 
people living in places with little public transportation service. This has 
been one of the greatest political challenges of implementing cost- effective 
climate policy for automobiles. The ideal economic solution would be to, 
at the same time a carbon tax is imposed, offer low-income households 
other benefits to make up for the increased tax burden. The carbon div-
idend (a form of basic income) proposed in the economists’ Wall Street 
Journal letter discussed above is one potential way to mitigate the inequi-
table impacts a carbon tax could have.
Concerns surrounding the inequity of gasoline taxation (one aspect of 
carbon taxation) have been the subject of much research in economics. In 
the United States, low-income households drive a lot of miles and so are 
very exposed to a carbon tax via their gasoline consumption. For example, 
US households with $25,000 to $50,000 in annual income consume about 
800 gallons of gasoline per year. Households with approximately double 
the income ($50,000 to $75,000 annually) consume about 1,100 gallons 
per year, much less than double the amount of gasoline. A carbon tax of 
$40 per ton works out to 35 cents per gallon of gasoline and so would cost 
the lower-income households 800 @ $0.35 = $280 per year. The higher- 
income households would pay $385—a higher amount, but a smaller frac-
tion of their income. (continued on next page)
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(Box 12.4.1 continued from previous page)
One important economic finding is that if the total revenue from a gas-
oline tax were given back evenly (the same dividend check to everyone), 
lower-income households would, on average, be better off than they had 
been before the tax. In the example above, if we have the same number 
of households in each of the two income ranges, then the dividend check 
would be $332.50.* The lower-income households would pay $280 per 
year but get a $332.50 dividend check (a gain of $52.50), while the richer 
households would pay $385 in but get the same dividend of $332.50 back 
(they would lose $52.50 overall).
The key challenge for a dividend system like the one above is when 
there are differences between households that have the same level of in-
come. Consider two households that both have $35,000 in annual income. 
One household uses public transport and consumes zero gallons of gaso-
line. The other drives a lot and uses 1,600 gallons per year. On average, this 
is exactly the 800 gallons above. But notice that a tax-and-dividend system 
would be very hard on the 1,600-gallon household (they would pay $560 in 
per year and get only $332.50 back) and very generous to the household 
with no cars (they would pay zero and still get $332.50 back). Avoiding 
this problem by targeting the dividends is difficult, if not impossible, and 
the subject of ongoing research. Notice that it is also important not to 
target the dividends too well, since part of the overall goal is to encourage 
a household like the one using 1,600 gallons yearly in the example above 
to find ways to reduce.
The most important advantage of a tax, relative to a command-based 
rule, in terms of managing equity concerns is that the tax produces revenue. 
The revenue can be used to help households that are the most affected 
by the policy. A command-based system—for example, banning traditional 
gasoline cars and requiring hybrid or electric drive—would also be very 
burdensome for low-income households. However, a command-based rule 
like this wouldn’t raise any government revenue, and so dividends or other 
programs to help reduce the impact on disadvantaged groups would need 
to come from outside funds.
*To see why, imagine there are 10 households at each of the two income levels 
(20 households all together). Low-income households would pay 10 @ $280 
= $2,800 into the system each year. High-income households would pay in 10 
@ $385 = $3,850. This would be $2,800 + $3,850 = $6,650 in revenue per year. 
Then $6,650 / 20 = $332.50 in dividends available for each household.
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Not coincidentally, cars in the muscle car era of the late 1960s and early 
1970s were often equipped with powerful V-8 engines, some producing 
well over 300 horsepower.
Next came two incredible runs upward in the 1970s and early 1980s, 
when fuel economy almost doubled. The rate of increase in that era 
was far more rapid than any command-based policy we have seen, and 
it was achieved with only small advances in technology. Why, and how, 
was this accomplished? It turns out both answers are straightforward: 
gasoline got much more expensive, and so people bought smaller and 
lower-horsepower vehicles.
The era of corporate average fuel economy
Partly in response to high gasoline prices and security concerns in the 
Middle East, the first significant command-based policy on gasoline use 
was put into place in 1978—the Corporate Average Fuel Economy (CAFE) 
standard. It is named a “corporate average” standard since it applies 
separately for each company, and within companies it applies separately 
for sedans and light trucks. Note that the “light trucks” designation in-
cludes SUVs, minivans, and also many of today’s crossover vehicles.
The level of the command-based standard was held quite flat for 
many years. For example, for every model year between 1990 and 2010, 
the standard for sedans was 27.5 miles per gallon. That is, all the differ-
ent sedans that any one company made (calculated as a sales-weighted 
average) had to get at least 27.5 MPG. Since CAFE standards did not 
change over these two decades, manufacturers were able to use ad-
vances in technology exclusively for improvements in horsepower and 
weight, holding fuel economy flat. For light trucks (SUVs, minivans, etc.) 
the standard was weaker, although it did increase slightly from 20.7 
MPG between 1996 and 2004 to 23 MPG by 2010.
From Figure 12.4.2 we can see that the true fuel economy of all 
vehicles on the road (the black line) actually declined somewhat through 
the 1990s, rather than remaining flat. If the CAFE rule was exactly flat, 
how is it that fuel economy slipped back downward? The answer lies in 
the composition of vehicle types. Many car buyers during this period 
were choosing to replace their sedans (which got an average of 27.5 
MPG, following the rule) with SUVs (which got an average of 21 MPG, 
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also following the rule). The compositional shift allowed manufacturers 
to stay within the law but still add power and weight back into the 
vehicle fleet.
In 2012 we saw the most ambitious and far-reaching reform to CAFE 
since its 1978 inception, with the following three important changes:
1. The target nearly doubled, to 54.5 miles per gallon (averaged 
across all private vehicles, and including some extra credits for 
electric vehicles) by 2025.
2. The original two categories (cars and light trucks) were divided 
into many more categories based on the width and length, or 
footprint, of the vehicles. Vehicles with very large footprints were 
assigned a much weaker standard to meet than vehicles with small 
footprints.
3. Trading of the standard among manufacturers was allowed. If a 
company chooses to exceed the standard, it can sell the credit to 
another company that can then fall below it.
Incentives with CAFE
What about the incentives, and our list of cost-effective actions, for 
climate? The first thing to notice is that the decision to apply the rule 
separately to every company means the strength of the incentive is dif-
ferent for different companies. Ford, General Motors, and Chrysler (the 
“big three” American automobile companies) were initially constrained 
by the standard and met the 27.5 MPG requirement almost exactly over 
the decades. There is evidence that, even though the outcomes were 
the same at 27.5 MPG, achieving them was much harder for GM and 
Chrysler (they were more well known for large and powerful cars) than 
it was for Ford (which sold more small cars to start with and so didn’t 
have as much to do to meet the rule).
To see an even sharper difference in incentives, consider Toyota, 
the largest foreign company selling cars in the US. Toyota’s fleet over 
this period had an average fuel economy of 30 MPG, reaching almost 
35 MPG in the early 2000s. The CAFE rule had no effect on Toyota at all, 
even though it would still have had an ability to improve the efficiency 
of its cars if it had been asked. More troubling, some of the fuel-saving 
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opportunities Toyota had left on the table would have been much 
cheaper per ton of carbon saved—that is, more cost-effective—than the 
changes that GM and Chrysler were forced to make. The CAFE rule did 
reduce carbon emissions (at least from some companies), but it didn’t 
find the most cost-effective ways to do so.
One key improvement to cost-effectiveness, and a change that was 
made to the rule in 2012, is item (3) in the list above: the ability for 
car companies to trade compliance. If in 2019 Toyota finds a cheap 
way to boost fuel economy by 1 MPG, for example, the trading system 
gives the company a reason to do that even though it is still more than 
complying with the rule. Toyota can sell its over-compliance to another 
company, like GM or BMW, that might find it cheaper to buy that 1 MPG 
than to implement it. The same amount of carbon would be saved, and 
it would cost less.
Unlike item (3) in the list of changes, which improves cost- 
effectiveness, the change in item (2) reduces cost-effectiveness. To see 
why, observe that the footprint basis of the rule now allows composi-
tional effects of the type we saw in the 1990s (switching from cars to 
SUVs) but throughout the whole fleet instead of just across two catego-
ries. Switches to wider and longer vehicles (for example, from compact 
sedans to midsize sedans) undermine the overall average, since that 
increase in square footage reduces the fuel economy target that a man-
ufacturer has to meet. This unintended incentive within the regulation 
has meant that even though the nominal standard has risen quickly in 
recent years (the colored lines in Figure 12.4.2), the actual fuel economy 
of new vehicles has remained quite flat between 2014 and 2018. This 
problem is not unique to the US. Indeed, the same unintended incen-
tives worked to reduce the effectiveness of the fuel economy standard 
in Japan.
Incentives with a carbon tax
Returning to our study of cost-effectiveness, let’s revisit the list of all 
possible ways to conserve carbon. New technologies to improve fuel 
economy are definitely on the list, and those are incentivized by the 
command-based CAFE standards. How about some of the other items 
on the cost-effectiveness list? Examples include
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 ➤ Combining trips to work and the store
 ➤ Reducing the number of cars in a household from three to two
 ➤ Choosing to live closer to work or school
 ➤ Walking or bicycling to work instead of driving
All of these (and many more) can be excellent, cost-effective ways 
to save gasoline. These options will make more sense for some people 
than others, because individual circumstances determine how much 
time or convenience is given up when taking these actions.
As an example, think about the reduction from three to two cars 
for a particular suburban household. Suppose this household observes 
that the cost of their third car plus the gasoline they put in it is $5,000 
per year. The third car sometimes lets the children avoid having to wait 
as long to be picked up, and it can make getting to work for one of the 
parents more convenient. Suppose this time and convenience is worth 
$5,100 to the household. They will keep the car and will get to enjoy 
$100 of “consumer surplus”—the difference between what something 
actually costs and the value the person gets from it.* CAFE policy will 
make that third car a little bit more efficient, reducing the amount that 
has to be spent on gas. CAFE might also raise the price of the third car a 
little bit (by putting new technologies into it). Because these two effects 
tend to offset each other, CAFE does not usually change the decision of 
the household: people still buy almost as many cars as they always did.
On the other hand, a price incentive on carbon could make a big 
difference for this household. Even a small carbon tax (which would 
show up in the price of gasoline) might be enough to raise the overall 
cost to $5,200 dollars, for example, and so the car would no longer 
be worth it. This is a very cost-effective action for saving carbon—the 
household only loses $100 of surplus, while society gains an entire car’s 
worth of carbon reductions.
The advantage of a carbon tax is that it incentivizes every one of the 
actions on the list above, and in fact every other action that we could 
write down, to save gasoline. The complete list of actions in the auto-
mobile sector is very long (we could probably fill this entire book with 
*We can calculate the consumer surplus here as $5,100 (the value to the 
household) minus $5,000 (the cost).
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it!), while the list of beneficial actions implemented as a result of the 
CAFE standard (mainly, better technology on new cars and reductions 
in horsepower and weight) is very short. Estimates in the literature vary, 
but my own research finds that a carbon tax could achieve the same 
amount of carbon savings as CAFE for one-fifth to one-third the cost. 
The carbon tax can do this because it utilizes much cheaper actions, 
much higher up on the cost-effectiveness list.
Double dividends and consumer choices
Separate from our goal of reducing carbon emissions, many advocates 
of command-based policies like CAFE argue that the policy will also help 
consumers avoid making mistakes in their car purchase decisions. This is 
the idea of a “double dividend”—getting two things out of one policy—in 
this case a cleaner environment and better decisions by consumers.
In this setting, the mistake would be that the typical car buyer isn’t 
thinking very far ahead about gasoline purchases. The hypothetical 
buyer picks a big and very powerful model and then regrets that choice 
after learning how much it costs to have the tank filled. A policy like 
CAFE could mean that the carmaker doesn’t even offer a vehicle with 
such a low MPG for sale anymore, or that it sets the purchase price high 
enough that most people can’t afford it.
Either way, the hypothetical buyer is forced into a smaller, more 
modestly powered car that was actually a better choice to start with. 
That extra surplus from the improved decision-making means the envi-
ronmental goals can be reached more cheaply. Much has been written 
about this effect in the economics literature, and no consensus has yet 
emerged. Some authors contend that statistical evidence shows that 
car buyers (particularly used-car buyers, who account for the majority 
of the car market) are very careful about fuel use. Small increases in the 
price of gasoline push used-car buyers very rapidly toward smaller and 
less powerful models, and so a policy like CAFE might not have the extra 
benefit of correcting consumer choice.
Other authors find instead that as much as 20% to 30% of future 
gasoline cost is ignored by new-car buyers. This opens up an oppor-
tunity for a policy like CAFE to improve decision-making and therefore 
improve somewhat on cost-effectiveness. There is so much ground to 
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make up (if the carbon tax starts at only one-third or one-fifth the cost 
of CAFE), however, that it could be difficult for this consumer-choice ef-
fect to reverse the overall ranking of policies. Questions surrounding the 
ability of consumers to make good decisions, and the ability of carbon 
policy to improve on those decisions, are quite important and an active 
area of research.
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12.5  Conclusion
Incentives are the key to understanding cost-effectiveness. As a general 
rule, a policy that spreads incentives out over as many possible activities 
and product choices as possible will have the best chance at achieving 
cost-effectiveness. A carbon tax or other market-based policy can do 
this by passing the damage done by greenhouse gas emissions through 
to the prices paid for all products throughout the economy. In contrast, 
narrow, command-based policies tend to be more costly per ton of 
carbon saved, because they miss cheaper actions that should have been 
done first.
Other areas in which command-based rules fall short have to do 
with incentives for technological change and the costs of enforcement. 
On technological change, once a command-based rule has achieved the 
mandated change (switching to a particular technology for lightbulbs, 
for example), the incentive for further improvement disappears unless 
a new law is written. A price-based policy, in contrast, would keep re-
warding development and use of ever more efficient LEDs even after 
the mandated technology had been adopted. Enforcement is likewise 
much simpler with a price-based policy. Most fossil fuels and processes 
that emit greenhouse gases are already tracked very closely by the gov-
ernment (an important exception is agriculture). Taxing emissions can 
therefore be done with very low government overhead, and it is much 
more transparent than command-based rules, because loopholes and 
politically motivated exceptions are more difficult to hide.
Finally, command-based policy tends to be expensive per unit of car-
bon reduced (or equivalently, it accomplishes less carbon reduction for 
a fixed price tag) because many of the actions people can take to con-
serve carbon are fundamentally private and individual. It would be very 
difficult, for example, for the government to write a command-based 
rule that controls which days I stop at the store when driving home from 
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work, and which days I make a separate trip. Incentive-based pushes, in 
the form of a carbon tax passed into gasoline price, can make us recon-
sider small decisions like this, occasionally combining or skipping trips. 
It is the combination of millions of these small decisions, throughout the 
economy, that can create real change at minimum cost.
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Learning Objectives
At the end of the chapter, the reader should be able to do the following:
1. Identify the roles of electric power generation and transportation 
in both climate change and the degradation of urban air quality.
2. Explain the role of combustion in both the generation of electricity 
and the powering of vehicles today, as well as the role of 
combustion in climate change and the degradation of urban air 
quality.
3. Identify the alternatives to combustion for the generation of 
electricity and the powering of vehicles.
4. Understand fuel cell technology and the application of fuel cells to 
the generation of electricity and the powering of vehicles.
5. Delineate the attributes and challenges associated with the 
generation of (1) renewable electric power and (2) renewable 
hydrogen.
6. Describe the two major pathways that are evolving in the electric 
grid, the evolution of vehicle engines and fuels, and the merging 
of the electric grid with transportation in response to mitigating 
climate change and the degradation of urban air quality.
7. Explain smart grid technology.
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Nomenclature 
°C Degrees Celsius
AC Alternating current
BEV Battery electric vehicle
CCHP Combined cooling, heat, and power
CH4 Methane
CHP Combined heat and power
DC Direct current
DER Distributed energy resources
DG Distributed generation
FC Fuel cell
FCEV Fuel cell electric vehicle
G2V Grid-to-vehicle
GHGs Greenhouse gases
GT Gas turbine
ISO Independent system operator
MCFC Molten carbonate fuel cell
MW Megawatts
PAFC Phosphoric acid fuel cell
PEMFC Proton exchange membrane fuel cell
PEV Plug-in electric vehicle
PFCEV Plug-in fuel cell electric vehicle
PM Particulate matter
SMR Steam methane reformation
SOFC Solid oxide fuel cell
V2G Vehicle-to-grid
WDAT Wholesale distribution access tariff
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Symbols
BEVs Hydrogen batteries
Central combustion plants Hydrogen dispensers
Electric batteries Industries
Electrolyzers Nuclear plants
FCEVs PFCEVs
Fuel cell/gas turbine hybrid 
(fuel cell/GT hybrid)
Residences
Fuel cells (FCs) Small gas turbines
Gas turbines (GTs) Solar photovoltaic panels
Gasoline stations University, hospital, office, 
commercial buildings
Hydroelectric plants Wind generators
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Overview
Climate change and the degradation of urban air quality are forcing par-
adigm shifts in the two key sources emitting carbon dioxide (CO2) and 
other pollutants into the atmosphere: electric power generation and 
transportation. Combustion of fossil fuels is the reason, serving as both 
(1) the conversion technology for both the generation of electricity and 
the powering of vehicles and (2) the principal source worldwide of CO2 
and “criteria” pollutants (that is, ozone, carbon monoxide, sulfur diox-
ide, nitrogen dioxide, lead, and particulate; see Box 13.1). While CO2 is 
a concern for global climate change, criteria pollutants are primarily a 
concern because of their local impacts on human health. As emissions 
of carbon are reduced, attention to the concomitant reduction in the 
emission of criteria pollutants must be addressed as well.
To reduce the emission of CO2 and criteria pollutants, the historical 
reliance on combustion needs to be displaced. This chapter outlines 
two pathways that are evolving to transform both the electricity and 
transportation sectors from a classic combustion-dominant construct 
(that has supported the economic growth and evolution of a myriad of 
societal conveniences over the last century) to a renewable-dominant 
construct (that is evolving in the new millennium in response to en-
vironmental impacts, geopolitics, and fossil fuel resource constraints). 
Among the notable characteristics of the two pathways is the merging 
of the transportation and electricity sectors (for example, plug-in elec-
tric vehicles charging with electricity) and the deployment of energy 
storage technologies to buffer and manage the idiosyncrasies (for exam-
ple, temporal variation, intermittency, low capacity factor) associated 
with renewable wind and solar power generation. While the pathways 
are identical early in the transition, they differ in the future years. In 
particular, the first pathway projects that electric battery technology 
and pumped hydro will alone manage the solar and wind resources now 
and in the future. The second pathway projects that, in addition to bat-
tery energy technology and pumped hydro, the following two additional 
resources will be required in the future:
 ➤ Renewable hydrogen “battery” technology.
 ➤ 24/7, clean, load-following renewable power generation.
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For both pathways, the goal is to establish a 100% renewable elec-
tricity sector and a 100% renewable transportation sector with the 
following characteristics: (1) zero emission of greenhouse gases (to 
mitigate climate change), (2) zero emission of criteria pollutants (to 
mitigate degraded urban air quality), and (3) energy sourced locally 
(to mitigate dependency on other countries for energy).
As a foundation to placing the two pathways into perspective and 
understanding the underlying technologies, the chapter reviews the his-
torical role of combustion, the rapidly emerging deployment of wind 
and solar resources as an option to combustion, fuel cell technology 
for both the generation of electricity and the powering of vehicles, 
energy storage and clean 24-hours-a-day, 7-days-a-week (24/7) power 
generation to manage the idiosyncrasies of solar and wind, smart grid 
technology to manage the complexity of and interactions between the 
electricity and transportation sectors, and renewable hydrogen as both 
a transportation fuel and a resource for energy storage.
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Combustion is the principal technology that powers the energy econ-
omy. Simply stated, combustion is at the heart of our everyday lives, 
from the provision of electricity to our home and place of work, to 
the automobiles we drive, to the propulsion of jet aircraft we fly. Com-
bustion is also the principal source of the environmental impact we 
experience, from climate change to degraded urban air quality.
The following four principal forces are driving the paradigm shifts 
from our dependency on combustion to alternative technologies for the 
generation of electricity and powering of vehicles:
1. Degraded urban air quality (1943): The first evidence of 
persistently degraded urban air quality in the United States was 
13.1  Introduction
Figure 13.1.1  Los Angeles 1943: Degraded urban air quality. Reproduced 
with permission from Getty Images.
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chronicled in the Los Angeles Times, describing a tenacious haze 
that seemed to irritate eyes and cause many to cough (Figure 
13.1.1). Today, urban regions throughout the world (for example, 
in India, China) are affected by degraded air quality.
2. Finite petroleum resources (1980s): Automobile companies 
recognized that petroleum was finite and demand may outweigh 
discovery in the next millennium.
3. Climate change (1990s): The world recognized that anthropogenic 
sources may be affecting the climate, leading to the signing of the 
UN Framework Convention on Climate Change in 1992 (Chapter 
10).
Box 13.1  Atmospheric Pollutants
In this chapter, two groups of anthropogenic emissions (CO2 and 
criteria pollutants) are considered. The formal designation of criteria 
pollutants (ozone, carbon monoxide, sulfur dioxide, nitrogen diox-
ide, lead, and particulate) was established in 1970 by the US Clean 
Air Act based on demonstrated health and environmental impacts 
established by a series of “criteria” studies. Some of the criteria pol-
lutants (“primary” criteria pollutants) are emitted directly from the 
exhaust of combustion and other sources, while other criteria pollut-
ants (“secondary” criteria pollutants) are formed in the atmosphere 
from reactions of primary criteria pollutants. The concentration of 
criteria pollutants emitted in the exhaust is very low (often less than 
10 parts of pollutant per million parts [ppm] of exhaust), but when 
the emissions accumulate from the large population of sources in an 
urban basin, they result in a health impact.
In 2009, carbon dioxide was classified by the US Environmental 
Protection Agency (EPA) as a pollutant that poses a danger to human 
health and welfare. The typical concentration in the exhaust of a 
combustion source is approximately 120,000 ppm (that is, 12% of the 
volume). Unlike criteria pollutants, which affect public health within 
hours to days of exposure near the source of their emission, CO2 has 
a more insidious impact, taking years to generate demonstrable and 
unambiguous climate change worldwide.
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4. Fuel independence (2001): The assault on the World Trade Center 
enhanced the urgency to reduce US dependence on foreign 
sources of petroleum.
Combustion
Depending on the type of engine, either air is compressed to a high 
pressure and fuel is added, or a fuel-air mixture is compressed to a 
high pressure. In both cases, the fuel-air mixture is then ignited, initi-
ating a combustion process (essentially “burning” the fuel-air mixture) 
that transforms the energy bound in the fuel (for example, gasoline) 
to high-temperature gas (thermal energy). The high-pressure, high- 
temperature gas then pushes on a piston (to power the transmission in 
a traditional gasoline vehicle, or generate electricity in a gasoline hybrid 
vehicle) or expands through a turbine (to generate electricity for the 
home and business). From this process, depicted in Figure 13.1.2, you 
can intuitively deduce that (1) the efficiency (the percentage of energy 
bound in the fuel that is transformed to useful power) will be limited by 
the friction associated with all of the mechanical steps, and (2) criteria 
pollutants will be formed because of combustion chemistry and emitted 
in the exhaust.
When you consider the role of combustion in everyday life, the 
examples seem limitless (for example, cooking; heating water; space 
heating; generating electricity; propelling aircraft and rockets; and 
powering automobiles, buses, trucks, locomotives, and ships). Simply 
stated, combustion is interwoven into the fabric of both the quality of 
life and the economics of the world’s markets.
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Figure 13.1.2 Combustion.
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In Figure 13.1.3, the relationship between combustion and the envi-
ronment is illustrated. Fuel and air are injected into a chamber, ignited 
to liberate the energy bound in the fuel into thermal energy, and ex-
panded to produce a useful product.
Unfortunately, combustion has an exhaust as a by-product com-
posed of criteria pollutants that degrade urban air quality (affecting the 
public health) and carbon dioxide (affecting the world’s climate). No-
tably, the amount of criteria pollutant mass in the exhaust is minuscule 
and was historically ignored until the first consequences to public health 
in modern times surfaced in 1943 (Los Angeles) and 1952 (London).* It 
is as if Nature incorporated environmental impacts in the combustion 
of fossil fuels to counsel the world’s population that combustion is not 
sustainable.
Why is it that such a minuscule emission of a few chemical criteria 
pollutant molecules affects the urban air basin, and a larger but still 
*Ramifications of combustion exhaust were observed centuries before, an example 
of which is “fumifugium” (Evelyn 1661).
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Figure 13.1.3 Combustion impacts. Image of earth reproduced with 
permission from Science Photo Library.
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relatively modest emission of CO2 affects the world’s climate? Consider 
that the atmosphere is evenly distributed in a thin layer around the 
Earth, barely 10 miles in depth. In Figure 13.1.3, the purple sphere in the 
image represents the volume of all the air if it were gathered together, 
relative to the volume of the Earth. The image conveys the surprisingly 
small air resource upon which life on Earth depends, and the relatively 
small volume of air into which products of combustion are injected. 
Within this small volume, CO2 and other greenhouse gases (GHGs) ac-
crue to affect climate, and secondary criteria pollutants are formed and 
primary criteria pollutants amass to degrade urban air quality. As noted 
in Figure 13.1.3, combustion is responsible for over 90% of the world’s 
emission of CO2 and criteria pollutants.
In addition to contaminating the air resource with CO2 and criteria 
pollutants, the combustion process has an impact not widely recog-
nized: namely the consumption of oxygen from the air. For every tankful 
of gasoline in your car, a ton of air (2,000 pounds) passes through 
your engine, and 400 pounds of oxygen are consumed. Given the finite 
resource of oxygen in the atmosphere, this is sobering. While Nature 
appears to be replenishing the oxygen removed to date, an increasing 
demand for oxygen could lead to an additional point of environmental 
stress. Fortuitously, the evolving transition from a classic “combustion- 
dominant construct” to a “renewable-dominant construct” will, in par-
allel with reducing the emission of CO2 and criteria pollutants, serve to 
mitigate the likelihood of this environmental stress.
The electric grid
A principal role of combustion is the generation of electricity. The elec-
tric grid is represented in Figure 13.1.4 in its classic form. Electric power 
is generated at large, central power plants in the general range of 100 to 
1,000 megawatts (MW). While hydro and nuclear contribute to varying 
degrees, combustion fueled by fossil fuels (natural gas, oil, or coal) has 
historically been the dominant strategy for the generation of electricity.
The classic form of the electricity grid, however, is not the only way 
in which electricity can be provided to houses, businesses, and facto-
ries. Figure 13.1.5 illustrates the following four potential paradigm shifts 
from the classic to the future electric grid.
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1. Use distributed generation (DG), the generation of power at the 
point of use (Figure 13.1.5 ). This could take the form of fossil 
fuel power plants such as gas turbines, solar panels, fuel cells, 
or ground source heat pumps that extract heat from under the 
ground. The advantages of this paradigm are threefold:
 ➤ Avoiding transmission losses. By generating electricity at the 
point of use, the loss in energy due to conveying electricity 
from central power generators to the urban loads, estimated 
to be in general 7%, is avoided.
 ➤ Increasing reliability. Generating electricity at the point of 
use increases the reliability of the electricity supply to the 
customer. Should the grid experience an outage, for example, 
DG can power critical circuits (at a minimum) and, if needed, 
power all circuits.
 ➤ Capturing and using exhaust heat. With generation at the point 
of use, the heat in the exhaust can be captured and used to 
serve thermal loads (such as steam, hot water, and chilled 
water) and thereby displace electricity and natural gas that 
NUCLEAR
HYDRO
COMBUSTION
CENTRAL GENERATION
Figure 13.1.4 The classic electric grid.
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would otherwise be required for these purposes. This gives 
rise to high overall efficiencies that can exceed 90%. Terms 
used to describe this attribute are combined heat and power 
(CHP) and combined cooling, heat, and power (CCHP).
2. Provide direct current power. The clean power generators 
emerging for the DG market (for example, photovoltaic panels, 
fuel cells, and microturbine generators) produce direct current 
(DC) that is converted to alternating current (AC) with a 
concomitant loss of energy estimated to be 10%. Then, the AC 
power is converted back to DC (with another estimated loss 
of 10%) to serve DC loads in a building, examples of which are 
lighting, personal computers, and servers. By serving these loads 
directly with DC, DG can avoid the conversion inefficiencies.
3. Deploy renewable power generation. The third paradigm shift is 
the deployment of renewable solar and wind resources in central 
generation, as well as the deployment of solar in distributed 
generation (Figure 13.1.5 ). The advantage of this paradigm is the 
displacement of the fossil fuel generation of power, by utilizing the 
Figure 13.1.5 The emerging electric grid.
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sun as the fuel resource, and the transition from combustion to a 
sustainable future that supports a clean, inexhaustible fuel supply 
(the sun) and protection of the environment. In California, for 
example, the penetration of renewable solar and wind resources has 
increased dramatically in the past decade (exceeding 30%) and is on 
course to meet a target of 60% in 2030 (Figure 13.1.6). California’s 
renewable energy policies are discussed further in Chapter 9.
 In contrast to traditional central generating plants that produce 
electricity continuously around the clock, renewable solar and 
wind resources vary diurnally—that is, the power produced varies 
throughout the day due to the presence and angle of the sun and 
the availability and strength of the wind. They also experience 
intermittencies, such as from a cloud momentarily shading a 
photovoltaic resource and dropping the generation, or a burst 
or drop in wind momentarily increasing or decreasing generation 
from a wind source. Diurnal variation refers to the daily cycle, 
while intermittencies are short-term and less predictable.
 Renewable resources also have a low capacity factor, defined 
as the percentage output divided by the maximum (often called 
“name plate”) output over a month, year, or other period of time. 
For example, traditional central plants have capacity factors of 
approximately 50%, whereas renewable resources have capacity 
factors of approximately 25% (solar) and 32% (wind). The capacity 
factors of 24/7 base load generators* are below 100% because of 
load following (that is, plant operators or controllers turning down 
the generation to match the load), whereas the capacity factors 
for renewable resources are low because of the diurnal variation.
 Renewable resources cannot load follow, generating instead 
whenever the “fuel” (sun or wind) is available. As a result, 
renewable wind and solar are “must take” resources, and other 
technologies must be used to meet the load demand. If the 
load is less than the renewable generation capacity, either the 
excess energy must be stored (for example, in electric batteries, 
*A base load generator is an electric power plant that provides a constant supply 
of electricity to meet the minimum load demand.
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as pumped hydro, or in the generation of hydrogen), or the 
renewable generation resources must be curtailed. Curtailment is 
the action of reducing (in the extreme, turning off) the renewable 
wind or solar generation resource when load on the grid (that 
is, demand) is insufficient to utilize the electricity that would 
otherwise be produced.
4. Improve energy storage. A fourth paradigm shift is the deployment 
of battery storage at both the central and distributed generation 
levels (Figure 13.1.5 ) to buffer and manage (1) the diurnal 
variation and intermittencies associated with wind and solar 
renewable resources, (2) uncontrolled vehicle charging loads,* 
and (3) the demand for rapid ramping of spinning reserves** 
*Uncontrolled vehicle charging loads result from the charging of plug-in electric 
vehicles (PEVs) with no control over key variables (for example, the time of day 
the charging occurs, the duration of the charging, and the rapidity with which 
charging occurs). As the population of PEVs grows, control over these variables 
will be required to protect grid resources (for example, transformers) and assure 
that generation resources are available to meet the charging load.
**Spinning reserves refers to rotating machinery (for example, gas turbines) that are 
spinning but generating little or no electricity and ready thereby to immediately 
(with a short delay) generate electricity if called upon. (This is similar to an aircraft 
with engines idling at the beginning of takeoff.)
Figure 13.1.6 California annual renewable percentage estimates. Data from 
California Energy Commission 2018.
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with the goal to provide a resource that can absorb an increase in 
generation in the absence of load and also discharge energy when 
the load exceeds the generation capacity.
 The most pervasive electric battery technology used today, 
from cell phones to multimegawatt applications, is the lithium-ion 
(Li-ion) battery (Figure 13.1.7). Just like your flashlight battery, 
the Li-ion battery stores energy (by charging on demand) and 
dispatches energy (by discharging on demand).
 While the electrolyte allows lithium ions to flow in both 
directions, electrons are rejected by the electrolyte and must 
instead flow through an external circuit from one electrode to the 
other. When the battery is fully charged, all of the lithium ions are 
in the anode. When the battery is discharging (Figure 13.1.7a), the 
lithium ions travel through the electrolyte to the cathode while the 
electrons travel through the external circuit and energize a load 
(for example, a lightbulb). When the battery is charging, energy 
from a power source (for example, the grid) creates a flow of 
electrons from the positive cathode back to the negative anode.
Figure 13.1.7 Lithium-ion battery.
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 Anodes in a Li-ion battery are typically composed of a carbon 
material that is able to absorb and store the electric charge. The 
cathode is an oxide of lithium such as lithium nickel manganese 
cobalt oxide, or lithium manganese oxide.
 In the future, energy storage technologies may be required in 
addition to electric batteries to (1) absorb the enormous amount 
of otherwise curtailed energy, (2) provide the ramp rates (rate at 
which the generation resource responds to load change) required 
for both the absorption and reuse of the energy, (3) store the 
energy for months (for example, from one season to another), and 
(4) counter the self-discharge associated with electric batteries. 
While pumped hydro is expected to complement electric batteries, 
opinions differ as to whether additional, more flexible and higher-
capacity energy storage technologies (for example, flow batteries 
and/or hydrogen “batteries”) will be required.
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13.2  Fuel Cell Technology
Electricity has historically been generated 24/7 by combustion-based 
power plants. With the deployment of diurnally varying and intermittent 
renewable solar and wind generation, the 24/7 plants are being oper-
ated more dynamically, namely ramping up and down in response to 
the varying renewable resources. Because combustion emits carbon di-
oxide and criteria pollutants as unavoidable by-products, an alternative 
to combustion that can operate (1) more efficiently than combustion 
(thereby reducing CO2 per megawatt hour), (2) with a zero-carbon fuel 
(thereby emitting no CO2), and (3) without the emission of criteria pol-
lutants would be preferred.
An emerging alternative to combustion is fuel cell technology (Fig-
ure 13.2.1), which converts fuel and air to electricity in a single step. 
Intuitively, you can imagine a higher efficiency in the absence of mechan-
ical friction. You can also imagine virtually zero formation and emission 
of criteria air pollutants, due to relatively low-temperature and relatively 
benign electrochemistry. In addition, fuel cells are quiet—a welcomed at-
tribute for deployment as a distributed generator in the midst of where 
the public resides (homes) and works (industry, office buildings, and 
hospitals, for example).
The manner by which fuel cells operate is illustrated in Figure 13.2.2. 
Similar to the electric battery presented in Figure 13.1.7, the fuel cell 
is composed of an anode and cathode separated by an electrolyte. But 
rather than storing energy, a fuel cell generates electricity continuously 
as long as fuel (hydrogen) and oxygen (from the air) are provided.
Hydrogen enters and is dissociated at the anode into protons (H+) 
and electrons (e−). While the electrolyte is receptive to transporting the 
protons to the cathode, electrons are rejected and required to find an 
alternative path. Engineers take advantage of this by providing a path for 
the electrons to travel through a load, represented in Figure 13.2.2 by 
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Figure 13.2.1 Power generation options.
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Figure 13.2.2 Proton exchange membrane fuel cell stack.
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a lightbulb. The electrons transfer energy to, and thereby support, the 
load. While “spent,” the electrons are sufficiently energetic to react with 
the oxygen entering the cathode channel and the protons exiting the 
electrolyte, and they close the electrochemical reaction by generating 
water. The water then mixes with the nitrogen from the air to comprise 
the fuel cell exhaust.
Types of fuel cells
The fuel cell stack depicted in Figure 13.2.2 is associated with a particu-
lar type of fuel cell, the proton exchange membrane fuel cell (PEMFC). 
In addition to the PEMFC, the three other major fuel cell types are 
shown in Figure 13.2.3—the phosphoric acid fuel cell (PAFC), the molten 
carbonate fuel cell (MCFC), and the solid oxide fuel cell (SOFC). The 
types vary by the chemistry utilized, the electrolyte used (which pro-
vides the name of each fuel cell type), the operating temperature, the 
time required to turn the fuel cell on and off, and the rate and extent to 
which the power output can be changed. All operate on hydrogen but 
can also run off fuels containing hydrogen (for example, natural gas, bio-
gas, and propane) that are re-formed (usually at high temperature with 
the addition of steam) to release the hydrogen for fueling the stack.*
Because PEMFCs turn on and off like an automobile engine, oper-
ate at a relatively low temperature, and rapidly change power output 
in response to load, they are ideal for powering both ground-based 
vehicles (from forklifts, to automobiles, to heavy-duty trucks) and space 
vehicles (for example, space modules, space stations) and for providing 
backup power in the event of a grid outage (for example, for servers 
and telephone cell towers). Ballard is an example of a manufacturer of 
PEMFC systems with applications that include buses, trucks, and urban 
light-rail trams.
The other fuel cell types require several hours to turn on and off. 
*Reformation (or re-formation) is a process to extract hydrogen from the 
hydrogen embedded in fossil and bio fuels. The most common fossil fuel re-
formed is natural gas, which is rich in methane (CH4), using a steam methane 
reformation (SMR) process. When methane is exposed to heat and steam, the 
hydrogen can be separated and purified for industrial applications and the refining 
of gasoline, as two examples.
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As a result, they are dedicated to generating electricity for facilities that 
have a relatively constant 24/7 load. These loads, while relatively con-
stant, can vary. For example, the load can be different during the day 
than at night, or during a weekday than on the weekend. The extent to 
which each fuel cell type can load follow varies. PAFCs are flexible in this 
regard, whereas MCFCs and SOFCs are less flexible.
PAFCs were the first fuel cell product to be commercialized (in 
1992), and today Doosan (their sole manufacturer) offers systems from 
400 kilowatts (kW) to 40 megawatts (MW) based on a 400 kW module. 
(A few kilowatts would be adequate for a home, whereas a megawatt 
would be appropriate for a hotel.) While the vast majority of the sys-
tems deployed worldwide operate on natural gas that is converted to 
hydrogen through a reformer external to (that is, separated from) the 
fuel cell stack, Doosan has deployed a 40 MW system that operates di-
rectly on hydrogen supplied by a waste stream at a petrochemical plant 
in South Korea. PAFCs operate at an elevated temperature (200°C), 
which allows combined heat and power (CHP) and combined cooling, 
heat, and power (CCHP) applications with efficiencies exceeding 90%.
The basic module of the MCFC commercial unit, 1.4 MW, is rep-
licated to achieve the power ordered by the customer. For example, 
Figure 13.2.3 Fuel cell types.
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ten 1.4 MW modules provide 14 MW of power. Typical systems are 
2.8 MW, with the largest system, 59 MW, in service in South Korea. 
MCFCs were first commercialized in 1993 by FuelCell Energy, the sole 
manufacturer, as the first high-temperature system (650°C). The higher 
temperature provides both attractive options for CHP and CCHP and 
the ability to internally reform the fuel (for example, natural gas). The 
technology has also led to
 ➤ The operation of fuel cells on biogas (sourced from water resource 
recovery facilities), thereby generating carbon-neutral renewable 
electricity.
 ➤ The generation of carbon-neutral hydrogen as well as electricity and 
heat, referred to as tri-generation.
Bloom Energy has pioneered the introduction of high-temperature 
(1,000°C) SOFC technology beginning with commercialization in 2009. 
While the size of the basic module has varied, 250 kW is representative. 
The technology is purpose-built to be solely an electric generator (that 
is, not equipped for CHP/CCHP), using the heat instead to generate more 
electricity with overall fuel-to-electricity efficiencies exceeding 60% and 
exhaust temperatures as low as 65°C. Similar to MCFCs, SOFCs use in-
ternal reformation. A second SOFC manufacturer entering the market is 
Mitsubishi Hitachi Power Systems with a 250 kW and 1 MW fuel cell (FC) 
module integrated with a gas turbine (GT) to create a fuel cell/GT hybrid.
Deployment of fuel cells
As shown in Figure 13.2.4, fuel cells are deployed as distributed gener-
ators, with sizes ranging from hundreds of kilowatts to tens of mega-
watts, across a myriad of market segments on the customer side of the 
electric meter.* These include
 ➤ Industry (Figure 13.2.4).
*Side of the meter refers to the customer side or utility side of the electric utility 
meter. The customer side of the meter encompasses the circuits owned and 
managed by the customer. The utility side of the meter encompasses the circuits 
and electrical resources owned and managed by the utility.
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 ➤ Office buildings, commercial developments, universities, and hos-
pitals.
 ➤ Water resource recovery facilities.
Fuel cell technology has been installed throughout the world, with 
initial market concentrations in Korea, Japan, Europe, and California. In 
California, over 250 MW of product is installed throughout the state 
(Figure 13.2.5), with higher concentrations in the two major population 
centers of northern California and southern California.
On the utility side of the meter, large fuel cell systems are being de-
ployed as TIGER (transmission integrated grid energy resource) stations 
to support local grid constraints (Figure 13.2.4 ). Rather than serving 
a single customer, these TIGER stations are integrated into the electricity 
grid. Examples include 10 MW TIGER stations powering “cloud” server 
farms (for example, eBay, Apple, and Microsoft); a 15 MW TIGER station 
in Bridgeport, Connecticut; a 30 MW TIGER station in Delaware; and 
a 59 MW TIGER station in South Korea. Also depicted are fuel cell/GT 
hybrid systems being developed for 1,000-MW-scale central generation 
(Figure 13.2.4 ).
Notable in Figure 13.2.4 is the absence of combustion sources of 
Figure 13.2.4 Fuel cell deployment.
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electricity, representing the culmination of the paradigm shift from a 
combustion-dominant electric grid, with the associated limited efficien-
cies and emission of criteria pollutants, to an electrochemical-dominant 
electric grid, with high efficiencies and virtually zero emission of local air 
pollutants such as nitrogen oxides. While this is notable, it is important 
to recognize that this paradigm, while having zero emissions of local air 
pollutants, may not have zero emissions of carbon. If the fuel cells are op-
erating on natural gas, biogas, or syngas, carbon dioxide generated in the 
reformation process will be liberated in the exhaust. If the fuel cells instead 
are operating on renewable hydrogen (from otherwise curtailed solar and 
wind, for example), Figure 13.2.4 represents a 100% renewable grid.
Figure 13.2.5 Plot of fuel cell sites in California in 2019. Reproduced from 
California Stationary Fuel Cell Collaborative.
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13.3  100% Renewable Grid
This section sets out two pathways toward a 100% renewable electricity 
grid, using the four new paradigms discussed in Section 13.1 and the fuel 
cell technologies discussed in Section 13.2. These pathways, illustrated 
in Figure 13.3.1, are being implemented today in many regions of the 
world, particularly Europe and California. The two pathways differ in the 
management of (1) load balancing, reliability, and dynamics associated 
with diurnal and seasonal variation, intermittency, and the limited capac-
ity factors that accompany a high penetration of solar and wind power 
generation; and (2) the uncertainty in forecasting intermittent solar and 
wind resources. Both scenarios hold in common that energy storage is 
required, but they differ in (1) the amount and types of energy storage 
and (2) the need for a clean, firm, 24/7 power generator in addition to 
solar and wind power generation.
Pathway 1
Pathway 1, depicted in Figure 13.3.1a, assumes that electric battery 
technology and pumped hydro storage alone will be sufficient to man-
age the diurnally varying and intermittent solar and wind resources. To 
this end, Li-ion batteries are being deployed at the transmission and 
distribution levels of the utility grid, at industry, at hotels/hospitals/
universities, and at homes. The basic strategy is for the batteries 
and pumped hydro to absorb the excess electricity generated by solar 
and wind resources when loads on the grid are below the renewable 
generating capacity, and then to recover the energy as electricity from 
the electric batteries and hydro reservoirs when the utility loads exceed 
the renewable generating capacity (particularly at times solar and wind 
resources are not generating during their diurnal cycles).
Pathway 2
Pathway 2, depicted in Figure 13.3.1b, argues that electric battery and 
pumped hydro storage alone, while providing a cornerstone to storing 
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Figure 13.3.1 100% renewable grid.
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energy available from otherwise curtailed wind and solar resources, are 
insufficient to provide a reliable electricity supply. To systematically and 
rigorously evaluate the requirements, energy systems analyses tools 
have been developed to explore the technologies required to enable 
and manage the solar and wind resources associated with a 100% re-
newable grid. Under the auspices of the California Energy Commission, 
for example, a systems analysis tool, the Holistic Grid Resource Integra-
tion and Deployment (HiGRID) code, was developed to guide planning 
for a modern electric grid. From evaluation of a myriad of scenarios 
to determine the resources needed to manage the intermittency, di-
urnal variation, and constrained capacity factor associated with solar 
and wind, two key resources emerged as being required: (1) a “hydro-
gen battery” resource and (2) a 24/7, clean, load-following renewable 
power- generating resource.
“Hydrogen battery” resource Due to the massive amounts of energy 
that are projected to be (1) available from otherwise curtailed solar and 
wind resources, (2) required to support the grid when loads exceed the 
available wind and solar, and (3) required to overcome the limitations 
of electric batteries (degradation, cost, self-discharging, and inability to 
accommodate seasonal shifts in energy demand), systems analyses such 
as HiGRID are consistently demonstrating that hydrogen in general, and 
renewable hydrogen in particular, is required as a major cornerstone in 
achieving a 100% renewable grid. To this end, a number of sources of 
renewable hydrogen are emerging. Here are some examples:
 ➤ Electrolytic renewable hydrogen: The generation of renewable hy-
drogen through electrolysis (Figure 13.3.1b ) is expected to be the 
largest source that can absorb the levels of projected curtailed en-
ergy, store the energy by injection into the natural gas or dedicated 
hydrogen pipeline (Figure 13.3.1b ), and convey the energy to the 
points of use (Figure 13.3.1b ).
 ➤ Tri-generation: A smaller-scale source is the generation of carbon- 
neutral hydrogen from a stationary fuel cell operating on biogas pro-
duced, for example, at waste water recovery facilities that process 
human sewage and food waste, landfills that store biodegrading 
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human waste, and dairies that deal with large volumes of cow ma-
nure (Figure 13.3.1b ). These facilities typically produce biogas 
rich in methane, which, if emitted, is significantly more climate 
change intensive than CO2. Tri-generation captures and uses the 
biogas to produce carbon-neutral electricity and heat. By operating 
the fuel cell with more biogas than required for the electricity and 
heat alone, excess carbon-neutral biohydrogen is made available at 
the stack and can be extracted and injected into the natural gas or 
dedicated renewable hydrogen pipeline. At waste water recovery 
facilities and dairies, the heat can be used to support the digest-
ers and thereby displace fossil fuel boilers, further reducing CO2 
emissions. Tri-generation is the epitome of sustainability, namely 
recovering and converting the energy from human and animal waste 
to renewable electricity, renewable heat, and renewable hydrogen.
24/7, clean, load-following renewable power-generating resource 
Stationary fuel cell systems, of the designs discussed in Section 13.2, are 
emerging as a technology to generate the required clean, 24/7, load- 
following, renewable power with the added attribute of virtually zero 
emission of pollutants. Already meeting initial market demand for base 
load power generation, more than 30% of the fuel cells operating today 
in California are generating renewable power by operating on locally de-
rived and directed biogas. To meet the challenge of the next-generation 
100% renewable grid, stationary fuel cell systems are being deployed 
today with the requisite load-following attributes and also the ability to 
operate on hydrogen as well as natural gas and biogas. Simply stated, 
stationary fuel cell systems are
 ➤ A resource, along with energy storage, to enable and manage a 
100% renewable grid.
 ➤ A match for the utilization of the renewable hydrogen generated from 
otherwise curtailed wind and solar resources (Figure 13.3.1b ).
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13.4  Merging of Transportation
The next generation of vehicles is emerging in response to environ-
mental pressures and a goal of fuel independence. The environmental 
pressures, which include the mitigation of climate change and air quality 
degradation, require a dramatic reduction in the emission of GHGs and 
air pollutants from the transportation sector as well as the electric sec-
tor. Fuel independence requires removing reliance on the international 
sourcing of carbon-rich fossil fuels and the associated geopolitics. In 
response, vehicles of all sizes are transitioning from combustion engines 
and mechanical drivetrains to alternative vehicles with battery and fuel 
cell engines and electric drivetrains. The transition began with light-duty 
vehicles, expanded into medium-duty vehicles, and is now emerging with 
heavy-duty vehicles including buses. This transition involves a merging of 
the transportation system with the electricity generation system.
Alternative vehicles encompass fuel cell electric vehicles (FCEVs) 
and plug-in electric vehicles (PEVs). Examples of PEVs are battery elec-
tric vehicles (BEVs) and plug-in fuel cell electric vehicles  (PFCEVs). 
All of these vehicles have a few key characteristics in common. First, 
alternative vehicles are designed to operate on fuels that portend (1) a 
potential of zero emission of both GHG and criteria pollutants and (2) an 
opportunity to be generated locally and thereby achieve the goal of fuel 
independence. Second, alternative vehicles have no tailpipe emissions of 
carbon or criteria pollutants. The GHG and criteria pollutant emissions, 
if any, come solely from the fuel supply chain, such as the generation of 
electricity or production of hydrogen. Electricity and hydrogen are the 
two fuels emerging to power alternative vehicles.
Electricity as a fuel
For PEVs, the electric grid becomes the source of the fuel. As shown 
in Figure 13.4.1, PEVs garner electricity from the home, from the place 
of work, and in the conduct of business at commercial centers such 
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as big-box stores, shopping centers, and hotels. Referred to as G2V 
(grid-to-vehicle), extracting energy from the grid adds a new load to the 
grid. Conversely, PEVs have the potential to provide beneficial attributes 
to the grid. With what is called V2G (vehicle-to-grid), energy can be 
extracted from qualified vehicles to serve loads when generating assets 
are strained.
The existing grid is able to accommodate modest charging events, 
but as the number of charging events increases (for example, at homes), 
local transformers may overload and fail. As a result, either upgrades to 
transformers or controlled charging (that is, smart charging), or both, 
will be required.
In Figure 13.4.1, while the emissions of pollutants from the tailpipes 
and electric grid are virtually zero and the emission of carbon from the 
vehicles is zero, the carbon emissions from the electric grid will not 
be zero with stationary fuel cells (as mentioned above) operating on 
fossil fuels (for example, natural gas) and biogas. What is required is a 
zero-carbon fuel.
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Figure 13.4.1 Merging of transportation and the electric grid.
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Hydrogen as a zero-carbon fuel
For FCEVs, hydrogen is the fuel. For PFCEVs, hydrogen is the “long-
range” fuel (300 to 400 miles) while electricity is the “short-range” fuel 
(50 to 150 miles). While the vehicles themselves emit zero carbon, the 
supply chain of electricity (as noted above) and hydrogen can be major 
sources of atmospheric carbon if not carefully planned. For example, 
hydrogen has been traditionally generated in large plants by the steam 
reformation of natural gas at elevated temperatures. The principal com-
ponent of natural gas is methane (CH4), with concentrations varying 
around the world from 70% to over 90%. Other components can be 
other hydrocarbons (for example, propane and ethane) and inert chem-
icals such as carbon dioxide and nitrogen.
Today, over 50 million metric tons of hydrogen from steam methane 
reformation (SMR; see Section 13.2) are produced annually worldwide, 
and 11 million metric tons are produced in the United States to support 
manufacturing (for example, of chemicals, foods, and electronics) and 
the refining of petroleum to generate gasoline. Notably, the amount of 
hydrogen needed to fuel 20 million FCEVs in California (today’s popu-
lation of all vehicles in California) is just 20% more than the hydrogen 
generated today for the production of gasoline in California. If all the 
vehicles were PFCEVs, less than 80% would be required. However, SMR 
hydrogen has an associated emission of CO2. What is required is the 
generation of renewable hydrogen without the emission of carbon.
A representative zero-carbon cycle is shown in Figure 13.4.2 for 
the future generation, distribution, and utilization of renewable hydro-
gen for the transportation sector as well as the electricity sector. As 
described in Figure 13.3.1b, an initial step in the production of renew-
able hydrogen is the generation of carbon-neutral biohydrogen using 
tri-generation (Figure 13.4.2 ) for fueling FCEVs and PFCEVs as well as 
stationary fuel cells. As noted previously, the vast majority of renewable 
hydrogen is expected to be sourced from the generation of electrolytic 
zero-carbon hydrogen from otherwise curtailed solar and wind. Not 
only can electrolytic zero-carbon hydrogen be stored over long periods 
of time and used in stationary fuel cells as diurnal or seasonal demand 
requires (Figure 13.3.1b), it can also be used to fuel FCEVs and PFCEVs 
(Figure 13.4.2 ).
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To use the California example again, systems analyses show that the 
amount of renewable zero-carbon hydrogen generated by otherwise 
curtailed renewable resources will be more than ample to fuel FCEVs. 
While water is also required, fueling all the state’s 20 million vehicles 
with electrolytic zero-carbon hydrogen would need less than 1% of the 
daily water flow in the California Aqueduct. If all vehicles were PFCEVs, 
less than 0.2% would be required.
For dispensing hydrogen to FCEVs, fueling stations are today being 
deployed at existing gasoline stations (Figure 13.4.2 ). The locations 
are already zoned for fueling, and the public is familiar with the location 
as a fueling site. Hydrogen dispensing can be added to an existing is-
land (displacing a gasoline dispenser) or on a newly established fueling 
island. Over time, gasoline dispensers could be replaced one by one as 
hydrogen-fueled vehicles displace gasoline-fueled vehicles.
California, again, provides an illustration of the scale of fueling in-
frastructure that will be required. Approximately 9,800 gasoline stations 
serve the California population, with multiple stations often sharing the 
same intersection. However, hydrogen dispensing will not be required 
at all of the existing gasoline stations. The reasons include the high 
Figure 13.4.2 100% renewable grid and transportation.
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Figure 13.4.3 Hydrogen fueling stations in California in 2019. Green, in 
operation; yellow, in development; gray, not operational. Reproduced from 
California Fuel Cell Partnership.
(a) Northern California
(b) Southern California
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efficiency of hydrogen vehicles, meaning they can drive farther before 
refueling than gasoline-powered cars can, and the replacement of com-
petition from the fuel pricing at intersections (often leading to four 
gasoline stations at an intersection) to the smart phone. For example, it 
is estimated that a minimum of 1,600 hydrogen stations are needed to 
fuel a full build-out of FCEVs in 2050. While this number of stations gives 
drivers a maximum 6-minute access to a hydrogen dispenser, the actual 
number will likely be larger in order to not overcrowd any one station. If 
PFCEVs alone were deployed (that is, no FCEVs), the minimum number 
of stations required statewide would be 93. The larger the percentage 
of PFCEVs in 2050, the fewer the number of stations over and above 
1,600.
In 2019, the number of hydrogen stations in California is approxi-
mately 50 (Figure 13.4.3). They are concentrated at population centers 
targeted for the introduction of FCEVs by the automobile manufactur-
ers, along with key connector stations (for example, between northern 
and southern California) and destination stations popular with tourists 
(for example, Santa Barbara, Lake Tahoe, and Napa Valley).
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13.5  Smart Grid Technology
With the introduction of distributed generation (DG), renewable gen-
eration, and PEVs, evidence of adverse impacts on grid operation is 
surfacing. These impacts include curtailed solar and wind, and increas-
ing challenges in managing intermittent solar and wind—for example, by 
buffering intermittencies and by increasingly high afternoon ramp rates 
to augment the loss of solar late in the afternoon when loads increase. 
Arguably, to accommodate and manage DG, renewable generation, and 
PEV penetration, major changes in the operation of the grid must be 
developed and implemented. The deployment of DG and associated 
distributed energy resources (DER) such as energy storage requires visi-
bility to, and control over, this new paradigm. Increasing the penetration 
of intermittent renewable resources requires an accurate forecasting of 
intermittent solar and wind resources, as well as a methodology to han-
dle the uncertainty that these resources introduce into the modeling, 
planning, and operation of the system. Managing a high penetration of 
PEVs requires more visibility into the distribution system so that their 
impact on the load profile can be managed and they can be used as a 
grid resource for providing energy and ancillary services. Such “visibility” 
(that is, the amount and resolution of information that is accessible to 
system managers) includes real-time operating information on individual 
transformers.
Smart grid technology is emerging as a major strategy to handle 
these challenges. A smart grid is a grid with the intelligence to (1) main-
tain (and increase) the efficiency and reliability of the grid, (2) provide 
the grid operator with visibility and remote control of the system com-
ponents through sensing throughout the transmission and distribution 
network, and (3) provide two-way communication and controls to en-
able a path for grid automation and electricity markets participation.
California provides an example of where the smart grid is emerging, 
with a focus on four major levels (Figure 13.5.1):
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 ➤ Consumer level: Facility energy management and control by resi-
dential owner, office building manager, industrial plant manager, or 
campus microgrid operator.
 ➤ PEV level: Automobile manufacturer and/or utility management 
schemes, control of PEV charging (smart charging), and potential 
V2G energy storage recovery.
 ➤ Utility level: Utility management and control of distribution system 
services and resources.
 ➤ Independent system operator (ISO) level: ISO management and 
control of the full portfolio of grid services and resources, including 
electricity markets, to ensure that loads are balanced and that sup-
ply is reliable and sufficient to meet the grid dynamics, namely load 
changes and rate of the load changes.
Smart grid technology in the country has developed and improved 
significantly during the past decade through investment in research and 
demonstration projects such as the California Public Utilities Commis-
sion’s smart grid investment plan and the US Department of Energy’s 
Irvine Smart Grid Demonstration program. These efforts resulted in ad-
vances and deployment of smart metering, smart appliances, automated 
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Figure 13.5.1 Smart grid.
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substations and other distribution system upgrades, advanced sensing 
and controls, high-speed communications, smart inverters, and smart 
switches. The broad deployment of smart grid technology faces chal-
lenges, including these examples:
 ➤ Interoperability: A smart grid requires the various components of 
the system to communicate with one another or at least a cen-
tral controller/operator. To achieve this, communication protocols, 
standards, and a robust communication infrastructure must be de-
veloped upon which vendors, utilities, and regulatory agencies can 
agree and comply.
 ➤ Reliability and cost: The reliability of the system must be ensured 
without having excessive redundancy, in order to minimize the over-
all cost of the system.
 ➤ Data management: The collection of high-resolution data is re-
quired to obtain an accurate picture of the system status and also 
verify the system load flow and transient models.
 ➤ Cybersecurity: As the system moves toward automation and re-
mote control, the system must be secured through cybersecurity 
measures and encrypted communications.
 ➤ Too much change, too quickly: The smart grid paradigm will dra-
matically change the roles of utilities, independent system operators, 
aggregators, and service providers in a relatively short amount of 
time. Therefore, it is prudent to develop road maps and guidelines 
for the industry to follow and prepare for their revised roles. For 
example, with more distributed energy resources, the role of the 
utility changes from delivering energy to providing ancillary services 
and backup and/or serving as an aggregator of distributed energy 
resources.
 ➤ Development of a wholesale electricity market: First, the gener-
ating resource needs to establish an agreement with the utility to ac-
cess the transmission system. Today this is done through wholesale 
distribution access tariffs (WDATs.) Second, the grid operators need 
to allow the distributed energy resources (DER) to participate in the 
market. This will present challenges since the DER can be very flex-
ible (compared with conventional generation and even renewable 
Chapter 13: Two Evolving Energy Technology Pathways 13-39
resources) and are located deep in the distribution system where 
the ISOs do not have visibility.
To achieve the compelling potential attributes of smart grids and 
microgrids (for example, high efficiency, lower GHG and criteria pol-
lutant emissions, lower operating costs, the accommodation of grid 
ancillary and emergency services, and the ability to enable and expand 
the evolving electricity), research is required to advance smart commu-
nications, controls, energy storage, high-resolution and robust sensors, 
power electronics, load-following and high-ramping 24/7 clean power 
generation, smart PEV charging/discharging, and energy management 
systems. In parallel, research is required to establish and implement pol-
icies that support the development and deployment of the empowered 
concomitant electricity markets.
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13.6  Microgrid Technology
A microgrid is a collection of generation resources, loads, and other 
DER that presents itself to the grid as a single controllable entity in order 
to (1) provide ancillary services to the grid in support of grid operations 
and (2) separate from the grid in the event of a grid outage and operate 
in an islanded mode. As shown in Figure 13.6.1, the normal operation of 
the microgrid is “grid-connected.” In this mode, the grid provides power 
when microgrid generation resources are unable to alone support the 
load. In this mode, the microgrid is also able to provide resources to 
the grid, these are called ancillary services. These ancillary services in-
clude local load and generation management wherein the microgrid can 
shed or add loads and can reduce or increase generation in response 
to signals from the utility or ISO when the grid itself is experiencing a 
local deficit in generation resources (for example, no wind to drive wind 
generators, or no sun to drive solar generators) or a local excess in 
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generation (for example, generation from renewable resources that ex-
ceeds existing loads). Overall, microgrids reduce the impacts associated 
with intermittent and flexible resources on the grid.
Microgrids also increase the reliability and resiliency of the commu-
nity served by the microgrid and the community adjacent to, but outside, 
the microgrid. In the case of a grid outage, the microgrid can seamlessly 
disconnect and remain in operation and maintain the microgrid commu-
nity with electricity. While some loads may have to be shed to match 
the load to the microgrid generation resources, loads critical to the op-
eration and safety of the microgrid community can be retained intact. 
An islanded microgrid can provide services such as shelter and food to 
the adjacent community. In principle, an islanded microgrid can provide 
electricity to grocery stores, fire stations, gasoline stations, and hospitals 
in the adjacent community and can assist the utility in restarting the grid.
The potential of microgrids is driving the evolution of microgrid 
controllers to communicate with loads, generation resources, and other 
DER (for example, energy storage systems) and thereby (1) optimize the 
grid-connected microgrid performance, (2) provide ancillary services, 
(3) support engagement in the electricity markets, (4) manage seam-
less islanding and reconnection, and (5) provide emergency services to 
communities adjacent to the microgrid.* In addition, the microgrid con-
troller must communicate in the future with the utility, ISO, and other 
microgrids to provide (or buy) the services outlined.
A nanogrid (Figure 13.6.2) is a controllable grid within a microgrid, 
typically a smart building (equipped with a building management sys-
tem, for example) that is capable of providing ancillary services to the 
microgrid and separating from the microgrid (retaining building critical 
loads in service) in case of a microgrid outage, and of managing DER, 
lighting, and plug-in loads within the nanogrid.
*Emergency services refers to services provided during a natural disaster or other 
unforeseen occurrences. These services include energizing critical loads such as 
hospitals, shelters, and other critical facilities, as well as providing mobility to the 
community through providing electricity to PEVs and hydrogen to fuel cell vehicles.
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Figure 13.6.3 Hydrogen microgrid.
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As the population of microgrids increases and the technology 
evolves, other possibilities emerge, including the following:
 ➤ Microgrids could become part of the hydrogen economy, not only 
utilizing hydrogen for generation and fueling FCEVs, but also gen-
erating hydrogen for use within the microgrid and potential export 
from the microgrid (Figure 13.6.3).
 ➤ Microgrids could operate at a frequency different from the grid, 
connecting to the grid through a power electronics connection, 
thereby eliminating the need to synchronize with the grid.
Nanogrids also have the potential to transform the manner by which 
electricity is distributed in a building. In addition to alternating current 
(AC), electricity can be distributed as direct current (DC), serving di-
rectly DC loads (such as computers, servers, and LED lighting). Since 
evolving distributed generators produce DC (for example, fuel cells, 
photovoltaic panels), the inversion of DC to AC and the rectification of 
AC to DC and the consequent losses of up to 20% can be avoided, as 
discussed in Section 13.1.
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13.7  Summary
To address both climate change and the degradation in urban air quality, 
paradigm shifts in the electric and transportation sectors began at the 
turn of the century. However, they will need to evolve over decades 
before settling into the new paradigm. The principal attributes of the 
new paradigm are (1) the generation of electricity from diurnally vary-
ing and intermittent renewable wind and solar; (2) energy storage, to 
capture and later use energy from otherwise curtailed renewable re-
sources; (3)  the integration and electrification of transportation as a 
challenging load (on the one hand) and a potential source for the grid 
to tap for stored energy (on the other hand); and (4) smart grid control 
and management.
Two pathways are emerging, differing only in (1) the need for fuel 
cell electric vehicles, (2) the amount of energy storage required, and 
(3) the need for 24/7, clean, load-following renewable power generation 
in order to manage the diurnally varying and intermittent renewables.
Electric vehicles
Pathway 1 The opinion of many is that BEVs are sufficient and, with 
advances in battery technology, the energy density will dramatically in-
crease, the charging time will dramatically decrease, and the weight 
will dramatically decrease to provide the range, fueling time, and size 
provided historically by petroleum-fueled internal combustion vehicles.
Pathway 2 Others believe that, while BEVs have a role, FCEVs and 
PFCEVs are needed to provide the range and refueling time to which 
the public is accustomed with conventional gasoline and diesel internal 
combustion vehicles. FC technology is also suitable for medium-duty 
vehicles (such as delivery trucks) and for heavy-duty vehicles (that is, 
buses and large trucks) where BEV technology is limited or insufficient. 
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FC technology is applicable as well for off-road construction vehicles, 
locomotives, and ships.
Energy storage
Pathway 1 The opinion of many is that electric storage batteries and 
pumped hydro are sufficient and, with advances in electric battery 
technology, the energy density will evolve to absorb the high levels of 
curtailed energy projected as the grid builds out.
Pathway 2 Others believe that a renewable hydrogen “battery” is re-
quired to
 ➤ Provide the massive storage capability to complement electric bat-
teries in absorbing the high levels of curtailed energy projected as 
the grid builds out.
 ➤ Buffer the self-discharging character of electric batteries.
 ➤ Provide the capability of diurnal and seasonal shifts in energy stored 
and energy required.
 ➤ Provide zero-carbon renewable hydrogen transportation fuel for 
powering fuel cell vehicles on the transportation sector.
24/7, clean, load-following power generation
Pathway 1 The opinion of many is that technological advances in elec-
tric batteries will provide, along with V2G, the energy storage and ramp-
ing to manage and buffer the variability of solar and wind and thereby 
render 24/7, clean, load-following power generation unnecessary.
Pathway 2 Others believe power generation will be required that is 
clean (that is, emitting neither GHGs nor criteria pollutants), 24/7 (that 
is, around the clock, every day of the week), and load following (that is, 
able to ramp up and down to meet both load demand and diurnal varia-
tion and intermittency of wind and solar) to complement and buffer the 
variability of solar and wind and achieve the goal of a reliable and resil-
ient 100% renewable grid and a 100% renewable transportation system.
The goal of this chapter is to present the key considerations 
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necessary to achieve 100% renewable electricity and transportation sec-
tors (to address climate change) commensurate with zero emission of 
criteria pollutants (to address degraded urban air quality) while achiev-
ing fuel independence. To this end, two pathways have been described. 
Whether pathway 1 (Figure 13.3.1a) or pathway 2 (Figures 13.3.1b and 
13.6.4) or another form is realized in the decades to come will depend 
upon factors such as (1) the evolution and practice of technology, mar-
ket dynamics, and social dynamics (that is, public support and accep-
tance); (2) the impacts of climate change and degraded air quality; and 
(3) policies of the world’s governments.
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Figure 13.6.4 Pathway 2: the future grid interwoven with 
transportation, microgrid technology, and smart grid technology.
Chapter 13: Two Evolving Energy Technology Pathways 13-47
Sources for the Figures
All figures provided by the author unless otherwise indicated.
Figure 13.1.1: Getty Images. https://www.gettyimages.com/creative-images/
royaltyfree.
Figure 13.1.3: Science Photo Library. https://www.sciencephoto.com/.
Figure 13.1.6: California Energy Commission. 2018, December. Tracking 
Progress. https://ww2.energy.ca.gov/renewables/tracking_progress/
documents/renewable.pdf.
Figure 13.2.5: California Stationary Fuel Cell Collaborative. http://www.casfcc 
.org/Map_Of_CA_Fuel_Cell_Installations.html.
Figure 13.4.3: California Fuel Cell Partnership. https://cafcp.org/stationmap.
Sources for the Text
13.1 Introduction
California Energy Commission. 2018, December. Tracking Progress. https://
ww2.energy.ca.gov/renewables/tracking_progress/documents/renewable.
pdf.
Evelyn, J. 1661. Fumifugium: or The Inconvenience of the Aer and Smoak of London 
Dissipated. Together with Some Remedies Humbly Proposed. Retrieved from 
https://books.google.com/books?id=AeI5NYp7WCwC.
US Energy Information Administration. 2018, October. Electric Power Monthly. 
https://www.eia.gov/electricity/monthly/.
13.2 Fuel Cell Technology
California Stationary Fuel Cell Collaborative. http://www.casfcc.org/Map_Of_
CA_Fuel_Cell_Installations.html.
13.3 100% Renewable Grid
Eichman, J. D., et al. 2013. Exploration of the integration of renewable 
resources into California’s electric system using the Holistic Grid Resource 
Integration and Deployment (HiGRID) tool. Energy 50, 353–363.
Saeedmanesh, A., Mac Kinnon, M. A., and Brouwer, J. 2018. Hydrogen is 
essential for sustainability. Current Opinion in Electrochemistry 12, 166–181.
13-48 Chapter 13: Two Evolving Energy Technology Pathways 
13.4 Merging of Transportation
California Fuel Cell Partnership. https://cafcp.org/stationmap.
Lane, B., Shaffer, B., and Samuelsen, S. 2019. A comparison of alternative 
vehicle fueling infrastructure scenarios. International Journal of Hydrogen 
Energy, in review.
Margalef, P., et al. 2012. Efficiency comparison of tri-generating HTFC to 
conventional hydrogen production technologies. International Journal of 
Hydrogen Energy 37(12), 9853–9862.
Stephens-Romero, S., et al. 2011. Projecting full build-out environmental 
impacts and roll-out strategies associated with viable hydrogen fueling 
infrastructure strategies. International Journal of Hydrogen Energy 36, 
14309–14323.
US Department of Energy. 2013, May. Report of the Hydrogen Production 
Expert Panel. A Subcommittee of the Hydrogen & Fuel Cell Technical Advisory 
Committee. https://www.hydrogen.energy.gov/pdfs/hpep_report_2013.pdf.
13.5 Smart Grid Technology
Farhangi, H. 2010. The path of the smart grid. Power and Energy Magazine 
(IEEE) 8, 18–28.
Gungor, V. C., et al. 2011. Smart grid technologies: communication 
technologies and standards. Industrial Informatics. IEEE Transactions 7, 
529–539.
Hart, E. K., and Jacobson, M. Z. 2011. A Monte Carlo approach to generator 
portfolio planning and carbon emissions assessments of systems 
with large penetrations of variable renewables. Renewable Energy 36, 
2278–2286.
Inman, R. H., Pedro, H. T. C., and Coimbra, C. F. M. 2013. Solar forecasting 
methods for renewable energy integration. Progress in Energy and 
Combustion Science 39, 535–576.
Ipakchi, A., and Albuyeh, F. 2009. Grid of the future. Power and Energy 
Magazine (IEEE) 7, 52–62.
Metke, A. R., and Ekl, R. L. 2010. Security technology for smart grid networks. 
Smart Grid. IEEE Transactions 1, 99–107.
Potter, C. W., Archambault, A., and Westrick, K. 2009. Building a smarter 
smart grid through better renewable energy information. Power Systems 
Conference and Exposition, 2009.
Chapter 13: Two Evolving Energy Technology Pathways 13-49
Sood, V. K., et al. 2009. Developing a communication infrastructure for the 
smart grid. 2009 IEEE Electrical Power & Energy Conference. Montreal, 
Canada. http://toc.proceedings.com/07340webtoc.pdf.
13.6 Microgrid Technology
Guerrero, J. M., et al. 2011. Hierarchical control of droop-controlled AC and 
DC microgrids: a general approach toward standardization. Industrial 
Electronics, IEEE Transactions 58, 158–172.
Razeghi, G., et al. 2018. A generic microgrid controller: concept, testing, and 
insights. Applied Energy 229, 660–671.
Samuelsen, S. 2016, December 5. Why the automotive future will be 
dominated by fuel cells. IEEE Spectrum. https://spectrum.ieee.org/green 
-tech/fuel -cells/why -the -automotive -future -will -be -dominated -by -fuel -cells.
C H A P T E R  1 4
Environmentally 
Sustainable 
Transportation
M AT T H E W  B A R T H
UC Riverside
D A N I E L  S P E R L I N G
UC Davis
14-2
C H A P T E R  C O N T E N T S 
Learning Objectives 14-3
Overview 14-3
14.1	 Introduction and Background 14-5
14.2	 Sustainable Transportation Solutions 14-15
14.3	 Vehicle Automation 14-24
14.4	 Improved Air-Conditioning Efficiency and Refrigerants 14-26
14.5	 Key Takeaways 14-28
Sources for the Figures 14-29
Sources for the Text 14-30
Chapter 14: Environmentally Sustainable Transportation 14-3
Learning Objectives
At the end of the chapter, the reader should be able to do the following:
1. Describe the impacts of transportation on air quality and 
greenhouse gas emissions that lead to climate change; 
understanding these impacts is critical to devising sustainable 
solutions. 
2. Understand the general relationships between traffic and 
emissions; congested traffic has higher emissions, so congestion 
mitigation techniques and traffic smoothing can reduce emissions.
3. Realize that the amount of vehicle use has increased dramatically 
over the last several decades and has a significant role in 
transportation emissions.
4. Understand the four general solutions to mitigate transportation 
emissions: vehicle technology, low-carbon fuels, VMT management, 
and intelligent transportation systems, including the use of 
connected and automated vehicles.
5. Understand how future “intelligent” transportation systems using 
low-carbon fuels (including electricity) can reduce emissions.
6. Understand the potential positive and negative environmental 
effects of vehicle automation.
7. Understand the challenges to sustainable transportation, and 
appreciate the political, technological, and economic perspectives 
in achieving transportation solutions.
Overview
The efficient movement of both people and goods is at the heart of a 
productive and equitable society. However, today’s transportation sys-
tems emit a significant amount of pollutants that degrade our urban air 
quality and cause climate change. This chapter provides background 
material on transportation-related environmental impacts and then dis-
cusses potential alternatives and methods of mitigation. A variety of mit-
igation methods are available, including improving vehicle technology, 
using low-carbon fuels, managing travel demand, and applying intelligent 
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transportation system management techniques. The mitigation opportu-
nities are expanding because transportation is undergoing several major 
“revolutions,” with new emerging forms of shared mobility, the use of 
electricity to power our vehicles, and the increasing use of connected 
and automated vehicle technology. This chapter addresses mitigation 
opportunities and challenges as well as strategies to steer these trans-
portation revolutions toward a more sustainable future.
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14.1  Introduction and Background
Over the last century, the transport of both people and goods has grown 
dramatically, affecting our economy, society, and environment. The abil-
ity to move people and commodities between different locations has 
allowed our society to prosper, expanded our economic opportunities, 
and improved our overall quality of life. Our total vehicle miles traveled 
(VMT) per capita increased dramatically, even as the use of transporta-
tion modes narrowed. Our use of most other modes shrank, while our 
dependence on cars increased.
Unfortunately, with the benefits of greater automotive use has come 
many negative consequences, including (1) safety and health effects 
from pollution, crashes, and less walking; (2) reduced productivity and 
financial loss from congested traffic; and (3) environmental impacts, 
including local air quality and climate change. In this chapter we first 
provide background information on mobility and congestion, impacts of 
transportation on emissions, and the relationship between vehicle emis-
sions and traffic. We then describe a suite of sustainable transportation 
solutions related to vehicle technology, low-carbon fuels, travel demand 
management, and intelligent transportation systems (ITS), including 
connected and automated vehicle technology. The US, the focus of this 
chapter, was the leader in creating car-centric lifestyles and cities but 
now is the home of many mobility innovations.
Mobility and congestion
Personal mobility—the ability to access work, school, health services, 
and other activities—is key to the successful functioning of a modern so-
ciety. Greater mobility has greatly enhanced our productivity and quality 
of life. And the greater ease of shipping goods has greatly enhanced our 
economy.
Motor vehicles—cars, trucks, and buses, as well as motorcycles and 
scooters—are at the heart of personal mobility and goods movement. 
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In the US and many other countries, the number of motor vehicles has 
rapidly increased, as shown in Figure 14.1.1. The US has the highest 
per capita motor vehicle ownership of any major nation, as shown in 
Figure 14.1.2. Indeed, US dependence on the motor vehicle has led to 
a vulnerable “transportation monoculture,” as outlined in the timeline 
shown in Table 14.1.1. Over time, the use of public transportation has 
steadily dwindled in the US to about 2% of trips. Most other nations are 
following this same path, becoming increasingly dependent on motor 
vehicles, though not to the same extent as the US.
During the twentieth century, rapid growth in motor vehicle use was 
accompanied by massive investments in roadway infrastructure, boosted 
in the US from the late 1950s into the early 1970s by the building of the 
Interstate Highway System. After the 1970s, new roadway construction 
was slowed by urban opposition and the high cost of building in urban 
areas. With more vehicle travel and slowed investment in road capacity, 
traffic congestion worsened.
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Figure 14.1.1 Rapid increase in vehicles globally, historical and projected. 
Adapted from Sperling and Gordon 2010.
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Figure 14.1.2 Motor vehicle ownership, various countries. Source: compiled 
by authors.
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Table 14.1.1 Evolution of transportation monoculture in the US
1859 First US oil well discovered
1908 Model T (with ICE) debuts
1926 US transit ridership reaches highest peacetime levels
1930 Car ownership reaches 200 for every 1,000 Americans
1947 Suburban building boom begins following World War II
1956 US Interstate Highway System launched
1973 Arab oil embargo constricts supply
1979 Iran-Iraq war doubles oil prices
2000 First hybrid electric cars sold in US
2003 Car ownership reaches 1.15 vehicles per American driver
2005 Motor vehicle population worldwide exceeds 1 billion
2008 Crude hits $140/barrel
2016 Crude drops below $30/barrel
2018 1 million EVs sold in US
Source: Adapted from Sperling, D., and Gordon, D. 2010. Two Billion Cars, Driving Towards 
Sustainability. Oxford University Press, New York, NY.
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Increased roadway congestion has grown everywhere, from small 
cities to large megacities (see, for example, the Urban Mobility Score-
card at http://mobility.tamu.edu/ums). Roadway congestion is occurring 
during longer portions of the day and is delaying travelers and goods 
more than ever. The costs of congestion are large. These costs include 
the following (in the US):
 ➤ More than 3 billion gallons of fuel wasted annually.
 ➤ More than 2.6 million extra metric tons of CO2 per year being emit-
ted into the atmosphere.
 ➤ Nearly 7 billion extra hours in travel time, valued at roughly $160 
billion—equivalent to 42 hours and $960 per rush-hour commuter.
Various solutions to roadway congestion exist. We could build more 
lanes to increase roadway capacity, though this is quite costly and in-
duces more people to drive. Another possibility is to improve traffic 
system “operations” through traffic management techniques such as 
responding quickly to traffic incidents (more details on this in Section 
14.2). In terms of managing “demand,” we can implement pricing mech-
anisms to limit the use of current roadway capacity. We could also pro-
mote shared mobility programs, such as car sharing and multi- passenger 
app-based ride sharing, increase the capacity of public transit, construct 
more walking and bicycling paths, provide greater incentives for use of 
alternatives to single-occupant private cars, and enact alternative work 
locations and schedules (for example, telecommuting). We could also 
implement urban design and land use planning that lead to less VMT, 
including (1) mixing residential and nonresidential land uses within a 
neighborhood, (2) increasing housing and industrial density, (3) allowing 
for innovative planning and zoning, and (4) implementing some type 
of growth management. These land use measures tend to reduce the 
distance that people travel, as destinations become closer together, and 
reduce the share of trips made by the private car.
Some policies that would alleviate roadway congestion would in-
crease emissions if they created more capacity that encouraged people 
to drive more. And some policies would enhance mobility of physically 
and economically disadvantaged travelers. If policies are implemented 
well, though, they will continue to improve mobility and accessibility, 
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while reducing congestion, greenhouse gas emissions, and local air 
pollutants.
Impacts of transportation on emissions
As described in the previous section, today’s transportation systems 
depend on motor vehicles. As shown in Figure 14.1.3, by 2017 transpor-
tation as a whole had become the largest emitter of greenhouse gases 
in the United States. In fact, in 2017 the US Environmental Protection 
Agency (US EPA) reported transportation emissions to be 1,866 mil-
lion metric tons of CO2 equivalent (MMT CO2e), approximately 29% of 
total US emissions. If one also considers the refining of fuels and the 
energy used to build roads, the emissions attributable to transportation 
are even higher. Where electricity generation has low greenhouse gas 
(GHG) emissions, transportation’s share of the total is much higher. 
For example, in California in 2017, transportation-related emissions 
accounted for 41% of California’s GHG emissions, or about 48% with 
refining of transportation fuels.
Transportation is also the largest source of directly emitted air pol-
lutants that cause local air pollution, including carbon monoxide (CO), 
oxides of nitrogen (NOx), and particulate matter (PM). Motor vehicles 
emit other gases as well, including hydrocarbons (HC) that lead to the 
Figure 14.1.3 Contributors of GHG emissions in the USA in 2017. Adapted 
from US Environmental Protection Agency 2019.
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formation of ozone (O3) and secondary PM. And air-conditioning units 
in vehicles increase fuel use and emit hydrofluorocarbon (HFC) refrig-
erant emissions that are short-lived climate super pollutants (Chapter 
15). Vehicle-related pollution causes about 15,000 premature deaths 
annually in the US and between 184,000 and 242,000 globally.
Fortunately, air quality has dramatically improved in US cities since 
the 1970s. Figure 14.1.4 shows that air pollutants from cars and light 
trucks were reduced by 73% from 1970 to 2016, even though VMT 
almost doubled.
This huge reduction in air pollutants was due to technological ad-
vances in vehicle emission control technology and the reformulation of 
gasoline and diesel fuels. These technology and refining improvements 
are the result of increasingly stringent performance standards adopted 
by the US EPA and the California Air Resources Board (CARB). Hydro-
carbon and carbon monoxide exhaust emissions from new light-duty 
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vehicles have decreased by over 99% in the US, as shown in Figure 
14.1.5. Massive improvements are also being achieved with trucks, 
ships, locomotives, and other transportation modes, but they are lag-
ging improvements in cars. Chapter 9 discusses California’s air quality 
efforts in more detail.
Vehicle activity and emissions
In order to understand the breadth of potential transportation-related 
emissions reductions, it is useful to understand the relationship between 
vehicle activity and the corresponding emissions. There are several fac-
tors that play a role in how much a vehicle emits from the tailpipe. 
A typical driving trip will consist of idling, accelerating, cruising, and 
decelerating. The proportion of a trip spent in these different stages will 
depend on the driver’s behavior (for example, aggressive versus mild 
driving habits), the roadway type (for example, freeway versus arterial 
roadway), and the level of traffic congestion.
We can create histograms of emissions for large regional areas. 
Data collected from passenger vehicles in Southern California are pre-
sented in Figure 14.1.6. As indicated, most trips produce about 330 
grams of CO2 emissions per mile, corresponding to approximately 26 
Figure 14.1.5 California tailpipe HC performance standards for new light-
duty vehicles. Source: Authors.
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miles per gallon of fuel economy. Other trips, however, produce far less 
or far more CO2 emissions per mile, depending on the specific driving 
pattern. This variation comes from the driver’s behavior, the roadway 
type, and the level of traffic congestion. Other vehicle types will have 
quite different emissions depending on their weight, power, and other 
vehicle factors.
Electric vehicles have zero tailpipe emissions, but their energy effi-
ciency (and upstream power plant emissions) is affected by these same 
factors.
If one plots emissions against speeds, one observes a U-shaped 
pattern as shown in Figure 14.1.7. The resulting emissions-speed curve 
can be generalized for different types of vehicles, different driving 
behaviors, and different types of trips, as shown in Figure 14.1.8. This 
generalized curve can then be used as a tool for evaluating different 
carbon reduction schemes for transportation management. The upper 
line in Figure 14.1.8 shows a representative emissions-speed curve for 
typical traffic. We can use this curve to examine how different traffic 
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Figure 14.1.6 CO2 emissions, in grams per mile, for a representative 
database of passenger vehicle trips in Southern California. Reproduced with 
permission from Barth and Boriboonsomsin 2009.
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Figure 14.1.7 Emission-speed plot of individual trips or trip segments. 
Reproduced with permission from Barth and Boriboonsomsin 2009.
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Figure 14.1.8 Possible use of traffic operation strategies in reducing on-road 
CO2 emissions. Reproduced with permission from Barth and Boriboonsomsin 
2009.
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management techniques can affect vehicle emissions such as CO2. The 
lower line represents the approximate lower bound of CO2 emissions 
for typical internal combustion vehicles traveling at a constant steady-
state speed. Several important results can be derived from this figure:
 ➤ If congestion reduces the average vehicle speed below 45 mph (for 
this particular freeway scenario), emissions increase. At these lower 
speeds, vehicles operate less efficiently and spend more time on 
the road, resulting in higher emissions. In this scenario, congestion 
mitigation programs will directly reduce emissions.*
 ➤ If moderate congestion reduces average speeds from a free-flow 
speed over 70 mph to a slower speed of 45 to 55 mph, this moder-
ate congestion can reduce emissions (because emissions are higher 
and energy efficiency is lower at very high speeds). With no conges-
tion, average traffic speeds can increase to over 65 mph, increasing 
emissions.
 ➤ Smoothing stop-and-go traffic will reduce emissions.
 ➤ Electric vehicles powered by renewable energy will have near-zero 
life cycle emissions; if electric vehicles are powered by fossil fuels, 
emissions from power plants will be lower at lower speeds, for the 
same reason as for combustion engine vehicles but even more so 
because regenerative braking captures energy in stop-and-go traffic.
*This analysis assumes that the travel demand won’t change when congestion 
is reduced. However, experience has shown that if congestion is reduced on 
our roadways, there is often “latent” demand that will increase traffic on those 
particular roadways. This “induced demand” or “rebound effect” is described in 
further detail later in this chapter.
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14.2  Sustainable Transportation Solutions
Pollutant and GHG emissions can be reduced in many ways. See Figure 
14.2.1 for a simplified framework. GHG emissions may be treated as 
primary energy carbon intensity multiplied by vehicle and transportation 
efficiency multiplied by total travel demand.
Primary energy carbon intensity can be reduced by using lower- 
carbon fuels or low-carbon electrification, which is described later in 
this section. The energy needed to drive a specific distance can be 
reduced by improving both (1) vehicle efficiency and (2) transporta-
tion system efficiency, again assuming no induced demand (note that 
induced demand can be mitigated using the methods outlined in Section 
14.1). This analytical construct—separating the determinants of emis-
sions into carbon intensity, efficiency, and demand—can be used as a 
policy framework. A large carbon tax would address all three strategies, 
though it must be very large to be effective. In practice, an environmen-
tally sustainable transportation solution will depend on a mix of policies 
and strategies.
Figure 14.2.1 General approach for calculating GHG emissions from 
transportation.
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Vehicle technology
There has been considerable effort over the years to make vehicles more 
energy efficient, thereby reducing pollutant and GHG emissions. Many of 
these vehicle-based technologies are described in Chapter 13. In recent 
years, vehicles have benefited from lighter materials and more-efficient 
combustion engines and powertrains. In just the past few years, the 
greater use of electric powertrains, including gasoline-electric, plug-in hy-
brid, battery electric, and fuel cell electric technologies, has provided the 
promise of even much greater efficiency improvements. Overall vehicle 
efficiency improvements are illustrated in Figure 14.2.2 for different areas 
of the world. The improvements are due to a combination of aggressive 
policies and large technology investments by automobile manufacturers.
The increasing use of electric powertrains provides the promise for 
continued improvements in energy efficiency. The continuing drop in 
battery costs assures that this trend will continue into the foreseeable 
future. Figure 14.2.3 illustrates the number of electric vehicles (EVs) that 
are being introduced in different parts of the world.
Figure 14.2.2 Average passenger car GHG emissions normalized by distance 
traveled for different regions. Reproduced with permission from the International 
Council on Clean Transportation 2019.
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Low-carbon fuels
Another key strategy for reducing GHG emissions is to utilize low- carbon 
fuels. Today’s dominant fuel for transportation is gasoline, followed by 
diesel fuel and then jet fuel (Figure 14.2.4). All of these fuels are petro-
leum based and contribute significantly to CO2 emissions. A number of 
other fuels are being introduced that are less carbon intensive, including 
bio-based fuels, electricity, and hydrogen. Their market share is currently 
quite small when compared with petroleum-based fuels. As described in 
Chapter 13, both electricity and hydrogen (as well as biofuels) can be 
utilized as effective energy carriers for transportation. Liquid biofuels 
have the advantage of being easily portable and having high energy den-
sity, like petroleum fuels. When made from crop and food wastes, liquid 
and gaseous biofuels have very low life cycle greenhouse gas emissions, 
sometimes even less than zero because waste disposal and methane 
leakage are avoided. With steady improvements in processing and 
farming, even biofuels made from crops, such as corn and sugarcane, 
tend to be significantly superior to petroleum fuels. As processes for 
converting grasses, trees, and other cellulosic material into liquids are 
improved (Chapter 18), resulting in even lower life cycle greenhouse gas 
emissions, biofuels will likely prove the superior alternative fuel for avi-
ation and perhaps long-haul trucking, where portability and high energy 
density are valued most highly.
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Figure 14.2.3 The number of electric vehicles (EVs) being introduced for 
different regions. Reproduced with permission from BloombergNEF 2018.
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Life cycle analysis is necessary for comparing emissions of different 
fuels. A life cycle analysis includes all emissions from extraction through 
combustion, including, for example, the energy from farm machinery 
and carbon released from soils when growing biofuels, emissions from 
the operation of refineries, and the transport of fuels in tankers, pipe-
lines, and trucks.
Table 14.2.1 provides rough estimates of life cycle emissions of 
different vehicle-fuel combinations, compared with gasoline-powered 
internal combustion engine vehicles. Note that these life cycle emission 
comparisons (per kilometer) could vary considerably since they rely on 
a large number of assumptions. For example, GHG emissions for an 
electric vehicle depend on the carbon intensity of the electricity used 
to charge the vehicle. This varies widely across space and time, from 
close to zero carbon in regions powered predominately by nuclear and 
low-carbon renewable sources, to carbon emissions exceeding those 
from internal combustion engines in places where electricity is gener-
ated from coal.
In general, petroleum-based fuels are convenient fuels for vehicles, 
since they have high energy density (per unit of volume), are easily 
Gasoline, 54%
Diesel, 23%
Jet fuel, 12%
Other, 3%
Biofuels, 5%
Natural Gas, 3%
Figure 14.2.4 Fuel utilization for the US transportation market, 2018. Data 
from Energy Information Administration 2019.
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portable and refuel vehicles quickly (because they are liquid), and have 
energy infrastructure already in place. However, petroleum-based fuels 
have high GHG emissions and emit large quantities of conventional 
pollutants. As a society, we have grown dependent on petroleum and 
have become quite cost-efficient at extracting and refining fossil fuels, 
resulting in low prices.
In some cases, though, alternative fuels are demonstrably cheaper 
than petroleum, even in the US, where petroleum products tend to have 
lower prices than elsewhere. For example, as of 2019, a kilowatt hour 
costs about $0.12 in the US on average—equivalent to about 3–4 cents 
per mile, an energy cost about one-third that of gasoline-powered cars. 
In areas with low-carbon electricity, these electric vehicles also offer 
significant GHG emission savings.
VMT reduction methods
As described earlier, total VMT in the US continues to grow at a steady 
pace (for example, see Figure 14.1.4). VMT was flat from 2008 to 2012, 
primarily because of the economic recession, but has been increasing 
since then.
In terms of potentially reducing VMT, we can refer back to a variety 
of mobility measures outlined in Section 14.1. In general, these include 
the following:
Table 14.2.1 Greenhouse gas emissions per kilometer,  
relative to gasoline-powered internal combustion engines, full energy cycle
Fuel/Feedstock Percent Change
Fuel cells, using hydrogen from solar −90 to −85
Cellulosic ethanol −90 to −40
Battery electric vehicles, electricity from low-carbon sources −60 to −25
Hybrid electric vehicles −40 to −30
Battery electric vehicles, current US power mix −40 to −20
Diesel −25 to −15
CNG from NG −20 to 0
Gasoline —
Battery electric vehicles, new coal plant 0 to +10
Note: Actual impacts could vary considerably; these estimates reflect a large number of 
assumptions and should be treated as illustrative.
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 ➤ Use pricing mechanisms to encourage users to reduce the number 
and distance of their trips and increase the number of passengers 
per vehicle. Several regions across the US are already increasing the 
number of toll and commuter lanes on their roadway networks, 
while cities such as Singapore, London, and Stockholm have imple-
mented congestion pricing schemes that charge drivers to enter the 
city center.
 ➤ Provide incentives for using alternative modes such as transit and 
biking, as well as shifting work locations and schedules, for instance 
by telecommuting.
 ➤ Reduce urban sprawl, increase land use densities, and improve the 
mix of jobs and housing.
Transportation efficiency
Another important strategy for reducing emissions from transportation 
is to improve the efficiency of transportation system operations. As 
described above, today’s transportation systems are often congested, 
which wastes time, money, and fuel. This wasted fuel translates to in-
creased pollutant and GHG emissions. Over the last several decades, a 
number of intelligent transportation system (ITS) techniques have 
emerged that are squarely aimed at reducing these environmental im-
pacts. Referring back to Figure 14.1.8, ITS techniques and applications 
target three general areas: (1) congestion mitigation (for example, 
advanced signal control, predictive ramp metering, incident manage-
ment), whereby congestion is reduced and speeds increased; (2) better 
management of speeds (on the right side of Figure 14.1.8) for different 
roadway types, using techniques such as variable speed limits and intelli-
gent speed adaptation; and (3) smoothing of traffic by using techniques 
such as cooperative adaptive cruise control and speed harmonization. 
These “eco-friendly” intelligent transportation system technologies are 
typically categorized into three areas: vehicle systems, traffic manage-
ment systems, and travel information systems.
Vehicle systems represent vehicle features and functions that allow 
a vehicle to “see,” respond to, and communicate with its surroundings. 
Sensors such as on-board radar and computer vision technologies en-
able a vehicle to monitor the distance to the vehicle in front and to 
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Table 14.2.2 Intelligent transportation system applications utilizing 
connected and automated vehicle technology
V2I Safety
• Red light violation warning
• Curve speed warning
• Stop sign gap assist
• Spot weather impact warning
• Reduced speed/work zone warning
• Pedestrian in signalized crosswalk 
warning (transit)
V2V Safety
• Emergency electronic brake lights 
• Forward collision warning 
• Intersection movement assist 
• Left turn assist 
• Blind spot/lane change warning 
• Do not pass warning 
• Vehicle turning right in front of bus 
warning (transit)
Agency Data
• Probe-based pavement maintenance
• Probe-enabled traffic monitoring
• Vehicle classification-based traffic studies
• CV-enabled turning movement & 
intersection analysis
• CV-enabled origin-destination studies
• Work zone traveler information
Environment
• Eco-approach and departure at signal-
ized intersections
• Eco-traffic signal timing
• Eco-traffic signal priority
• Connected eco-driving
• Wireless inductive/resonance charging
• Eco-lanes management
• Eco-speed harmonization
• Eco-cooperative adaptive cruise control
• Eco-traveler information
• Eco-ramp metering
• Low emissions zone managment
• AFV charging/fueling information
• Eco-smart parking
• Dynamic eco-routing (light vehicle, 
transit, freight)
• Eco-ICM decision support system
Road Weather
• Motorist advisories and warnings 
(MAW)
• Enhanced MDSS
• Vehicle data translator 
• Weather response traffic information 
(WxTINFO)
Mobility
• Advanced traveler information system
• Intelligent traffic signal system (I-SIG)
• Signal priority (transit, freight)
• Mobile accessible pedestrian signal 
system (PED-SIG)
• Emergency vehicle preemption 
(PREEMPT)
• Dynamic speed harmonization 
(SPD-HARM)
• Queue warning (Q-WARN)
• Cooperative adaptive cruise control 
(CACC)
• Incident scene pre-arrival staging 
guidance for emergency responders 
(RESP-STG)
• Incident scene work zone alerts for 
drivers and workers (INC-ZONE)
• Emergency communications and evacua-
tion (EVAC)
• Connection protection (T-CONNECT)
• Dynamic transit operations (T-DISP)
• Dynamic ridesharing (D-RIDE)
• Freight-specific dynamic travel planning 
and performance
• Drayage optimization
Smart Roadside
• Wireless inspection
• Smart truck parking
Source: Adapted from Iteris. 2016. Connected Vehicle Reference Implementation 
Architecture. http://www.iteris.com/cvria/html/applications/applications.html.
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detect when a vehicle is leaving a lane, and they support adaptive cruise 
control systems that allow a driver to select a desired speed and set a 
following distance. In addition, communication devices (for example, 
dedicated short-range communications, cellular) will likely be deployed 
to enable vehicle-to-vehicle, vehicle-to-infrastructure, and infrastructure-
to- vehicle applications that are primarily focused on improving safety. It 
is important to point out that improved anticollision systems may have 
a significant indirect energy and emissions savings: fewer crashes result 
in less congestion, allowing for higher average traffic speeds with less 
stop and go (Figure 14.1.8). In addition to safety applications, a variety 
of mobility and environmental applications have also emerged, as illus-
trated in Table 14.2.2. These applications take advantage of connected 
vehicle technology such as cooperative adaptive cruise control where 
vehicles communicate with each other to cooperatively manage follow-
ing distance, braking, accelerating, and more. These technologies are 
allowing vehicles to become increasingly automated, with the goal of 
full vehicle automation coming in the next decade.
Traffic management systems have become more sophisticated 
with the advent of better sensor technology, more reliable communi-
cation channels, and advanced information processing. Transportation 
managers are better equipped to estimate traffic conditions, detect 
and remove traffic incidents, and craft better travel demand manage-
ment strategies (that is, manage the number of vehicles on a congested 
roadway). The overarching goal of traffic management is to take full 
advantage of the existing roadway capacity, thus keeping traffic flowing 
smoothly at moderate speeds. In doing so, it will have a large impact 
in reducing energy consumption and GHG emissions from each vehicle. 
In addition, traffic management system strategies go even further by 
reducing the number of vehicles and VMT in the transportation network 
without compromising overall travel needs, thereby reducing the total 
contributions of energy consumption and emissions from the transpor-
tation sector.
Travel information systems provide information to drivers, such 
as route guidance systems, geolocation systems, and electronic pay-
ment systems. All of these systems add convenience to the traveler 
while reducing energy consumption and emissions. For example, a route 
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guidance system will cut back on unnecessary travel that may occur 
when a driver gets lost or chooses a long, out-of-the-way path. En route 
driver information can reduce energy and emissions associated with 
driving around in search of a specific location or parking. Electronic 
payment systems also eliminate the need for a driver to decelerate the 
vehicle, idle while a manual transaction takes place, and then accelerate 
the vehicle back to a desired speed. If this payment can occur without 
slowing down, energy consumption and emissions are greatly reduced.
In general, environmentally friendly ITS applications (that is, specific 
ITS applications that reduce energy and emissions) have slowly been 
emerging over the last decade, as have safety and mobility programs 
mentioned in Table 14.2.2. Pioneering research programs in the US, the 
European Union, and other regions have made significant progress in 
developing and testing these ITS applications and technologies with a 
focus on environmental benefits. From these research programs, it is 
clear that specific environmental benefits can be maximized when differ-
ent ITS applications are “tuned” so that emissions and energy consump-
tion are reduced. The actual energy and emissions savings vary, but they 
are typically on the order of 5% to 20%. It is important to point out that 
there is not a single ITS technology solution that has demonstrated a 
large reduction in energy consumption and emissions. But since most of 
these applications are additive, greater benefits may be achieved when a 
combination of environmentally friendly ITS programs is put into place.
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14.3  Vehicle Automation
In recent years, interest in vehicle automation has soared. Some re-
ports have predicted that vehicles could be fully automated (that is, 
not requiring a driver) by as early as 2025, though this is highly unlikely 
other than in tightly bounded areas with easy driving conditions. As an 
extension of ITS, vehicle automation could have both positive and neg-
ative effects on society (Figure 14.3.1). Vehicle automation could lead 
to reduced emissions, due to congestion reduction (for example, crash 
avoidance, platooning), traffic smoothing (for example, cooperative 
adaptive cruise control), and better speed management (for example, 
speed harmonization). Indeed, eco-driving behaviors could be directly 
programmed into the automated vehicle operation.
On the other hand, vehicle automation could potentially increase 
emissions by increasing vehicle travel. People might use their automated 
vehicles for additional purposes or choose a more distant place to live, 
since the time cost of travel would be reduced. Automated vehicles 
could be used by a wider range of users, including youth and elderly. 
“Drop-off” errands might increase, resulting in new empty vehicle relo-
cation trips, such as returning home without any passengers.
Some early conclusions regarding automated vehicles include the 
following:
 ➤ Partial and full automation can reduce energy use and emissions, but 
only if incentives exist to encourage pooled use of vehicles.
 ➤ Automated vehicles that communicate and coordinate with other 
vehicles and the infrastructure will likely have greater improvements 
in safety, mobility, and the environment compared with autonomous 
vehicles without those capabilities.
 ➤ Automated vehicles have the strong potential to induce travel de-
mand, unless incentives exist for pooled use of the vehicles.
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 ➤ It may be advantageous to first introduce automation in fleet ap-
plications or shared mobility, since their operations (that is, total 
travel) can be closely managed and pooling can be more easily 
encouraged.
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Figure 14.3.1 Potential energy/emissions impacts of automated technology. 
The upper-bound case is shown in the top panel, and the lower-bound case in 
the lower panel. Reproduced with permission from Stephens et al. 2016. Figures 
10 and 11.
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14.4   Improved Air-Conditioning Efficiency 
and Refrigerants
Motor vehicle air-conditioning systems consume between 3% and 20% 
of all motor fuel, depending on the climate, vehicle, drive cycle, and 
congestion. Worldwide, more people are purchasing vehicles with air 
conditioning (AC). As fuel efficiency standards across the globe make 
the global fleet increasingly fuel efficient, AC will account for a growing 
percentage of vehicle fuel use. Warmer temperatures due to climate 
change will further increase the use of air conditioning. GHG emissions 
due to AC are almost three times greater in higher-temperature cli-
mates, making system efficiency improvements even more important in 
warmer regions.
Changes in refrigerants and improvements in AC efficiency can 
cut per-vehicle GHG emissions associated with AC use by up to 70% 
Figure 14.4.1 Greenhouse gas reduction potential from an internal 
combustion engine passenger vehicle air conditioner operating at higher 
average-temperature conditions, such as those found in Florida. Reproduced 
with permission from Blumberg et al. 2019.
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compared with older systems (Figure 14.4.1). As of 2019, most vehicles 
still used HFC-134a (R-134a) refrigerant, which has a 100-year global 
warming potential (GWP100) of 1,300. Enhanced R-134a systems reduce 
GHG emissions by approximately 40% and are now prevalent in the 
market. Fortunately, cost-effective alternatives that use low-GWP refrig-
erants and technology to improve AC system efficiency are available that 
can reduce vehicle-AC-related GHG emissions by another 50%.
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14.5  Key Takeaways
 ➤ Transportation plays a crucial role in energy use, GHG emissions, 
and local air quality.
 ➤ There are generally four different ways to mitigate transportation 
emissions: through vehicle technology, low-carbon fuels, VMT man-
agement, and intelligent transportation systems, including the use 
of connected and automated vehicles.
 ➤ Vehicle electrification is well underway and is providing opportuni-
ties for large emission reductions.
 ➤ Huge improvements in vehicle technology have reduced pollutant 
emissions and, to a lesser extent, CO2 emission.
 ➤ The amount of vehicle use has increased dramatically over the last 
several decades and has a significant role in transportation emissions.
 ➤ VMT can be reduced by increasing the use of pooled travel (for 
example, buses, transit, shared mobility that is pooled).
 ➤ Other VMT reduction methods may include adopting incentives 
and disincentives to reflect full social costs of travel and, eventually, 
transitioning from individual vehicle ownership to use of mobility 
services that are pooled.
 ➤ Sustainable transportation requires advances in all aspects of trans-
portation, including technological, political, economic, and behav-
ioral aspects.
 ➤ Vehicle automation is likely to be deployed in the near future and 
should be managed so as to achieve environmental sustainability.
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Learning Objectives
1. Explain the importance of rapid action to mitigate super 
pollutants, also known as short-lived climate pollutants 
(SLCPS).
You will learn how mitigation of black carbon, methane, tropo-
spheric ozone, and hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs) can have a powerful 
and relatively rapid impact to bend the warming curve because of 
the large contributions of these climate pollutants to current global 
warming (>40%) and their short atmospheric lifetimes. You will be 
able to explain some of the main benefits of immediate action to 
reduce emissions of these short-lived climate pollutants.
2. Describe and evaluate measures to bend the curves of black 
carbon, methane, and ozone.
Next, you will learn about specific measures to mitigate emissions of 
black carbon and methane. Mitigation of methane will also reduce 
levels of tropospheric ozone, a potent greenhouse gas. You will be 
able to describe how reduction of these substances can contribute 
to human health, food security, and climate justice.
3. Describe and evaluate measures to bend the HFC curve, 
including the Montreal Protocol and other policy instruments.
You will learn how the Montreal Protocol, a 1987 international 
agreement that was designed to protect the stratospheric ozone 
layer, has also resulted in significantly reduced warming from green-
house gases such as chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs). You will be able 
to explain how the 2016 Kigali Amendment to the Montreal Protocol 
goes further and has the potential to avoid up to 0.5°C of warming 
by 2100 by mandating the global phasedown of HFCs, a class of 
powerful greenhouse gases. Finally, you will learn how parallel efforts 
to improve energy efficiency of air conditioning and other cooling 
equipment can double the climate benefits of the HFC phasedown.
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Overview
This chapter focuses on Solution #9 from the Bending the Curve report, 
part of the technology-based solutions cluster:
Immediately make maximum use of available technologies and 
regulations to reduce methane emissions by 50% and black carbon 
emissions by 90%. Phase out hydrofluorocarbons by 2030 by 
amending the Montreal Protocol.
The last few chapters have discussed technologies and policies to 
bend the warming curve by reducing emissions of carbon dioxide (CO2). 
However, as discussed in Chapter 4, the benefits of CO2 mitigation will 
not be felt for at least a decade or two, and CO2 mitigation alone will not 
be enough to keep us below the 2°C threshold of dangerous warming, 
nor the more prudent 1.5ºC threshold.
Moreover, decreasing CO2 emissions by transitioning away from 
fossil fuels might have the paradoxical effect of increasing global warm-
ing in the short term. Fossil fuels contain sulfur and other impurities. 
Their combustion results in the formation of sulfate aerosols in the at-
mosphere. Efforts to reduce sulfates have been under way for several 
decades because of their damaging effects on human health and natural 
ecosystems, but these aerosols also reflect sunlight, causing a cooling 
effect that partly offsets the warming from carbon dioxide. As the use 
of fossil fuels decreases, the loss of sulfate aerosol cooling will be felt 
almost immediately, while the warming effects of the emitted CO2 will 
take decades or even centuries to diminish.
In this chapter, we will explore a complementary solution: reducing 
a key group of warming agents knows as super pollutants or short-
lived climate pollutants (SLCPs) to bend the warming curve quickly 
(over a few decades) while we pursue CO2 mitigation to bend the curve 
in the long term (over several decades to centuries). Combined, these 
efforts, if enacted by 2020, give us a significant chance (about 90% prob-
ability) of keeping warming well below 2°C (aiming for 1.5°C) in this 
century and beyond.
Figure 15.1 summarizes the properties of the four short-lived cli-
mate pollutants we’ll be considering: black carbon particles (a major 
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component of soot), the greenhouse gases methane and tropospheric 
ozone (not to be confused with the beneficial ozone in the strato-
sphere), and hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs). These four warming agents 
are called short-lived climate pollutants (SLCPs) because their typical 
lifetimes in the atmosphere range from about a week to 15 years, com-
pared with hundreds or thousands of years for CO2 (see Box 1.3.1 in 
Chapter 1 for a discussion of atmospheric lifetimes and warming po-
tentials of greenhouse gases). Reducing emissions of these substances 
quickly brings down their concentrations in the atmosphere. For exam-
ple, if all black carbon particle emissions were eliminated today, black 
carbon would disappear from the atmosphere within a few weeks.
We will mostly use the scientific term SLCPs in the rest of this chap-
ter, but these four climate pollutants are often called super pollutants 
because of their strong warming effects. It has been recognized since 
1975 that these warming agents are much more potent, pound for 
pound, than CO2. The warming effect of gases is measured in terms of 
Figure 15.1 This figure shows the lifetime of black carbon, methane, 
tropospheric ozone, and hydrofluorocarbons as well as their geographical 
impacts and mitigation potentials. Reproduced with permission from Climate and 
Clean Air Coalition. 
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their global warming potential (GWP), which is defined in Box 1.3.1 in 
Chapter 1. Methane is about 30 times more powerful than CO2, black 
carbon is 500 to 2,000 times more powerful, and HFCs produce from 
1,000 to over 4,000 times more warming on a 100-year time scale.
As detailed later in this chapter, mitigation of these SLCPs, if com-
pleted by 2030, can bend the warming curve by up to 0.6°C by 2050 
(about 0.4°C from methane mitigation, 0.1°C from black carbon, and 
0.1°C from HFCs), cutting the rate of projected warming by about half 
compared with “business as usual” and reducing the projected sea level 
rise between 2020 and 2050 by 20%. We can summarize the required 
emissions reductions as “80/40/100”: an 80% reduction for black car-
bon; a 40% reduction for methane; and a complete phaseout of high-
GWP HFCs. By 2100, these measures combined could avoid up to 1.2°C 
warming. For comparison, aggressive CO2 mitigation would avoid about 
0.1ºC to 0.3°C by 2050 and up to 1.9°C by 2100.
In this chapter, we will describe some of the available measures to 
SLCP Measures
Black carbon
• Improve stoves (biomass to 
LPG/biogas, wood to pellet)
• Upgrade brick kilns
• Use particle filters for diesel 
vehicles
Methane
• Degasification, recovery, and 
use 
• Recovery from municipal 
waste & wastewater treatment 
• Reduce emissions from 
agriculture
16 measures, including those listed above:
ü » −40% methane, » −80% BC in 2030 (rel. to BAU)
ü No technical breakthroughs needed
ü Already implemented in many countries
ü Half reductions at low cost or cost-neutral
HFCs
• Low-GWP, high energy-
efficiency alternatives for 
refrigeration, air conditioning, 
and foam blowing
• Efficacy for cooling 
technologies
ü No “one-size-fits-all”
solution
ü Further R&D for super-
efficient and affordable 
cooling equipment
Figure 15.2 Short-lived climate pollutant measures. BC = black carbon; 
BAU = business as usual; R&D = research and development. Adapted from the 
Climate and Clean Air Coalition; data from UNEP and WMO. 2011.
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produce the required 80/40/100 reductions in emissions of black car-
bon, methane, and HFCs, some of the most effective of which are high-
lighted in Figure 15.2. While many more SLCP mitigation measures are 
possible—a 2011 study by the United Nations Environment Programme 
(UNEP) and the World Meteorological Organization (WMO) examined 
over 2,000 of them—the key measures discussed in this chapter account 
for 90% of the avoided warming. These measures are based on existing 
technologies and do not require new technical breakthroughs.
It’s important to note that the sources of SLCPs as well as the mea-
sures for emissions reductions are highly dependent on the region under 
consideration. For Africa and Asia, the critical measures include reducing 
black carbon emissions from biomass cookstoves and diesel vehicles as 
well as reducing methane emissions from coal, oil, and gas production 
and municipal waste. For North America and Europe, the key mitigation 
measures include reducing methane emissions from oil and gas pro-
duction, long-distance natural gas transmission pipelines, and municipal 
waste as well as reducing black carbon emissions from residential bio-
mass heating, shipping activities, and open agricultural biomass burning.
You may have noticed that we have not discussed mitigation mea-
sures for tropospheric ozone emissions. This is because ozone is not 
directly emitted by human activities; we will see later in this chapter that 
measures to reduce methane emissions and fossil fuel combustion will 
significantly decrease ozone as well.
The final sections of this chapter cover the phasedown of HFCs 
under the Kigali Amendment to the Montreal Protocol, an international 
treaty signed in 1987 to phase out substances that deplete the ozone 
layer. Generally considered the world’s most successful environmental 
treaty, the Montreal Protocol solved the first great threat to the global 
atmosphere by phasing out chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs) and related 
fluo rinated gases and by putting the ozone layer on the path to recov-
ery in the 2030s. At the same time, because CFCs and other fluorinated 
gases are also powerful climate pollutants, the success of the Montreal 
Protocol has avoided warming that would have grown to equal or sur-
pass the warming caused by CO2 today. The success of the Montreal 
Protocol is continuing with the Kigali Amendment, which was approved 
in 2016 and entered into force at the beginning of 2019.
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15.1   Why Should We Mitigate Short-Lived 
Climate Pollutants?
Climate benefits of SLCP mitigation
We can see the importance of mitigating SLCPs by looking at Figure 
15.1.1. We have already seen this figure in Chapter 4. It shows the 
temperature record (purple line) from 1950 to about 2010 and possible 
future temperature pathways up to 2100. As we have previously dis-
cussed, the planet has already warmed by 1°C. Most researchers con-
clude that warming of less than 1.5°C (relative to preindustrial times) 
will have impacts that, while significant, will mostly be manageable. This 
zone of presumed relatively “safe” temperatures is colored green. Red 
represents the zone of “dangerous” warming above 2°C.
The curved lines in the figure represent different possible tempera-
ture pathways, based on the choices we make now and in the near 
future. The highest, gray “business as usual” curve shows the evolution 
of temperatures if human emissions continue to grow unabated. (Some 
policymakers now call this the “disaster curve” rather than the more 
benign-sounding “business as usual curve.”) This pathway leads to tem-
perature increases that will likely exceed 4°C by 2100. As described in 
previous chapters, the impacts of warming in this range are not merely 
dangerous; they could be catastrophic for human society and natural 
ecosystems. This is the warming curve we must bend to ensure a sus-
tainable future for our children and their descendants. The other curved 
lines show possible mitigation scenarios, as described below.
It’s important to keep in mind that, although these pathways are 
shown as definite lines, there is actually a range of possible tempera-
ture trajectories for each of these pathways. Refer back to Box 1.4.3 
in Chapter 1 for more details on this concept. The lines represent the 
most likely temperature outcome for each pathway, as determined by 
computer models.
The dotted black “CO2 only” line shows the expected effects if we 
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make significant efforts to reduce carbon dioxide, but not SLCPs. We 
can see that this scenario bends the warming curve well below the 
business- as-usual line, but the benefits happen very slowly and don’t 
really become apparent until after about 2050. In contrast, the solid 
black “SLCPs only” mitigation line drops below the business-as-usual 
curve almost immediately because of the short atmospheric lifetimes of 
SLCPs. This pathway delays the time to cross the 2°C threshold by 20 
to 30 years.
A mitigation strategy that focuses on reducing both CO2 and SLCPs 
simultaneously—the solid blue line in the figure—is the only pathway 
that keeps warming below the 2°C threshold throughout this century. 
Reducing SLCPs bends the curve immediately and buys us time for the 
long-term effect of CO2 reduction to take effect. Pursuing both CO2 and 
SLCP mitigation simultaneously is our best—indeed, our only—hope for 
avoiding dangerous warming of the planet.
Commentary on temperature thresholds: From a scientific perspective 
there are no sharply defined physical thresholds beyond which negative 
impacts will start to happen. In fact, damaging effects of the current 
Figure 15.1.1 Projections 
of future warming along 
business-as-usual and 
mitigation pathways. From 
Ramanathan et al. 2017. 
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warming of 1°C are already being experienced in most parts of the 
world and will get progressively worse as temperatures keep increasing, 
as documented in the 2018 Special Report from the Intergovernmental 
Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) on the impacts of 1.5°C warming. Our 
best understanding of the climate system indicates that sustained warm-
ing of 2°C would be unprecedented over at least the past 2 million years 
and would lead to very severe impacts on human health and threaten 
food and water security. In practice, such temperature thresholds are 
used as benchmarks to evaluate the effectiveness of mitigation mea-
sures. The yellow area between 1.5°C and 2.0°C represents the transi-
tion zone between “safe” temperatures and dangerous climate change. 
Keep in mind that we generally are referring to warming that is averaged 
globally, even though in reality warming is not evenly distributed, with 
some regions, such as the Arctic, warming at least twice as much as the 
global average.
Health and food security benefits of SLCP mitigation
Mitigation of SLCPs has important co-benefits in addition to helping to 
bend the warming curve. Black carbon and tropospheric ozone have sig-
nificant negative impacts on human health, and ozone is a major cause 
of damage to agricultural crops. The mitigation measures detailed in 
this chapter can save about 2.4 million lives lost each year and about 50 
million tons of crops lost each year to air pollution. The health benefits 
from reduction of black carbon and ozone are valued at about $5 tril-
lion per year. The health benefits and food benefits alone would justify 
mitigation of these pollutants even without consideration of the cooling 
benefits from cutting them.
Climate justice benefits of SLCP mitigation
It’s also important to bear in mind that, as we discussed in Chapter 2, 
the negative impacts of these pollutants are borne disproportionately by 
the global poor. The poorest 3 billion human beings, representing 40% 
of the global population, have limited access to energy from fossil fuels 
and contribute only about 5% of global CO2 emissions. Poverty forces 
the poorest 3 billion to rely on eighteenth-century technologies such as 
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inefficient wood-burning stoves for cooking. The poorest 3 billion on 
the planet are far more exposed to threats such as drought, flooding, 
heat waves, and sea level rise. Meanwhile, the wealthiest 1 billion repre-
sent about 13% of the world’s population but emit about 50% of global 
CO2 pollution. Their greater resources provide more opportunities to 
adapt to the impact of global warming, such as using air conditioning to 
reduce deaths from heat waves. Mitigation of SLCPs would help to re-
duce these disproportionate impacts. Moreover, some of the solutions, 
such as more efficient stoves, would result in improved quality of life for 
many among the global poor.
The disproportionate responsibilities of the global wealthy and vul-
nerabilities of the global poor add a moral and ethical component to 
climate change. As discussed in Chapters 6, 7, and 8 on societal trans-
formation, solutions to these issues should involve not only scientists 
and engineers, but also religious communities, philosophers, ethicists, 
climate justice advocates, and others from civil society. Mitigating short-
lived climate pollutants brings these issues into particularly sharp focus. 
Addressing them will require an alliance among science, religion, health 
care, and public policy.
Political benefits of SLCP mitigation
Fortunately, reducing SLCPs poses fewer political barriers than cutting 
carbon dioxide. First, governments are more likely to agree to emissions 
reduction strategies that can deliver local benefits. Second, already avail-
able technologies and policies (such as air pollution regulations for black 
carbon and methane and the Montreal Protocol for HFCs) readily allow 
for deep cuts in these pollutants. Third, unlike reductions in carbon 
dioxide emissions, whose main benefits arrive only after decades of mit-
igation efforts, SLCPs mitigation would satisfy the immediate interests of 
countries because of rapid and visible improvements in health and food 
security. Visible early success in fighting climate change through limiting 
SLCPs would also enhance the credibility of climate change policies and 
thus accelerate progress on the more challenging task of limiting car-
bon dioxide. A plan to reduce short-lived climate pollutants would align 
the self-interests of many polluting nations. It is not surprising that the 
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Climate and Clean Air Coalition, formed in 2012 by the United Nations 
to focus on SLCP mitigation, already has 61 member nations working 
together to mitigate SLCPs (Box 15.1.1).
Economic costs and benefits of SLCP mitigation
To date, there are only limited studies on the costs and benefits of mea-
sures to reduce SLCPs. However, studies that account for co-benefits 
such as human health improvements and the gains from reduced crop 
loss, as well as the avoidance of damage that would otherwise result 
Figure 15.1.2 Black carbon and methane mitigation measures. Numbers 
indicate the share of warming reduction from each measure as a percentage 
of the total warming reduction for all 16 measures in the 2011 UNEP report. 
Labels indicate whether the measure targets black carbon (BC) or methane 
(CH4). Colors indicate the cost grouping: blue indicates minimal cost or cost 
savings; green indicates moderate costs; orange or yellow indicates high costs; 
gray indicates costs that are difficult to quantify. Data from UNEP and WMO 
2011. 
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from warming, show a clear net societal benefit from SLCP mitigation 
measures. Furthermore, off-the-shelf technologies exist for mitigating 
most of these emissions.
For black carbon and methane, a comprehensive cost analysis was 
provided by the 2011 UNEP study that was highlighted in the Overview. 
That study, which identified the 16 key measures for black carbon and 
methane mitigation discussed in Figure 15.2, also classified these mea-
sures into four groups: measures with minimal costs or that yielded 
cost savings; measures with moderate costs; measures with high costs; 
and measures whose costs are difficult to quantify because they depend 
in part on improved governance mechanisms in developing countries. 
Figure 15.1.2 summarizes these results for the top 16 measures recom-
mended in the UNEP report. Notice that over half of these measures can 
be accomplished with minimal costs or cost savings; however, most of 
these measures have up-front costs for their initial implementation, with 
the savings realized over many years and not always by those paying the 
up-front cost. It’s also important to note that these cost estimates do 
not include savings due to improvements in human health or avoided 
crop damage. Even measures that are identified as high-cost could be 
adopted based on health or food security co-benefits. The European 
Union, for example, has implemented standards for diesel particle filters 
based primarily on health benefits from improved air quality.
For HFCs, the cost-benefit calculus is just as compelling as that for 
black carbon and methane. The companies that make refrigerants such 
as HFCs have learned how to profit from the switch to safer substi-
tutes, without increasing the cost to consumers in any significant way. 
Indeed, when these companies lose the intellectual property protection 
for their chemicals, they welcome the transition so they can sell their 
newer substitutes. Moreover, under the Kigali Amendment to the Mon-
treal Protocol, developed countries contribute to a dedicated funding 
mechanism that pays the incremental cost for developing countries to 
switch to safer substitutes. We’ll be discussing the costs and benefits of 
HFC mitigation in more detail in Sections 15.5 and 15.6.
It is important to consider what weight should be given to such 
cost-benefit analyses when facing an existential threat from runaway 
climate change. Former California governor Jerry Brown has compared 
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the climate threat to the threat the US faced in World War II, when 
it is unlikely a cost-benefit approach was used to determine how the 
US should produce the needed war material. (Wagner and Weitzman’s 
book Climate Shock explains why, in their view, a cost-benefit analysis 
shouldn’t be used to determine how to address the existential threat 
of climate.) Even if a cost-benefit analysis isn’t the most appropriate 
metric to evaluate climate solutions, however, the studies we’ve dis-
cussed show that the cost-benefit arguments for SLCP mitigation are 
quite compelling.
Box 15.1.1  Climate and Clean Air Coalition
The Climate and Clean Air Coalition (CCAC) is a global organization 
of governmental, nongovernmental, and intergovernmental entities 
that have committed to improving the air quality through actions 
that reduce short-lived climate pollutants (SLCPs), consistent with 
the recommendation in Solution #9 of reducing global methane 
emissions by up to 40% and black carbon emissions by up to 80%. 
The CCAC was launched in 2012 by the United Nations Environment 
Programme (UNEP) and six countries—Bangladesh, Canada, Ghana, 
Mexico, Sweden, and the United States. There are 61 state partners 
(nations) and 67 nonstate partners (such as international finance 
institutions, regional development banks, and city networks) at the 
time of this writing. In 2015, CCAC countries contributed about 40% 
of global black carbon emissions, and CCAC countries could supply 
about 50% of total mitigation by 2030.
The CCAC’s activities target the main sectors responsible for 
SLCP emissions: cooking and heating, industry, transport, agriculture, 
fossil fuels, waste management, refrigeration, and cooling. The CCAC 
is currently focused on 11 initiatives. Seven are sector-specific initia-
tives that include diesel, oil and gas, waste, bricks, HFCs, household 
energy, and agriculture. The remaining four, which include supporting 
national action and planning, assessments, finance, and health, cut 
across sector lines to reduce emissions for all SLCPs. 
http://ccacoalition.org/en/content/who-we-are.
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Moving toward SLCP mitigation
Given the clear net benefits, why have nations not aggressively pro-
moted SLCP mitigation so far? There are several reasons:
 ➤ Perhaps the most important reason is that the combined climate, 
health, and food security benefits of SLCP mitigation have only been 
recognized since about 2010. While the scientific study of SLCPs is 
at least 40 years old, scientists studying the health effects of SLCPs 
as air pollutants were working separately from the scientists study-
ing SLCPs’ climate impacts. The vital role that SLCP mitigation can 
play in bending the warming curve has only begun to catch the 
attention of climate scientists in the last 10 years.
 ➤ Cost-benefit studies that show the combined societal benefits of 
SLCP mitigation—from reduced warming together with health and 
food security benefits—have only become available in recent years.
 ➤ Until around 2010, the attention of climate scientists, activists, and 
policymakers was focused primarily on CO2 emissions. There was 
concern that a sudden shift in focus to SLCPs would create the im-
pression that action on CO2 mitigation could be delayed or avoided, 
presenting a “moral hazard.”
 ➤ In all areas of environmental science, there is a time lag between 
scientific findings and policy response.
However, significant progress in SLCP mitigation is now underway. 
The Climate and Clean Air Coalition (http://ccacoalition.org/en, de-
scribed in Box 15.1.1) coordinates policies and practices at the interna-
tional level. In the US, the State of California has enacted legislation to 
drastically cut emissions of SLCPs. In addition, the United States Climate 
Alliance, which includes governors whose states represent 40% of the 
US population, is aggressively pursuing SLCP mitigation and has devel-
oped a detailed road map for reducing emissions.
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15.2  Mitigating Black Carbon
Black carbon, a major component of soot, consists of small particles of 
carbon that are mainly produced by incomplete combustion of fossil 
fuels or biomass, such as wood or other organic materials. These parti-
cles are classified as aerosols because they are light enough to remain in 
the atmosphere for anywhere from several hours to a few weeks.
Black carbon impacts
While many aerosols reflect solar radiation (sunlight) and have a cooling 
effect, black carbon absorbs sunlight and radiates infrared heat, sig-
nificantly contributing to the anthropogenic greenhouse effect. Black 
carbon is estimated to be the second or third most important warming 
agent behind CO2, with an impact comparable to that of methane.
Black carbon has additional negative impacts beyond its direct 
warming effect. In particular, when black carbon particles “rain out” of 
the atmosphere, some land on surfaces covered with snow or ice. There, 
the dark particles absorb sunlight, reducing the reflectivity of these sur-
faces and accelerating melting of snow, ice, and underlying permafrost. 
This in turn amplifies warming, particularly in the Arctic. It’s estimated 
that implementing the black carbon and methane mitigation measures 
discussed in this chaper could reduce Arctic warming between 2005 and 
2040 by nearly two-thirds, compared with a business-as-usual scenario.
Moreover, black carbon has serious negative impacts on air quality 
and human health. Black carbon particles are classified as PM2.5, which 
refers to particles that are less than 2.5 micrometers in size (PM stands 
for “particulate matter”). A micrometer is one-thousandth of a millime-
ter. (For comparison, most bacteria are between half a micrometer and 
5 micrometers long, so we’re considering particles that are quite small 
indeed.)
Because they are so small, PM2.5 particles like black carbon can be 
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inhaled deep into the lungs, where they are difficult to dislodge, and 
even into the bloodstream. This results in significant negative impacts on 
human health, including premature deaths from lung cancer and heart 
disease. A recent study by UNEP estimated that measures to reduce 
black carbon could avoid 2.4 million premature deaths annually by 2030 
(within a range of 0.7 to 4.6 million annual deaths).
Black carbon sources
In combustion (burning), carbon-rich molecules such as those in plant 
matter or fossil fuels combine with oxygen to produce carbon dioxide 
and water vapor. In actual combustion, not all of the carbon is converted 
to carbon dioxide. Some of it remains in complex interlinked molecules 
that form black carbon aerosols. Major sources of black carbon pol-
lution include a variety of types of combustion, as detailed in Figure 
15.2.1. The largest category is residential and commercial combustion. 
About 75% of this is from cooking with solid fuels (coal, firewood, and 
dung) by the world’s poorest 3 billion. The next largest source is trans-
port, with more than 90% of the emissions due to diesel vehicles. Next 
is industrial processes (8%) where solid fuels are used for combustion in 
boilers, kilns, and furnaces. Agriculture contributes 7% of black carbon 
emissions, mainly through burning of agriculture residues and waste.
Fortunately, a range of policy measures and off-the-shelf technolo-
gies are already available to address many of the major sources of black 
carbon, as we’ll see in the next section.
Black carbon mitigation
Table 15.2.1 summarizes the nine most important black carbon miti-
gation measures, as identified by UNEP in 2011. In this section, we will 
highlight a few of these key measures.
As shown in Figure 15.2.1, the largest single source of black car-
bon is residential and commercial combustion, and this is primarily for 
heating and cooking of food. In particular, cooking with traditional, 
inefficient stoves fueled by wood, dung, or agricultural waste (Figure 
15.2.2) is a major source of black carbon emissions worldwide, second 
only to burning of biomass. Household members, mostly women, must 
in many cases walk several kilometers each day to obtain firewood and 
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Table 15.2.1 Black carbon mitigation measures affecting BC and other co-
emitted compounds
Sector Measure
Transport Diesel particle filters for road and off-road vehicles
Elimination of high-emitting vehicles in road and off-road transport
Residential Replacement of coal by coal briquettes in cooking and heating 
stoves
Pellet stoves and boilers, using fuel made from recycled wood waste 
or sawdust, to replace current wood-burning technologies in the 
residential sector in industrialized countries
Introduction of clean-burning biomass stoves for cooking and 
heating in developing countries
Substitution of clean-burning cookstoves using modern fuels for 
traditional biomass cookstoves in developing countries
Industry Replacement of traditional brick kilns with vertical shaft kilns and 
Hoffman kilns
Replacement of traditional coke ovens with modern recovery ovens
Agriculture Ban on open field burning of agricultural waste
Source: Adapted from United Nations Environment Programme and World Meteorological 
Organization. 2011. Integrated Assessment of Black Carbon and Tropospheric Ozone. UNEP, 
Nairobi, Kenya.
Figure 15.2.1 Black carbon percentage contribution from 
various sources, 2005. Data from UNEP and WMO 2011. 
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are exposed to high levels of indoor particulates while cooking. Indoor 
air pollution is estimated to cause about 3 million premature deaths 
each year.
Pollution from cooking stoves is a particularly acute problem for 
the 3 billion global poor, many of whom lack the infrastructure and 
financial resources for gas or other fossil fuel stoves. An estimated 38% 
of households worldwide lack access to efficient, low-emission cook-
stoves, particularly in developing regions of Asia and sub-Saharan Africa.
Replacing biomass fuels such as wood or dung with fuels such as 
liquified petroleum gas or kerosene can significantly reduce black carbon 
emissions, but this is only possible in areas with developed fossil fuel 
and transportation infrastructures. In less-developed areas, inefficient 
traditional cooking methods can be replaced by cleaner forced-draft 
biomass stoves, which use a small fan to increase oxygen flow, promot-
ing more efficient and complete combustion and cutting black carbon 
emissions by 80%. Because the stoves require less fuel, they can also cut 
Figure 15.2.2 Woman cooking in Mukteshwar, Indian Himalayas, India. 
Photograph by V. Ramanathan.
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CO2 emissions by 50%. This is a win-win solution that not only reduces 
global emissions but provides a significant improvement in quality of life.
Improving stoves is the single most effective SLCP mitigation mea-
sure and actually saves money over the long run in reduced fuel costs. 
Considering the benefits, why haven’t these stoves been more widely 
adopted? Paradoxically, one obstacle is the initial cost to buy a stove, 
which may be moderate by the standards of developed nations but can 
amount to a month’s earnings or more for a low-income household. 
However, each stove is estimated to reduce warming emissions by the 
equivalent of 5.3 tons of CO2 per year.
Compensating householders for these reduced emissions based 
on a reasonable carbon price is one way to pay back the cost of the 
stove and even provide a small income stream. This kind of bottom-up 
mechanism that directly rewards individuals for their actions to protect 
climate may prove to be a key strategy for reducing SLCPs and is the 
approach taken by Project Surya (www.projectsurya.org). Other pilot 
programs to promote and fund wider use of clean cookstoves are also 
underway, under the auspices of organizations such as the Climate 
and Clean Air Coalition (Box 15.1.1) and the Clean Cooking Alliance 
(cleancookingalliance.org).
In the transportation sector, a variety of measures are also available 
to mitigate black carbon emissions. Diesel engines in particular emit 
much higher levels of black carbon than gasoline engines. However, 
diesel particle filters are available that can eliminate up to 95% of black 
carbon particulate emissions from each vehicle. Cities, states, and 
regions around the world, including Santiago (Chile) and New York 
City, have implemented regulations requiring the use of diesel particle 
filters. The State of California requires particulate filters for commercial 
vehicles such as heavy-duty trucks, and the European Union has required 
filters on all new diesel engines since 2009.
In addition to capturing diesel particles with filters, reductions in 
black carbon and other emissions from vehicles can be achieved through 
many of the same transportation measures discussed in Chapter 14. 
More fuel-efficient vehicle use, electrification of transportation systems 
(including use of hydrogen cells in larger trucks), smart transportation 
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systems, and reduction of vehicle miles traveled all reduce total emis-
sions of black carbon as well as CO2.
Elimination of the most heavily polluting vehicles, mostly older vehi-
cles with poor emission controls, is another effective measure to reduce 
black carbon emissions from transportation. However, this can be dif-
ficult to implement in countries with weak governance and inadequate 
enforcement systems.
Policies to reduce or ban agricultural waste burning can also con-
tribute to black carbon mitigation. Such policies have already been en-
acted in the European Union and California. By requiring diesel particle 
filters and phasing out agricultural waste burning, the State of California 
succeeded in reducing black carbon concentrations by 50% between 
1990 and 2010. 
Figure 15.2.3 displays some of the measures that are currently avail-
able to mitigate black carbon emissions.
Figure 15.2.3 Nine measures that aim to reduce black carbon emissions. 
Reproduced with permission from Climate and Clean Air Coalition; data from 
UNEP and WMO 2011. 
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15.3  Mitigating Methane
Methane (chemical formula CH4) is a particularly important warming 
agent because it affects global temperatures in four different ways. First, 
it is a powerful greenhouse gas in its own right, with a warming effect 
that is 30 times more powerful than carbon dioxide over 100 years and 
more than 85 times more powerful over 20 years. Second, although 
methane has a relatively short lifetime in the atmosphere (about 12 
years), it decomposes to carbon dioxide, a significant fraction of which 
will remain for hundreds to thousands of years. Third, methane can 
react with other chemicals to produce ozone, which is also a significant 
greenhouse gas. Finally, methane in the upper atmosphere can react 
with hydrogen to produce water vapor, yet another greenhouse gas.
Because of this “quadruple threat,” methane mitigation can have a 
significant impact in bending the warming curve. Due to its short atmo-
spheric lifetime, the benefits of methane reduction will begin to appear 
relatively quickly, within a decade or two.
Studies indicate that full implementation of the methane mitigation 
strategies discussed in this section could bend the global warming curve 
by 0.4°C by 2050. Moreover, implementing both the methane and black 
carbon mitigation measures discussed in the previous section could save 
over 2 million lives, 50 million tons of crops, and $5 trillion annually by 
2050.
Sources of methane
Data from ice cores show that methane concentrations in the atmo-
sphere were relatively steady for the past few thousand years but began 
to increase dramatically around the beginning of the Industrial Revolu-
tion, rising from just over 700 parts per billion (ppb) in the preindustrial 
era to more than 1,800 ppb today. Studies have confirmed that this rise 
is primarily due to human activities. The primary anthropogenic sources 
of methane are shown in Figure 15.3.1.
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One major source of emissions is the exploitation of fossil fuels. 
The same geologic processes that produce coal and oil also generate 
methane, which is often found in association with coal beds and oil 
fields. Natural gas is primarily composed of methane (around 90%). 
Anthropogenic methane emissions associated with fossil fuel extraction 
and use include the following:
 ➤ Methane leaks from natural gas production, processing, and pipe-
line distribution systems (sometimes called “fugitive emissions”)
 ➤ Methane escape during completion of oil wells and oil production
 ➤ Methane leaks from active and inactive coal mines
A second source of methane is bacterial decay of organic matter 
in the absence of oxygen. This occurs in underwater or underground 
environments such as wetlands, swamps, or landfills and is referred to 
as anaerobic decomposition. Bacteria in the digestive tracts of live-
stock can also produce methane through a process known as enteric 
fermentation. Anthropogenic sources of methane from anaerobic de-
composition and fermentation include the following:
 ➤ Livestock—before digesting their food, ruminants such as cattle, 
goats, and sheep ferment the plant material they eat in a specialized 
stomach (called a rumen). This enteric fermentation process pro-
duces significant quantities of methane.
 ➤ Manure—decomposition of waste from livestock and poultry re-
leases methane.
 ➤ Wet rice agriculture—flooded rice fields create anaerobic condi-
tions similar to those in a natural wetland.
 ➤ Waste—decomposition of organic food waste in landfills and human 
waste in wastewater systems produces methane.
Methane mitigation strategies
As in the case of black carbon, there is a range of technologies already 
available to reduce anthropogenic methane emissions. Many of these 
technologies involve capturing methane and burning it for heat or elec-
tric power generation. Although burning methane converts it to carbon 
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dioxide, this significantly reduces its warming effect, since CO2 is a much 
less potent greenhouse gas.
Methane seeps naturally from coal beds. Coal mines create open-
ings that allow the methane to escape into the atmosphere. Both active 
and abandoned coal mines are significant sources, but degasification 
pump stations have proven effective in removing and collecting meth-
ane. Coal mines are not usually near natural gas distribution facilities, so 
the methane captured is typically burned on-site and could be used for 
heating or generating electricity.
Oil drilling often brings natural gas to the surface along with the oil, 
and the gas must be vented to the atmosphere to maintain safe pressure 
in the well. Sometimes this gas can be stored and sold, but where gas 
distribution facilities are not available nearby, it is often released to the 
Figure 15.3.1 Methane percentage contribution from various sources, 2010. 
Global annual methane emissions are in the range of 558 million to 736 million 
metric tons CH4 per year from the 2003–2012 decade. (Data for this range are 
from Saunois et al. 2016.) Adapted from the Global Methane Initiative. 
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atmosphere. Burning the methane instead (this is referred to as flaring) 
would significantly reduce its greenhouse effect. The mitigation effect 
could be further enhanced by capturing the resulting CO2, which can be 
pumped back into the ground and stored or pumped into a depleted 
oil field to enhance oil recovery (which, of course, will produce still 
more oil).
Leaks in the natural gas production and distribution system should 
be relatively straightforward to address. Loss of gas from the system 
represents a loss of profits, and significant leaks can present a safety 
risk. Companies involved with natural gas production, storage, and dis-
tribution are generally motivated to locate and address leaks. A wide 
range of portable methane detectors are now available to help with 
this task (Figure 15.3.2).
The Oil and Gas Climate Initiative (OGCI), which includes several 
of the world’s largest oil and gas producers, has set a target of reduc-
ing the methane intensity of its member companies by 20% by 2025, a 
very modest goal but a start nonetheless. In contrast, the International 
Energy Agency estimates that the oil and gas industry can reduce its 
worldwide methane emissions by 75%—and up to two-thirds of those 
reductions can be realized at zero net cost.
Methane emissions associated with oil and gas extraction are an 
important consideration in evaluating the impacts of hydraulic fracturing 
(often called hydrofracking, or fracking for short). In the United States, 
hydrofracking over the past decade or so has significantly reduced the 
cost of natural gas, resulting in a significant shift from coal to oil in 
Figure 15.3.2 To the naked eye, no emissions from an oil storage tank 
are visible (left), but with the aid of an infrared camera, escaping methane is 
evident (right). Reproduced with permission from UNEP and WMO 2011.
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electric power production. Because natural gas emits only about half 
as much CO2 per unit of energy produced compared with coal, this 
shift could significantly reduce greenhouse gas emissions associated 
with electricity generation. However, the leakage of as little as 3% of 
the methane during well completion or production could reduce or 
even negate the climate benefits of reduced CO2 emissions and be as 
greenhouse- gas intensive as burning coal. Studies by different groups 
have resulted in published estimates of methane leakage rates of be-
tween 1.4% and 2.3% of production industry-wide, but emissions from 
individual facilities can be significantly higher. The extent of methane 
emissions from hydrofracking is currently a topic of serious scrutiny.
About 10% of anthropogenic emissions are due to wet rice agri-
culture, in which rice is grown in flooded fields. Studies have shown 
that periodic short-term draining of the rice fields to expose the soil 
to oxygen, known as intermittent aeration, can significantly reduce 
methane emissions.
Methane emissions from livestock and poultry manure can be 
Table 15.3.1 Methane mitigation measures
Sector CH4 Mitigation Measures
Extraction and 
transport of 
fossil fuel
Extended pre-mine degasification and recovery and oxidation of 
CH4 from ventilation air from coal mines
Extended recovery and utilization, rather than venting, of 
associated gas and improved control of unintended fugitive 
emissions from the production of oil and natural gas
Reduced gas leakage from long-distance transmission pipelines
Waste 
management
Separation and treatment of biodegradable municipal waste 
through recycling, composting, and anaerobic digestion as well 
as landfill gas collection with combustion/utilization
Upgrading primary wastewater treatment to secondary/tertiary 
treatment with gas recovery and overflow control
Agriculture Control of CH4 emissions from livestock, mainly through farm-
scale anaerobic digestion of manure from cattle and pigs
Intermittent aeration of continuously flooded rice paddies
Source: Reproduced with permission from United Nations Environment Programme 
and World Meteorological Organization. 2011. Integrated Assessment of Black Carbon and 
Tropospheric Ozone. UNEP, Nairobi, Kenya.
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addressed using covered anaerobic digesters, which accelerate the 
decomposition process and capture the resulting methane, rather 
than allowing it to escape to the atmosphere. Burning the methane 
can generate heat or electricity for on-farm use or for sale. California 
agencies are funding pilot projects to demonstrate the collection and 
concentration of methane from dairy digesters for injection into natu-
ral gas pipelines. Industrial-scale hog farms, meanwhile, are expanding 
their efforts to reduce methane—partly because such efforts often yield 
co-benefits in terms of a reduction in offensive odors—after being sued 
dozens of times and being required to pay neighbors damages for the 
offensive odor. In a recent North Carolina lawsuit against the largest 
pork and hog producer, Smithfield Foods, a jury awarded $473.5 million 
in damages, reduced to $94 million by a North Carolina law capping 
punitive damages.
Similar to degasification pumps for coal mines, landfill gas wells can 
capture methane from landfills to be burned for heat or energy. Waste-
water can undergo anaerobic wastewater treatment with installations 
Figure 15.3.3 Seven measures that aim to reduce methane emissions. 
Reproduced by permission from Climate and Clean Air Coalition; data from UNEP 
and WMO 2011. 
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that use technology similar to anaerobic digesters, but typically on a 
larger scale, with the methane captured and used for energy.
Although this chapter focuses primarily on technological mecha-
nisms to remove methane, there are other mitigation strategies that 
involve societal transformations or changes in ecosystem management. 
For example, a reduction in meat consumption, particularly lamb and 
beef, would reduce the associated methane. Similarly, we’ll see in the 
next chapter how reducing food waste could substantially lower meth-
ane emissions from landfills as well as the CO2 emissions associated with 
the energy required for food production, transportation, and storage.
Table 15.3.1 and Figure 15.3.3 summarize measures that aim to re-
duce methane emissions.
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15.4  Mitigating Tropospheric Ozone
Ozone (chemical formula O3) has very different impacts, depending on 
where it is found in the atmosphere. Stratospheric ozone, produced 
naturally in the upper atmosphere through a reaction between oxygen 
molecules and solar ultraviolet radiation, is vital to human health and 
indeed to the existence of life on the Earth’s land surfaces. The strato-
spheric ozone layer, at a height of roughly 20 to 30 km, absorbs ultravi-
olet radiation that would otherwise be damaging or even fatal to life on 
land. In Section 15.6, we’ll see how the Montreal Protocol (1987) led to 
the phasing out of chemicals that damage the ozone layer.
While ozone in the stratosphere is beneficial to life, ozone near the 
Earth’s surface, called tropospheric ozone, has serious negative effects 
on both human health and agricultural crop yields. It is also a significant 
greenhouse gas.
As discussed in the Overview, human activities aren’t responsible 
for the direct emission of ozone. However, they do generate a range 
of precursor gases that can react in the presence of sunlight to form 
ozone. Methane is a key ozone precursor. Other precursor gases in-
clude nitrogen oxides (often referred to as NOx), carbon monoxide, 
and volatile organic compounds (VOCs). NOx and carbon monoxide are 
generated by combustion of fossil fuels in power plants, industrial pro-
cesses, and vehicle engines. During combustion, NOx is formed through 
the reaction of nitrogen and oxygen at high temperatures, and carbon 
monoxide is formed by incomplete fuel combustion. VOCs represent a 
whole range of carbon-based molecules, including gasoline, benzene, 
solvents, and other industrial and household chemicals. Ozone formed 
by reactions between NOx and VOCs is a major component of photo-
chemical smog in urban areas.
Catalytic converters are designed to significantly reduce vehicle 
emissions of NOx, carbon monoxide, and VOCs. Air quality regula-
tions, including requirements to equip cars with catalytic converters, 
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have significantly reduced ozone levels in Los Angeles and other urban 
areas. As discussed in previous chapters, measures to replace fossil-fuel- 
powered internal combustion engines with electric motors, powered 
by batteries or fuel cells, would also significantly reduce emissions of 
ozone precursors. While such measures reduce ozone pollution region-
ally, they have a relatively small impact on ozone on a global scale.
In contrast, methane reduction has significant potential to reduce 
tropospheric ozone and its warming impact on a global scale. Since 
methane is a major ozone precursor, the methane reduction strategies 
discussed in Section 15.3 are also effective ozone mitigation measures.
Mitigating tropospheric ozone would have significant health and 
agricultural co-benefits. Ozone can promote asthma attacks and cause 
respiratory irritation, particularly in children, older adults, and those 
with existing respiratory conditions such as bronchitis and emphysema. 
Long-term exposure to ozone can cause permanent inflammation and 
scarring of the lungs, resulting in respiratory illnesses and premature 
deaths.
Ozone pollution is a dominant destroyer of agricultural crops. 
Ozone pollution is estimated to result in the loss of more than 110 
million metric tons of crops per year, and it is responsible for 39% of 
crop losses in North America and 37% of losses in Asia. A UNEP study 
focused on the world’s four main staple crops (maize, rice, soybeans, 
and wheat) showed that full implementation of the methane reduction 
measures outlined above would also reduce ozone, avoiding 25 million 
metric tons of crop losses each year, relative to a scenario of unmiti-
gated emissions; implementing black carbon reduction measures along 
with methane mitigation could double that figure to 50 million metric 
tons.
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15.5  Mitigating Hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs)
Hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs) are factory-made gases that are SLCPs with 
comparatively short lifetimes in the atmosphere. They are super climate 
pollutants with high global warming potentials. They were invented as 
substitutes for chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs) and hydrochlorofluorocar-
bons (HCFCs), two groups of chemicals that destroyed the protective 
stratospheric ozone layer and warmed the climate. CFCs were phased 
out under the 1987 Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the 
Ozone Layer, and HCFCs are currently being phased out under that 
treaty. The phaseout of these and related chemicals under the Montreal 
Protocol has put the stratospheric ozone layer on the path to recovery, 
with noticeable improvements to the ozone layer expected by the 2030s 
and closing of the Antarctic ozone hole expected by 2060.
While they do not destroy stratospheric ozone as the CFCs and 
HCFCs they replaced did, HFCs are the fastest-growing climate pollutant 
in many countries, and many HFCs have high global warming potentials 
(GWPs). Because of the climate risk posed by the fast-growing HFCs, 
a small group of countries began an 8-year effort to phase down HFCs 
under the Montreal Protocol, culminating in the Kigali Amendment in 
October 2016, which will take the single biggest bite out of the cli-
mate problem so far. Phasing down HFCs has the potential to avoid up 
to 0.5ºC of warming by 2100, and the initial phasedown schedule of 
the Kigali Amendment will deliver 80%. Getting the remaining 20% will 
require speeding up the schedule or otherwise encouraging countries 
to avoid moving into HFCs during their current phaseout of HCFCs—a 
leapfrog strategy whereby countries move directly into climate friendly 
substitutes. (Unlike the earlier phaseouts, the Kigali Amendment is a 
phasedown because some HFCs have very low GWPs; for example, 
HFC-1234yf, a refrigerant used in mobile air conditioners, has a GWP 
of only 1.)
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HFC impacts
HFCs were developed in the 1990s and started to replace CFCs and 
HCFCs in refrigerators, air conditioners, insulating foams, and other 
uses. As noted, HFCs are the fastest-growing climate pollutant in many 
countries, and while their climate impact in 2010 was relatively small, 
they were projected to increase 30-fold by 2050 if not mitigated through 
the measures discussed in this section.
The average lifetime of HFCs currently in use is 15 years, but their 
high GWPs (some are almost 5,000 times more potent than CO2) mean 
they have a large impact on the climate in that short time. Unchecked, 
annual HFC emissions could have the global warming equivalent of 12% 
of annual CO2 emissions in 2050 under a business-as-usual scenario, and 
up to 71% under the strongest of IPCC mitigation scenarios. Addition-
ally, continued manufacture of appliances and foams that utilize HFCs 
will lead to storage of these pollutants in what are called HFC banks, 
which will emit HFCs as the products are discarded and will contribute 
to further warming.
HFC sources
HFCs are used in refrigeration, air conditioning, thermal insulating foam 
blowing, aerosol sprays, fire protection, and solvents. As an example, in 
Table 15.5.1 The most commonly used HFCs according to Montzka et al. 
2015, with GWPs and lifetimes from the IPCC Fifth Assessment Report
HFC GWP (100-Year) Lifetime (Years)
HFC-134a 1,300 13.4
HFC-152a 138 1.5
HFC-143a 4,800 47.1
HFC-125 3,170 28.2
HFC-32 677 5.2
HFC-227ea 3,350 38.2
HFC-365mfc 804 8.7
Source: Montzka, S. A., et al. 2015. Recent trends in global emissions of hydrochloro-
fluorocarbons and hydrofluorocarbons: reflecting on the 2007 adjustments to the Montreal 
Protocol. Journal of Physical Chemistry 119, 4439–4449; IPCC. 2013. Climate Change 2013: The 
Physical Science Basis. Contribution of Working Group I to the Fifth Assessment Report of 
the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change [Stocker, T. F., et al. (eds.)]. Cambridge 
University Press, New York, NY. 
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the United States, air conditioning and refrigeration make up 86% of the 
country’s HFC emissions; this includes commercial refrigeration, mobile 
air conditioning in cars and other vehicles, and stationary air condi-
tioning in homes, offices, and other buildings. The remaining emissions 
come from residential and industrial refrigeration, transport refrigera-
tion, aerosol propellants, and solvents.
At what point during their life cycle HFCs are emitted depends on 
how they are being used. For aerosols and solvents, HFCs are emitted 
while in use. For foams, HFCs are emitted during the manufacturing pro-
cess, when they leak out of foam in use as building insulation (off-gas), 
and when the foam is crushed for disposal later or when it is otherwise 
damaged. For HFCs used in refrigerators and air conditioners, emissions 
occur throughout a product’s lifetime, including during manufacture, 
while the appliance is in use, during servicing, and at the end of the 
appliance’s life.
HFC mitigation
Many developed countries have already begun the transition to low-
GWP HFCs and non-HFC alternatives, and as developing countries move 
away from HCFCs, they can leapfrog HFCs to the more climate-friendly 
alternatives to maximize climate benefits. This leapfrog strategy also 
helps avoid the buildup of the banks of HFCs in air conditioners, foams, 
and other products, with the potential to avoid another 53 gigatons of 
CO2 equivalent (CO2eq) between 2020 and 2060.
Alternatives to high-GWP HFCs are readily available for most uses, 
ensuring a smooth transition (Table 15.5.2). Alternatives include low-
GWP HFCs like R-32 with a GWP of 660 and extremely low-GWP HFCs 
sometimes called hydrofluoroolefins (HFOs), natural refrigerants, and 
not-in-kind alternatives. For example, HFC-134a, with a GWP of 1,300, 
has been the most commonly used refrigerant in mobile air conditioners 
and is quickly being replaced in developed countries by HFO-1234yf, 
with a GWP of less than 1.
Natural refrigerants include ammonia (GWP near 0), hydrocarbons 
like propane and isobutene (GWPs less than 5), and CO2 (GWP of 1). 
Commercial refrigeration has moved to these low-GWP alternatives, 
with up to 65% of new installations already using them. Domestic 
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refrigeration could see about 75% of production using natural refriger-
ants by 2020. Some room air conditioners are also using hydrocarbons 
as alternatives, although such natural refrigerants tend to be more flam-
mable, which presents safety concerns and in some circumstances limits 
their use to smaller appliances. Not-in-kind alternatives include methods 
Table 15.5.2 Indicative list of low-GWP alternatives to high-GWP HFCs
Application
Current 
Refrigerant GWP Alternative GWP
Refrigeration 
(domestic)
HFC-134a 1,300 HC-600 (isobutene) ~3
HFC-152a 138 HC-290 (propane) <5
HFO-1234yf <1
Refrigeration 
(commercial & 
industrial)
HCFC-22 1,760 HC-600 (isobutene) ~3
HFC-407C 1,774 R-744 (CO2) 1
HFC-134a 1,300 R-717 (ammonia) 0
HFC-404a 3,943 HFCs and HFC blends <1–1,600
Air conditioners 
(room)
HFC-410A 1,923 HC-290 (propane) <5
HCFC-22 1,760 HFC-32 677
HFC-407C 1,774 HFC/HFC blends emerging ~350
Air conditioners 
(commercial)
HFC-134a 1,300 HFO-1233zd <1
HCFC-22 1,760 HFO-1234ze <1
HCFC-123 79 HFC/HFC blends emerging 400–500
HFO-1234yf <1
Mobile air 
conditioners
HFC-134a 1,300 HFO-1234yf <1
HFC-152a 138
R-744 (CO2) 1
R-290 (propane) <5
Foams HFC-227ea 3,220 HCs <5
HCFC-142b 1,980 CO2/water 1
HFC-245fa 1,030 HFO-1234ze <1
HCFC-22 1,810 Methyl formate <25
HFC-134a 1,300 HFO-1336mzz-Z 2
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of cooling that do not involve chemical refrigerants, such as improving 
building insulation and implementing reflective roofs.
The mandated transitions of refrigerants from CFCs to HCFCs and 
then to HFCs catalyzed energy efficiency improvement of the cooling 
equipment, and the Kigali Amendment’s mandated transition from HFCs 
to more climate-friendly alternatives presents another opportunity to 
further improve efficiency. When selecting among alternatives, it is 
important to consider energy efficiency, as the electricity used to run 
cooling equipment can be up to 90% of the total carbon footprint when 
fossil fuel is the source of the electricity. It also is important to consider 
safety issues, like the flammability associated with natural refrigerants.
Even before the Kigali Amendment was agreed, some leading coun-
tries began taking steps to phase down HFCs, including economic and 
market-based incentives, required practices, import/export licensing, 
reporting requirements, and taxes and fees. For example, the US has 
a number of regulations relating to HFCs, curtailing the applications 
where they may be used. The EU has regulated HFCs for over a decade, 
strengthening the regulations over time to more aggressively phase 
down HFCs. Norway instituted a tax-and-refund scheme where a tax was 
levied on the import of HFCs but was refunded upon proper disposal of 
the refrigerant. In the US, some states, including California, also restrict 
HFC use.
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15.6   Mitigating HFCs: The Kigali Amendment 
to the Montreal Protocol
The Kigali Amendment to the Montreal Protocol was adopted in October 
2016 and entered into force on January 1, 2019. It has the potential to 
avoid up to 0.5ºC of future warming by 2100, assuming fast ratification 
and implementation. The Montreal Protocol is widely considered the 
world’s best environmental treaty for successfully solving the first great 
threat to the global atmosphere—the destruction of the stratospheric 
ozone layer by CFCs and related chemicals. Its success over more than 
three decades has prevented an increase in ultraviolet (UV) radiation 
that otherwise would have led to increased cancers, cataracts, immune 
suppression, and other problems. At the same time, that treaty has 
provided more climate mitigation than any other agreement because 
CFCs and HCFCs are also powerful greenhouse gases; in 2014, The Econ-
omist ranked the Montreal Protocol as the top of all major measures 
to reduce climate change. It also is the only international treaty with 
universal membership of all UN countries, and their membership makes 
them “Parties” to the treaty. Under the Kigali Amendment, the treaty 
now mandates the phasedown of HFCs. In 2017, Project Drawdown, a 
comprehensive analysis of climate solutions, ranked the HFC refrigerant 
transition as the top solution of 100 solutions to reverse global warming.
History of the Montreal Protocol and stratospheric ozone 
protection
In 1974, Mario Molina and F. Sherwood Rowland, scientists at UC Ir-
vine, published a study in Nature that described the risk to stratospheric 
ozone from CFCs. As these scientific findings were publicized, they led 
to consumer boycotts against products such as hair spray containing 
CFCs in the US, Canada, and Europe, which in turn helped pave the way 
for national and regional regulations to control CFCs.
But this was not enough to solve the problem and protect the 
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stratospheric ozone layer. In 1981, UNEP assembled a group of experts 
to discuss developing an international treaty for controlling CFCs. This 
led to the Montreal Protocol, which was adopted in 1987 and included 
a mandatory phaseout of CFCs and related gases, starting with a 50% 
reduction of production and use within 12 years. The treaty is successful 
because every country is on board and works toward common goals. 
The treaty has mandatory requirements to phase out the production 
and use of specific factory-made chemicals, by specific amounts, by 
specific dates. At the same time, the treaty implements the important 
principle of “common but differentiated responsibility,” which in this 
case means that the developed-country Parties are required to phase 
out the damaging chemicals first and to develop safer alternatives and 
bring them to scale, which drives down the cost and demonstrates the 
best way to meet the treaty’s obligations for the developing-country 
Parties. After a grace period of several years, developing-country Parties 
are required to start their own phaseouts.
The developed-country Parties also provide funding through the Mul-
tilateral Fund (MLF) for the Implementation of the Montreal Protocol, to 
pay the “agreed incremental costs” of the developing-country Parties in 
meeting their obligations. This funding is negotiated every 3 years and 
for 2018–2020 was US$500 million. Between 1991 and 2010, the MLF 
spent US$2.4 billion and achieved emissions reductions of approximately 
188–222 gigatons of CO2eq, which is equivalent to roughly $0.01 per ton 
of CO2eq. The phasedown of HFCs may cost $0.22–$0.29 per metric 
ton of CO2eq. On a consumer level, a new home air- conditioning system 
can cost anywhere from $6,000 to $12,000, but the lifetime savings 
from newer, more efficient refrigerants and equipment can significantly 
reduce energy consumption, which leads to a reduction in lifetime cost.
The Montreal Protocol is a “start-and-strengthen” treaty because it 
started modestly, learned by doing, helped the Parties to gain confi-
dence that they could meet their obligations, and then strengthened the 
control measures time and again. Since its inception, the Montreal Pro-
tocol has been amended five times to add new chemicals and adjusted 
six times to speed up existing phaseouts. The Kigali Amendment of 
2016 is the sixth amendment, which adds HFCs to the list of controlled 
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substances and requires that they be phased down in the coming de-
cades. We’ll return to the Kigali Amendment shortly.
The Montreal Protocol has phased out roughly 100 chemicals by 
nearly 100%. Success of the Montreal Protocol has reduced exposure to 
UV radiation that otherwise would have led to skin cancer, eye damage 
and cataracts, and immune suppression. Without the Montreal Proto-
col, skin cancer would have quadrupled by 2100. The US Environmen-
tal Protection Agency (EPA) calculates “that full implementation of the 
Montreal Protocol is expected to result in the avoidance of more than 
280 million cases of skin cancer, approximately 1.6 million skin cancer 
deaths, and more than 45 million cases of cataracts in the United States, 
resulting in hundreds of billions of dollars in societal health benefits in 
the United States over the period 1990 to 2165.” The reductions of these 
cancers and cataract cases have been valued at more than 11 times the 
costs of phasing out CFCs and other ozone-depleting substances.
Figure 15.6.1 October average minimum ozone over Antarctica over time, 
measured in Dobson units, which are a measurement of total ozone in the 
atmosphere. “Since the mid-1990s, global ozone levels have become relatively 
stable. In fact, because of the Montreal Protocol, model simulations suggest 
the size of the hole should return to its pre-1980 levels by about 2075. Here, 
the four globes show monthly-averaged total ozone over Antarctica in October. 
The graph shows each year’s October average minimum (white dots) over 
Antarctica. The red curve represents a smoothed version of the white dots.” 
Reproduced from NASA’s Goddard Space Flight Center.
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In addition to avoiding further damage to the stratospheric ozone 
layer, the reduction of these ozone-depleting substances has also avoided 
more climate warming that any other strategy. Professor V. Ramanathan 
calculated that CFCs and related chemicals were powerful greenhouse 
gases and published his results in 1975, the year after Molina and Roland 
published their results. These scientific papers spurred early consumer 
boycotts and national and regional measures to control CFCs, followed 
by the Montreal Protocol. This early start to reduce and ultimately ban 
CFCs not only put the ozone layer on the path to recovery, but also 
avoided an amount of future warming that otherwise would have been 
Figure 15.6.2 The immense amount of avoided emissions under the 
Montreal Protocol through 2010, as well as the projected future avoided 
emissions impact from phasing down HFCs. This figure is based on a similar 
figure in the Institute for Governance and Sustainable Development’s Primer on 
HFCs (available at http://www.igsd.org/primers/hfc/), which contains additional 
information about the sources referenced in the figure by numbers in parentheses. 
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24–76 gigatons CO2eq per year—up to twice the amount of warming 
that CO2 is causing today. The avoided warming just from the Montreal 
Protocol is about 135 gigatons CO2eq, or 11 gigatons CO2eq per year. 
The CFC story shows the importance of starting early to address climate 
pollutants, which we unfortunately did not do with efforts to cut CO2.
Path to the Kigali Amendment
The path to the Kigali Amendment began in 2009 when the low-lying 
island country of the Federated States of Micronesia, along with Mau-
ritius, proposed an amendment to the Montreal Protocol that would 
phase down high-GWP HFCs. Morocco immediately joined the pro-
posal, which was soon followed by a similar proposal from the North 
American Parties—the US, Canada, and Mexico. Over the next few years, 
more and more Parties joined in support, and in 2015 India, previously 
one of the most reluctant Parties, submitted its own proposal, as did the 
EU, with the Africa Group (representing all 54 countries) also submitting 
an informal proposal and becoming a strong champion for the HFC 
phasedown.
Negotiating a treaty or an amendment to a treaty requires consen-
sus among all the Parties, and consensus is built on the foundation of 
science (in this case, to understand how damaging HFCs are to climate), 
technology (to understand what substitutes are available to replace 
HFCs), and economics (to determine what the substitutes will cost and 
who will pay). Another important factor is competitiveness (to deter-
mine which companies located in which countries might benefit from 
phasing out old chemicals that were soon to lose their intellectual prop-
erty protection and become commodities that any company could make 
without paying a royalty to the inventor, and which countries might lose 
during a phaseout). Over time, more and more of the Parties learned 
the underlying facts about HFCs and could communicate those facts 
to their governments and industries, to help formulate their negotiat-
ing strategy. At the same time, early movers, including the US and the 
EU, took specific actions to control HFCs at home. Once companies 
in these major markets were required to phase down HFCs under na-
tional and regional laws and were compelled to develop climate-friendly 
alternatives, these companies started encouraging their governments 
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to “multilateralize” the controls to all of the countries of the world to 
ensure the playing field stayed level (and to open up new markets for 
alternatives they were developing).
Strong US leadership was critical for building the consensus for the 
Kigali Amendment. President Obama, Secretary of State John Kerry, and 
EPA Administrator Gina McCarthy all became champions of the HFC 
phasedown. President Obama and Secretary Kerry negotiated bilateral 
agreements with various leaders, starting with President Xi of China in 
2013. This was done during the first meeting between President Obama 
and President Xi, where they agreed on two things: first, to cooper-
ate to reduce the risk from North Korea, and second, to cooperate to 
phase down HFCs. President Obama negotiated agreements on HFCs 
with other heads of government, including Prime Minister Modi of India, 
President Macri of Argentina, and Prime Minister Sharif of Pakistan. 
Along with the support of the island States and the Africa Group, this 
ensured that the battle to finish the Kigali Amendment would not be a 
contest between the rich and poor countries.
A final push came in September 2016 when the White House assem-
bled a “fast start” fund of $80 million to help developing-country Parties 
phase down HFCs and improve energy efficiency of air conditioners and 
other cooling devices. Governments provided $27 million, and a group 
of philanthropic donors provided the other $53 million. This fast-start 
fund was announced in New York by Secretary Kerry and other minis-
ters, in association with the High Ambition Coalition of more than 100 
Parties. The $27 million from governments was later added to the Mul-
tilateral Fund, and the remaining funds are being disbursed by the Kigali 
Cooling Efficiency Program (K-CEP), organized under the ClimateWorks 
Foundation in San Francisco.
The following month, on October 16, 2016, at 7 AM Saturday, after 
an all-night negotiating session, the Parties to the Montreal Protocol 
agreed to the Kigali Amendment to phase down HFCs (Figure 15.6.3). 
A few minutes after the agreement, after the cheering stopped, the 
negotiators from Rwanda and Morocco introduced a draft decision to 
explore how to increase energy efficiency of cooling equipment during 
the phasedown of HFCs. The Parties agreed to this decision too.
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Implementing the Kigali Amendment
As of May 2, 2019, 71 Parties have ratified the Kigali Amendment, which 
means the amendment entered into force at the earliest date set by the 
terms of the amendment, on January 1, 2019. Under the initial phase-
down schedule, the Kigali Amendment will avoid up to 0.4ºC of warm-
ing. Faster implementation that leapfrogs over HFCs during the ongoing 
phaseout of HCFCs can sweep up the additional 0.1ºC to achieve the 
full 0.5ºC of avoided warming projected by scientists. Previous phaseout 
schedules were accelerated by the Parties, and it is anticipated that the 
Parties will do the same with the Kigali Amendment, especially because 
climate-friendly alternatives are readily available. A strategy that leap-
frogs from HCFCs to climate-friendly alternatives and avoids HFCs also 
will prevent the buildup of HFC banks in products and equipment, with 
the potential to avoid an additional 53 gigatons of CO2eq.
As always under the Montreal Protocol, developed countries (known 
as non-Article 5, or non-A5, Parties within the Montreal Protocol) will 
take action first, reducing consumption and production of HFCs by 10% 
(compared with a 2011–2013 baseline) starting in 2019, with a second 
Figure 15.6.3 Rwanda’s Minister for Environment Vincent Biruta makes the 
Kigali Amendment official. Photograph by IISD/Kiara Worth. 
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group (listed in the footnote to Table 15.6.1) beginning their phasedown 
in 2020. By 2036, both groups of developed countries will have reduced 
consumption and production by 85% of the 2011–2013 baseline. Most 
developing countries (Article 5, or A5, Parties) will freeze consumption 
and production in 2024 and step down to 20% of a 2020–2022 baseline 
by 2045. A group of countries with very high ambient temperatures 
were given a few more years to reach these goals because warmer tem-
peratures may require further improvements in refrigerants and cooling 
equipment.
Figure 15.6.4 Warming avoided by the Kigali Amendment. Shown are global 
HFC scenarios without global HFC controls and with full compliance with the 
Kigali Amendment. Also shown is a scenario in which global production of HFCs 
is phased out in 2020. Note, the contribution from HFC-23 emissions is not 
included in either. For comparison of the benefit from HFC mitigation, warming 
at 2100 from all greenhouse gases is projected to contribute an additional 
1.4ºC for a moderate-emissions scenario and 4.8ºC for a high-emissions 
scenario, relative to the 1986–2005 global average temperature (which is the 
baseline used by the IPCC’s Fifth Assessment Report and represents warming 
of 0.61ºC above preindustrial temperatures). GtCO2eq yr⁻1 = gigatons of CO2 
equivalent per year. From WMO 2018. 
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Importance of improving efficiency of cooling equipment 
during HFC phasedown
At the conclusion of the Kigali negotiations, the Parties also agreed to 
consider opportunities to improve energy efficiency for even greater cli-
mate benefits. While previous transitions under the Montreal Protocol 
catalyzed improvements in energy efficiency of cooling equipment, this 
time the Parties were determined to actively promote improvements in 
efficiency, including promoting new and more advanced components 
as appliance manufacturers make the switch to low-GWP refrigerants. 
According to the 2018 quadrennial assessment by the Scientific Assess-
ment Panel of the Montreal Protocol, improvements in energy efficiency 
of air conditioners and other cooling equipment can double the benefit 
of the Kigali Amendment, with the potential to cumulatively avoid up to 
1ºC of warming by the end of the century.
The Economist magazine calls air conditioning one of the great over-
looked industries of the world. It asks what the most effective ways are 
to protect the climate and concludes that it’s not to become a vegetar-
ian, or even to replant the Amazon. Rather, the answer is to radically 
improve air conditioners. The Economist notes that phasing down HFCs 
Table 15.6.1 Phasedown schedule under the Kigali Amendment 
 
A5 Parties 
Group1
A5 Parties 
Group2*
Non-A5 Parties 
Group 1 
Non-A5 Parties 
Group2**
Baseline 2020–2022 2024–2026 2011–2013 2011–2013
Freeze 2024 2028
1st step 2029: 90% 2032: 90% 2019: 90% 2020: 95%
2nd step 2035: 70% 2037: 80% 2024: 60% 2025: 65%
3rd step 2040: 50% 2042: 70% 2029: 30% 2029: 30%
4th step 2034: 20% 2034: 20%
Final step 2045: 20% 2047: 15% 2036: 15% 2036: 15%
*Bahrain, India, Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Oman, Pakistan, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and United Arab 
Emirates
**Belarus, Kazakhstan, Russian Federation, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan
Non-Article 5 (Non-A5) Parties are developed countries that will begin phasedown in 
2019. Article 5 (A5) Parties are developing countries that are given additional time before 
beginning their phasedown. Some Parties within the Non-A5 and A5 categories are grouped 
together for a modified schedule that will allow more time for phasedown.
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will avoid the equivalent of 90 billion tons of CO2 by 2050, and making 
air conditioners more energy efficient could double that. This compares, 
they continue, to having half the world’s population give up meat, which 
would avoid 66 billion tons of CO2, or successfully replanting two-thirds 
of degraded tropical forests, which would avoid 61 billion tons of CO2.
With a growing population, an expanding middle class, and a warm-
ing climate, the demand for air conditioners and other cooling equip-
ment is growing fast. Hot cities like Delhi and Beijing already use half of 
their electricity to run air conditioners, and even in France, demand for 
air conditioners in 2018 grew by almost 200% above 2017. In India, air 
conditioner ownership has increased from 2 to 5 million units between 
2006 and 2011 and is forecast to reach 200 million by 2030. Globally, 
there are 3.6 billion cooling appliances in use, which will increase to 9.5 
billion by 2050. To provide cooling for all who will need it in a warming 
world—and not just those who can afford it—will require 14 billion cool-
ing appliances by 2050.
Presently, over 1.1 billion people lack access to cooling, which makes 
it harder to escape poverty, to keep children healthy, to keep vaccines 
Figure 15.6.5 Estimated annual emissions abatement potential of air 
conditioner stock in 2030. The red and blue represent the refrigerant transition 
and efficiency improvement benefits, respectively. The avoided emissions are 
compared with proposed projects, represented by the green bars. From Shah et 
al. 2015.
15-46 Chapter 15: Technologies for Super Pollutants Mitigation
stable, to preserve food, and to keep economies productive. Already, 
about 30% of the global population is exposed to life- threatening tem-
peratures for nearly 20 days per year, and heat waves kill roughly 12,000 
people annually. As warming continues, deaths from extreme heat could 
multiply 20-fold by 2050, and by 2100, 75% of humanity could face 
deadly heat.
In the coming years, mandating energy efficiency alongside the tran-
sition away from high-GWP HFCs will be crucial for climate protection. 
Policies to require stringent energy efficiency can cut future energy de-
mand by at least half. Even a modest 30% improvement for just room 
air conditioner efficiency can save enough energy to avoid the need to 
construct up to 2,500 medium-sized, peak-load power plants globally by 
2050, according to Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory. The Rocky 
Mountain Institute is offering a Global Cooling Prize of $3 million to de-
velop residential cooling technology that has “at least 5x less climate im-
pact when compared to a baseline unit.” Improving efficiency of cooling 
equipment will provide multiple benefits, including making ownership 
more affordable, more secure, and more sustainable and saving as much 
as US$2.9 trillion in investment, fuel, and operating costs between 2017 
and 2050. This will be particularly important in the hotter regions of the 
world, where many of the poorest live.
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15.7  Conclusion
Successful mitigation of super pollutants, also known as SLCPs, will avoid 
up to 0.6ºC of warming by 2050 (with 0.1ºC of this from HFCs) and 
1.2ºC by 2100 (with up to 0.5ºC from HFCs). The short lifetimes of SLCPs 
mean that fast action yields fast results, which is crucial in the near term 
because of the accelerating rate of warming we are experiencing. SLCP 
mitigation bends the curve almost immediately, limiting the warming that 
will take place during the decades that will pass before CO2 mitigation 
takes effect. This will reduce the risk of runaway climate change from 
self-reinforcing feedbacks that could lead to a “hot house” planet. SLCP 
mitigation also has co-benefits of reducing impacts to human health and 
crops from air pollution that is associated with black carbon and tropo-
spheric ozone, which disproportionately affect the global poor.
The direct and indirect impacts of black carbon can be mitigated 
through already available and deployable solutions in the transporta-
tion, residential, industrial, and agricultural sectors. Similarly, the pow-
erful warming from methane—which also reacts in the atmosphere to 
produce tropospheric ozone, another SLCP—can be mitigated through 
measures implemented in the fossil fuel industry, waste management, 
and agriculture. HFCs have helped transition the world away from the 
CFCs and HCFCs that were destroying the ozone layer, but the climate 
impact from HFCs must now be eliminated. Fast implementation of the 
Kigali Amendment to the Montreal Protocol can avoid up to 0.5ºC of 
warming, and improvements in energy efficiency in cooling equipment 
can double this.
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Learning Objectives
1. Describe the basic concepts of the terrestrial carbon cycle.
You will learn how carbon moves from the atmosphere through 
plants, to soils, and eventually back to the atmosphere. Understand-
ing the carbon cycle is a critical first step to managing it for carbon 
capture and storage.
2. Explain the role of soils, organic matter, and greenhouse gas 
dynamics in the carbon cycle.
Soils are a hidden part of the carbon cycle but play a key role. 
Understanding what soil is, how carbon enters and leaves soils, and 
the controls on greenhouse gas production and consumption will 
help you understand (and invent) viable carbon removal strategies.
3. Describe the role of plants in carbon uptake, storage, and 
green house gas emissions.
Plants are superstars when it comes to removing atmospheric CO2. 
You will learn how plants act as conduits and reservoirs and how 
some plants and plant management can increase or decrease green-
house gas emissions.
4. Identify potential for emissions reduction on working lands.
Remember, carbon removal has to be coupled with emissions re-
duction to bend the curve. You will use your knowledge gained 
from earlier chapters to explore ways to reduce emissions from 
agricultural and forestry activities.
5. Describe carbon recovery and sequestration approaches for 
working lands.
How do we get more carbon out of the atmosphere? You will learn 
how plants and soils can be managed for carbon removal and stor-
age while they support soil and ecosystem sustainability. We will 
critically examine case studies of management approaches that are 
already in use. This information should help you use your creativ-
ity and knowledge to develop more approaches for the combined 
emissions reduction, carbon capture, and carbon storage that are 
needed to bend the curve.
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The material needed to meet these learning objectives will be delivered 
in the following six sections:
 ➤ 16.1 Natural and Working Lands in the Terrestrial Carbon Cycle
 ➤ 16.2 Soils, Organic Matter, and Greenhouse Gas Dynamics
 ➤ 16.3 The Role of Plants in Carbon Storage and Greenhouse Gas 
Emissions
 ➤ 16.4 Emissions Reduction via Management
 ➤ 16.5 Soil Carbon Recovery and Sequestration
 ➤ 16.6 What Have We Learned So Far?
Note that when it comes to ecosystem management for climate 
change mitigation, solutions are rarely simple. Ecosystems, by their 
very nature, are complex interacting, reactive environments. Nothing 
is static—they are always changing in response to weather (in the short 
term), climate (in the long term), big events (for example, fires, hurri-
canes, harvests), and smaller ones (for example, the gradual shifting of 
species). Thus, ecosystem management requires a systems approach, 
and it benefits greatly from long-term monitoring and careful observa-
tion. Sometimes ecosystem management also involves trade-offs; un-
derstanding how ecosystems function and how they respond to change 
will help us minimize those trade-offs. This chapter will help you under-
stand some of the complexity of ecosystems, where trade-offs are likely 
to occur, and how to recognize and minimize negative outcomes.
Overview
Greenhouse gas emissions reduction is a critical component of any plan 
to slow climate change. However, we have now reached a point where 
greenhouse gas emissions reduction alone is insufficient to solve the 
climate change crisis. The primary reason for this is that CO2 is a long-
lived atmospheric gas, meaning that once it arrives in the atmosphere, 
it is likely to stay there for many years. A small proportion of the CO2 
added through human activities can be retained in the atmosphere for 
thousands of years! This means that climate warming will continue even 
with greenhouse gas emissions reduction, because the rate of increase 
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in atmospheric concentrations of CO2 exceeds the rate of background 
removal. However, if we can increase the rate at which CO2 is removed 
from the atmosphere, while at the same time reducing emissions, we 
have the potential to bend the curve.
The Earth’s system has built-in ways to remove atmospheric CO2. 
On land, the most important mechanism to remove CO2 from the atmo-
sphere is photosynthesis by plants. Plants, and the soils they live in, are 
tremendous resources in the battle against climate change. Plants need 
CO2 to survive and grow, and they have the “machinery” to remove CO2 
from the atmosphere. We depend upon plants for food, fiber, fuel, and 
building materials, so we have perfected plant management—also called 
photosynthesis management—over thousands of years of practice. Soils 
have the potential to be deep, long-term repositories of some of the 
carbon captured by plants, keeping it from returning to the atmosphere 
for years to decades or longer. Finally, managing plants and soils for 
carbon uptake and storage often translates into more sustainable and 
productive practices for people and ecosystems.
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16.1   Natural and Working Lands 
in the Terrestrial Carbon Cycle
Natural ecosystems and working lands (those used for agriculture and 
forestry) play an important role in the terrestrial carbon cycle. Forests, 
grasslands, crop fields, wetlands—in fact, all ecosystems with plants and 
soils—exchange carbon dioxide (CO2) with the atmosphere. Approxi-
mately 86% of the Earth’s land surface is rural natural or working land, 
housing approximately 45% of the world’s population. Although most of 
the natural and working lands can be found in rural areas, they are not 
limited to rural areas. And urban, suburban, and peri-urban areas—even 
residential lawns and gardens—cycle CO2. Plants take up CO2 from the 
atmosphere during the process of photosynthesis. About half of the 
CO2 that plants take up gets released back to the atmosphere via plant 
respiration, together with oxygen and water vapor. The remaining CO2 
absorbed by plants is converted into plant tissues such as stems, roots, 
leaves, fruits, and flowers. From CO2, plants get the carbon they use 
as a major building block to make and sustain their tissues. Plants are 
at the base of the food chain and thus provide energy, in the form of 
carbon, together with nutrients from the soil to most of the rest of the 
organisms on Earth. Plants feed the world.
How do plants feed the world? Some organisms (for example, her-
bivores) harvest and eat live plant parts, but most of the carbon and 
nutrients in plants go to feed microorganisms. Plants regularly slough 
tissues, akin to animals shedding hair or skin. When plants shed their 
tissues, or when whole plants die, the tissues get deposited on or in 
the soil as plant litter. Some of this plant litter subsequently becomes 
food for microorganisms living in the soil (for example, bacteria and 
fungi). Like plants, microorganisms play a critical role in the local, re-
gional, and global cycles of carbon. Soil microorganisms use enzymes 
to help break down plant litter during the process of decomposition. 
The carbon captured by microorganisms during decomposition is used 
for energy and to build microbial bodies. Microorganisms also respire 
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CO2, thus completing the carbon cycle by returning some of the carbon 
initially captured by plants via photosynthesis back to the atmosphere 
(Figure 16.1.1).
Plants and microorganisms live in every biome on the Earth’s surface, 
and their activity can be clearly seen at a global scale in the graph of 
atmospheric CO2 data from Mauna Loa volcano on the island of Hawaii 
(Figure 16.1.2). There are two prominent features of this graph. The first 
feature is the steep rise in atmospheric CO2 concentrations from the 
Figure 16.1.1 The global carbon cycle. Carbon cycles on the scale of seconds 
to centuries among the atmosphere, plants, animals, soils, and soil microbes. 
Geologic reserves cycle carbon on the scale of centuries to millennia. The 
exception is when humans mine carbon from geologic reserves in the form 
of coal, gas, oil, and other fossil fuels. The burning of fossil fuels dramatically 
accelerates the release of geologic carbon to the atmosphere. Adapted from 
UCAR Center for Science Education.
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start of the record in 1958 to present. The long-term rise in atmospheric 
CO2 concentrations is due to increasing emissions from human activity. 
The second prominent feature in the graph is the annual “wiggle” in the 
atmospheric CO2 data. The wiggle occurs as a result of the breathing of 
the biosphere. Every time the line goes down, CO2 uptake by plants has 
exceeded the release of CO2 by microbial respiration. This in turn results 
in the net removal of carbon from the atmosphere and its storage in 
the biosphere. This annual downturn in CO2 is a natural process driven 
Figure 16.1.2 Atmospheric carbon dioxide (CO2) as measured from the 
top of Mauna Loa Volcano, on the Island of Hawaii. The upward trend in the 
data results from human activities that release CO2 to the atmosphere—the 
use of fossil fuels, biomass burning, and deforestation, among others. The 
annual troughs and peaks result from photosynthesis by plants and respiration, 
primarily by microorganisms. Data from Pieter Tans, NOAA/ESRL; and Ralph 
Keeling, Scripps Institution of Oceanography.
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by plant uptake of CO2 during photosynthesis at a global scale. The 
global minimum of atmospheric CO2 concentration generally occurs in 
September or October, which in the Northern Hemisphere occur in 
summer and early fall. The Northern Hemisphere has more land mass 
than the Southern Hemisphere and thus more land plants and associ-
ated carbon uptake. For this reason, the Northern Hemisphere growing 
season is the main driver of the annual low point in atmospheric CO2 
concentration.
The annual peak in atmospheric CO2 concentration occurs when 
the respiration of microorganisms that live predominantly in the soil 
exceeds plant uptake of CO2 from the atmosphere. Soil microorgan-
isms in many parts of the world are active in decomposition all year 
long and respond to periods of plant litter deposition during the plant 
growing season and at the end of the growing season when plants drop 
their leaves or completely senesce. During the growing season, plant 
uptake of CO2 exceeds microbial respiration. When plant activity slows 
or comes to a halt during the Northern Hemisphere winter and early 
Figure 16.1.3 Global carbon stocks. One petagram (Pg) equals 1015 grams. 
Deep rock reserves are the largest pool of carbon on Earth, with oceans storing 
the second largest amount. Soils are the next largest pool, followed by the 
atmosphere and plants. There is considerable uncertainty in the exact size of 
the Earth’s carbon stocks, as it is impossible to accurately measure the full pool 
directly. Estimates are derived from strategic direct measurements, remote 
sensing (satellite, airplane), and computer models. Data from University of New 
Hampshire 2008.
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spring, microbial respiration of CO2 exceeds plant uptake. This causes 
the global atmospheric concentration of CO2 to increase to a maximum, 
generally in May.
Plants and soils don’t just exchange carbon with the atmosphere; 
they are also a reservoir of stored carbon, together with the atmo-
sphere, oceans, freshwaters, and geologic reserves (Figure 16.1.3). 
The reservoirs where carbon is stored are also referred to as pools or 
stocks. On the land surface, soils are the largest reservoir of carbon. 
The total amount of carbon in soils is not well understood, because it 
is difficult to estimate the amount of carbon below the top meter, even 
though scientists know that deep soils contain carbon. Plants represent 
a smaller carbon stock but play a key role as conduits of carbon capture 
from the atmosphere. The interaction among the atmosphere, plants, 
and soil organic carbon pools can significantly affect the rate of climate 
change. The more carbon that is stored in soils and plants, the less that 
is stored in the atmosphere where it can absorb heat and warm the cli-
mate. Below, we will explore how carbon is cycled and is stored in soils 
and plants and how ecosystems can be managed to increase carbon 
storage to help slow climate change.
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16.2   Soils, Organic Matter, and 
Greenhouse Gas Dynamics
Why should we care about soils?
Soils are literally and figuratively the basis for life on Earth (Figure 16.2.1). 
Soils provide a substrate for plants to sink their roots into. Soils also 
provide the nutrients that plants need to survive, and by extension they 
provide the nutrients for most other living things on Earth. Soils store 
water. They also filter water by removing minerals and contaminants. 
Figure 16.2.1 Soil is the basis for life on Earth. Reproduced from © Okea/
Fotolia.
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In this way, healthy watersheds with abundant and intact soil resources 
help provide clean water to humans and other organisms. Some groups 
of soil microbes can consume and break down toxic chemicals, ren-
dering them less dangerous to human and ecosystem health. The sus-
tainability and productivity of agriculture depends on soils. However, 
much of the world’s soils have suffered damage and degradation from 
poor management (Figure 16.2.2). Erosion, overuse, compaction, and 
contamination from chemicals threaten the health of soils.
What is soil?
Soils are made up of a complex mixture of minerals and organic matter. 
The minerals come from rocks that are broken down through the pro-
cess of weathering. The organic matter in soils comes from plants, mi-
croorganisms, and animals. Soils are teeming with life. There are more 
microorganisms in a teaspoon of soil than there are people on Earth. In 
addition to live organisms, soils are the repository of microbial by-prod-
ucts and dead microbial, plant, and animal tissues. The organic matter 
derived from live and dead tissues thus makes up an important part of 
the soil. As all these tissues contain carbon, storing organic matter in 
soils is the vehicle for storing carbon in soils.
Figure 16.2.2 Map of soil degradation globally. The majority of managed 
lands experience moderate to very severe degradation including soil loss 
from wind and water erosion, toxicity from pollutants, low nutrient content 
from over harvesting, and compaction from overgrazing and the use of heavy 
machinery. Reproduced from the FAO.
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Soils and greenhouse gas emissions
Soils exchange gases with the atmosphere. These gases include CO2, 
methane, and nitrous oxide, the big three greenhouse gases. Microor-
ganisms, roots, insects, and other soil animals that breathe oxygen (that 
is, aerobic organisms) release CO2 through the process of respiration. 
Some soil microorganisms release methane to the atmosphere through 
anaerobic respiration (that is, respiration in the absence of oxygen), 
while still other soil microorganisms consume methane from the atmo-
sphere and respire CO2. Soils are the largest natural source of nitrous 
oxide, which is produced predominantly by yet another group of soil 
microorganisms. Both methane and nitrous oxide are very potent green-
house gases with more warming power than CO2. Thus, even relatively 
low methane and nitrous oxide emissions from soils can have a big 
impact on climate.
Microbes are not the only source of greenhouse gases in soils. In 
addition to biological sources of greenhouse gases, soils can foster the 
conditions needed for nonbiological (for example, geochemical) re-
actions that produce greenhouse gases. Geochemical greenhouse gas 
production in soils is thought to play a less important role than micro-
biological processes at a global scale, thus in this chapter we will focus 
on the microbial greenhouse gas emissions and ways to reduce these 
emissions.
All ecosystems exhibit some greenhouse gas emissions. The produc-
tion of greenhouse gases is a by-product of natural microbial processes 
and an indicator of life. However, some agricultural and forestry activities 
can increase greenhouse gas emissions from soils. For example, the use 
of nitrogen fertilizers on agricultural soils can stimulate the production 
and emission of nitrous oxide. Irrigation, especially flood irrigation, can 
create the anaerobic conditions needed for both methane and nitrous 
oxide production and emissions. Plowing and tillage can release stored 
carbon and nitrogen, making it accessible to microbes that release CO2, 
methane, and nitrous oxide to the atmosphere. Agriculture accounts for 
more than half of the nitrous oxide and methane emissions globally and 
approximately 25% of the total greenhouse gas emissions worldwide. 
Forestry and other land uses result in similar levels of emissions.
16-14 Chapter 16: Enhancing Carbon Sinks in Natural and Working Lands
Organic matter versus organic carbon versus 
inorganic carbon
The organic matter in soils contains carbon that was originally stored in 
the atmosphere and subsequently captured by plants via photosynthe-
sis. There is a wide range of soil organic carbon (SOC) contents in soils 
globally. This is because both inputs and outputs of SOC are sensitive to 
a suite of environmental factors:
 ➤ Climate and weather: temperature, precipitation, storms, drought
 ➤ Geology: rock type and weathering rate
 ➤ Soil age: landscape and landform stability
 ➤ Biology: vegetation, microorganisms, and animals
Carbon capture via photosynthesis differs among ecosystems. The 
plants of temperate and tropical wetlands and tropical rain forests are 
among the most productive globally, meaning that they capture the most 
carbon annually. Wetlands are productive where water and dissolved 
and suspended nutrients are constantly flowing and providing a regular 
renewal of resources. Tropical rain forests are productive because their 
location near the equator promises abundant sunlight and near-constant 
warm, moist conditions that favor continuous plant growth throughout 
the year.
The pool of SOC also differs among ecosystems. The amount of 
organic carbon storage in soils is a function of the difference between 
carbon inputs and carbon losses. Where organic carbon losses via de-
composition and leaching (or other physical removal) equal organic 
carbon inputs to the soil, the size of the SOC pool remains the same. 
Where decomposition rates are lower than carbon inputs, SOC can ac-
cumulate. Northern peatlands store the most SOC among the world’s 
terrestrial biomes. Although plant growth and associated carbon uptake 
is low compared with ecosystems like wetlands or tropical forests, the 
rate of SOC loss is even slower as a result of cold temperatures and un-
favorable conditions for microbial decomposition (for example, anoxia). 
This facilitates the gradual buildup of large quantities of SOC.
So far, we have focused on organic carbon pools. Soil also contains 
inorganic carbon. Inorganic carbon is primarily made up of calcium and 
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magnesium carbonates and enters soils through the weathering of car-
bonate rocks. Soils contain about 1,000 petagrams (Pg; 1 Pg = 1015 g) 
of inorganic carbon (equivalent to 1,000 gigatons) in the top meter, 
globally, mostly concentrated in deserts and semiarid regions. Increas-
ing atmospheric CO2 associated with climate change and the increase 
in soil acidity from certain land uses can result in the loss of inorganic 
carbon in soils.
Soil organic carbon sequestration
To review, when the rate of inputs of SOC exceeds the rate of losses, 
SOC accumulates. Another term for this is SOC sequestration. Soils 
have tremendous capacity to sequester SOC. It has been estimated that 
soils store between 1,500 and 3,500 petagrams of organic carbon. The 
low estimate of SOC is double the amount of carbon stored in the 
atmosphere (750 petagrams) and almost three times the carbon stored 
in vegetation globally (560 petagrams) (Figure 16.1.3). We do not have 
precise estimates of SOC pools, because soils vary greatly from place to 
place and are heterogeneous, deep, and largely hidden from view. This 
makes measuring the total amount of SOC challenging at a global scale.
With so many microorganisms in soils, it is a wonder that any SOC 
can escape microbial decomposition and become sequestered. How-
ever, there are several ways that organic matter and its associated car-
bon can get stored in soils:
 ➤ Organic carbon can chemically react with soil minerals or other 
organic compounds to form strong bonds. These bonds can be dif-
ficult for microbes to break, leading to the persistence of organic 
carbon in soils.
 ➤ Organic carbon can accumulate if it is deposited deep down in the 
soil. Microbial activity is greatest near the surface of soils (top 10 
to 30 centimeters) and declines with depth. This is because most of 
the carbon and nutrients that microbes need to survive is deposited 
on or near the surface by plants. However, roots can penetrate to 
deep soil depths and inject organic matter into soils as they slough 
tissues. In some seasonally dry environments, like parts of the Am-
azon basin, roots extend down almost 20 meters. Water can also 
transport organic carbon into deep soils as it percolates down. 
16-16 Chapter 16: Enhancing Carbon Sinks in Natural and Working Lands
Burrowing animals and insects are good agents of organic carbon 
transport and deposition into deep soils.
 ➤ Organic carbon can persist in soils if conditions are more favor-
able for plant growth than for microbial decomposition or physical 
losses. The organic-rich northern peatlands discussed above are an 
example of where SOC accumulates because microbial decomposi-
tion is inhibited by the lack of oxygen in soils and cold temperatures.
 ➤ Organic carbon can persist in soils if the organic matter it is derived 
from is chemically or physically difficult for microbes to break down. 
This happens with materials like compost, wood, and waxy tissues 
or in cases where the microbial community lacks the enzymes to 
break down specific types of chemical compounds.
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16.3   The Role of Plants in Carbon Storage 
and Greenhouse Gas Emissions
Plants as conduits and reservoirs
When it comes to the global carbon cycle, plants are the ultimate car-
bon-capturing champions. While artificial carbon capture technologies 
are being developed to address climate change, photosynthesis can be 
thought of as a “technology” that has been perfected and deployed for 
over 2 billion years. The rate of atmospheric carbon uptake by plants via 
photosynthesis dwarfs all other forms of carbon capture. Land plants 
pull an estimated 120 petagrams of carbon from the atmosphere each 
year—over 15% of the total atmospheric carbon pool.
Plants, in addition to being the primary conduits for CO2 removal 
from the atmosphere, can sequester carbon. As mentioned above, the 
global terrestrial plant carbon pool stores approximately 560 petagrams 
of carbon. It is easier to estimate aboveground plant carbon pools than 
it is to estimate carbon in soils. Plants, and more specifically the re-
flectance of the chlorophyll in leaves, can be measured from satellites 
in space. This technique is called remote sensing and is a powerful 
tool for assessing the amount of plant biomass on the land surface. 
Changes in reflectance over time are correlated with changes in leaf 
area, which in turn is directly related to rates of plant growth. Thus, 
satellite imagery repeated over time can be used to estimate how much 
plant growth is occurring on land. Belowground plant parts, namely 
roots, are much harder to estimate than aboveground plant parts, as 
roots are hidden from view. Roots can extend deep into soils. Roots 
can be large, like the structural roots of trees, or small and ephemeral, 
like the main absorptive roots of grasses and herbs. Although measuring 
root biomass is difficult, it is important for understanding the carbon 
cycle. In some ecosystems there is as much root carbon below ground 
as is stored in plant biomass above ground. Roots are also important 
because they are the main conduits for soil organic matter formation. 
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Roots are generally assumed to be a greater contributor to soil carbon 
stocks than aboveground plant tissues because roots are already buried 
below ground and can be more easily captured and sequestered in the 
soil than aboveground tissues. Thus, roots play a key role as transmitters 
of carbon into soils.
Forests as carbon sinks and sources
Overall, trees store more carbon than any other plant type. Forests cover 
about 30% of the total land area on Earth and account for approximately 
80% of the terrestrial plant biomass. This means that forests store an 
estimated 350 petagrams of carbon in their tissues, most of which is in 
wood. Forests are vulnerable to natural and human-caused disturbance 
events such as fire, logging, pests, and weather-related disturbances. 
Some estimates suggest that 60% of the world’s forests are in some 
stage of recovery from the last disturbance event. Forest disturbance 
often leads to the emissions of greenhouse gases. Deforestation is a big 
contributor to global greenhouse gas emissions, especially in the tropics. 
At a global scale, tropical deforestation accounts for about 10% of all 
greenhouse gas emissions annually. Some of the greenhouse gas emis-
sions from deforestation result from disturbance to soils. Tree cutting 
and removal can break up soil aggregates, exposing previously trapped 
carbon to microbial decomposition and providing fuel to microbes that 
produce CO2, methane, and nitrous oxide. Greenhouse gases are also 
released during the decomposition of the plant litter produced from 
deforestation.
Forest fire and biomass burning is another large source of green-
house gas emissions. Fires consume biomass and produce CO2, meth-
ane, and nitrous oxide, among other gases. Globally, 2 to 3 petagrams 
of carbon are emitted to the atmosphere annually from fires. Over 80% 
of this comes from tropical regions, with approximately 1 petagram of 
carbon per year coming from savannas (wooded grasslands). Climate 
change is increasing the frequency and severity of drought in some re-
gions, and this can in turn increase the occurrence of fires.
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16.4   Emissions Reduction via  
Agricultural Management
Management of agricultural lands has historically been a major con-
tributor to climate change, amounting to approximately 25% of global 
greenhouse gas emissions. When plants and animals are harvested from 
working lands, the associated carbon and nutrients are harvested as 
well. Fertilizer can replace some of the nutrients harvested, and plant 
growth can bring new carbon into ecosystems, but rarely do we replace 
all the carbon and nutrients that are lost. Fertilization, irrigation, and 
biomass burning, as well as practices that disturb soils such as plowing 
and tillage, can increase emissions of all three of the major greenhouse 
gases. Human land use over the last 12,000 years has resulted in the 
loss of an estimated 116 petagrams of SOC in the top 2 meters of 
soil, globally. Deforestation, primarily in the tropics, results in the loss 
of approximately 1.7 petagrams organic carbon per year from ecosys-
tems. In order to slow climate change, and bend the curve, greenhouse 
gas emissions from working lands must be reduced. There are several 
possible approaches for reducing emissions that can yield significant 
greenhouse gas savings, including improved fertilizer, tillage, water, and 
residue management, as well as matching crops to appropriate soils and 
climates, and incorporating fallow periods. Improved grazing land and 
livestock management, together with better manure management, are 
additional practices that are known to reduce emissions. Taken together 
at a global scale, these practices have been estimated to have the poten-
tial to save over 3 petagrams in CO2 equivalents (CO2e) per year. Below, 
we detail two examples of approaches that can reduce emissions and 
offer valuable co-benefits.
Nitrogen fertilizer
Nitrogen fertilizer comes in organic and inorganic forms and is widely 
used in agriculture to enhance plant growth. Inorganic nitrogen fertilizer 
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can be a large source of greenhouse gas emissions, from production to 
field application. The manufacturing of inorganic nitrogen fertilizer is a 
carbon-intensive activity. A lot of energy is required to convert dinitro-
gen gas to ammonia during fertilizer production. In 2004, the fertilizer 
industry used approximately 1% of the world’s energy, with 90% of that 
used to produce ammonia. Producing the 119 million metric tons (MMT) 
of nitrogen fertilizer applied to soils globally in 2018 resulted in at least 
492 MMT of CO2 emissions (values calculated using Statista 2014). This 
is assuming that natural gas was used in the manufacturing process; if 
coal was used, the energy cost was higher. To compound the problem, 
nitrogen is often applied to fields in excess of plant requirements. This 
extra nitrogen fertilizer stimulates microorganisms in the soils that make 
nitrous oxide gas, and nitrous oxide emissions increase exponentially 
with the amount of nitrogen fertilizer added.
At the field scale, there are several approaches that can lower green-
house gas emissions from fertilizer use. Careful monitoring of plant re-
quirements could significantly lower the amount of nitrogen fertilizer 
needed for agriculture. There are important co-benefits from this rela-
tively simple action. Less fertilizer applied means that less fertilizer will 
need to be produced, lowering the carbon footprint of fertilizer manu-
facturing. Lower fertilizer application rates will also lower nitrous oxide 
emissions. More efficient fertilization application could save the farmer 
money, helping to support a more financially sustainable agricultural 
industry. And finally, less fertilizer use can help reduce nitrogen runoff 
and pollution of waterways. Some additional ways to lower greenhouse 
gas emissions associated with fertilizer use include the following:
 ➤ Use low-carbon or no-carbon fuels in fertilizer manufacturing.
 ➤ Capture biosolids and wastewaters and convert them to nitro-
gen amendments; this also helps remove nitrogen pollution from 
waterways.
 ➤ Use organic nitrogen and slow-release fertilizer. If the fertilizer is 
released slowly, it can result in lower emissions and have a lower 
overall carbon footprint.
 ➤ Use buried or drip irrigation. Supplying only the amount of water 
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the plant needs can minimize overwatering that can stimulate ni-
trous oxide emissions.
 ➤ Use nitrogen-fixing cover crops. Nitrogen-fixing plants are species 
that can pull nitrogen from the atmosphere and supply it to soils. 
Nitrogen-fixing plants in the legume (pea) family are often used 
as cover crops during fallow periods (see below). Nitrogen-fixing 
cover crops can also stimulate nitrous oxide emissions but do not 
result in the energy costs associated with inorganic nitrogen fertil-
izer production.
The total greenhouse gas savings from these improved practices 
have not yet been estimated at a global scale, but models suggest the 
results will be very promising.
Livestock waste
Animal waste is another large source of greenhouse gas emissions on 
working lands. Animal agriculture accounts for approximately 20% of the 
non-CO2 greenhouse gas emissions, globally. Almost half of these emis-
sions come from manure management, primarily on dairies and feed-
lots. Manure is generally stored in piles or slurry ponds, which create 
favorable conditions for the production of nitrous oxide and methane. 
Storage of manure presents additional problems in the form of bio-
logical and chemical hazards to human and ecosystem health. Manure 
applied to fields can stimulate plant growth but has also been shown to 
be a large source of soil nitrous oxide emissions and to contribute to 
nitrate pollution of waterways.
Livestock waste is carbon-rich material. One alternative manage-
ment for livestock waste is anaerobic digestion. Anaerobic digestion is 
the process of controlled microbial decomposition under anoxic (no-ox-
ygen) conditions. The microbes that perform the anaerobic decompo-
sition produce methane gas. While methane is a greenhouse gas, it can 
also be used as a biofuel and can be captured directly from the digestor. 
Thus, processing livestock wastes through anaerobic digestion lowers 
emissions from traditional waste storage and produces a valuable fuel 
source. It should be noted that when the methane fuel is utilized for 
energy, CO2 is the by-product. The CO2 by-product is considered to be 
carbon-neutral and not a contributor to climate change. This is because 
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the livestock waste was derived from CO2 recently captured from the 
atmosphere (via the plants that the animals consumed), and in carbon 
accounting schemes, this relatively fast cycling of CO2 is considered to 
result in no net change in atmospheric CO2 concentrations.
Anaerobic digestion does not completely decompose the livestock 
waste, leaving a partially decomposed material called digestate. The 
digestate is nitrogen rich and can stimulate nitrous oxide emissions if 
applied directly to soils. Composting the residual digestate can reduce 
nitrous oxide emissions. Anaerobic digestion may not remove harmful 
chemicals (for example, hormones, antibiotics) or microorganisms (for 
example, pathogenic bacteria), thus original feedstocks, such as the live-
stock manure, and the ultimate digestate must be monitored closely to 
avoid contamination of soils and waterways. As yet, anaerobic digestion 
is not widely adopted in the US or globally, but policy and financial 
incentives can increase the use of this technology. Concerns over costs, 
reliability, and leakage remain, but this technology holds considerable 
promise for emissions reduction.
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16.5  Soil Carbon Recovery and Sequestration
While emissions reduction is a critical step for slowing the climate 
change crisis, emissions reduction alone is no longer sufficient to solve 
the problem. The issue is clearly stated in the following quote from the 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change Report (2014):
A large fraction of anthropogenic climate change resulting from 
CO2 emissions is irreversible on a multi-century to millennial time 
scale, except in the case of a large net removal of CO2 from the 
atmosphere over a sustained period. Surface temperatures will 
remain approximately constant at elevated levels for many centuries 
after a complete cessation of net anthropogenic CO2 emissions. 
Due to the long time scales of heat transfer from the ocean surface 
to depth, ocean warming will continue for centuries. Depending 
on the scenario, about 15 to 40% of emitted CO2 will remain in the 
atmosphere longer than 1,000 years.
The difference between emissions reduction alone and the combi-
nation of emissions reduction with CO2 removal is illustrated in Figure 
16.5.1. In this figure a hypothetical emissions reduction scenario shows 
a slower but still increasing trend of atmospheric CO2 concentrations. 
What is needed to change this trend? We need to bend the curve! The 
best way to bend the curve is to combine emissions reduction with CO2 
removal from the atmosphere.
Land-based solutions
Land-based solutions hold considerable promise to help bend the curve, 
particularly through organic carbon capture, recovery, and sequestra-
tion in soils (Table 16.5.1). Well-established agricultural management 
approaches that have been shown to increase carbon stocks include the 
following:
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 ➤ Reduced or no tillage
 ➤ Improved grazing regimes
 ➤ Fire management
 ➤ Use of cover crops
 ➤ Use of plant species with high root allocation
 ➤ Conversion from annual to perennial crops
 ➤ Crop rotation involving perennials
 ➤ Agroforestry
 ➤ Wetland restoration
 ➤ Fertilization
 ➤ Irrigation
 ➤ Organic matter amendments
Figure 16.5.1 Hypothetical patterns in atmospheric CO2 concentrations 
from 2018 to 2060 as a result of different climate change mitigation scenarios. 
The business-as-usual scenario is depicted in blue with a sold black trend line. 
A hypothetical emissions reduction scenario, even when optimistic, will still 
only slow the rate of increase of CO2 in the atmosphere (dotted black line). 
Combining emissions reduction with CO2 removal will help lower atmospheric 
CO2 concentrations and bend the curve (dotted red line). (ppmv = parts per 
million by volume). Image by Whendee L. Silver.
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Land-based solutions that can help mitigate climate change fall into 
three general categories. The first category includes practices where the 
primary goal is to slow SOC losses. The second category includes the 
manipulation of plant species composition to increase SOC capture and 
associated storage. The third category, using natural and working lands, 
is the use of soil amendments. Below, we cover each of these in more 
detail.
Slowing carbon losses in agriculture
Some land use practices result in the loss of carbon from plants and 
soils. When carbon losses are slowed, emissions are reduced, and car-
bon storage is enhanced. Examples of land use practices that can slow 
Table 16.5.1 Potential global soil carbon sequestration with improved 
agricultural land management
Management Land Use
Mean 
Sequestration 
Potential 
(Pg∙C∙yr-1)
High Range 
(Pg∙C∙yr-1)
Low Range 
(Pg∙C∙yr-1)
Biochara All 1.05 ± 0.75 1.10 ± 0.70 0.59 ± 0.41
Nutrient, tillage, 
irrigationb
Cropland 0.56 ± 0.14 1.01 ± 0.33 0.48 ± 0.17
Grazingc Rangeland 0.26 ± 0.05 0.77 ± 0.31 0.26 ± 0.11
Combined 
potential 
(excluding 
biochar)d
All 0.83 ± 0.11 1.78 ± 0.32 0.74 ± 0.14
Combined 
potential 
(including 
biochar)e
All 1.88 ± 0.35 2.89 ± 0.42 1.32 ± 0.13
Source: Adapted from Mayer et al. 2018.
High and low estimates are the mean values of the lower and upper limits of potential 
sequestration given in the associated references. Values are means plus and minus standard 
errors. (Pg∙C∙yr-1 = petagrams of carbon per year)
a Griscom et al. 2017, Woolf et al. 2010; b Griscom et al. 2017, Lal 2010, Paustian et al. 
2016, Smith et al. 2008, Zomer et al. 2017; c Griscom et al. 2017, Henderson et al. 2015, Lal 
2010, Paustian et al. 2016, Smith et al. 2008; d Griscom et al. 2017, Henderson et al. 2015, 
Lal 2010, Paustian et al. 2016, Smith et al. 2008, Zomer et al. 2017; e Griscom et al. 2017, 
Henderson et al. 2015, Lal 2010, Paustian et al. 2016, Smith et al. 2008, Zomer et al. 2017, 
Woolf et al. 2010
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the loss of carbon from ecosystems include reduced or no tillage, im-
proved grazing regimes, and fire management.
Tillage is the manual or mechanical practice of turning and agitat-
ing soils before planting. It is commonly used in agriculture to reduce 
weeds, mix soils, and incorporate dead plant material left over from 
the previous harvest. Tillage also breaks up soil aggregates, exposing 
soil organic matter to decomposition; tilled fields tend to have lower 
surface SOC than nontilled fields. Reducing tillage, or doing away with it 
altogether, decreases the rate of decomposition of soil organic matter 
and can lead to soil carbon sequestration. Rates of carbon gain tend to 
be slow, particularly if decreasing the amount of tillage slows the rate 
of plant growth. Slower plant growth can present challenges to farmers. 
Furthermore, low- or no-till soils have a greater potential to produce 
nitrous oxide. From a climate change perspective, the ultimate benefit 
of reduced- or no-till practices will be a function of the rate of new plant 
carbon inputs relative to the rate of soil organic matter decomposition 
and physical soil carbon losses, as well as overall greenhouse gas emis-
sions. Improved tillage practices associated with maintaining soil cover 
have the potential to save 0.3 to 0.5 petagrams CO2 per year.
Livestock grazing is another practice that can result in significant 
SOC losses. Grazing practices vary widely, from a few animals grazed 
for short periods to continuous grazing of large herds. Overgrazing can 
decrease the ability of plants to recover and can degrade soil resources, 
akin to overharvesting of an agricultural crop. Overgrazing can also 
compact soils and lead to SOC losses via erosion. Changes in grazing 
regimes that provide opportunities for plant regrowth can decrease the 
rate of SOC losses. Similarly, restricting herd size and movement during 
periods when soils are vulnerable (for example, when soils are very wet 
and thus easily compressed) can reduce SOC losses. Plant regrowth 
not only increases carbon capture, but also provides additional forage 
for livestock. Root regrowth can also help hold soil in place and limit 
erosional losses. Together, improved grazing practices are estimated to 
have the potential to save 0.2 to 0.7 petagrams CO2e per year.
Fire leads to rapid carbon losses through the oxidation of plant 
biomass and surface organic material. By oxidation we are referring to 
the conversion of solid carbon to CO2 and other carbon gases during 
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burning. Fire management is challenging. Attempts to suppress fire 
through management in regions where fire is a natural part of the land-
scape can have devastating results. Fuels, in the form of dead organic 
matter or standing biomass, can accumulate in the absence of fire, lead-
ing to hotter, more severe, uncontrolled fire events such as wildfires. 
Fuel management can reduce the chance of wildfire. Examples of fuel 
management include forest thinning, removal of downed wood, and 
grazing or mowing of grasslands and woodlands to remove residual 
dead plant material. Fire management not only decreases the amount 
of carbon loss via severe fire events, but also facilitates plant growth 
and associated CO2 capture. The potential of fire management to lower 
greenhouse gas emissions and increase soil carbon storage is poorly 
understood at a global scale. Preliminary estimates suggest that carbon 
savings of 0.2 to 0.4 petagrams CO2e are possible.
Plant species–based approaches
The carbon-friendly management of plant species and communities can 
take many forms, but some of the best-documented examples include 
the planting of cover crops, use of plant species with typically high root 
biomass, conversion from annual to perennial crops, crop rotation using 
perennial plant species, agroforestry, and wetland restoration.
Cover crops can increase carbon capture by increasing the length 
of time that plants are active in an ecosystem. In some forms of crop 
agriculture, soil is left bare during the fallow periods in between grow-
ing seasons. Bare soil is vulnerable to erosion and associated carbon 
losses, and the lack of live plants means that CO2 is not being captured. 
Nitrogen-fixing cover crops can increase the nitrogen content of the 
soil, reducing the need for inorganic fertilizer, as mentioned above. 
Species that tend to build large root systems are particularly helpful for 
sequestering SOC, as most SOC is thought to be dominantly derived 
from root biomass.
Similarly, the use of perennial crops, alone or in crop rotations or 
with agroforestry, can increase carbon capture and sequestration. An-
nual crops live out their entire life cycle within a single year. Examples of 
important annual crops include corn, wheat, rice, and soy. Annual plants 
must grow from seed each year, establishing new root systems and 
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aboveground plant parts. Perennial plants such as alfalfa, grapes, arti-
chokes, asparagus, and tree crops persist for multiple years. In the case 
of tree crops, the below- and aboveground plant parts remain on the 
landscape. In the case of nonwoody plants like alfalfa, the aboveground 
plant parts may die back or be harvested, while the root system remains 
and becomes reactivated during the next growing season. There are 
many advantages of perennial crops from a carbon perspective. Peren-
nial crops often have a longer growing season, as they have greater 
access to soil resources. A longer growing season translates into greater 
potential for carbon capture from the atmosphere and storage in soil, 
even past the time when the fruit or vegetable is harvested. Deeper, 
more extensive root systems can access water and nutrients not avail-
able to annual species. The maintenance of perennial root systems helps 
hold the soil in place, limiting erosion and associated carbon losses. Pe-
rennial species are often used to rehabilitate degraded, overgrazed, or 
overharvested lands. Although carbon sequestration rates can be slow, 
owing to lack of nutrient and water resources, the use of perennials can 
be an effective climate change mitigation approach for degraded soils. 
Crop selection and conservation agriculture techniques (particularly the 
use of cover crops) combined can save 0.3 to 1 petagrams CO2e per 
year.
Wetland plant species can also contribute to climate change mit-
igation. Wetlands in some regions have been drained for agriculture 
because the underlying peat soil is often rich in organic matter and 
nutrients. However, when peat soils are exposed to the atmosphere and 
become aerated, the organic matter decomposes rapidly. In the Sacra-
mento–San Joaquin Delta of California, the biggest freshwater wetland 
in the western US, wetland drainage has led to the loss of approximately 
1 petagram of carbon to the atmosphere. The loss of SOC has contrib-
uted to land subsidence. In some areas, the land surface has dropped 
10 meters or more (Figure 16.5.2).
Wetland restoration has the potential to sequester carbon by re-
storing peat soils. Estuarine, swamp, and marsh wetlands are among 
the most productive ecosystems in the world, meaning that they have 
the highest rates of CO2 capture and conversion, globally. Plant growth 
in these wetlands benefits from high soil moisture year round and the 
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near-constant input of nutrients leached from upslope sources. Wetland 
restoration could potentially save 0.3 to 1.3 petagrams CO2e per year. 
Wetland flooding helps create anaerobic conditions in soils that slow 
organic matter decomposition. Thus, high rates of carbon capture by 
wetland plants coupled with low decomposition rates in wetland soils 
lead to rapid rates of organic carbon accumulation in soils. The anaero-
bic conditions in wetland soils can also lead to methane production and 
emissions. The net benefit of wetland restoration for climate change 
mitigation must carefully consider the balance between carbon seques-
tration and methane emissions. Wetland restoration also provides many 
co-benefits, including reduced flood risk and increased downstream 
water quality.
Soil amendments
Enhancing the soil environment directly is another carbon sequestration 
approach. Fertilizer, water, and organic amendments are approaches 
that are commonly used to increase plant growth and enhance soil 
organic matter and SOC storage. Fertilizer applications, as discussed 
above, can stimulate plant growth and associated carbon capture. 
However, nitrogen-based inorganic fertilizers, and even some organic 
fertilizers, can also result in high carbon costs during production and 
increased emissions of nitrous oxide from soils. Thus, a full greenhouse 
gas and carbon accounting is necessary to determine the costs and 
benefits of fertilization for climate change mitigation.
Figure 16.5.2 Soil subsidence in the Sacramento–San Joaquin Delta of 
California. Wetland drainage led to the decomposition of soil organic matter, 
leading the land surface to drop over time. Reproduced from USGS.
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Irrigation is also used in agricultural ecosystems to enhance plant 
growth. Irrigation helps land managers maintain optimal soil moisture 
conditions for plant productivity. Periodic drought associated with nat-
ural climate patterns (that is, annual dry seasons) can limit plant growth 
to the rainy months of the year. Irrigation can be used to lengthen the 
growing season and to minimize the impacts of rainfall variability. Ap-
proximately 89 million acre-feet of water (1 acre-foot = 326,000 gallons) 
was applied to farmland in the US in 2013. Over 82% of that water was 
applied to farms in the western US alone, because of the strong rainfall 
seasonality in the region. Where irrigation increases plant growth, it 
has the potential to also increase soil carbon sequestration. However, 
increasing soil moisture can also stimulate microbial decomposition 
and the loss of SOC from soils. Careful management of the timing and 
amount of irrigation, as well as the way it is applied (subsurface, drip, 
or sprinkler systems), can help limit SOC losses. Overwatering can lead 
to soil water saturation, the development of anaerobic conditions, and 
the emissions of nitrous oxide and methane.
Transporting and applying water represent some of the carbon costs 
of irrigation, although the actual emissions are very difficult to quantify. 
Transport-related greenhouse gas emissions from irrigation depend 
upon the distance the water has to travel and the change in elevation 
required to bring water to the site of delivery. Climate change–related 
increases in drought frequency and severity, particularly in regions like 
the western US, are likely to result in additional greenhouse gas emis-
sions from water transportation. Estimates of the potential CO2e costs 
and savings from improved irrigation are lacking at a global scale.
Organic matter amendments are another land use practice that has 
potential to help mitigate climate change. Organic matter amendments 
can take many forms, from residual plant material not utilized from a 
harvest, such as corn stover, to livestock manure, composted urban or 
agricultural organic waste, and biochar produced by burning organic 
materials. Adding organic matter to soils is thought to increase the 
chances for soil organic matter formation. However, the application of 
fresh plant material (called green waste) to the soil surface often leads 
to higher emissions of CO2 due to the stimulation of microbial activity. 
This stimulation, call the priming effect, can lead to the loss of some 
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of the existing SOC stock, although the duration and amount of SOC 
loss is variable and dependent upon a suite of environmental factors. 
The application of raw animal wastes has been shown to increase SOC 
storage but also leads to emissions of nitrous oxide. As nitrous oxide 
is a much more potent greenhouse gas than CO2 with regard to at-
mospheric warming potential, the net benefit of soil amendments of 
livestock manures can be low or even negative—leading the ecosystem 
to become a net contributor to climate change.
Composting organic material before land application can significantly 
decrease the rate of decomposition and greenhouse gas emissions and 
lead to net carbon sequestration in soils. Composting organic waste 
also removes the waste from high-emitting sources such as landfills and 
manure ponds, leading to large greenhouse gas savings. For example, 
composted green waste applied to just 5% of California’s grasslands 
resulted in a net savings of 28 million metric tons of CO2e over 3 years. 
Much of this savings came from reducing methane and nitrous oxide 
emissions from waste management, while the remainder came from the 
new carbon added to soil via enhanced plant growth and the additional 
storage of the compost carbon added as the amendment. Preliminary 
estimates based on the generation of organic waste suggest that com-
posted organic amendments could save on the order of 2 petagrams 
CO2e per year globally.
Biochar is an amendment that is produced from the burning of 
organic residues and waste. Under some conditions, biochar has the 
potential to remain for years, decades, or longer, although the actual 
decomposition rate is dependent upon the chemical and physical char-
acteristics of the biochar, as well as the climate and soil characteristics 
of where it is applied. Biochar can act as a slow-release fertilizer similar 
to compost and can improve other soil chemical and physical charac-
teristics, including soil aeration and drainage. This can lead to enhanced 
plant growth and associated carbon capture and storage. Estimates of 
the carbon savings from biochar amendments vary widely, as this is a 
relatively new approach for climate change mitigation in the agricultural 
sector. Scientists estimate that carbon savings range from less than 1 to 
over 2.5 petagrams of carbon per year. 
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16.6  What Have We Learned So Far?
Natural and working lands can both contribute to climate change and 
help to mitigate it. What is needed to bend the curve? “Carbon-friendly” 
land management is key to reducing emissions and increasing carbon 
capture, conversion, and storage. Field-tested solutions are needed. These 
must consider the full life cycle of carbon and greenhouse gases to be 
truly effective. A systems perspective is critical. Ecosystems are complex, 
and thus cross- and multidisciplinary collaborations may be necessary 
to devise and implement comprehensive climate change solutions for 
natural and working lands. In addition to research, training and outreach 
are important components of successful strategies. Educating yourselves 
and others on the concepts of the carbon cycle and our ability to alter 
it through everyday decisions is perhaps the most effective strategy to 
solving the climate change crisis. Making decisions about how to fertil-
ize fields and supporting climate-friendly practices with our purchasing 
power are examples of actions that we can take today.
Summary
 ➤ Greenhouse gas emissions reduction is critical for slowing climate 
change, but emissions reduction alone is no longer sufficient to 
solve the problem. We must remove carbon dioxide from the atmo-
sphere to bend the curve.
 ➤ Ecosystems are complex and management approaches must em-
brace that complexity to be successful. Trade-offs, for example 
between carbon sequestration and enhanced greenhouse gas emis-
sions, need to be identified, quantified, and carefully weighed for 
effective climate change mitigation outcomes.
 ➤ Plants need CO2 from the atmosphere to survive and grow. They 
convert CO2 to plant tissues via photosynthesis. The annual pattern 
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in the drawdown of CO2 by plants is evident at a global scale in the 
concentrations of atmospheric CO2.
 ➤ Microorganisms in the soil break down plant litter into soil organic 
matter. Microbes also respire CO2, returning some of the carbon 
originally captured by plants to the atmosphere, completing the car-
bon cycle. The annual pattern in respiration of soil microorganisms 
is detectable at a global scale in the concentrations of atmospheric 
CO2.
 ➤ Plants and soils are reservoirs of carbon. Soils are the largest res-
ervoir of carbon on the land surface. Plants are a smaller reservoir 
of carbon but are key conduits for moving carbon from the atmo-
sphere to the soil.
 ➤ Soils are the basis for life on Earth. They are a complex mixture of 
minerals and organic matter. They house and feed microorganisms 
and support plants. They are a source and a sink of greenhouse 
gases.
 ➤ All ecosystems produce some greenhouse gases, as this is an in-
dicator of life. Land management can increase greenhouse gas 
emissions. Agriculture accounts for approximately 25% of global 
greenhouse gas emissions.
 ➤ Soil organic matter contains carbon that was originally captured by 
plants. Soil organic carbon pools vary across locations because they 
are affected by climate, by plant, animal, and microbial species, and 
by underlying geology.
 ➤ Soils can accumulate organic carbon when the rate of inputs ex-
ceeds the rate of losses. This is called soil carbon sequestration.
 ➤ Photosynthesis can be thought of as a “technology” that has been 
perfected and deployed for over 2 billion years. The rate of atmo-
spheric carbon uptake by plants via photosynthesis dwarfs all other 
forms of carbon capture.
 ➤ Plants can accumulate and store carbon. Trees and forests store 
more carbon than other plant life. Forest carbon is vulnerable to 
fire and logging, as well as pest outbreaks. Tropical deforestation 
accounts for 10% of annual greenhouse gas emissions globally.
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 ➤ Emissions reduction from working lands is critical for climate change 
mitigation. There are several possible ways to lower emissions. Many 
of these approaches have valuable co-benefits for land owners and 
managers. Fertilizer and livestock waste management are examples 
of promising avenues for emissions reduction.
 ➤ Soil carbon sequestration holds great potential as a carbon sink. 
Large areas of the land surface have become depleted in soil or-
ganic carbon through management over the last 12,000 years. Many 
land use practices have already been shown to increase soil carbon 
storage.
 ➤ Soil carbon sinks can be divided into three categories: those that 
slow emissions and allow carbon to accumulate, those that increase 
the rate of carbon capture by plants, and those that use amend-
ments to stimulate plant growth, increase carbon storage, and re-
duce emissions in other sectors.
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Learning Objectives
1. Describe how ice sheets melt in the polar regions.
2. Understand the history of melting and the tools used to unveil its 
recent history.
3. Understand the dynamic effects of melting across socioeconomic 
levels and how to curb these effects.
Overview
Glaciers and ice sheets in Greenland, Antarctica, and other parts of 
the world are melting as a result of climate change resulting from 
human- induced emissions of greenhouse gases. The rates of ice melt 
have increased by one order of magnitude in the last 40 years and will 
likely continue to increase rapidly in the next 40 years. At the current 
accelerated rate of ice melt, sea level will rise by about 1 meter by the 
end of the twenty-first century, but the actual number will depend on 
both the rate at which our climate continues to warm up and the rate 
at which ice sheets undergo catastrophic retreat and melt, especially in 
the marine-based sectors of the ice sheets. Large uncertainties remain 
in both processes. Meanwhile, paleoclimate records and basic physics 
dictate that the current regime of climate warming is unsustainable for 
ice sheets and that continued warming commits us to multiple-meter 
sea level rise in the coming centuries. A reduction in the rate of ice melt 
is possible but entails a massive curbing of our greenhouse gas emis-
sions and the implementation of carbon sequestration to bring carbon 
concentration in the atmosphere back to lower levels.
The ice sheets in Greenland and Antarctica contain large volumes of 
ice, equivalent to a change in global sea level of 7 meters (43 feet) for 
Greenland and 56 meters (360 feet) for Antarctica if all the ice were to 
melt into the sea. This is because the ice sheets hold several quadrillion 
tons of land ice. One billion tons is called 1 gigaton (Gt), and 361 Gt of 
land ice melting into the ocean would cause 1 millimeter (mm) of global 
sea level change. One gigaton of water is the annual supply of water 
for a city the size of Los Angeles and its 8 million inhabitants. We use 
gigatons to quantify the mass loss of ice sheets.
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The average precipitation on Earth is 1 meter per year. Greenland 
(average precipitation 24 centimeters per year) and Antarctica (average 
precipitation 17 centimeters per year) qualify as deserts (the Sahara gets 
10 centimeters per year). Yet their combined annual cycle of precipita-
tion is equivalent to a 7-millimeter fluctuation in global sea level because 
they cover such large areas, about 1.7 million square kilometers for 
Greenland and 14 million for Antarctica.
Ice accumulates in Greenland and Antarctica from snowfall, which 
slowly densifies into ice and deforms under its own weight to flow to-
ward the ocean along rivers of ice called ice streams and glaciers. At 
the ocean boundary, ice melts in contact with ocean water or is released 
as icebergs that subsequently melt in the ocean. At the surface, snow/
ice mass is removed via wind transport, sublimation, evaporation, and 
surface melt. Surface melt that does not refreeze in place produces run-
off, which reaches the bottom of the glacier, or bed, through cracks and 
holes (known as moulins). It emerges at the ice front (where ice meets 
ocean water; Figure 17.1) or at the grounding line (where ice detaches 
from the bed and becomes afloat in the ocean) as a buoyant plume of 
freshwater, often laden with sediments. Runoff in Greenland averages 
about 300 Gt per year, and the ice flux crossing the glacier fronts or 
grounding lines averages 400 Gt per year. In Antarctica, the ice flux 
Figure 17.1 Calving front of Getz ice shelf, West Antarctica, with 50-meter-
tall ice cliffs. Photograph by Jeremy Hardbeck, NASA.
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crossing the grounding line is 2,200 Gt per year and runoff is nearly zero 
at present (Figure 17.2).
Glaciers and ice sheets move from a few centimeters per year near 
ice divides to a few kilometers per year at the front of the fastest- 
moving glaciers. Around 13,000 years ago, sea level rose 4 meters per 
century for several centuries. This rapid sea level rise was associated 
with the collapse of the northern ice sheets, including parts of Green-
land, northern Canada, and Scandinavia, but also parts of West Antarc-
tica and, presumably, parts of East Antarctica yet to be identified. During 
the Holocene, sea level rose, in comparison, very slowly before rising 
1.8 millimeters per year in the twentieth century and 3 millimeters per 
year at present. This rate is projected to increase as climate continues 
to warm up, land ice melts worldwide, and the oceans continue their 
thermal expansion. While the glaciers and ice sheets already control 
Figure 17.2 The Greenland and Antarctic ice sheets form from the slow 
accumulation of snowfall, which densifies into ice, which deforms under its 
own weight. Snowfall at the poles is low by global standard: 24 centimeters 
per year in Greenland, 17 centimeters per year in Antarctica. However, the 
Greenland ice sheet contains enough ice to raise global sea level by 7 meters, 
and that figure is 56 meters for Antarctica. When 360 gigatons (Gt) of ice melt 
in the ocean, that raises sea level by 1 millimeter. One gigaton is the amount 
of water consumed by a large city like Los Angeles in a year. The transfer of 
mass by the glaciers and the amount of melt at the surface are measured 
in gigatons per year (Gt/yr). R is the annual runoff production and D is the 
annual discharge of ice for the ice sheets, averaged for the years 1961–1990 
(Greenland in blue, Antarctica in red). Adapted from NASA. 
Greenland 
R = 300 Gt/yr 
D = 300 Gt/yr
Antarctica 
R = 0 Gt/yr 
D = 2,200 Gt/yr
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two-thirds of the global increase in sea level rise today, we expect 
greater rates of sea level rise in the future as the ice sheets in Greenland 
and Antarctica start melting faster. We face the distinct possibility that 
ice sheets will contribute multiple meters of sea level rise in the future.
Millions of people and trillions of dollars of infrastructure located 
along the coastlines of the world’s oceans will be threatened by as little 
as 1 meter (3 feet) of sea level rise, which is almost certain to happen by 
the end of the twenty-first century, and multiple meters of sea level rise 
are expected in the ensuing centuries. While adaptation may be possible 
in some places, people in many low-lying underdeveloped countries will 
have to move to higher ground or to other countries. Moving infrastruc-
ture such as industries, roads, housing, seaports, airports, and other 
critical facilities will cost trillions of dollars.
At present, predictions of sea level rise are affected by two major 
uncertainties: (1) the rate at which our emission of greenhouse gases 
into the atmosphere will continue to increase and warm the planet, 
and (2) the rate at which ice sheets and glaciers will respond to climate 
warming and collapse, which depends on physical processes that have 
not been fully elucidated and incorporated into physical climate models. 
Most current numerical ice sheet models use simplified and incomplete 
physical descriptions of ice sheet and ocean dynamics that systematically 
underestimate the risk of catastrophic melting. In the next sections, we 
will discuss the physical processes of ice melting, the history of melting, 
and what we can do about it.
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17.1  How Ice Is Melting
Surface melt and runoff
In Greenland, ice and snow that melts at the surface of the ice sheet 
is transported by supraglacial rivers, which end up in large holes in the 
ice, called moulins, that go straight into the ice for hundreds of meters 
before migrating in a complex set of horizontal and vertical galleries 
that ultimately connect the water from the surface to the bed (Figure 
17.1.1). Water pressure slowly builds up at the bed in early summer and 
eventually becomes high enough to overcome the overburden pressure 
of ice, lifting the ice off the bed so it can slide faster downhill. Subglacial 
water flows beneath the ice along a network of subglacial channels that 
are initially disconnected. Eventually, the subglacial channels become 
connected and reach the ocean, subglacial water pressure is released, 
and ice again comes into contact with the bed, which stops its en-
hanced sliding. As more meltwater pours down from the surface to 
reach the bed, the speedup occurs sooner and is larger in magnitude, 
but it extends over shorter time periods because the subglacial channels 
become connected sooner. Overall, in Greenland the summer speedup 
averages about 10% for a period of 2–3 months; that is, enhanced sliding 
has only a small impact on the annual mass loss from the ice sheet. This 
enhanced sliding is often presented in news media as a main process of 
acceleration of ice toward the ocean, but in reality, we have learned that 
it is not a major process of ice loss.
Other aspects of snow/ice melt are important. A higher production 
of meltwater at the surface results in the formation of supraglacial lakes 
that may break up and cause flooding, a natural hazard. In addition, as 
snow melts, it is replaced by the underlying ice, and as ice melts, it is 
replaced by standing liquid water. The albedo of fresh snow is 90%; that 
is, it reflects 90% of the incoming sun energy and absorbs only 10% as 
heat that melts snow. In comparison, the albedo of ice is 35%, so 65% 
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of the incoming energy is absorbed. The albedo of liquid water is only 
3%, meaning that 97% of the incoming energy is absorbed as heat. As 
the ice sheet melts away, its surface changes from strongly reflective 
to strongly absorptive by nearly a factor of 10. This positive feedback 
keeps pushing the ice sheet out of mass equilibrium.
Another positive feedback is the elevation feedback: As ice melts, 
the snow/ice surface migrates to a lower elevation, becomes exposed 
to warmer air temperatures, and melts faster. Similarly, as the ice mar-
gins get exposed to the atmosphere when ice melts away, more ice 
melts, and rocks, fine glacial debris, and dust with no vegetation to 
hold it are exposed. Dust gets blown away onto the glaciers by the 
prevailing winds, which makes ice and snow dirty, lowering their albedo, 
and increasing melt.
The largest positive feedback affecting climate warming, however, is 
a change in ice flow dynamics, that is, the speed of glaciers, as discussed 
next.
Figure 17.1.1 Ice and snowmelt at the surface of Greenland are transported 
in supraglacial rivers like this one, which ends up in a big hole called a moulin. 
The moulin goes 100 meters vertically, then connects horizontally and 
eventually brings water to the bed. The bed is wet. Water pressure at the bed 
can be high enough to lift the ice. When that happens, the ice moves faster, 
at least temporarily. Photograph reproduced with permission from The New York 
Times from Davenport et al. 2015.
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Ice discharge
The second major process of “melting” or ice removal from the ice 
sheets is the rate at which ice is transported by glaciers and ice streams 
into the ocean (Figure 17.1.2). When ice reaches the glacier front, 
several scenarios may take place. Ice may melt in contact with ocean 
waters, or it may break up into blocks called icebergs. In Greenland, 
it is not uncommon for icebergs to “explode” into a myriad of small 
pieces during their detachment from an ice face, because the blocks of 
ice are too small to remain cohesive under their own weight. Iceberg 
debris generated in a matter of minutes quickly dissipate into the ocean. 
Ocean water is a very efficient “solvent” of land ice because the melting 
Figure 17.1.2 To a photographer in space, Antarctica looks like a vast white 
continent with no life. Using radar imagery and tracking the scintillation of 
the surface, scientists can measure the rate of deformation of the ice with 
amazing precision—a few millimeters per day. This visualization shows ice flow 
in Antarctica. Flow speed is highest in purple to red areas and low in brown to 
green. The rivers of ice, or glaciers, reach far into the continent and drain ice 
into narrow corridors at a few locations along the coast. The glaciers control 
the flow of ice into the sea. If they flow slowly, the ice sheet grows; if they flow 
quickly, the ice sheet shrinks. From Rignot et al. 2011.
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point of the seawater-ice mixture is to −2°C, reduced from 0°C for pure 
water.
As the climate warms up, glaciers produce smaller and smaller ice-
bergs. In Antarctica, where the climate is colder, icebergs are larger and 
more cohesive and do not explode into a myriad of pieces. They are 
called tabular icebergs because they form large “tables of ice” several 
kilometers to tens of kilometers in size afloat in the ocean. They do not 
flip over as they detach, as the icebergs in Greenland do because they 
are taller than wide and hence flip to the side when they detach, which 
helps them break up and melt. In contrast, an Antarctic iceberg will 
survive for years or decades in the ocean.
Traditional books of glaciology state that iceberg production is the 
main process of mass loss in Antarctica. We have learned in the last 20 
years, though, that a significant part of mass loss proceeds directly from 
below due to ice melt by the ocean (Figure 17.1.3). This means that 
ocean warming, or changes in the advection of ocean heat toward the 
glaciers, or both, is a climate forcing that plays a major role in the evo-
lution of glaciers around Greenland and Antarctica. As frontal ice breaks 
up and melts away, the inland ice flows faster, effectively unplugging the 
land ice to spill out into the ocean.
Ice that is already afloat in the ocean does not change the mass of 
the ocean or sea level when it melts; in fact, it lowers sea level (by only 
2.6%) due to dilution. Ice that rests on land above sea level does raise 
sea level when it melts into the ocean, at a rate of 1 millimeter for every 
361 Gt of ice.
Iceberg calving
Icebergs detach from glaciers or ice shelf fronts when the tensile stress 
of ice, that is, the rate at which ice is stretched longitudinally by the 
speedup of ice flow toward the ocean margin, exceeds a threshold. That 
threshold depends on ice fabrics, ice temperature, and preconditioning 
of the ice to break up, for example, the presence of cracks or bottom 
crevasses. Icebergs may also detach when ice blocks are sufficiently 
close to flotation that they freely rotate off the ice face and fall into 
the ocean. In the case of an ice shelf, where ice is partly attached to 
land and partly floating on water, we have also witnessed a domino-like 
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effect: as unstable blocks of ice detach and rotate off the ice shelf front, 
they may bang back into the ice shelf and generate more calving events. 
If cracks preexist in the ice shelf, as in the case of the Larsen B ice 
shelf in the Antarctic Peninsula, the detaching of an iceberg triggers a 
chain reaction that breaks up the entire ice shelf in a matter of weeks. 
Conversely, it would take centuries to re-form these ice shelves if we 
were to let the land ice expand freely into the ocean again, at the same 
original speed, until it reaches the former position of the ice shelf front.
Scientists have examined the impact of surface meltwater and its 
role in hydrofracturing ice. Another process is “ice cliff failure” whereby 
ice cliffs above a certain height can no longer support the ice pressure, 
fail, and break off. These two calving processes may explain episodes of 
rapid sea level change that took place in the past. When applied to the 
present-day evolution of the Antarctic ice sheet, these calving processes 
yield a sea level rise greater than 1 meter by the end of the century.
Another form of calving that is important in Greenland but which 
Figure 17.1.3 When ice reaches the ocean, it melts in contact with warm, 
salty ocean water, and it also breaks into icebergs like this one on Helheim 
Glacier that is 800 meters tall and 3 kilometers wide. Everyone has heard 
about icebergs. For a long time, scientists thought that most of the meltwater 
reaching the ocean was due to the breakup of icebergs. In the 1990s, we 
learned that a lot of ice is melted from below, by the ocean, orders of 
magnitude faster than at the surface. Photograph reproduced with permission 
from Denise Holland. 
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has been highlighted only recently is undercutting. In that process, ice 
melting by the ocean is most effective at depth; that is, the ocean waters 
undercut the glacier front. The ice above the cut is then not supported 
by its base, so it breaks up, independent of the tensile stress or height 
above flotation. This form of calving is driven by the temperature of the 
ocean: the warmer the water, the higher the melt rate, and the faster 
the ice is undercut. It is also affected by the production of subglacial 
meltwater, discharged at the base of the glacier front, which is buoy-
antly driven up the water column and entrains warm ocean water along 
the ice face to melt it. In Greenland, the process of undercutting is 
comparable in magnitude to the mass loss from “dry” calving by tensile 
stress and block rotation, but the partitioning between the two varies 
considerably from one glacier to the next.
Understanding how the calving of icebergs changes as a result of cli-
mate warming is an important topic of ongoing research. We need to 
quantify the roles of hydrofracture, the mixture of ice and sea ice that glues 
large pieces of ice shelf together before they break away from an ice front, 
fabrics, temperature, and the stress regime at calving margins. We expect 
the calving rate of glaciers to increase in a warmer climate, but quantifying 
the increase has remained challenging because of a lack of observations.
The marine ice sheet instability
A most important process of evolution of ice sheets and glaciers is called 
the marine ice sheet instability (MISI). This concept was proposed in 
the 1960s by a number of glaciologists, including Weertman (1974), 
Thomas and Bentley (1978), and Hughes (1981), and observed in the 
case of marine-terminating glaciers in Alaska, where it was referred to as 
the “tidewater glacier cycle,” by Meier and Post (1988) (Figure 17.1.4). 
We had to wait until the 1990s and early 2000s to verify the concept of 
marine instability in ice sheets, but scientists studying tidewater glaciers 
in Alaska knew it decades earlier.
If a glacier stands on a retrograde slope, that is, where the bed-
rock slopes downward in the inland direction, there are only two stable 
states for the glacier: either it reaches the outer edge of that slope and 
remains stable at that location, or it retreats inland until either the bed-
rock slopes upward or the entire glacier is afloat in water between the 
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glacier and the bedrock. In other words, glaciers resting on retrograde 
slopes are inherently unstable and prone to rapid retreat. In Alaska, the 
edge of the slope is a moraine created by the glacier during a prior 
advance. If the glacier retreats from the moraine because of climate 
forcing, for example, warmer ocean waters melt the ice faster than in 
the past, the retreat will proceed rapidly, in a nonclimatic fashion, until 
the ice front reaches a new bed position where the bedrock elevation 
rises again in the inland direction. This could be many kilometers inland. 
For Columbia Glacier in Alaska, the retreat that started in the 1980s will 
proceed for another 50 kilometers along a retrograde bed. Conversely, 
if the bedrock slope is prograde (slopes downward in the ocean direc-
tion), the glacier retreat will be slow and may even stop.
The effect of a retrograde slope is large because ice deformation 
exhibits a nonlinear dependence on ice thickness. The strain of deforma-
tion of ice varies as the third power of the thickness, and the speed of 
the ice varies as the fourth power of ice thickness. Hence a drop in bed 
elevation as the ice front moves inland translates into an accelerating 
response of the ice tensile stress, with sliding and ice breakup into the 
ocean. This is the marine ice sheet instability.
Figure 17.1.4 The most im-
portant concept for ice sheets in 
a warmer world is the concept of 
marine ice sheet instability (MISI). 
If a marine-terminating glacier 
ends in the ocean on a normal 
(prograde) slope, that is, with 
bed elevation increasing inland, 
any glacier retreat or advance will 
be slow, as there are many stable 
positions. If the glacier is on a 
reverse (retrograde) slope, that 
is, with bed elevation dropping in 
the inland direction, there are only 
two stable states: either it reaches 
the edge of the continental shelf, 
or it becomes entirely afloat in the 
ocean. Once initiated, the MISI 
retreat is in principle (consider-
ing one-dimensional geometry) 
unstoppable. From Thomas 1979. 
Normal  
slope  
stable
Normal  
slope  
unstable
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In practice, the MISI is complicated by two dimensional effects. The 
glacier and its floating extension in the ocean—the ice shelf—experience 
friction along valley walls (lateral shear), islands (longitudinal back-
stress), and bumps in bedrock topography (basal friction), so a glacier 
on a retrograde slope may not be systematically unstable and hence 
capable of unstoppable and rapid retreat. To address that possibility, 
precise observations of bed topography, detailed understanding of the 
ice flow mechanics, proper scenarios of climate forcing, and the usage 
of a coupled ocean-ice numerical model are essential.
We have already witnessed examples of MISI in present-day ice 
sheets: (1) the Jakobshavn Isbrae Glacier, the largest discharger of ice in 
Greenland; and (2) the Pine Island, Thwaites, and Smith Glaciers drain-
ing into the Amundsen Sea Embayment of West Antarctica, the largest 
dischargers of ice in Antarctica. Scientists think that the retreat of ice 
in these areas is ongoing and unstoppable. There are, however, other 
sectors at risk of MISI around North Greenland and East Antarctica.
Ocean heat and its impact on ice sheets
How could more ocean heat be brought into contact with ice in a 
warming climate? The physical processes are the same in the Arctic and 
Antarctic—ocean heat is driven by wind—but the details differ. In both 
polar regions, we find cold, fresh water at the top of the water column 
and warm, salty water at the bottom, about 200–300 meters below the 
surface in Greenland and 400–500 meters in Antarctica (Figure 17.1.5). 
This configuration is opposite to that in the tropics, where warm, fresh 
water sits atop cold, salty water. In polar regions, colder air tempera-
tures cool the surface, and the freezing of seawater forms sea ice, which 
loses its salt. This produces salty water that sinks to the ocean bottom 
and participates in the global thermohaline circulation of the ocean.
Depending on prevailing winds and the depth of the seafloor around 
the ice sheets, ocean heat may or may not reach the glaciers. Prevailing 
winds are affected by climate change. Seafloor depth differs where deep 
channels have been carved into the seafloor by prior advances of the 
glaciers. Wind characteristics, depth, and ocean temperature all must 
be known if they are to be used in numerical ocean and ice models.
When warm seawater reaches the glaciers or ice shelves, it fuels 
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rapid rates of ice melt because ocean water has a melting point of 
−2°C (versus 0°C for freshwater ice) and the melting point decreases 
with pressure by 0.75°C per kilometer of water, hence it is −3.5°C at 
2 kilometers depth. If warm seawater does not reach the glaciers, that 
is, if the glaciers stand in cold water, ice melts slowly. In Antarctica, the 
largest observed melt rates are of the order of 100–200 meters per year. 
In Greenland, the melt rates reach 2–3 meters per day, that is, one order 
of magnitude larger than in Antarctica. Conversely, in cold parts of Ant-
arctica, melt rates may drop to values as low as 10 centimeters per year. 
In some places, ice may even cease to melt completely. Instead, typically 
up to 100 kilometers from the grounding line, seawater may freeze onto 
the ice shelf bottom, creating a layer of “marine ice.” Marine ice may 
accumulate by about 100 meters over time (decades to centuries).
In the Antarctic, ocean heat originates from the Antarctic Circumpo-
lar Current (ACC), which is a broad area of subsurface warm, salty water 
that encircles the continent, clockwise, pushed by the westerly winds 
(Figure 17.1.6). In some parts of the Southern Ocean, the ACC is close 
Figure 17.1.5 In polar seas, ocean heat is found several hundred meters 
below the surface in the form of warm, salty water. Surface waters are 
comparatively cold and fresh. Winds transport ocean heat toward the glacier, 
and a thermohaline circulation ventilates the ice shelf cavities as in this figure. 
Melt rates of 100 meters per year in Antarctica and several meters per day in 
Greenland are generated in this manner. In the Antarctic, heat comes from the 
Antarctic Circumpolar Current. In Greenland, it comes from the subtropics. 
Reproduced from NASA. 
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to the continent, for example, in the Amundsen Sea Embayment of West 
Antarctica and in the western Antarctic Peninsula. In other parts it is far 
from the coast, for example, in the Weddell Sea and in the Ross Sea. 
Since the 1980s, the westerlies have increased in strength and started 
to contract southward. This is due to an increase in the temperature 
difference between Antarctica and the rest of the world. Antarctica is 
not warming as fast as the rest of the world, because a decrease in the 
ozone concentration in the stratosphere above cools Antarctica, and it 
experiences a slower rate of warming from greenhouse gas emissions 
than the rest of the world because of a lack of albedo feedback. As a re-
sult of the Coriolis effect, the winds tend to push surface waters to the 
north (to the left of the wind), which contributes to the slight extension 
of sea ice cover with time, and to push subsurface waters to the south 
(to the right), which brings more subsurface ocean heat toward Antarc-
tica’s glaciers. As more heat reaches Antarctica’s coast, glaciers and ice 
shelves melt faster from below, which reduces the buttressing force in 
front of them, leads the glaciers to speed up, and increases sea level.
In Greenland, warm water is transported north from the subtropics 
Figure 17.1.6 In Antarctica, ocean heat 
is contained in the Antarctic Circumpolar 
Current (ACC). Warm water, about +2°C, 
is present at 400−700 meters below the 
surface. At the surface, the water is cold 
and fresh. Prevailing westerly winds push 
the ACC in a clockwise direction. The 
Coriolis force displaces the surface water to 
the north (left) and displaces the subsurface 
warm, salty water to the south (right). With 
climate warming in most of the world and 
cooling in Antarctica under the ozone hole, 
the winds are getting stronger and displac-
ing more warm water toward Antarctica. 
From Gille et al. 2016.
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by the Gulf Stream, which is deviated by Iceland to form the Irminger 
Current, which runs along southeast Greenland, rounds the tip of Green-
land, and reaches the Labrador Sea. Some of that warm water makes 
it into Baffin Bay through Davis Strait, circles counterclockwise inside 
Baffin Bay, and returns south along the coast of Canada. To the east, a 
branch of the North Atlantic Current returns cold water from the High 
Arctic along the east coast of Greenland and meets the Irminger Current 
southeast of Greenland. These currents contribute to the North Atlantic 
gyre, which allows warm, salty Atlantic Water (AW) to intrude onto the 
continental shelf and glacial valleys by following troughs on the seafloor 
that have been carved by former glacier advances during ice ages. The 
strength of the North Atlantic gyre is affected by fluctuations of the jet 
stream, itself affected by climate change.
At present, the Arctic is warming up 2–3 times faster than the rest 
of the world. As the temperature differential between the Arctic and the 
rest of the world decreases, the strength of the jet stream is reduced, 
allowing it to wobble, that is, undergo large excursions and incursions 
north and south. In some of the lobes of the Rossby waves—global air 
pressure waves high in the atmosphere—cold Arctic air flows unusually 
far south, which creates cold snaps along the east coast of the United 
States, for instance. In other lobes, warm air from the subtropics intrudes 
far north, which creates unusually warm winters in Greenland. Models 
suggest that as the jet stream wobbles, the lobes tend to become sta-
tionary, hence the unusual flow of cold, and air masses may persist for 
long periods of time. This simple explanation of Arctic changes is in 
debate but offers an explanation for changes taking place in the north. 
If the models are correct, the wobbling will send more warm air and 
ocean masses toward Greenland than in the past, which will melt the 
glaciers from above and below faster than in the past.
In both Greenland and Antarctica, the amount of warm, salty sub-
surface ocean water pushed by the prevailing winds toward the glaciers 
has been changing in response to climate change, which is caused by 
human activities.
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17.2  History of Melting
Ice sheet mass loss through recent times
Since the early 1990s, scientists have been using a new set of precise, 
powerful tools to measure the ice sheets—satellites, complemented by 
dedicated airborne surveys to measure the ice sheets at an unprece-
dented level of precision. Satellite instruments observe whole ice sheets 
and collect precise measurements of all their glaciers, from about 800 
kilometers above ground, day in and day out, over days to years and de-
cades, in a comprehensive and uniform fashion. These observations are 
possible as a result of massive technological advances and engineering 
achievements in remote sensing over the last 40 years.
There are three main ways to measure the ice sheets. In the mass 
budget technique, we compare the mass added to the continent by 
snowfall, reconstructed by regional atmospheric climate models, with 
the mass flux into the ocean along the periphery, obtained by combining 
ice thickness from airborne radar sounders and ice speed from satellite 
radar interferometers. The mass budget record goes back to the 1970s. 
The mass budget technique is difficult to use because it compares two 
large numbers with large uncertainties, but advanced satellite observa-
tions and regional atmospheric climate models constrained by a wealth 
of meteorological data have permitted us to obtain precise and detailed 
estimates of glacier changes with this method. The advantage of the 
mass budget method is that it documents changes in glacier dynamics 
separately from surface melt processes.
A second method to measure the ice sheets is altimetry in which sci-
entists continuously measure the height of the snow and ice over time. 
If ice/snow accumulates, the height of the surface increases; if ice/snow 
melts, the height of the surface decreases. In the meantime, the elevation 
of the bedrock beneath the ice changes by only millimeters. This tech-
nique collects data from ice sheets and measures surface elevation with 
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meter to decimeter precision (by radar and laser, respectively). A major 
difficulty of altimetry is in transforming the observed height changes 
into mass changes, since we do not know a priori whether the changes 
in height are due to changes in snow (density of 0.3) or ice (density of 
0.9). On the other hand, the technique provides a critical view of where 
elevation changes are taking place, analogous to a warning signal.
Since 2002, scientists have used the time-variable gravity data from 
NASA’s Gravity Recovery and Climate Experiment (GRACE) mission to 
measure mass changes directly. GRACE has a large footprint, about 350 
kilometers, which does not allow it to see small detail such as individual 
glaciers, but it detects changes in water mass with a precision of 1 
centimeter of water on a monthly basis. The measured mass changes 
in Greenland are so precise that they capture seasonal cycles: gain in 
mass in winter, loss in mass in summer. In a graph of GRACE data, the 
seasonal changes in mass do not produce a straight line (Figure 17.2.1). 
Figure 17.2.1 Since 2002, scientists have used NASA’s Gravity Recovery and 
Climate Experiment (GRACE) mission to measure ice mass changes directly 
from space via changes in the gravity field of the Earth. GRACE has shown that 
the mass change in Greenland (left) has clear seasonal cycles and is negative; 
that is, the ice sheets are losing mass. The time series graph has a downward 
bend in it, showing that the mass loss is increasing with time. In Antarctica 
(center), the signal is noisier, with no clear seasonal cycles but large interannual 
to decadal cycles. The mass change is negative there too, and the acceleration 
is slightly larger than in Greenland. GRACE also measures the mass changes of 
the world’s glaciers and ice caps. The glaciers are melting fast, but their melting 
rates are accelerating less than those of the ice sheets. Adapted from Velicogna 
2009.
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Instead the line is “bent.” This bend means that the mass loss is getting 
larger every year, or accelerating. The data show that over several years, 
the ice mass has decreased markedly. For every 361 Gt per year of extra 
mass melting into the ocean, sea level has risen 1 millimeter. This is 
more or less how fast Greenland ice is melting into the ocean today. The 
rate of acceleration shown by GRACE from 2002 to 2017 has been 430 
Gt per year per decade.
For Antarctica, the mass change graph is noisier than the Green-
land graph, and it shows no seasonal cycle but a large interannual to 
decadal variability. A few years of observations in Antarctica would not 
be sufficient to capture the long-term trend in ice mass. However, it can 
already be determined that overall, the ice sheet is losing mass—not as 
fast as Greenland and not over the entire periphery, but the time series 
graph has more curvature, indicating that the acceleration in mass loss 
is greater than in Greenland. The acceleration was 180 Gt per year per 
decade in 2002–2017.
With GRACE, scientists also quantify the mass loss of mountain gla-
ciers, a set of about 150,000 glaciers and ice caps around the world. 
The glaciers and ice caps (GICs) turn out to melt as fast as the ice 
sheets. They experience a loss that increases by 110 Gt per year per 
decade. In total, melting ice from Greenland, Antarctica, and the GICs 
dominates sea level rise. From 2002 to 2017, the mass loss averaged 575 
Gt per year with an acceleration of 430 Gt per year per decade. At this 
rate, we will exceed 1 meter of sea level rise by 2100 if we factor in a 
20- centimeter sea level rise expected from the thermal expansion of the 
ocean. Glaciologists, however, fear that the contribution of land ice to 
sea level could become larger if major ice sheet instabilities take place.
Ice shelf collapse
How fast glaciers collapse into the ocean remains a central question in 
projecting the evolution of ice sheets in a warmer climate. In 1995 and 
2002, large ice shelves in the Antarctic Peninsula collapsed following de-
cades of slow decay from warm air and ocean temperatures. These ice 
shelves act like plugs on the glaciers upstream. Once gone, the glaciers 
are “free” to speed up. In 2002, following the collapse of the Larsen B 
ice shelf, the glaciers upstream of Larsen B sped up by a factor of 3 to 
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8. Fifteen years later, the glaciers are still flowing 5 times faster than 
when an ice shelf was present. The glacier response is therefore rapid, 
the impact on the mass loss is significant, and the effect is persistent for 
long periods of time.
As stated earlier, the collapse of Larsen B is an irreversible process 
on a human time scale. Studies have shown that the ice shelf had been 
stable during the entire Holocene; that is, it did not collapse in the prior 
10,000 years. If the same process were to take place farther south, 
where larger ice shelves hold large sea level rise potential, the effect on 
global sea level would be measured in meters instead of millimeters. As 
an illustration, if all the glaciers around Antarctica were to speed up by 
a factor 6.5, sea level would rise by 4 meters per century.
Do we know where irreversible mass loss could take place in the 
ice sheets? In principle, the portions of the ice sheet most sensitive to 
climate change are marine based, that is, where the base of the ice is 
grounded below sea level. There the ice will remain in contact with the 
ocean waters during the retreat and be replaced by an ocean. Among 
marine ice sheets, the most sensitive sectors are those with a retrograde 
slope, as discussed earlier. Among the marine ice sheets capable of 
MISI, those closest to the sources of warm ocean water around Antarc-
tica (and Greenland) are at risk because changing winds will bring more 
ocean heat to the glaciers.
In Greenland, we recognize three major marine-based basins: (1) 
the Jakobshavn Isbrae in central west Greenland, (2) the Petermann- 
Humboldt drainage in central northwest Greenland, and (3) the 79 
North–Zachariæ Isstrøm drainage in northeast Greenland (Figure 
17.2.2). These basins hold sea level rise equivalents of 0.6 meters, 0.6 
meters, and 1.1 meters, respectively. All three basins are currently under 
attack by climate warming. In 2002, the floating ice shelf that protected 
Jakobshavn Isbrae broke up in a few weeks, following years of melting 
from the bottom (due to warm ocean temperature) and above (warm 
air temperature), and the glacier sped up by a factor of 3. The glacier 
has been retreating along a retrograde slope at a rate of 0.6 kilometers 
per year. In the warm summer of 2012, the glacier was flowing at a 
record speed of 18 kilometers per year, or 54 meter per day, versus 
3–4 kilometers per year in the 1990s. Based on the bed topography of 
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the glacier, the retreat should continue for decades until the grounding 
line reaches a bed that is rising in the inland direction, more than 80 
kilometers inland.
In the northeast, the floating section of Zachariæ Isstrøm collapsed 
in 2004 following years of slow decay of the permanent sea ice cover. 
Eight years after the collapse, we detected a glacier speedup of about 
30%. The slower response reflects the geometry of the glacier: the 
grounding line was anchored on a ridge. As stated earlier, the glacier 
holds a 0.5-meter sea level rise equivalent. The glacier is now retreat-
ing along a retrograde slope for another 10–15 kilometers before the 
bed elevation rises again. Its neighbor, 79 North Glacier, is retreating 
more slowly because it is retreating along a prograde bed slope. Both 
glaciers are retreating for the same reason: warmer-than-usual waters 
have eaten away the floating section of the glaciers and removed the ice 
mélange that glues detached pieces of ice shelf together.
Figure 17.2.2 In Greenland, there are three major marine-based basins 
with retrograde slopes: Petermann/Humbolt (P/H), the Northeast Greenland 
Ice Stream (NEGIS), and Jakobshavn Isbrae ( JKS). All three are currently 
under attack by climate warming. In Antarctica, the mass loss is mostly from 
the Amundsen Sea Embayment (ASE), the Antarctic Peninsula, and sectors 
in East Antarctica (such as the Totten Glacier with a 3.9-meter sea level rise 
equivalent). Antarctica image from Fretwell et al. 2013. Greenland image from 
Morlighem et al. 2018.
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The third sector has been the most stable, but in 2010 a series of 
calving events removed one-third of the floating ice shelf of Petermann 
Glacier. The ice shelf moved to its most retreated position since the 
beginning of the twentieth century when first discovered by explorer 
Lauge Koch. Parts of the ice shelf have thinned by 100 meters in the last 
8 years, suggesting that prolonged exposure to warmer conditions will 
eventually result in the collapse of the ice shelf. This glacier is connected 
to the interior of the ice sheet via a deep, marine-based channel.
In Antarctica, the northern part of the Antarctic Peninsula does not 
hold a lot of sea level rise potential, in the range of centimeters, but 
the southern part holds a lot of ice. At present, the northern part is 
melting away rapidly, and the southern part is changing slowly. In West 
Antarctica, the glaciers draining into Siple Coast have been slowly grow-
ing with time since the 1970s. This situation is an anomaly in Antarctica 
and is driven by internal dynamics rather than by climate. As the glaciers 
thicken, basal pressure rises until ice starts to melt under its own pres-
sure, the bed becomes wet, and ice starts sliding. As ice slides faster 
and thins, it eventually loses its momentum, slows down, and refreezes 
to its bed, and the process starts again.
In the northern part of West Antarctica, Pine Island and Thwaites 
Glaciers hold a 1.2-meter sea level rise potential and stand in warm cir-
cumpolar deep water (CDW) at about +2°C. These glaciers drain from a 
basin below sea level with steep retrograde slopes in the interior. Since 
the mid-1990s, scientists have seen these glaciers slide to sea faster 
and thin. Grounding lines have retreated about 1 kilometer per year, or 
twice as fast as in Greenland, and the glaciers have lost vast quantities 
of ice to the ocean. Scientists have mapped the bed geometry of these 
glaciers in great detail since 2002, and we concluded in 2014 that we 
knew enough about the bed and the ocean conditions to conclude that 
the glaciers are in a trend of irreversible retreat. Warm water is fueling 
the retreat. We find no major bumps in the bed that will slow the retreat 
to a stop. If these glaciers retreat completely, losing all their water to 
the sea, they will entrain the collapse of the rest of West Antarctica and 
raise global sea level by 3 meters.
In a spectrum of slow, catastrophic changes, there is also good 
17-24 Chapter 17: Sea Level Rise from Melting Ice
news. During a series of colder years (2009–2013) with a 60% drop in 
ocean heat, the glacier retreat in the Amundsen Sea Embayment slowed 
down by 1%. A warmer ocean therefore triggers the retreat but a colder 
ocean can slow it down. This is yet another illustration that MISI is com-
plex rather than one-dimensional. Similarly, as the glaciers retreat in a 
nonuniform fashion and form new embayments with smaller ice shelves, 
warm water intrusion is more difficult, which slows the retreat. While 
the retreat may remain unstoppable, the rate of retreat depends on the 
rate at which ocean heat is delivered to the glaciers. As colder waters 
intruded Disko Bay in Greenland in 2017–2018, not only did the retreat 
of Jakobshavn Glacier stop, the glacier started to readvance.
The West Antarctic ice sheet is not the only source of instability in 
Antarctica. Other sectors at risk exist in East Antarctica.
East Antarctica has generally been viewed as stable and immune 
to change because it stands taller on the ground, most of the ground 
below the ice sheet is above sea level, the surface climate is colder, the 
bed slopes are not as steep as in West Antarctica, and there is scanty 
evidence for the presence of warm circumpolar deep water along the 
coast, due to a lack of observations. Altimeters on satellites, however, 
revealed that some parts of marine-based East Antarctica have been 
changing, with major glaciers thinning at rates of 0.4–0.7 meter per 
year. Other methods, such as the mass budget technique and use of 
GRACE mission data, suggest that these glaciers are slowly losing mass 
to the ocean. High-risk areas include the Totten Glacier, which holds a 
3.5-meter sea level rise equivalent, that is, more than the marine part of 
West Antarctica; Denman Glacier, which holds a 1.5-meter sea level rise 
equivalent; and the sector drained by Cook ice shelf and Ninnis Glacier. 
Recent oceanographic data revealed that Totten Glacier stands in rela-
tively diluted circumpolar warm water at +0°C. At present, the glacier 
is retreating on a nearly flat bed. In the inland direction, the bed rises 
for another 50–80 kilometers. This prograde slope offers a temporary 
protection from MISI on Totten. Beyond 50–80 kilometers, the basin 
drops down in the deep and broad Aurora Basin and its large reserve 
of ice. To the east, Denman Glacier is also at risk, grounded on a ridge 
at the edge of a deep trough with retrograde slopes, which reaches 
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one of the lowest points in Antarctica, at 3,500 meters below sea level. 
These sectors at risk are closest to the sources of warm circumpolar 
deep water. Ongoing research will have to determine how and where 
this warm water reaches the East Antarctic coastline and what pathways 
exist to trigger a rapid retreat of the glaciers.
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17.3  What Can We Do?
Impact of sea level rise
At present, the Earth is on a trajectory for a 1-meter sea level rise by 
2100. The economic and environmental damages that a 1-meter sea 
level rise will inflict on humans and ecosystems should not be underes-
timated. A 1-meter sea level rise will affect our coastlines worldwide, 
their assets, homes, industries, and airports; populations will have to 
move inland and entire ecosystems will disappear. Sea level rise will 
affect our water resources (for example, by salt infiltration), security, 
and safety; it will force massive immigration of millions of people who 
cannot afford to move to higher ground. Flooding by rising sea level is 
there to stay once it occurs. Seawater does not recede after a few days 
of warm weather, as in the case of a rain storm. Humanity has to think 
of it as a permanent storm.
Changes in polar ice produce the most dramatic changes in sea level 
in areas farthest from the ice sheets because of the nature of the re-
adjustment of the crust and gravity field associated with mass removal. 
Sea level will actually decrease near the sources of melting land ice as 
the crust rebounds; conversely, the ground will subside far from the ice 
sheets, hence increasing the rate of sea level rise compared with the 
global average. The effects of melting in Antarctica and Greenland add 
up to raise sea levels by about 20% to 30% more at low latitudes than on 
average around the globe. While the ice sheets may seem remote, they 
are therefore most relevant to us at low latitudes. Sea level rise will also 
vary regionally depending on local tectonics, geology, erosion, slopes, 
tides, and oceanic conditions.
Paleo record of sea level rise
As discussed earlier, there is a possibility for sea level to rise by multi-
ple meters in a warmer future. Sea level rose by 4 meters per century 
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about 13,000 years ago during the demise of northern ice sheets and 
portions of Antarctica. If the climate warms up by 4°C–5°C by the end 
of the century, the ice shelves in Antarctica will not survive. The world 
therefore faces the risk of unabated multiple-meter sea level rise if we 
do not change the course of our greenhouse gas emissions.
A most important finding from the paleoclimate records in recent 
years is that during the Eemian period, in the last interglacial, when the 
temperature of the Earth surface was only slightly warmer than present, 
sea level was 6 to 9 meters higher (Figure 17.3.1). At that time, a large 
share of Greenland probably melted away, West Antarctica was left as 
an archipelago, and parts of East Antarctica probably collapsed. If the 
world commits to a climate system similar to that in the Eemian, it is 
likely that sea level will rise to a similar level again. Paleo records do not 
indicate how fast we will reach that state. But they do show that the end 
Figure 17.3.1 In the 
Eemian period, during 
the last interglacial, 
temperature at the surface 
of the Earth was only 
0.5°C–1°C warmer than 
present, but sea level was 
6 to 9 meters higher. If the 
Earth climate reaches a 
similar state, it is likely that 
sea level will rise multiple 
meters again. Reproduced 
from Dutton et al. 2015.
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state will be 6 to 9 meters of sea level rise, which would yield a massive 
redefinition of the world’s coastlines and a complete transformation of 
our polar regions and global climate.
What can we do about this?
There is no benefit to humanity from rapid multiple-meter sea level rise 
from the collapse of Greenland and Antarctica. The poorest people on 
the planet will be affected first, but the world’s population will be af-
fected as well. Coastal ecosystems and the entire global climate system 
will change as ice sheet melt threatens to slow down, and eventually 
stop, the ocean’s thermohaline circulation. In 2015, 180 countries signed 
an agreement to limit climate warming to 1.5°C above the preindustrial 
temperature. This agreement was a giant step that needs to be con-
firmed by prompt actions. The world may fail to keep the temperature 
from rising more than 1.5°C. A recent IPCC report indicates that a world 
with an increase of 2°C above the preindustrial temperature would be 
significantly worse than a world with an increase of 1.5°C. Yet limiting 
warming to 1.5°C may not be sufficient to stabilize ice sheets. We need 
to make our energy production free of greenhouse gas emissions rapidly. 
Curbing our carbon emissions is a first step, to be followed by carbon 
sequestration to reduce the concentration of carbon in the atmosphere 
to more sustainable levels. Prompt actions on carbon emissions may 
take 30–40 years to take effect on the climate. They may take even 
longer to affect the ice sheets, and by that time we will have cumulated 
a significant amount of sea level change, but we may be able to prevent 
multiple meters of sea level rise.
 Becoming a world with carbon-free energy production and better, 
equitable, sustainable management of our natural resources comes with 
large benefits, at all levels of society, especially to the poorest popu-
lations of the world. Cleaner air, cleaner water, sustainable use of our 
natural resources, reduction of conflicts bound to petroleum resources, 
energy available where the sun shines, new jobs, and new technologies 
will not only protect the glaciers and ice sheets and their magical beauty, 
but protect us from massive changes in the climate, permanent damage 
to ecosystems, loss of biodiversity, and the very existence of life as we 
know it.
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Learning Objectives
1. Explain the concepts of negative emissions and carbon dioxide 
removal from the atmosphere—why do we need them?
2. Describe why reducing emissions of greenhouse gases will not 
be enough to reach our climate goals. You will understand the 
amount and timing of negative emissions—removing CO2 from the 
atmosphere—that will be needed.
3. Define what it means to remove CO2 from the atmosphere, and 
what we will do with it to keep it out.
4. List four ways to remove carbon dioxide from the atmosphere and 
what steps need to be taken to make that removal permanent. 
You will be able to list the potential costs and volumes of those 
methods, as well as one potential drawback for each approach. 
Along with these you will be able to list the accompanying ways to 
store the CO2 permanently.
5. Describe the idea of recycling CO2 to make carbon-based 
products, instead of using oil.
6. Describe two products that could be made from CO2 instead 
of oil. One of the important sources of residual emissions—CO2 
emissions that are very hard to remove from our economy—is the 
carbon-based products we use every day.
7. Describe how engineered systems remove CO2 from the air, and 
identify what their limitations are.
8. Describe the reasons why engineered systems might be important 
and how they can be used to clean up the atmosphere. Engineered 
systems are different from natural-based systems like forestry and 
soil carbon.
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Overview
Even after we electrify everything, we will still need to clean up the 
atmosphere. This is because we have been too slow to implement clean 
energy technology, and some greenhouse gas emissions will be very 
hard to ever stop, like carbon dioxide from airplanes. In this chapter 
I discuss the size of this negative emissions challenge and a series of 
technical approaches we can use to accomplish removing CO2 from the 
atmosphere at a scale of billions of tons per year.
The need to remove carbon dioxide from the atmosphere in order 
to stay well below 2°C total temperature rise is widely accepted today. 
The climate models can tell us how much CO2 needs to be removed, 
and the economic models can tell us how fast changes can be made 
to existing systems, but the details of these massive new technologies 
are not well constrained. In this chapter I describe our current under-
standing of the general classes of technologies, but it will be up to you, 
today’s students and tomorrow’s leaders, to establish the details and 
implement those technologies. You will find that there is considerable 
uncertainty about exactly which approaches will be the most useful—
will reforesting poorly used land be the most critical? Will new, as yet 
untested, approaches come to the fore? All we can say at this point is 
that there is no obvious silver bullet, and prudence indicates we should 
develop and test as many approaches as possible.
Negative emissions methods can be divided into natural solutions, 
such as increasing forested lands and improving carbon levels in soils, 
and engineered solutions, such as machines that directly remove carbon 
dioxide from the atmosphere. In between those extremes are hybrid 
solutions, such as making biofuels and capturing the CO2 emitted during 
that process or speeding up the natural weathering of rocks that re-
moves CO2 from the air.
All of these approaches require land, and often large amounts of 
land, either for the technology or growing areas, or for the renewable 
energy systems to power the more engineered solutions. The trade-offs 
that will have to be considered are large. Will we turn areas of desert 
over to solar power to run direct air capture? Will we plant crops, 
purely to capture their embedded CO2? And where will we store the 
Chapter 18: Atmospheric Carbon Extraction 18-5
CO2 removed from the atmosphere? Plants and soils can take up some 
of it, perhaps a lot with time, but in the short run it is likely that much of 
the fossil-derived CO2 in the air will have to be returned to rocks deep 
beneath the earth. I try to balance these multiple options and give you 
a sense of the technology development, societal choices, and energy 
issues associated with cleaning up the atmosphere.
A major issue is how we will pay to achieve these goals. California’s 
current efforts to reduce emissions now include the first mechanisms to 
pay for negative emissions. I conclude the chapter with an explanation 
of California’s Low Carbon Fuel Standard and how it informs us about 
ways that we can develop and encourage negative emissions technology 
development.
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18.1  Introduction
Detailed studies of our options to keep the planet livable tell us that the 
technologies the world is currently focused on—renewables and electri-
fication—will not be enough. We will need to actively clean up the at-
mosphere—essentially decarbonize it back to a safe level. That is a huge 
challenge. Figure 18.1.1 shows two scenarios—or trajectories—we have 
for emissions of greenhouse gases. In yellow is the trajectory for busi-
ness as usual, which represents no change in our current emissions. 
This is the trajectory of carbon emissions we will follow if we continue 
our current activities—it will have devastating results for temperature 
and climate, as you have learned in previous chapters.
Our ambition to keep temperature increase well below 2°C requires 
us to follow the red trajectory of worldwide carbon emissions. The 
models tell us it would give us about a 66% chance of staying below 2°C 
of global total temperature increase. The goal of 1.5°C would be much 
harder to achieve.
But the range of current tools available—renewables, electrification 
of transportation, efficiency, basically eliminating almost all fossil fuels—
will only give us the reduction shown in brown. These are the massive 
changes in our energy use and economic activity that the other chapters 
in this book and the Bending the Curve course have discussed. But it’s 
not enough. Even if we stop all the greenhouse gas emissions repre-
sented by the brown field, we won’t reach the desired rate of emissions 
to stay below the 2°C goal. Why is that?
It’s mainly because of greenhouse gases like methane, nitrous oxide, 
and the other heat-trapping gases you have learned about. But it is 
also partially because some CO2 is going to be really hard to remove 
from the economy, like that from airplane fuel. It will be very difficult 
to eliminate all emissions, and it will take a long time to achieve the 
maximum reductions. We call these residual emissions. Agriculture is 
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a particularly difficult case. For instance, nitrous oxide is emitted from 
fertilizer use, and of course cattle emit methane. Are we going to stop 
using fertilizer and eating meat? These are choices that the world could 
make, but that would represent dramatic changes in our food system 
and agricultural economy. Other chapters have discussed how to ad-
dress these problems, but we expect some emissions to remain.
And it’s worse than that. We’ve already put so much CO2 in the air 
that we would need negative emissions, shown in blue in Figure 18.1.2, 
even if we could get our current emissions to zero, which we can’t do, 
because of the residual emissions. But the sum of the slow action and 
residual emissions is large—10 billion tons by 2050, 20 billion tons by 
2100.
One approach for dealing with residual emissions is to create neg-
ative emissions, basically removing CO2 from the atmosphere. (In this 
chapter we expressly limit the phrase negative emissions to CO2 that is 
Figure 18.1.1 Two trajectories for future greenhouse gas emissions, showing 
all greenhouse gases (GHGs) as their equivalent in carbon dioxide emissions 
(GTCO2e). The red curve would give a 66% chance of reaching less than 2°C in 
global temperature rise. The brown field represents current efforts to reduce 
GHG emissions. Adapted from Fuss et al. 2018.
Mitigated
GHG emissionsB
usin
ess 
as u
sual
Below 2°C
Net zero
GHG emissions
80
60
40
20
0
2020 2040 2060 2080 2100
–20
G
H
G
 e
m
is
si
on
s 
(G
TC
O
2e
/y
ea
r)
Source: Jérôme Hilaire Mercator Institute
18-8 Chapter 18: Atmospheric Carbon Extraction
removed from the atmosphere—and not any of the reductions in emis-
sions that you have learned about previously). The green wedge in Figure 
18.1.2 represents the required negative emissions in order to meet the 
trajectory of well below 2°C emissions. (The trajectories shown in Fig-
ures 18.1.1 and 18.1.2 represent averages of many models that change 
the rates of electrification, efficiency, and other economic parameters 
to achieve the 2°C future at the lowest cost to the world economy given 
today’s knowledge of technology options.)
The green wedge, the required negative emissions, grows in slowly 
to represent realistic growth rates of the technologies required to re-
move CO2 (even though we do not yet have a good understanding of 
those technologies, as we will discuss in this chapter). But the size of the 
required negative emissions is daunting—we will need to remove around 
1 billion tons in 2030, 10 billion tons in 2050, and 20 billion tons in 2100. 
That means between now and 2050, we need to create an industry to 
Figure 18.1.2 The green wedge represents the negative emissions—removal 
of CO2 from the atmosphere—required to offset residual emissions from other 
greenhouse gases and unmitigated CO2 and to keep worldwide greenhouse gas 
emissions below that required to meet a 2°C future. (GTCO2e = GHG equivalent 
in CO2.) Adapted from Fuss et al. 2018.
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clean up the atmosphere that moves twice the material of today’s oil 
industry. In 2030, the 1 gigaton we need to remove per year is about 
equal to the weight of all humans on Earth, or the weight of all the corn 
we harvest each year.
How will we create the negative emissions required to meet a 2°C 
future, or better yet to keep temperature rise significantly lower than 
2°C? We have to find the right technologies, and then quickly get them 
to scale. We have to create technology that can address negative emis-
sions and also to understand how full-scale negative emissions ecosys-
tems—capture, transportation, and storage—can be created. We have to 
catch billions of tons of CO2 at an affordable price. A really important 
aspect is how we encourage and enable the creation of businesses that 
can do this job. You don’t move billions of tons of anything without busi-
nesses that make money, even if that money is from taxes or government 
subsidies (like our trash removal today). Most importantly, we need to 
do all of this in a way that does not do unacceptable damage to the peo-
ple and natural environment of the Earth that we are seeking to protect.
This chapter discusses these challenges and how we might go about 
addressing them. I address the major issues associated with the removal 
of carbon and its ultimate permanent storage. Five methods are listed 
here with approximate values for how much annual negative emissions 
they might provide:
1. Regrowing forests (1–5 billion tons per year).
2. Putting CO2 back into soils as soil carbon (450 billion tons total, 
but slowly, at 2–5 billion tons per year).
3. Using biomass to remove CO2, either while making fuel and 
energy, or to restore soil carbon (2–5 billion tons per year).
4. Enhancing the natural reactions of minerals with the air (2–4 billion 
tons per year).
5. Directly removing CO2 via chemistry and machinery, that is, direct 
air capture (limited only by the availability of renewable energy to 
power the devices, but probably 2–5 billion tons per year).
The biomass and direct removal methods generate CO2 that must be 
stored permanently out of the atmosphere. These approaches also have 
limitations. I describe two in detail:
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1. Making carbon-based products from CO2 instead of oil (1–5 billion 
tons/year).
2. Putting CO2 underground as liquid (unlimited capacity but 
expensive).
Some consideration has been given to increasing the rate of bio-
logical uptake in the oceans by fertilizing plankton or enhancing the 
growth of large algae (like kelp), but those methods are subject to even 
more environmental conflicts than the seven activities listed above, and 
an adequate estimate of how they might affect our negative emissions 
activities is not yet available.
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18.2   Capturing CO2 from the Atmosphere
Trees
Trees are the first form of natural carbon storage that most of us think 
of when we imagine removing carbon dioxide from the atmosphere. 
There are at least three trillion trees on Earth, and they hold about 500 
petagrams of carbon, or in more common terms, 500 billion tons. When 
we talk about living organisms, we talk about carbon as the chemical 
species, C (molecular weight 12), as opposed to when we talk about 
the atmosphere, where carbon takes the chemical form CO2 (molecular 
weight 44 with the addition of the two oxygen molecules). The 500 
billion tons of carbon in forests (trees, roots, and dead material) came 
originally from CO2 in the air: 500 × 44 / 12 = 1,833 billion tons of carbon 
dioxide, or roughly about twice as much CO2 as exists in the atmosphere 
today.
Figure 18.2.1 Aspen grove, 
Rocky Mountain National Park. 
National Park Service photograph by 
J. Westfall.
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Adding more forested area to the Earth is an obvious and fairly rapid 
way to remove carbon dioxide from the atmosphere, and reforesting 
land that has been denuded by logging or clearing for agriculture is the 
first option for negative emissions. This is happening naturally in places 
like Maine in the United States, where former farmland has been al-
lowed to return to forest, and because of conservation activity in places 
like Bhutan, where in 2016 at the request of the king, 108,000 trees were 
planted to honor the birth of the new prince, Jigme Namgyel  Wangchuck 
(the number 108 is auspicious in Bhutan’s Bhuddist tradition).
There are two important limitations to how much CO2 we can re-
move by reforestation. The first is the total land area to be covered 
in trees. We can’t cover farmland that is in active use, or much of our 
urban landscape. This limits the total CO2 that can be removed to about 
100 billion tons, although some estimates are as high as 260 billion tons. 
The second limitation is the rate of growth, and this restricts the rate 
of removal to between 1 and 3 billion tons of CO2 per year. The good 
news is that this is a relatively inexpensive option, with costs as low as 
$10/ton of CO2 removed.
Climate change is hard on forests, however. Figure 18.2.2 shows 
the carbon uptake and loss from Canada’s extensive forests. Despite 
being mostly undisturbed by direct human activity, Canada’s forests are 
Figure 18.2.2 Gain and loss of carbon from Canada’s forests in recent years. 
Since 2002, Canadian forests have been emitting carbon dioxide, not absorbing 
it, because of fires and insect kills. (MT CO2e = million tons of carbon dioxide 
equivalent.) Data from Natural Resources Canada.
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currently emitting CO2, not absorbing it. In California, trees are also 
dying at a rapid rate because of drought and insects. In 2010 there 
were fewer than 5 million dead trees in California’s forests; today there 
are more than 145 million. Maintaining healthy forests will be a major 
challenge in the Anthropocene, and using forests as a negative emis-
sions sink requires us to solve the forest health challenge. We can’t just 
assume that planting trees, and ignoring existing forests, will achieve a 
climate benefit.
Soils
Soils store a large amount of carbon in the form of decaying plant 
matter, organic chemicals derived from plants and soil organisms, and 
also a large pool of living organic matter such as microbes and fungi. 
In healthy soils these compounds are in constant flux. Plants absorb 
CO2 and grow roots; roots exude chemicals that are absorbed by the 
microbial community, which is preyed upon by viruses; new microbes 
consume the decaying plant and animal matter, emitting CO2; and some 
soil organic material becomes associated with soil minerals. This results 
in a constant flux of carbon in and out of healthy soils, such that the 
carbon content of soils is never static but is a stock and flow problem. 
Soils that are rich in organic matter have healthy ecosystems and vice 
versa, as you learned in Chapter 16.
The rich soils of the US Midwest were formed by these processes 
operating around the roots of perennial plants, such as grasses, that 
live for multiple years (as opposed to the annual plants that die and 
regrow from seeds every year, like most of our crop plants). These 
perennial plants typically put down deep roots—often 4 meters deep—in 
search of reliable water. Switchgrass is one of the most common of the 
perennial grasses of the Midwest.
Agricultural practices like plowing can decrease soil carbon by ex-
posing it to the atmosphere, which causes it to oxidize to CO2 and be 
lost. An even larger loss of carbon can occur from rich surface soils 
washing or even blowing away, as they did in the US Dust Bowl of the 
1930s. Similarly, harvesting a crop like corn and then leaving the ground 
uncovered for the winter allows organic matter to be lost by all these 
mechanisms and discourages the healthy microbial activity that forms 
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good soils. Today farmers seek to diminish these effects by using soil 
conservation plowing that decreases erosion, no-till agriculture where 
seeds are planted without plowing, and cover crops in winter to avoid 
bare soil and reduce loss of organic material.
When American farmers began plowing the soils of the prairies, 
they rapidly released carbon from the soils. Figure 18.2.3 shows how 
the loss continued until recent years, when the new soil management 
practices were put into place.
These kinds of soil carbon losses have occurred around the world 
and are responsible for approximately 133 billion tons of carbon loss 
from farmed land, which represents about 450 billion tons of CO2 in 
the atmosphere. If we could return that carbon to soils, it would in-
crease their productivity while decreasing the carbon dioxide in the at-
mosphere. Since soils formerly had these carbon contents, we assume 
they could be returned, but the challenge is: how fast can that occur? 
This is a major target for negative emissions studies, because returning 
that carbon to agricultural soils would erase much of the excess CO2 in 
Figure 18.2.3 Soil organic carbon (SOC) in the central US. Conventional till-
age is plowing every year, without using cover crops in winter. Reduced tillage 
uses things like no-till planting, cover crops, and contour plowing to reduce 
erosion and runoff. Adapted from Donigan, A. S., Jr., et al. 1994.
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the atmosphere today. As you can see in Figure 18.2.3, it is possible for 
the soil to slowly regain carbon, but can we regain all of it? And, can 
we greatly speed up the process? Research in this area includes better 
farm practices, which you learned about in Chapter 16, using perennial 
crops instead of annual crops, and finding ways to encourage deep root 
growth. Changing the plants we grow today to do more for soil carbon 
enrichment—through deeper roots or genetic modification to increase 
root growth and longevity—is an active research area. There is not yet an 
obvious silver bullet—much work needs to be done.
Biofuels and carbon dioxide capture
An important link between forestry, agriculture, and negative emissions 
is the production of biofuels. Today in the United States 10% of auto-
mobile fuel is the biofuel ethanol, produced from corn and increasingly 
from other lignocellulosic feedstocks like corn stover, which is the corn-
stalks left over after the ears of corn are removed. That ethanol is made 
by fermentation in which yeast breaks down the sugar in the corn, 
turning it into ethanol and CO2 in about equal parts. Today that carbon 
dioxide is simply allowed to bubble out of the vat and return to the at-
mosphere where it started at the beginning of the growing season. If we 
could catch that CO2 and permanently keep it out of the atmosphere, 
it would be an easy form of negative emissions. Since the CO2 bubbling 
out of the fermentation vat is nearly pure (it has some water vapor in 
it), it is relatively easy to capture. Today much of the CO2 in fizzy drinks 
comes from that source. Of course, that does not constitute negative 
emissions, since it immediately returns to the atmosphere when we 
drink the beverage.
The production of other biofuels also emits carbon dioxide. Anaer-
obic digesters that process manure, sewage, and food waste create 
methane for use in vehicles or in our natural gas pipelines, and carbon 
dioxide is a by-product. That CO2 has to be separated from the methane 
before it can be used, and today the CO2 is simply dumped into the at-
mosphere. This represents another readily obtained negative emission. 
Typically, one carbon dioxide molecule is created for every two methane 
molecules in an anaerobic digester. Decomposition of trash in landfills 
creates a similar mix of gases. Today we try to control the methane 
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emissions from these sources because it is such a potent greenhouse 
gas. Capturing and storing the CO2 can turn this control into a double 
benefit.
Another way to obtain energy from biomass is to burn it for elec-
tricity. This is an old way to make electricity, but now we can consider 
also capturing the CO2 and putting it underground. This leads to a neg-
ative emissions concept that is prominent in recent Intergovernmental 
Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) reports—bioenergy carbon capture 
and storage, or BECCS. An attractive aspect of this approach is that in 
principal all of the carbon in the biomass could be captured, yielding 
the maximum amount of negative emissions. A challenge is that the elec-
tricity generated by burning biomass is relatively expensive compared 
with solar and wind power—typically about 12¢ per kilowatt hour (kWh) 
compared with 5¢. The added cost of capturing the CO2 from a biomass 
power plant would today increase the cost of the power by at least 50%, 
to 18¢ per kWh, making it dramatically more expensive as a source of 
electricity. The question to be asked is, How much are we willing to pay 
to remove carbon dioxide from the atmosphere, and is this a practical 
way to do it? We could certainly subsidize BECCS power to achieve this 
goal, but since biomass power plants are struggling to be competitive 
today, it seems that this will be an expensive and potentially less attrac-
tive way to remove carbon dioxide from the atmosphere.
Much of the biomass that could be burned for electrical power can 
also be processed into liquid fuel by using a variety of methods that 
heat the organic material to extract organic molecules. One method is 
pyrolysis, or the rapid heating of organic material, as mentioned in Fig-
ure 18.2.4. This volatile organic material comprises most of the smoke 
from typical fires. Pyrolysis attempts to keep the volatile organic mate-
rial from burning by performing the heating rapidly in an oxygen-free or 
low-oxygen environment. The released organic chemicals, called bio-oil, 
are then condensed and processed into fuel in a refinery, much like fossil 
petroleum is made into gasoline.
Once the volatiles have been removed, pyrolysis leaves behind a 
carbon-rich residue that is fundamentally charcoal and has been la-
beled biochar. Typically making up about 20% of the original weight 
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of the biomass, this material can be added to poor soil to enrich its 
water-holding and nutrient properties, as well as encouraging microbial 
activity by providing a substrate for growth. This carbon is the major 
opportunity for negative emissions when pyrolysis is used to create fuels 
from biomass. Although the carbon in the fuel (from the volatiles) is rap-
idly returned to the atmosphere for net neutral emissions, the biochar 
can be stable for as long as hundreds of years (this is highly dependent 
on the soil environment), providing negative emissions.
The practice of adding charcoal to poor soil through deliberate 
burning campaigns has been used by agricultural societies for centuries. 
In Brazil, soils labeled by European settlers as terra preta (“black earth”) 
are now known to have been deliberately created by the Indigenous 
people as an enrichment process for depleted rain forest soils. How-
ever, pyrolysis is in its infancy as a combined negative emissions and en-
ergy technology, with many issues yet to be worked out. One perceived 
advantage is the ability for pyrolysis facilities to be relatively small and be 
economically located near the source of the biomass. A major cost in any 
biomass-to-energy system is transporting the biomass. Trucks can typi-
cally carry biomass about 50 miles before the costs begin to overwhelm 
Figure 18.2.4 The smoke coming off a pile of burning leaves is volatile 
organic compounds being cooked out of the biomass. It could be condensed 
to form a biofuel in a process called pyrolysis. Photograph by Jorge Royan via 
Wikimedia.
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the profitability of the operation. This is particularly important for forest 
biomass such as the slash that is left over from logging operations that 
are often far from potential places to use biomass. Currently these small 
trees, limbs, and unmarketable wood are piled up and burned in the 
forest (have you heard the term slash and burn?). This material could 
be converted into bio-oil and transported to refineries, where it could 
be made into transportation fuel. If the biochar is left in the forest soils 
(or otherwise permanently stored out of the atmosphere), the resulting 
transportation fuels can be carbon negative; that is, even after burning 
the fuel, the net impact on the atmosphere is that carbon dioxide has 
been removed (discussed in Section 18.4).
The final method for converting biomass into energy with ultimate 
negative emissions is gasification. In this approach the biomass is 
heated to high temperatures, above 1,200°C, in the absence of oxygen, 
and it breaks down into a mixture of hydrogen, carbon monoxide, and 
carbon dioxide called synthesis gas. This process has been used industri-
ally for more than 180 years. The synthesis gas can be converted, using 
catalysts, into organic chemicals and fuels or even burned directly to 
generate heat or electricity.
This is an interesting way to create hydrogen for a modern 
 carbon-free economy. Running the conversion process in such a way as 
to generate maximum amounts of hydrogen and carbon dioxide, and 
minimal carbon monoxide, is a good way to make hydrogen. The carbon 
dioxide can then be separated from the hydrogen with either solvents 
or membranes, leaving pure hydrogen for energy use, as well as pure 
carbon dioxide for permanent storage out of the atmosphere. Gasifica-
tion plants tend to be large in order to achieve efficient operations, and 
industrial development in the past depended on coal as the feedstock. 
It is hard to get enough biomass in a small radius around a gasification 
plant to keep it operating efficiently (without excessive distances for 
trucks to travel, which is an additional cost and which generates addi-
tional pollution), but modern developers are trying to overcome these 
hurdles. Like burning biomass for direct energy production, gasification 
is in principal capable of capturing all of the carbon, for maximum neg-
ative emissions.
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Biomass negative emissions benefits and limitations
I discussed biomass and soil negative emissions methods first in this 
chapter because they have many positive attributes, but they also have 
some significant limitations.
On the positive side, we can improve soils while also harvesting bio-
mass, yielding double benefits. These approaches tend to be the least 
expensive of negative emissions technologies because the plants have 
done the hard work of accumulating CO2 and solar energy for us. Affor-
estation, biochar, and soil carbon enhancement all can be done for less 
than $100/ton of CO2 removed, and they have, respectively, maximum 
capacities of 4 billion, 2 billion, and 5 billion tons per year worldwide, 
capable of making a significant dent in our 20-billion-ton need.
Each of these methods requires land, however, which is also needed 
for other purposes. Producing the food we need is the primary compe-
tition with energy uses—of course it is the good-quality land that is best 
for both needs. If farmers are paid higher prices to grow energy-related 
crops, then they will grow less food. The US Department of Energy has 
estimated the amount of biomass that could be provided in the United 
States for energy purposes in 2050, without reducing food production. 
The 2016 Billion-Ton Report found that it was realistic to expect that in 
2040, the United States would have about 1.5 billion tons of biomass 
available for energy or negative-emissions-related use, without signif-
icant impact on food production or other land uses like housing and 
transportation. This amount of biomass could be used to create all of 
the airplane fuel used in the United States.
That 1.5 billion tons of biomass includes trash, sewage, manure, 
crop residues like almond shells and straw, and also growing new crops 
like poplar trees or switchgrass on land not suitable for high-value 
agricultural crops. About half of that total would be from those new 
energy crops, so the impact on food and water needs to continue to 
be evaluated. Not surprisingly, the trash resources are located in cities, 
and the agriculture-based biomass is in the center of the country, where 
agriculture is vibrant and widespread (Figure 18.2.5).
Since biomass tends to be around 50% carbon (waste like sewage 
can be much less, however), 1.5 billion tons would represent about 
750 million tons of carbon. In the form of the carbon dioxide that was 
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pulled from the atmosphere to make the biomass, this would be about 
1.5 / 2 × 44 / 12 = 2.75 billion tons of carbon dioxide (remember that 
carbon and carbon dioxide have molecular weights of 12 and 44, respec-
tively). While it is infeasible to assume that all of that biomass could be 
collected, and that energy crops could achieve their maximum contri-
bution with no impact on other important aspects of society, it is clear 
that biomass could be a very real contributor to US negative emissions.
In countries with significant biomass-based industry like the timber 
harvesting in Sweden and Finland, there may be significantly more op-
tions for negative emissions using existing resources. These countries 
get a significant amount of their energy supply from wood waste today, 
and capturing the CO2 from that combustion could be a very substan-
tial component of their greenhouse gas activities, by some estimates 
making both countries carbon negative overall. Europe is investigating 
Figure 18.2.5 Summary map of biomass resources in 2040 in the United 
States available at a cost less than $60/ton of dry biomass. Map colors show 
the available tons of dry biomass (dt) per square mile of area. From US 
Department of Energy 2016, Figure ES4.
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using its trash for negative emissions in a project called Northern Lights, 
where the CO2 from the trash-burning facility in Oslo, Norway, will be 
captured for true negative emissions, expected to come on line in 2022.
Some plans for negative emissions involve growing additional en-
ergy crops, such as switchgrass or poplar trees, entirely for the purpose 
of bioenergy with carbon capture and storage. These plans face serious 
criticism today because of the competition for land and water, and the 
impact on food supplies. Most current assessments conclude that the 
most obvious sources of biomass are those that are thrown away today. 
However, the future need for negative emissions may require us to eval-
uate whether additional biomass resources can be brought to bear on 
the problem without undesired consequences.
Direct capture of carbon dioxide from the atmosphere
Carbon dioxide can be removed from the air with strong chemicals 
like sodium hydroxide (known as caustic soda, or lye) and liquid amine 
or ammonia solutions. Both of these work because they are chemical 
bases, while CO2 is an acid. The stronger the base, the more reactive 
it is with the acid carbon dioxide. Carbon dioxide is not an acid until it 
dissolves in water, at which point the reaction occurs to create carbonic 
acid (H2CO3), a weak acid:
 CO2 + H2O ↔ H2CO3  (1)
Carbonic acid, H2CO3, can give up a proton (H+) to react with a base like 
sodium hydroxide, NaOH, yielding water and two new ions in solution, 
and releasing heat (chemical energy):
  H2CO3 + NaOH ↔ H+ + HCO3− + Na+ + OH− ↔ H2O + Na+ + HCO3− (2)
A solution of sodium hydroxide will spontaneously absorb carbon 
dioxide by reactions (1) and (2), releasing heat and heating the solu-
tion or surrounding air. The solution will only contain the air’s carbon 
dioxide, and not all the other gases—oxygen, nitrogen, argon, etc.—that 
were mixed with the carbon dioxide. If you heat that solution—add back 
into the system the heat that was released in dissolving the CO2 (plus a 
little extra heat, of course; no chemistry is free!)—pure CO2, plus some 
water vapor, will bubble out of the solution. This way of making pure 
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CO2 has been known for more than 100 years and was used to make 
dry ice and carbonated drinks before other sources of CO2 became 
available from industry. If you use amines or ammonia in place of sodium 
hydroxide, a similar reaction occurs.
These reactions are being used to harvest CO2 from the atmosphere 
in experimental systems we call direct air capture, or DAC. Today they 
are relatively expensive to operate because of the heat that has to be 
added to the system to release the CO2 in pure form, and because the 
systems need to be large to harvest significant amounts of CO2 from air. 
In this book, we are very worried about CO2 at a concentration of 415 
parts per million (ppm) because of its blanket effect, but to a chemical 
engineer, 415 ppm is a very low concentration and requires large, ex-
pensive machines to both contact the air with the solution to catch the 
CO2, and process that solution once it is enriched in CO2.
A variety of schemes are being tested today to examine whether 
this direct air capture can realistically be used to remove CO2 from the 
air. Most estimates place the current cost at around $600/ton of CO2 
Figure 18.2.6 The Climeworks direct air capture facility near Zurich, 
Switzerland, uses 18 modular capture units to remove CO2 from the air. 
The purified CO2 is then used to enhance the growth of vegetables in the 
greenhouses in the background—not really negative emissions yet, but a 
demonstration of the costs and issues associated with separating CO2 from 
air. This facility catches about 1,000 tons of CO2 per year. Photograph by Roger 
Aines.
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removed, with the possibility in the future of decreasing to $300 to 
$100/ton. Barring dramatic breakthroughs, direct air capture will always 
be more expensive than the biomass-based systems we previously dis-
cussed. But an advantage of direct air capture systems is that they are 
only limited by the amount of space we are willing to allocate to their 
operation and the amount of carbon-free energy we can supply to run 
them (obviously you cannot use something like coal-fired electricity to 
power such an endeavor, or you will emit more CO2 than you catch).
Jennifer Wilcox has evaluated the amount of energy needed for di-
rect air capture systems, and it is significant. Today’s methods require 
about 250 megawatts (MW) of power supply to remove CO2 at a rate 
of 1 million tons per year. A 250 MW solar farm is among the largest 
built today. The area required for a direct air capture facility would pre-
dominantly be for the energy production, and not for the actual capture 
devices (like those in Figure 18.2.6). For scale, the Topaz Solar Farm 
in California takes up 7.3 square miles of land and generates 550 MW 
of peak power. Considering intermittency (the solar farm produces no 
power at night), this would be about what is needed for 1 million tons 
of direct air capture per year. While it is certainly possible to allocate 
large areas of land for renewable power for direct air capture, this will 
be a major land use challenge. Today direct air capture methods are 
being studied and seriously evaluated, even though their large-scale op-
eration may be many decades in the future. If we are lucky and work 
hard at other options, we may not need direct air capture to meet our 
climate goals, but if we need it in 2040 or 2050, it will be too late then 
to start developing it.
Carbon mineralization
Next, a brief mention of the mechanisms that the Earth uses to control 
CO2 in the atmosphere, and how we might speed them up. Limestone, 
or calcium carbonate, CaCO3, is the most stable solid form of CO2 in 
the earth. Its stability is attested by its use to construct buildings, par-
ticularly beautiful facades. But even as the most stable solid form of a 
CO2-containing substance, it will still dissolve slowly in rainwater and 
turn into bicarbonate, HCO3−, in solution, which is even more chemically 
stable than limestone and is one of the most important ions in seawater. 
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Marine organisms use bicarbonate to form their shells and solid struc-
tural elements (like coral).
Bicarbonate and calcium carbonate come from the weathering of 
rocks containing calcium. These rocks tend to come from deep in the 
earth and are brought to the surface by volcanism (in basalt like that 
found in Hawaii) or faulting and plate tectonics, which can bring up large 
slabs of rock from deep in the earth called ultramafic rocks. Some ex-
amples are shown in Figure 18.2.7. These rocks are dissolved readily by 
seawater for the same reason that CO2 is absorbed by a sodium hydrox-
ide solution—the calcium dissolves to form calcium hydroxide, which 
reacts by the same mechanisms as sodium hydroxide (see equations [1] 
and[2]) forming calcium ions and bicarbonate in rivers that empty into 
the ocean. There the bicarbonate builds up until marine organisms like 
corals precipitate it into their homes and bodies, which eventually turn 
into limestone rock, permanently storing the CO2. This natural cycle 
of CO2 in the air reacting with rocks, forming calcium and bicarbonate 
ions that travel to the ocean in rivers, where they eventually precipitate 
into solid calcium carbonate shells and skeletons that accumulate on 
the ocean bottom and turn into limestone rock, has been the primary 
control on the average amount of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere 
throughout time. (This process does not acidify the ocean, because 
the acidity of the CO2 was neutralized by the base in the rock—ocean 
acidification occurs when CO2 in the air dissolves directly into the ocean 
and, as in equation [1], turns into carbonic acid.)
Researchers are examining whether this process can be speeded up, 
either by circulating water through rocks and dissolving the calcium or 
by grinding up calcium-rich rocks and reacting them with air and rain-
water. This is an attractive approach because it mimics the processes 
already active in the earth and, most importantly, uses very little added 
energy because the reaction of CO2 with dissolved calcium hydroxide 
actually releases energy (heat). There is no need to heat the solutions 
up again, as the direct air capture facilities must do to recover pure 
CO2, because in this carbon mineralization or enhanced weathering 
approach the CO2 forms either solid calcium carbonate or dissolved 
bicarbonate like that already in the ocean.
Much needs to be worked out before the benefits of this approach 
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can be estimated, but since ultramafic rocks are found in a wide variety 
of locations, including California, it is worth pursuing. Current estimates 
are that a process like this is less expensive than direct air capture and 
could be quite inexpensive. Since it is still quite uncertain, we estimate 
that the costs would be from $50 to $200 per ton removed, and the 
capacity would be several billion tons per year.
Ocean carbon uptake
Finally, a brief mention of one of the earliest ideas for removing carbon 
dioxide from the air: enhancing the primary productivity of the oceans. 
Figure 18.2.7 Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory scientists examine 
ultramafic rocks in Washington state. These rocks are rapidly reacting with 
CO2 and breaking down to calcium and bicarbonate ions, leaving clays and 
unreacted blocks of rock behind. This site is a landslide—as the rocks break 
down, they lose structural integrity and slide downhill. Photograph by Roger 
Aines.
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In this approach, fertilizer would be applied to encourage the growth 
of plankton, which upon their death would sink to the abyssal depths 
of the ocean where carbon is out of contact with the atmosphere. This 
approach has proven to be difficult to experimentally test, because 
of limitations imposed by international treaties and also public opin-
ion objecting to addition of the fertilizer components, like iron, to the 
ocean. However, the extraordinary size of the oceans, and therefore the 
amount of CO2 that could be absorbed by this method, makes this an 
interesting option to continue evaluating.
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18.3  Storing CO2 Removed from the Air
After we remove CO2 from the air with the methods described in the 
previous section, it still needs to be permanently stored. Biochar pro-
vides one means of storage, as does mineralization. Biological means 
such as soil carbon or trees provide other important forms of storage 
that have to be maintained to keep their integrity—you can’t plow up the 
soil or cut down the trees in the future without losing some or all of the 
benefit. Our estimates of the maximum capacity of these systems are in 
the range of 10 billion tons per year. That is an outstanding start but not 
enough. And some of the important systems, like bioenergy and direct 
air capture, generate pure CO2 that still needs another storage form.
Recycling CO2 into carbon-based products
Many of the carbon-containing products we use every day are made 
from petroleum, including carpets, fabrics, and plastics. The availability 
of carbon from petroleum has made these products easy to make and 
inexpensive, but there is no fundamental reason that they cannot be 
made from carbon sourced from carbon dioxide. The important differ-
ence is that in general energy must be added to CO2 in order to make 
the reduced-carbon chemicals that can be used in things like polymers 
(Figure 18.3.1). The good news today is that energy is increasingly abun-
dant and inexpensive because of renewable sources. We can expect that 
in the future the energy to turn carbon dioxide into organic chemicals 
and make things like carpet fiber will be a small fraction of the total cost 
of the product.
Researchers are working today on the catalysts and electrochemi-
cal systems required to achieve this chemistry, with promising results. 
Worldwide, we produce enough chemicals (other than fuels) to take 
up about 1.4 billion tons of CO2 (Table 18.3.1) if we completely replace 
petroleum as the carbon source. In principal those chemicals could all 
be produced using CO2 processed with the use of renewable electricity, 
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but the amount of electricity would be gigantic—as much electricity as 
the world produces today! Clearly we need more efficient methods, 
which seem very likely, given progress in catalysis and electrochemistry.
The lifetime of the materials we make from industrial chemicals is of 
primary interest when we discuss negative emissions. For instance, it is 
not realistic to think of fuels as contributors to negative emissions, since 
they are burned soon after being made. But polymers, fabrics, and plas-
tics have longer lives, although they are still not permanent. Researchers 
are currently evaluating the benefits of producing these intermediate-life 
materials and the amounts of CO2 removal from air they represent.
While we might think of organic chemicals as the principal place CO2 
could be used in our economy, it turns out that construction materials 
are another large possible sink. Concrete is composed of an aggregate 
material like gravel, which is held together with cement. That cement is 
mainly portland cement, which uses calcium hydroxide as the primary 
binding chemical. When water is added, the calcium hydroxide reacts 
with sand and fine rock in the aggregate mixture to form new minerals 
Table 18.3.1 Possible chemicals and building materials that can be made from CO2, and the 
maximum amount of CO2 that would be utilized
Carbonate Materials Chemicals and Fuels
Durable Carbon 
Materials
Binders/
Cement Aggregates
Commodity 
Chemicals Fuels
Fiber, Nanotubes, 
Graphene
Market size 
(GT/y)
4 44 0.5 2.5 ~0.0001
Portland 
cement 
(2016)
Non-metallic 
minerals 
(2017)
Upstream 
 chemicals 
(2013)
Transport fuels 
(2016)
Carbon fiber 
(2018 est.)
CO2 demand 0.1–1 1 
Waste streams
1.4 7.7 ?
CO2 
abatement
Unclear—
indirect 
benefits
Reduced emissions 
likely—negative 
emissions possible
Reduced emissions 
possible—negative 
emissions possible
Reduced 
emissions 
possible
Unclear—indirect 
benefits
Note: The estimates in this table are highly uncertain. GT = gigatons. 
Source: Prepared by Sean McCoy, University of Calgary, based on analyses in ICEF. 2017. Carbon Dioxide 
Utilization (CO2U): ICEF Roadmap 2.0. LLNL Report LLNL-TR-739322. https://www.icef-forum.org/platform/
upload/CO2U_Roadmap_ICEF2017.pdf. Used by permission.
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that bind all the material together. Production of calcium hydroxide is 
a major contributor to emissions, as it involves burning the CO2 off 
limestone.
Remember calcium hydroxide from our discussion of carbon min-
eralization? CO2 can also be permanently stored in cement and con-
crete, where instead of reacting all the calcium hydroxide with water 
and sand, as is currently done, we react some of the calcium hydroxide 
with carbon dioxide, also forming strong, stable minerals that bind the 
material together. While this substitution does not reduce the amount 
of CO2 in the atmosphere, it does offset some of the emissions from 
calcium hydroxide production. That CO2 is still emitted, but the net 
greenhouse gas total is reduced because some CO2 is added to the 
resultant concrete. However, the gravel or other aggregate that goes 
into the concrete is another story. If that aggregate could be made from 
calcium carbonate produced from atmospheric CO2 and calcium from 
wastes, minerals, or the ocean, that could be a very large contributor to 
negative emissions (Table 18.3.1).
Figure 18.3.1 CO2 is a low-energy form of carbon: energy must be added to 
chemically reduce the carbon molecule in order to make organic chemicals that 
are used in products and fuels today. Image from French Ministry of Energy and 
Environment.
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Geologic storage
An important form of storage will be injection of liquified CO2 deep 
into the earth in rocks like those that oil was produced from originally 
(Figure 18.3.3). When it is injected at depths greater than 1,000 meters 
(about 3,000 feet), the pressure is sufficient to keep the CO2 in a liquid 
state. (Chemists will recognize this as a supercritical state where the 
distinction between liquid and gas is no longer meaningful, but the ma-
terial’s properties are very much like a liquid.) This is about as dense as 
oil (a little less dense than water), with about the same viscosity. Thus, 
if we inject CO2 into an old oil field, or rocks similar to an oil field, the 
CO2 will stay there permanently as the oil did. (Of course, some oil 
leaks out naturally, as on the beach in Santa Barbara, California, but 
those oil deposits are very shallow, only a few hundred feet below the 
surface.) The US Department of Energy has conducted extensive tests 
Figure 18.3.2 An oil pump at sunset. Image by skeeze from Pixabay.
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of this approach, placing 16 million tons of CO2 underground in a series 
of experimental sites that have been carefully monitored. No leaks have 
been observed in 10 years of experiments in the US, nor in 20 years at 
the Sleipner site in Norway, which is an offshore platform that injects 
CO2 beneath the seabed.
This form of CO2 storage can put very large amounts of CO2 safely 
away from the atmosphere. The US Geological Survey and the National 
Academies estimate that about 3,000 billion tons can be safely stored 
in rocks under the United States. This number, of course, needs to be 
verified for individual sites and projects, but there appears to be more 
than adequate capacity for the US to store negative emissions in, under, 
and around old oil fields and similar rocks.
The technical issues associated with storing CO2 underground are 
very similar to those of oil production, which involves very similar wells, 
surface equipment, and safety procedures. This is good news because 
Figure 18.3.3 (Left) Underground storage of CO2 as a liquid can be done at 
depths greater than 3,000 feet (1,000 meters) where the pressure keeps the 
CO2 in supercritical state with properties very similar to those of oil. The CO2 
fills the space in between sandstone grains. Image reproduced with permission 
from Reuben Juanes, MIT News. (Right) The volume taken up by CO2 gas 
decreases as you add pressure to it, as happens when it is injected deep into 
the earth. At depths greater than 800 meters it converts into a supercritical 
liquid with much higher density than the original gas, taking up a small amount 
of space in the subsurface. Image from US Department of Energy, National Energy 
Technology Laboratory.
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the skilled workforce required to rapidly scale up geologic CO2 storage 
already exists in the oil industry. As the use of oil declines in the future, 
there is an opportunity to reemploy those workers in the carbon stor-
age workforce, doing very similar jobs and in the same places where 
they do them today. This is valuable for a just transition, that is, the 
conversion of jobs in the old economy to jobs in the new economy that 
are similar in skills, location, and pay to the old jobs. If it is not possible 
to make these transitions, the workforce ends up suffering while the 
climate improves. Geologic storage is one opportunity to make a just 
transition for workers in the oil fields.
As with oil activities, there are safety issues with geologic storage 
that are being addressed in the ongoing demonstration programs. Leak-
age is always a concern, but to date it has not been observed (and it 
has been the primary focus of monitoring science). Earthquakes are also 
a concern, since changing the pressure on fluids underground (such as 
CO2) can change the forces holding faults locked and cause induced 
seismicity, where the fault slips and an earthquake occurs. This effect is 
limited by the size of the fault—short faults can only make small earth-
quakes, while long ones like the San Andreas in California are capable 
of massive earthquakes. Clearly any CO2 storage activity needs to take 
place well clear of large faults. Small faults are common in oil fields, 
however, and the mechanics of those faults are well understood. They 
often form barriers to underground fluid flow, trapping oil. They are 
also relatively easy to locate using seismic methods. This is another area 
where the expertise and monitoring equipment that was developed for 
the oil industry can be put to use in safely storing CO2 underground.
Another concern is that leaking CO2 might affect groundwater, mak-
ing it slightly acidic and potentially releasing metals at higher levels than 
originally present. This could occur in large leaks, but in general the 
CO2 is stored much, much deeper than groundwater. All CO2 is stored 
below 3,000 feet, while most groundwater is held at depths of only sev-
eral hundred feet. The US EPA has strictly regulated CO2 underground 
storage on the basis of protecting groundwater. They require that wells 
be constructed to protect from leakage and that CO2 can only be stored 
in rocks where the native groundwater is not drinkable (it must have 
greater than 10,000 ppm total dissolved solids, basically salt, rendering 
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it undrinkable). Leaks that just return CO2 to the atmosphere are not a 
safety problem, just a climate problem.
Geologic storage is one of the climate technologies that generate 
public concern because it is unfamiliar and occurs out of sight. How-
ever, it looks like managing the CO2 content of the atmosphere will 
require geologic storage, so it is important to develop the safety and 
monitoring procedures appropriate for public confidence. As with many 
issues in climate technology, as a society we must balance the possible 
risk of a new technology against the known hazard of the effects of 
climate change. Learning about risks and being prepared to control and 
mitigate them is extremely important.
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18.4   The California Story:  
Paying for Negative Emissions
California’s progressive policies on greenhouse gas control (Chapter 9) 
present the first major opportunity in the world for mechanisms that 
can be used to pay for the development and implementation of negative 
emissions technologies, especially in the early phase when new technol-
ogies and businesses are being developed.
A lot of discussion focuses on the ultimate cost of the climate tech-
nologies we will need, and that is a very important topic. But since 
many of these technologies will not be in full use until midcentury, and 
not built out until the end of the century, it is difficult to estimate total 
costs. The year 2100 is about as far from now as we are today from 
1939. Some very important things have changed that could not have 
been guessed then! But do we wait for those miracles to happen? Of 
course not. We get started, we create new technologies and policies, 
Figure 18.4.1 The first Califor-
nia hydrogen fueling station fed 
directly from an active industrial 
hydrogen pipeline. Photograph 
from US Department of Energy.
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and perhaps most importantly, we create businesses that do these jobs 
at large scale as we did with renewable energy.
California’s ambition is to reach economy-wide net-neutral green-
house gas emissions by 2045 (as you learned in Chapter 9). Let’s take 
a look at how negative emissions will play a role in California’s efforts 
to deal with its thorny transportation emissions problems through a 
policy known as the Low Carbon Fuel Standard. This policy controls 
the ultimate carbon dioxide contribution of fuels to the atmosphere 
by controlling their carbon intensity, or the total amount of CO2 (and 
other greenhouse gases) that are emitted by producing, transporting, 
and ultimately using the fuel. For biofuels this includes agricultural emis-
sions and even the change in land use required to make the biofuel. For 
petroleum fuels it includes the energy required to pump and refine the 
fuel. Conventional gasoline emits about 101 grams of CO2 per megajoule 
(MJ) of energy content by this analysis. Each year California decreases 
the allowable carbon intensity of fuels sold in the state by a little more 
than 1%, so by 2030 it will be 20% less than the 101 gram/MJ baseline.
If a fuel seller has a product, like a biofuel, that has a lower carbon 
intensity than the standard (such as fuel mix A in Figure 18.4.2), they 
are allowed to sell the fuel, and it generates credits, measured in tons 
Figure 18.4.2 Low Carbon Fuel Standard mechanics.
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of CO2 avoided compared with the standard. On the other hand, if a 
seller wants to sell a product like conventional gasoline that is above the 
standard (like fuel mix B in Figure 18.4.2), they have to buy credits in 
order to offset the overage amount.
This presents the opportunity to create fuels that are carbon neg-
ative and to get paid for the fact that producing and using those fuels 
removes CO2 from the atmosphere. Figure 18.4.3 shows the carbon 
intensity of all the fuels currently used for transportation in California. 
Some biologically derived compressed natural gas (Bio-CNG) has ex-
tremely negative carbon intensities, as low as −280 grams CO2/MJ fuel. 
This is because that fuel is made from manure (as I talked about in 
Section 18.2). The previous practice was to let the manure sit in open 
ponds, emitting methane, which is a potent greenhouse gas. The Low 
Carbon Fuel Standard gives the farmers credit, as a negative emission, 
for stopping that emission. This isn’t quite how we have discussed neg-
ative emissions in this chapter (it doesn’t actually remove carbon from 
Figure 18.4.3 Carbon intensities for all the transportation fuels sold in 
California in 2017. The size of the bubble indicates the volume of fuel sold. 
Reproduced with permission from the California Air Resources Board.
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the atmosphere). The farmers are being given credit for eliminating this 
emission that would have been one of the residual emissions shown in 
Figure 18.1.2, so California counts it as negative.
However, when carbon capture is employed, it will be possible to 
push many of those carbon intensities to below zero—that is, those fuels 
will have negative emissions. The California Low Carbon Fuel Standard, 
as of January 2019, allows producers to reduce the carbon intensity 
of fuels by capturing CO2 from the fuel production pathway and per-
manently storing it underground, as we discussed in Section 18.3. For 
the ethanol in Figure 18.4.3, that additional carbon dioxide removed 
from the system would amount to a decrease of about 40 grams CO2/
MJ—not enough to get to zero or below, but a significant decrease. On 
the other hand, with more-carbon-efficient biofuels like Bio-CNG from 
anaerobic digesters, capturing and storing the carbon can reduce the 
carbon footprint to below zero. For fuels like those proposed to be 
made from forest biomass, this can be significantly below zero—a liquid 
fuel whose use decreases carbon dioxide in the air. The trading of Low 
Carbon Fuel Standard credits provides a way for businesses to make 
money making better biofuels for California and also to get a start on 
negative emissions, working out the details of the best technology and 
business practices.
The guidelines go a little further as well, authorizing direct air cap-
ture as a way to generate Low Carbon Fuel Standard credits. A company 
can set up a capture site anywhere in the world, capture and store CO2, 
and sell the credits in the California market. (The basic premise is that 
CO2 emitted by a car in California goes all around the world—capturing 
it anywhere and keeping it out of the atmosphere is exactly the same 
as not emitting it in California to begin with.) The current price for 
credits—about $190/ton at the time of writing—is probably not enough 
to pay for direct air capture yet, but it will be sufficient to encourage de-
velopment of negative emissions from fuel production and is the highest 
price for carbon in the world today.
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18.5  Summary
I’ve discussed a number of possible ways to achieve the negative emis-
sions we will need to stay well below a 2°C total temperature rise. There 
is no single technology that can do it all—or even a small handful of 
approaches. We will need many different techniques, and all will need 
to achieve heroic scales—on the order of billions of tons of CO2 per 
year—in relatively short times.
Figure 18.5.1 summarizes most of the technologies we have dis-
cussed in this chapter. Achieving 20 billion tons per year of negative 
emissions would require almost all of these operating at full capacity, 
and probably more beyond that.
Ultimately the removal of CO2 from the air is very similar to trash 
collection in cities today. It is an activity that we must do to maintain a 
livable environment. We simply will have to pay for it. Some technologies 
Figure 18.5.1 Summary of negative emissions technologies. From Sabine 
Fuss, Mercator Institute.
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to reduce CO2 emissions, such as renewable energy, generate a useful 
product (electricity), and once renewable energy reached the price of 
fossil fuels it became easier to replace the fossil sources. But achieving 
negative emissions does not replace an existing technology, and so it is 
harder than developing renewable energy. There is no price incentive 
for negative emissions, because the price we have been paying to dump 
CO2 into the atmosphere is zero!
Figure 18.5.2 from the Mercator Institute in Germany gives one 
current estimate of the range of costs, and potential volumes, for the 
major negative emissions options discussed here. At this point it is not 
possible to produce precise estimates; the impacts of land use, energy, 
and cost have not been established, and the technologies are still being 
developed. The natural options such as afforestation and soil carbon 
sequestration are most likely to be the least expensive but do not add 
up to the 20 billion tons we will need at the end of the century. Nor 
does this estimate give options like bioenergy with carbon capture and 
storage, or direct air capture, an unlimited estimated capacity; they will 
ultimately have limits due to land use and cost of capital to build them. 
It appears most likely that we will need many, if not most, of these 
approaches (and some not yet invented!) to achieve our climate goals.
Figure 18.5.2 Potential costs and capacities of a number of prominent 
negative emissions technologies. From Sabine Fuss, Mercator Institute.
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We could estimate the average from Figure 18.5.2 as around $100/
ton of CO2 removed (averaging the cost of the less expensive technolo-
gies and hoping that we need a minimum of direct air capture). At that 
cost, which seems achievable by the end of the century, the 10 billion 
tons required in 2050 would cost the world $1 trillion per year—a huge 
number, but only about 1% of today’s world gross domestic product 
(GDP) of $100 trillion. (By 2050, world GDP is expected to be about 
$220 trillion.) The United States, with a GDP today of about $18 trillion, 
spends on the order of $200 billion to manage its garbage—a remarkably 
similar 1%. Can we spend 1% of our world economy cleaning up the 
mess we have made of our atmosphere over the last 200 years? Let’s 
hope we can.
And the path that we follow is not just a function of negative emis-
sions options. As you have learned throughout this book, there are 
dozens or even hundreds of choices that society has to make about the 
rate of carbon-free energy adoption, energy efficiency, land use, pop-
ulation, and many other factors. Each of these choices contributes to 
the pathway that we take through future climate space. That path is not 
yet decided, and society is grappling with the mechanisms to weigh and 
implement the various options. By reading this book, you have made 
yourself an educated contributor to that discussion. Whether they be 
technological, organizational, political, inspirational, or real muscles, 
you are now ready to apply your muscles to bending the curve.
Negative emissions technology and evaluation are just in their in-
fancy today, rather like renewable energy was in the 1970s. Some of 
the directions we need to take are clear, but the details of technology 
combinations, system approaches, and overall trade-offs are not yet ap-
parent. What is obvious is that cleaning up the atmosphere to levels we 
consider livable will be a massive effort—one that the students of today 
(you readers of this book) will spend their careers making successful. 
It is no small effort and will likely be the most important science and 
technology effort of this century. Go forth and succeed!
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Learning Objectives
This chapter has four main learning objectives, the accomplishment of 
which will enable you to do the following:
1. Explain localization. Explain why so many global scientific 
organizations and international agencies are now claiming that 
the commitments and actions of cities and other local subnational 
entities (for example, counties, port districts, metropolitan 
planning organizations) are vital to averting climate change disaster 
on a planetary scale.
2. Describe green infrastructure. Describe how green infrastructure 
is being used in local climate action plans and ecological landscape 
design to address flooding and drought while meeting climate 
change mitigation and adaptation goals on a bioregional scale.
3. Analyze natural climate solutions. Identify potential benefits of 
natural climate solutions (for example, urban agriculture, food 
forests, carbon farming) and hybrid solutions that couple human 
and natural systems (for example, community composting, 
anaerobic biodigesters, aquaponics) from social justice, economic 
efficiency, ecological sustainability, and resilience perspectives.
4. Define rooted university. Assess from an ethical standpoint the 
current and potential role of universities in creating and helping 
to advance climate change solutions. List one or more ways you 
can improve science-society relations by linking climate change 
knowledge and action through community engagement.
This chapter will also examine the power of narratives and framing to 
help you become a good climate change solutions communicator. The 
chapter content you’ll need to meet these learning objectives is orga-
nized in four sections:
 ➤ 19.1 Localization and the Bioregional Transition
 ➤ 19.2 Green Infrastructure and Climate Action Planning
 ➤ 19.3 Natural Climate Solutions and Hybrid Approaches
 ➤ 19.4 Rooted Universities and the Green Infrastructure Nexus
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Overview
The combined impact of anthropogenic climate change and ecological 
degradation worldwide poses an existential threat to humanity. Signif-
icant global and national efforts are underway to accelerate climate 
change mitigation and adaptation. But there is a rising concern that 
these efforts may be too little too late. The Intergovernmental Panel on 
Climate Change (IPCC) and many other reputable science-based orga-
nizations are sounding the alarm. That is, that much more needs to be 
done, and quickly, if we are to avert devastating climate disruption. The 
fact that Earth’s land, water, and ecosystems are subject to mounting 
cumulative stresses from unsustainable development practices greatly 
complicates matters.
This chapter focuses on what we can do about this problem, now 
and going into the future. We’ll be exploring local solutions that involve 
people working together where they live and work. This raises some 
key questions for you to ponder: Which of these place-based solutions 
should we try to better understand, rally around, improve, and share? 
Which factors are most essential to the success of solutions? Is it the sci-
ence and technology; community engagement; cultural, political, and/
or economic system change; some combination of these? This chapter 
concentrates on identifying and examining climate change solutions that 
are local and bioregional. In particular, we will concentrate on natural 
climate solutions and green infrastructure.
Natural climate solutions can remove significant amounts of car-
bon from the atmosphere through better stewardship of natural and 
working lands. Examples include land management practices that in-
crease carbon storage and/or avoid greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions 
through ecological restoration, wetland protection, regenerative ag-
riculture, community composting, carbon farming, and reforestation. 
Natural climate solutions are taking place in both rural and urban en-
vironments. The results are sometimes mixed (good and not so good) 
and thus need to be more closely studied and understood.
Green infrastructure incorporates the functioning of natural sys-
tems like trees, soil, and waterways into human-built systems designed to 
improve environmental services (for example, storm water management 
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and flood control, ecological conservation, and drought-resistant land-
scaping in the public realm). Green infrastructure provides solutions 
to climate change through physical planning and design that integrates 
ecological systems, land use, and the built environment. Green infra-
structure is included in a growing number of climate action plans.
Natural climate solutions and green infrastructure are woven to-
gether in this chapter as part of a bioregional approach taking into 
account local-global and urban-rural relationships. The term bioregion 
is a place-based concept that is not solely urban nor solely rural; it is 
a territorial space composed of urban-rural linkages. The bioregional 
frame enables us to think about a city-region as a functioning whole 
including relationships among urban centers, towns, and natural and 
working lands. Strengthening urban-rural linkages through a bioregional 
approach can help bolster support for climate change solutions.
Bioregional imagination helps inspire ideas, innovation, and civic en-
gagement needed to create an equitable green economy with good jobs 
while improving community health and well-being, minimizing waste, 
and regenerating ecosystems. Along such lines, this chapter presents 
the idea of a bioregional transition and points to what some universities 
are doing to help navigate this transition. One example is the creation 
of a green infrastructure nexus, a social and technical concept that 
provides a narrative that values justice and democracy in science-society 
relations. Our prospects for successfully “bending the curve” depend on 
our strengthening democratically inclusive and informed participation in 
sustainability science, planning, and design.
The green infrastructure nexus can help society meet human needs 
(for example, for food, water, energy, resilient and healthy life space) 
while supporting local and bioregional development that is climate 
friendly, resilient, and regeneratively sustainable. This chapter encour-
ages you to ponder whether something like a green infrastructure nexus, 
supporting natural climate solutions along with other approaches, can 
help bring about a climate-friendly land ethic and rooted democracy.
Much of the technical data and observations provided in this chapter 
are derived from assessments, special reports, and conference proceed-
ings published by the National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and 
Medicine; Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change; United Nations; 
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and university centers and institutes. Other sources include scholarly 
literature spanning the social, natural, physical, and life sciences; arts 
and humanities; and engineering, management, planning, and design. 
Chapter sections that highlight particular cases unfolding in Southern 
California and Northern Baja California, Mexico, are mostly derived from 
the author’s direct engagement and participant observation in these 
cases over the course of three decades.
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19.1  Localization and the Bioregional Transition
Localization is a development process that favors investment inside a 
particular locality for the benefit of that locality and the people, plus 
other life, living within it. In a localizing process that addresses climate 
change, efforts concentrate on identifying and enabling behavioral and 
physical changes needed to bring about more climate-friendly develop-
ment. This includes carbon-neutral ways for people to collectively build, 
dwell, and adapt-in-place together.
Localization is a territorial process that generates place-based pol-
icies, plans, and activities. The aim is to create resource-conserving, 
waste-minimizing, and regenerative systems of production, consump-
tion, distribution, and exchange. The number of organizations imple-
menting localization strategies is growing. In the USA, the New Economy 
Working Group (a multipartner, action-oriented think tank) highlights 
the possibility and potential of localized living economies that support 
a healthy biosphere. Ecotrust, based in Portland, Oregon, operates an 
environmental bank, an ecosystem investment fund, and a range of pro-
grams in fisheries, forestry, food, farms, and Indigenous affairs. On a 
global scale, Bioneers, a group of social and scientific innovators, grows 
social capital by building local and bioregional and community-based 
alliances. The Bioregional Center for Sustainability Science, Planning and 
Design (based at UC San Diego) is doing civically engaged research and 
education focused on the transborder San Diego–Tijuana bioregion. The 
Bioregional Center works closely with the Global Action Research Cen-
ter, known as the Global ARC. The Global ARC has a busy localization 
agenda linking research and action in community gardens, food forests, 
community composting, watershed protection, green infrastructure, and 
the establishment of a community-university partnership-led neighbor-
hood environmental learning hub. The Global ARC’s food forest planted 
in an underserved, low-income community in Southeast San Diego has 
proven to be an especially good way to join concerns about climate and 
19-8 Chapter 19: Local Solutions
food systems. The definition and role of food forests in this context are 
described in more detail in Section 19.3.
The localization narrative now has a long list of tools and concepts 
(and yes, ample jargon) upon which to draw. Prominent examples in-
clude locavore, locavesting, slow foods, food justice, green infrastructure, 
adapting-in-place, eco-districts, biocapacity, ecological footprint, business 
alliance for local living economies (BALLE), local ownership and import sub-
stitution (LOIS), community-based natural resource management (CBNRM), 
relocalization, and reinhabitation.
Localization on the world stage
Global leaders and initiatives that are tasked to address climate change 
have begun to stress the importance of local engagement by actors that 
are jurisdictionally less comprehensive than an entire country (that is, 
nation-state). This includes subnational actors such as cities, counties, 
port districts, and metropolitan planning organizations. A clear example 
can be seen in the proceedings of the United Nations Climate Change 
Conference of the Parties (COP). The COP is an annual meeting of nearly 
all the world’s nation-states and other organizations that formally come 
together to assess climate change efforts on the world stage.
The COP was established to track the degree to which nation-states 
worldwide are complying with the 1992 United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). At the COP’s twenty-first 
annual meeting (COP21) held in Paris for 10 days in 2015, 195 nations 
reached a milestone agreement that has gotten a lot of media coverage. 
COP21’s Paris Agreement commits all of the participating parties (mem-
ber states) to holding the increase in the global average temperature to 
well below 2°C above preindustrial levels and to pursuing efforts to limit 
the temperature increase to 1.5°C above preindustrial levels. This one-
half-degree difference is significant. Keeping the increase under 1.5°C 
improves our chances to avoid devastating climate change impacts.
Glocalizing commitments to reducing carbon emissions
COP21’s agenda and activities recognize that local and regional govern-
ments play a critical role in global climate action. The Climate Summit for 
Local Leaders that took place during COP21 produced a declaration by 
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city and regional leaders from five continents announcing their cities’ and 
regions’ commitment to tackle climate disruption. Those who signed 
the Paris City Hall Declaration—including mayors, governors, premiers, 
and other local government leaders—committed to collectively deliver 
up to 3.7 gigatons of reduction in urban greenhouse gas emissions every 
year over the period 2015–2030. Meeting this goal would significantly 
help to close the gap between current national commitments and the 
2°C emissions reduction pathway identified by the scientific community.
The Paris City Hall Declaration constitutes a promising case of 
 glocalization—defined in the Encyclopedia Britannica as “linguistic 
merger of globalization and localization to describe processes that si-
multaneously exhibit both universalizing and particularizing tendencies 
in contemporary social, political, and economic systems.” The Paris 
City Hall Declaration draws attention to urban and regional networks 
worldwide, including the Compact of Mayors, the Covenant of Mayors, 
and the Compact of States and Regions. These glocal networking efforts 
are mobilizing commitments that specify local carbon and other GHG 
emission reduction targets for national and global benefit.
The Climate Summit of Local and Regional Leaders that took place 
at COP23 in 2017 culminated in a commitment by 1,019 local and re-
gional governments from 86 countries, representing 804 million people, 
to reduce 5.6 gigatons of CO2 equivalent emissions by 2020 and 26.8 
gigatons of CO2 equivalent emissions by 2050. COP24 held in Katowice 
Poland in 2018 concentrated on clarifying the details and protocols nec-
essary to make the Paris Agreement operational. COP24 established a 
working group to support local and Indigenous communities in their 
efforts to strengthen Indigenous and local knowledge systems, enhance 
the engagement of local communities and Indigenous peoples in the 
UNFCCC, and process and integrate their considerations into climate 
change policy and action.
In addition to COP conferences where support for local and subna-
tional solutions to climate change is rising, support for localization of 
this sort can also be seen in other global networking endeavors. More 
than 9,000 cities and local governments representing roughly 800 million 
people worldwide have joined the Global Covenant of Mayors for Cli-
mate & Energy—a voluntary accord whereby cities can commit to make 
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a low-carbon future one of their top priorities. Other examples include 
work coming out of the UN’s Habitat III, Union of Concerned Scientists, 
and the Catholic Church. Pope Francis wrote “On Care for Our Common 
Home,” a widely read encyclical letter focused on climate change as 
a moral issue, especially insofar as climate change disproportionately 
affects the world’s poor living in vulnerable cities and towns.
The new urban agenda and the bioregional transition
The globalization of local efforts to deal with climate change is a har-
binger of what may be unfolding in some places as a bioregional tran-
sition. Organizations seeking integrated approaches to climate change 
have begun focusing world attention on urban-rural linkages and inter-
dependencies. One of the top priorities listed on the Cities and Climate 
Change Science agenda produced during the forty-eighth IPCC meeting 
in 2018 is a clarion call for greater depth of understanding and commit-
ment to improving holistic systems approaches to climate action plan-
ning. Specifically, the Cities and Climate Change Science agenda calls for 
more research to better understand the diverse interdependent links 
and resource flows throughout natural, built, and social systems and be-
tween urban areas and the rural hinterlands. This kind of research begins 
to look at bioregions as a useful territorial concept where urban, rural, 
natural, and working lands can be examined as interacting systems.
Bioregional solutions to climate change connect efforts in urban 
areas with related efforts and/or concerns in adjacent and nearby rural 
areas. Rural areas are made up of rural settlements, working lands, and 
waters (for example, farms, ranches, fisheries) and wildlands (natural 
and conserved spaces such as parks and forests). Bridging and improv-
ing urban-rural linkages is crucial if we ever hope to improve communi-
cation and public reasoning necessary to address climate change. This 
argument is well articulated globally in Habitat III’s New Urban Agenda.
The New Urban Agenda operationalizes Goal 11 of the UN’s 2030 
Sustainable Development Goals. Goal 11 aspires to make all cities and 
human settlements on Earth inclusive, safe, resilient, and sustainable. 
The New Urban Agenda emphasizes the importance of the “urban-rural 
continuum.” This emphasis constitutes an important relational shift in 
perspective that sets aside the simplistic dualism of urban versus rural 
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(the urban-rural binary). It may prove useful to view this shift as the 
beginnings of a bioregional transition in how we humans build and dwell 
together collectively on Earth.
Drivers of the bioregional transition
Local and bioregional approaches to climate change benefit from glo-
balized science and technology (for example, climate change model-
ing, transnational cyberinfrastructure, mapping, and data visualization 
technology). Science helps put things into perspective. NASA created 
a widely shared image showing Earth’s city lights from space (Figure 
19.1.1). The city lights on the image show how urbanization tends to 
concentrate along coastlines. The United Nations reports that roughly 
10% of the world’s population (at least 600 million people) live in coastal 
areas that are less than 10 meters above sea level. And approximately 
40% of the world’s population (about 2.4 billion people) live within 100 
km (60 miles) of the coast. This puts many people in harm’s way as sea 
level rises. And the global human population continues to grow rapidly.
The world’s human population in 2018 was 55% urban and 45% 
rural. The UN projects that the urban population will increase to 68% of 
the total by 2050. The sheer number of people involved is staggering. 
Between 2018 and 2050 an additional 2.5 billion people will populate 
the world’s cities. It is hard to grasp such magnitude. So, imagine this. 
Figure 19.1.1 City lights at night. Reproduced from NASA.
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The city of Los Angeles has roughly 4 million inhabitants. It is the largest 
city in California, and the second largest in the USA (behind New York 
City). Every single year, from 2018 to 2050, roughly 78,000,000 people 
will join the ranks of the world’s urban population. That translates into 
an annual population increase of about 20 LA-sized cities! This dramatic 
urban growth surge will take place mostly in Asia and Africa. The growth 
will include population increases from rural-to-urban migration. The 
growth will also stem from births within existing cities and the creation 
of new cities (perhaps most dramatically in China, where hundreds of 
new cities with more than a million inhabitants each are expected to 
populate the landscape). The Cities Alliance warns that meeting the 
infrastructure and construction needs of this urban population growth 
over the period from 2018 to 2050 may use up more than three-quarters 
of humanity’s global CO2 budget if climate change is to be limited to less 
than 1.5°C. The institutional, economic, and societal stresses happening 
in the wake of rapid urbanization in many parts of the world where 
infrastructure and public services are inadequate is one of many factors 
motivating urban and regional planners to focus on urban-rural linkages 
from a bioregional perspective.
Figure 19.1.2 illustrates global and regional factors that may give rise 
to a bioregional transition in some places around the world. The drivers 
of the bioregional transition are multiple and complex, combining prob-
lematic stresses as well as opportunities, including (1) the intensification 
of climate change as global demand surges for meeting basic human 
needs such as food, water, energy, and dwelling space; (2) mounting 
institutional, economic, and societal tensions, including inequality; (3) 
culture change within universities where demand is rising for equitable, 
civically engaged research and education that is problem-solving and 
solutions oriented; and (4) disruptions good and bad happening in the 
wake of newly emerging modes of knowledge production, data science, 
multimedia communication, networking, and cyberinfrastructure.
Together these stresses, as well as opportunities, are stoking inter-
est in localized, place-based solutions to climate change. The bioregion 
as a unit of analysis is gaining traction as a territorial framework to ad-
dress urban-rural linkages. Bioregion as a term combines the Greek word 
for “life” (bios) with the Latin word for “territory” (regia) and the Latin 
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term for “ruling/governing” (regere). Bioregion thus means “life territory 
or life place.” A bioregion is a region broadly defined by its physical, 
human-built, sociocultural, and economic attributes. The physical attri-
butes of a bioregion include its geographic, ecological, and hydrological 
contours/systems giving shape to its landscapes and watersheds. Other 
physical attributes include climate, flora, fauna, soil, and water. The hu-
man-built attributes of a bioregion include the area’s infrastructures and 
human settlement patterns.
Bioregionalism is an action-oriented field of study focused on en-
abling human communities to live, work, eat, and recreate sustainably 
within Earth’s dynamic web of life. The bioregional approach to climate 
Figure 19.1.2 The bioregional transition. Illustration by Keith Pezzoli.
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change solutions calls for establishing just, ethical, and ecologically re-
silient ways to (re)connect people with one another and with the land. 
Bioregionalism’s core commitments include (1) rebuilding urban and rural 
communities—at a human scale—to nurture a meaningful sense of place 
and to secure healthy attachments and rootedness among community 
inhabitants; (2) integrating nature and human settlements in ways that 
holistically instill eco-efficiency, equity, and green cultural values into sys-
tems of production, exchange, consumption, and daily life; (3) making 
known (and valuing) the way natural and working lands, ecosystems, 
and rural dwellers and resources enable cities to exist; (4) developing 
authentic community-based participatory processes that empower just 
and equitable civic engagement in local and regional planning, visual-
ization, and decision-making; and (5) building global trans-bioregional 
alliances and knowledge networks to support sustainable place making 
around the world.
Bioregional ethics: local place-based attachments
Bioregional ethics begins with the following premise: Human beings 
are social animals. If we are to survive well as a species, we need sustain-
able human-nature relationships and healthy place-based attachments in 
ethical living arrangements with one another and with the land, waters, 
habitat, plants, and animals upon which we depend. Figuring out how 
to meet this need in socially just, ecologically regenerative, equitably 
inclusive, and climate-friendly ways is the paramount ethical as well as 
practical challenge of the twenty-first century. This is especially chal-
lenging, given how modern civilization’s globalized, hypermobile econ-
omy and large-scale migratory flows of people worldwide have made 
it increasingly difficult for people to form healthy place-based (rooted) 
attachments. Yet, stable, rooted attachments of this sort (including a 
sense of belonging to, and affection for, a particular place) are arguably 
necessary for societal well-being and environmental stewardship.
A rooted community is a community that identifies and supports 
aspects of social and political rights (for example, mutual aid, com-
munitarianism, place-based attachment) that the liberal paradigm has 
neglected. Peter Marris provides us a wise suggestion in this regard: “In-
stead of thinking about social justice only in terms of the equal treatment 
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of equivalent units, it acknowledges the right of each community of peo-
ple to a familiar habitat, like creatures in the natural world. It recognizes 
the attachments which bind people to each other and to places, and out 
of which evolve the unique meaning of each person’s life.” Wendell Ber-
ry—a widely noted farmer-philosopher, poet and writer, conservationist, 
environmentally minded public intellectual—eloquently made the same 
point during his highly acclaimed Jefferson Lecture. Berry’s lecture, titled 
It All Turns on Affection, provides a strong moral and ethical critique of 
the presumption held by too many that cities can be improved by pillage 
of the countryside. Berry argues that we need to do a much better job 
understanding and valuing the multiple ways—ethically, culturally, eco-
nomically, ecologically—that the fates of cities and towns are inextricably 
bound together.
There is a disconnect in how we arrange our urban and rural settle-
ments and life support systems on Earth. For sure, resource-intensive 
industrialism worldwide has generated great wealth, even lifting millions 
of people out of extreme poverty. But it is also a highly uneven process 
that in many cases uproots people for lack of secure and stable connec-
tions to land and jobs. The relative abundance generated by globalized 
factory farming as an adjunct to industry has made it hard for many 
small-scale farms to survive. At the same time, many city people experi-
ence poverty and insecurity trying to meet their needs for food, water, 
and shelter.
The increasing volume of migratory flows of rural people—from de-
graded lands, expulsions, and lack of job opportunities—join the stream 
of urban migrants fleeing from violence in war-torn areas and from dev-
astation caused by increasingly powerful storms and other mega-scale 
disasters, especially in coastal areas. These heavy migratory flows could 
eventually overwhelm existing legal and institutional systems designed 
to handle challenges posed by immigration and refugee needs. The 
prospect that “climigration” (migration forced by climate change) may 
get heavier increases this risk. What all of this points to is the need to 
transform how we go about urban and rural development.
Localization informed by a globally minded bioregional perspective 
is one way to address the daunting problems facing human civilization 
right now, including climate change. Localization can help us “connect 
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the dots” linking cities, towns, infrastructure, and working lands that are 
bound together by geography, ecology, and culture. Identifying, under-
standing, implementing, and sharing local and bioregional solutions in 
the form of green infrastructure and natural climate solutions is a good 
start.
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19.2   Green Infrastructure and  
Climate Action Planning
Water is one of the most essential elements of life. Green infrastructure 
and climate action planning, if done well, can help ensure a secure and 
reliable flow of water to meet the needs of cities and agriculture, among 
other thirsty entities. The stakes are high. Researchers from the Center 
for Environmental Systems Research (University of Kassel, Germany) 
and the Nature Conservancy (Washington, DC) did a comparative study 
that examined climate change and urban growth globally. They found 
that rising levels of competition for water are pitting the needs of cities 
against the needs of agriculture. The study projects that urban water 
demand will increase 80% by 2050 in 482 of the world’s largest cities. 
Over the same period, the deficit in available urban surface water is 
expected to increase.
The water-climate-energy nexus
In the case of California, nearly 10% of the state’s GHG emissions come 
from the energy-intensive water system. Pumping, treating, and heating 
water consumes approximately 20% of statewide electricity use—and 
30% of business and home use of natural gas. The San Diego region is ac-
tively seeking ways to supply water more efficiently, capture storm water 
using climate-smart tactics, and foster integrated regional watershed 
management. Green infrastructure is one of the favored approaches.
California’s 2018 Fourth Climate Change Assessment Report pub-
lished data projecting that an increase in the number of extreme weather 
events will likely bring more torrential downpours and flooding to many 
parts of California and nearby Mexico. Green infrastructure includes 
rain gardens, bioswales, permeable pavement, rainwater harvesting, and 
other naturally designed features created to conserve or enhance land, 
wetlands, and ecosystems. Green infrastructure that reduces flooding 
while making more efficient use of water saves money and energy in 
ways that reduce a city’s carbon footprint and vulnerability.
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Green infrastructure can play a significant role in climate change mit-
igation and adaptation while enabling ecosystem regeneration. Green 
infrastructure incorporates ecosystem functions into human settlements 
and working lands. Serious efforts are now being made to incorporate 
green infrastructure into municipal climate action plans. Green infra-
structure programs and policies in the US have mainly focused on im-
proving water systems. But that is changing.
The US Environmental Protection Agency has expanded the defini-
tion to describe an array of products, technologies, and practices that 
use natural systems, and/or engineered systems that mimic natural pro-
cesses, to enhance environmental quality and provide utility services. 
Figure 19.2.1 shows elements of green infrastructure that builds urban 
resilience. Green infrastructure defined in this way may include urban 
and rural networks of green spaces and other natural elements such 
Figure 19.2.1 Green infrastructure builds resiliency. Reproduced from the 
EPA.
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as rivers, lakes, forests, and canyonlands that connect villages, towns, 
cities, and working lands.
The concept can be stretched a bit further to include community 
composting facilities, green roofs and green walls, and green streets 
and alleyways, among numerous other clever ways to couple human 
and natural systems in the provisioning of utilities and public services. 
Designed well, green infrastructure can use a combination of vegeta-
tion, soils, and natural processes to manage water and create climate- 
friendlier, healthier urban environments. These systems can range from 
micro to more macro scales—from household rain gardens and green 
roofs up to large tracts of undeveloped natural lands.
Green infrastructure can help cities adapt to storm events and flood-
ing, as well as drought, through climate-smart design that integrates 
 human-built infrastructure (engineered systems for handling storm 
water) with natural environmental features (for example, watershed 
hydrology, ecosystems services). This can be accomplished in ways that 
join concerns about climate change, equity, justice, and health where 
people live.
Water quality, supply, and infrastructure improvement
In November 2014, California voters approved Proposition 1 (Prop 1), 
The Water Quality, Supply, and Infrastructure Improvement Act of 2014. 
Prop 1 authorized $7.5 billion in general obligation bonds for water 
projects including surface and groundwater storage, ecosystem and 
watershed protection and restoration, and drinking water protection. 
Prop 1 included $510 million in funding to improve integrated regional 
water management (IRWM) throughout the state. The Prop 1 IRWM 
Grant Program is administered by the State of California’s Department 
of Water Resources, which is funding projects that help meet the long-
term water needs of the state.
Integrated regional water management (IRWM)
The Prop 1 IRWM Grant Program provides support for “disadvantaged 
community involvement” in the grant process. The State of California 
defines disadvantaged communities (DACs) as those areas through-
out California that are most negatively affected by a combination of 
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economic, health, and environmental burdens. These burdens include 
poverty, high unemployment, and health conditions like asthma and 
heart disease, as well as air and water pollution and hazardous wastes.
The state’s Office of Environmental Health Hazard Assessment devel-
oped the California Communities Environmental Health Screening Tool 
(“CalEnviroScreen”) to identify DACs in California, in part to help target 
DAC-eligible localities where a certain percentage of the state’s cap-and-
trade funding is required by law to be awarded (directly benefiting the 
people inhabiting that particular place). The law specifies that 25% of 
the revenue available from cap-and-trade sources must be used within 
communities designated as disadvantaged—the justification being that 
these communities are likely to be more vulnerable and thus especially 
hard hit by climate change.
In 2018, the State of California Department of Water Resources 
awarded a $1.17 million Prop 1 IRWM grant to UC San Diego, as part 
of a regional cluster of Prop 1 IRWM grants compiled and facilitated by 
the San Diego County Water Authority. San Diego’s 2019 IRWM strategic 
plan includes efforts to address climate change through more effective 
water resource management, including ways to enhance the resiliency 
of local water resources while reducing greenhouse gas emissions. UC 
San Diego IRWM researchers teamed up with the San Diego Housing 
Commission—a major grant partner. This 2018 collaborative grant is 
titled Disadvantaged Community Planning Project (DAC): Alternative 
Non-Potable Water Supplies, Xeriscape Design and Flood Prevention for 
DACs. The DAC grant is a good example of localization involving water 
systems and green infrastructure that can help bend the curve.
The DAC project has an integrated design approach that includes a 
strong public health component, a research translation process for com-
munity residents, and water-conserving methods that include xeriscape 
design, flood control, water use management, and urban agriculture. 
UC San Diego and the San Diego Housing Commission joined forces 
with the Scripps Institution of Oceanography, Public Health Alliance of 
Southern California, San Diego Food System Alliance, and Global Action 
Research Center (Global ARC). Together this group is designing a half 
dozen shovel-ready projects for which funding will be sought once the 
design phase is completed.
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The DAC project addresses core challenges for bringing water re-
source resilience to California’s DACs, which are faced with water scarcity, 
urban heat island effects, a lack of access to healthy food, rising potable 
water prices, and periodic flooding from intense storms. Alternative non-
potable water reuse systems (for example, laundry-to-landscape graywa-
ter use, rainwater harvesting) can strengthen urban resilience by support-
ing urban agriculture. The project’s plans for drought- and flood-resilient 
green spaces are also good for environmental public health. One of the 
more difficult aspects of work like this is the need to translate current 
research, science, and policy around alternative nonpotable water reuse 
into designs that can be permitted, effectively managed, and useful to 
residents in DACs and publicly supported housing. In order to maximize 
potential benefits, significant effort has to go into joining bottom-up 
grassroots efforts that reach into the resident base of communities with 
“treetop” efforts within the government and other institutions. One tree-
top effort that has the potential to join local and global objectives, by 
embracing green infrastructure, is climate action planning. Municipali-
ties, counties, port districts, and other subnational as well as national 
agencies are creating and implementing climate action plans.
C40 and climate action plans
C40 is a network of the world’s megacities. It has rapidly grown since 
its birth in 2005. C40 facilitates collaboration among 94 of the world’s 
largest cities with the intent to accelerate meaningful and measurable 
climate change solutions. C40 represents 700+ million citizens and 
one-quarter of the global economy. The mayors of C40 cities are com-
mitted to delivering on the most ambitious goals of the Paris Agreement 
at the local level. As outlined in Box 19.2.1, C40 defines a climate action 
plan as a strategic document (or series of plans and documents) that 
demonstrates how a city will deliver on its commitment to address cli-
mate change.
The C40 mayors have joined forces with 9,000 others committed 
to taking action called for in the Paris Agreement. The C40 mayors 
estimate that the combined collective impact of these commitments 
could achieve annual reductions from “business as usual” of 1.4 giga-
tons of CO2 equivalent (CO2e) in 2030 and 2.8 gigatons CO2e in 2050. 
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Unfortunately, while real progress is being made, many cities have not 
yet been able to address climate change. Several deficits and obstacles 
stand in the way. Relevant city policies and action plans are not yet in 
place; urban and environmental planning regulations are out of step 
with the complexities posed by climate change; misinformation and a 
lack of public awareness make communication about climate change 
risks and vulnerabilities difficult.
Box 19.2.1  Climate Action Plan Objectives and Strategies
A climate action plan will:
• Develop a pathway to deliver an emissions neutral city by 2050 
at the latest and set an ambitious interim target and/or carbon 
budget. 
• Demonstrate how the city will adapt and improve its resilience to 
the climate hazards that may impact the city now and in future 
climate change scenarios. 
• Detail the wider social, environmental, and economic benefits 
expected from implementing the plan, and improve the equitable 
distribution of these benefits to the city’s population. 
• Outline the city’s governance, powers, and the partners who need 
to be engaged in order to accelerate the delivery of the city’s 
mitigation targets and resilience goals. 
A city will do this by:
• Considering adaptation and mitigation in an integrated way, iden-
tifying interdependencies to maximize efficiencies and minimize 
investment risk. 
• Setting an evidence-based, inclusive, and deliverable plan for 
achieving transformational mitigation and adaptation, centered 
on an understanding of the city’s powers and wider context.
• Establishing a transparent process to monitor delivery, commu-
nicate progress, and update climate action planning in line with 
governance and reporting systems.
C40 Cities Climate Planning Framework. 2018. Chapter 1, page 4. Retrieved from 
https://resourcecentre.c40.org/climate-action-planning-framework-home.
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Green infrastructure at a watershed scale
Connecting climate action planning with strategies to green a biore-
gion’s infrastructure is a good way to advance climate change mitigation 
and adaptation. An example of this can be seen in a vacant land asset 
mapping project that took place in San Diego, California. Figure 19.2.2 
shows the Pueblo watershed (the polygon area layered as blue) in San 
Diego County. The dark blue line depicts one of the most polluted 
creeks in the United States, Chollas Creek. Chollas Creek drains into San 
Diego Bay, one of the most polluted bays in the US. Contamination of 
Chollas Creek and the San Diego Bay are in part due to the way urban 
development paves over the earth. Streets, parking lots, buildings cover 
the land with impervious surfaces, reducing the porosity necessary for 
rainwater to seep into the earth. Consequently, rain events pick up sur-
face pollution that gets dumped directly into the bioregion’s creeks, 
bays, and ocean.
During storm events, flooding is a major problem, a problem likely 
Figure 19.2.2 OVGG Community Garden and Chollas Creek in the Pueblo 
watershed, San Diego, CA. Adapted from Google Earth; inset photograph by 
Keith Pezzoli.
Vacant	lots Chollas	Creek
Vacant	lots Chollas	Creek
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to get worse in Southern California with climate change. Thus, signifi-
cant effort is going into figuring out how to reclaim the Earth’s capacity 
to absorb storm water. This is where green infrastructure comes into 
play. The tiny yellow polygons shown in Figure 19.2.2 are 810 vacant lots 
distributed throughout Southeast San Diego. UC San Diego’s Bioregional 
Center did a survey of these vacant lots as part of a research grant. Many 
of the 810 vacant lots would be very good sites for urban agriculture 
and installations of green infrastructure. The inset photo in Figure 19.2.2 
shows a work group planting a food forest on what was one of the 810 
vacant lots. The site now includes a community garden and food forest; 
it is called the Ocean View Growing Grounds (OVGG). Over the period 
from 2014 to 2019, local residents, community leaders, civically engaged 
academics, various professionals, students, and volunteers transformed 
the vacant lot. Members of OVGG installed a bioswale on-site to retain 
water for the food forest. The bioswale in this case is a simple carved-
out depression in the land, spanning 30 by 20 feet and surrounded by 
the planted trees, shrubs, and plants (Figure 19.2.3). A bioswale is a 
hydromodification of a landscape to slow, collect, infiltrate, and filter 
storm water.
Part of the OVGG narrative speaks to how a plot of contaminated 
Figure 19.2.3 Bioswale at the Ocean View Growing Grounds, San Diego, CA. 
Photograph by Keith Pezzoli.
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vacant land (what the EPA designated as a brownfield site because of 
concerns about toxicants in the soil, discussed below) got transformed 
into a neighborhood garden resource as well as a watershed asset. The 
neighborhood garden part is easy to understand; the site now produces 
fresh fruits and vegetables in a food desert (that is, a geographical area 
that suffers from a deficit of markets providing healthy food). The water-
shed part of the story is less obvious but merits attention for ecological 
reasons. OVGG sits within the Pueblo watershed with a great deal of 
impervious services (streets, parking lots, driveways, alleyways). Paving 
over the land with concrete has created an urban runoff problem that 
ends up degrading Chollas Creek. Chollas Creek drains the Pueblo wa-
tershed, which empties into the heavily contaminated San Diego Bay.
The bioswale at OVGG is a hydromodification of the land surface 
that improves on-site water retention and flow. This also provides a 
benefit to the health of the Pueblo watershed. It does so by reclaiming 
some of the watershed’s capacity to be more spongelike as opposed to 
impermeably hardscaped. At least 100 of the 810 vacant lots surveyed 
in the Chollas Creek watershed appear to be well positioned with re-
spect to their location in the watershed’s urban runoff flow paths. If a 
concerted effort were made to hydromodify some of the vacant lots, 
as was done at the OVGG site, then, it is reasonable to assume, less 
pollution would end up in the waterways. Herein lies an opportunity to 
think about creating green infrastructure improvement districts.
Imagine incentivizing owners of vacant land to allow community 
groups to use their land for urban agriculture, at least for some de-
fined period until said landowners decide to develop their land. Now 
imagine 20 or 30 landowners taking advantage of the incentive as part 
of a green infrastructure improvement district. As a result, 20 or 30 
vacant lots get transformed by local groups of residents, school or 
faith-based organizations, neighborhood associations, and the like, into 
community gardens and/or food forests. The locals working on these 
lots could get support through the green infrastructure improvement 
district. For instance, there could be small grants to install low-cost but 
effective bioswales and/or rain gardens. Rain gardens are smaller-scaled 
versions of bioswales. Both bioswales and rain gardens are landscape el-
ements designed to slow and filter storm water, and both are, in effect, 
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small-scale natural climate solutions. This scenario is not farfetched. 
In 2018 the State of California passed the Urban Agriculture Incentive 
Zones Act (Assembly Bill 551). This bill allows landowners in metropoli-
tan areas to receive tax incentives for putting land into agricultural use. 
Cities and counties must first create urban agriculture incentive zones 
to set the stage. With the intent to scale up efforts like this, UC San 
Diego’s Bioregional Center—supported in part by a grant (P42ES010337) 
from the National Institute of Environmental Health Sciences, Superfund 
Research Program—enlisted hundreds of students to do site suitability 
analysis of the 810 vacant lots in the Pueblo watershed shown in Figure 
19.2.2. Site suitability analysis in this context refers to a method of as-
sessment that gauges the qualities of the land and its surroundings as a 
potential growing space (for example, the lot’s soil condition, access to 
water, adjacent land uses, slope, shading, plant cover, trees, upkeep). 
This effort helps to embed small micro interventions (a community gar-
den on one lot) in a larger watershed context.
The Bioregional Center contributed the image shown in Figure 
19.2.3 to the sixteenth report of the Good Neighbor Environmental 
Board. Said report, which focused on ecological conservation in the US- 
Mexico border region, was submitted in 2014 to President Obama and 
the Congress of the United States. The image as included in the report 
has the caption “Vacant lot in San Diego being converted into a food 
forest and site for urban ecological restoration.” This line of thinking 
adds value to and helps justify/advance efforts like California’s Assembly 
Bill 551. But this effort, as good as it sounds, is not without its risks. 
Some of the vacant lots are contaminated with lead and other toxicants. 
Contaminated storm water and urban runoff might negatively affect the 
soil that people are using to grow food in the community garden and/
or food forest. The Community Engagement and Research Translation 
teams of UC San Diego’s Superfund Research Center are providing soil 
testing and risk assessment communication to deal with this concern.
Many obstacles, not just pollution, stand in the way of meeting the 
high demand in Southeast San Diego and other urban food deserts for 
places to grow fresh fruits and vegetables. Much work needs to be 
done to change legislation and regulations. Climate action plans are 
helpful insofar as they elevate systems thinking that values the greening 
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of infrastructure and effort to work with nature not against it. Urban 
forestry is now included as an important part of the City of San Diego’s 
climate action plan. The City of San Diego and the City of Tijuana plan to 
use geographic information systems (GIS) as a way of locating the best 
sites for green infrastructure, including the use of vegetated bioswales 
for storm water management and the strategic use of trees, including 
food forests, for carbon sequestration and other benefits.
The Good Neighbor Environmental Board report mentioned above 
argues that a vigorous and engaged urban forestry program (a natural 
climate solution) is critical to meeting San Diego’s integrated commit-
ments to ecological restoration, climate change, carbon sequestration, 
storm water reduction, and water conservation. With these goals in 
mind, the City of San Diego developed a long-range urban forest man-
agement plan to guide the city’s urban forest into the future.
Understanding natural climate solutions and urban-rural linkages is 
especially important in a transborder metropolis like San Diego–Tijuana. 
Figure 19.2.4 San Diego–Tijuana US-Mexico border. Adapted from Google 
Earth.
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The two cities share a watershed, so collaborative binational land man-
agement is crucial to any hope of realizing climate-friendly sustainable 
development. The San Diego–Tijuana shared bioregion located along the 
US-Mexico border has a south-to-north slope to the land. Storm water 
flows from Tijuana across the border into the US, picking up along the 
way tons of soil washed loose from Tijuana’s rapidly urbanizing canyons. 
The erosion is a major problem. Tijuana’s thinly vegetated steep can-
yon slopes are easily disturbed by poorly planned urbanization lacking 
adequate infrastructure. The eroded soil, trash, and contaminants that 
flow from Tijuana’s canyons into the US clog the wetland on the US side. 
This puts farmland at risk of contamination and causes frequent beach 
closures to protect public health. The soil loss and land degradation 
release carbon to the atmosphere.
Research universities, and local partners, on both sides of the 
US-Mexico border have formed an alliance to try to help solve some of 
the border region’s complex problems. A recent grant from the National 
Science Foundation (NSF, 2018 award number 1833482) provided sup-
port for several workshops in the US and Mexico geared to scoping out 
an actionable research agenda for a binational Border Solutions Alliance. 
One of the work groups for these workshops is named Measuring, Un-
derstanding and Improving Natural Climate Solutions: Enabling Carbon 
Neutral Development through Transborder Urban-Rural Linkages and a 
Green Infrastructure Nexus, clearly indicating its focus.
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19.3   Natural Climate Solutions  
and Hybrid Approaches
Significant global and national efforts are underway to accelerate climate 
change mitigation and adaptation. But there is a rising level of concern 
that these efforts may be too little too late. The IPCC, among many 
other reputable science-based organizations, is sounding the alarm: 
much more needs to be done, and quickly, if we are to avert devastating 
climate disruption. The fact that Earth’s land, water, and ecosystems are 
subject to mounting cumulative stresses from unsustainable develop-
ment practices complicates matters.
Carbon budgets and CO2 removal
Researchers are keen to understand and improve methods to remove 
carbon from the atmosphere. The concept of a “carbon budget” has 
drawn attention to the notion that the atmosphere can absorb just so 
much carbon if we hope to avoid global warming beyond a certain lev-
el—a level that if surpassed could be catastrophic. There is a fair amount 
of debate concerning the assumptions and methods used to specify the 
upper limit for this carbon budget. Likewise, there is debate and a wide 
range of estimates concerning how much carbon humans have already 
dumped into the atmosphere. The IPCC’s Fifth Assessment Report says 
the upper limit is 1 trillion metric tons of carbon. The same report esti-
mates that a little more than half of the 1 trillion metric tons (that is, 515 
billion metric tons) is already saturating the atmosphere. By those fig-
ures, roughly half our carbon budget (buffer) is already used up, spent.
Getting fixated on carbon budget numbers misses the point. The 
main thing to keep in mind is that we are not yet reducing emissions fast 
enough. This makes it clear that we need to get busy removing carbon 
from the atmosphere. Of course we still need to get all hands on deck 
to aggressively reduce carbon emissions. Carbon removal methods pro-
vide another pathway, simultaneously with emissions reduction, to avert 
going beyond critical global warming thresholds.
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Climate change solutions focused on removal are often referred to 
as negative emissions technologies—wherein the negative is intended to 
convey a drawing down of emissions via sequestration, as contrasted 
with preventing or reducing upward flows. Some are now arguing that 
natural climate solutions (NCSs) provides a more sensible term for label-
ing removal technologies. That is what we are using in this chapter.
NCSs can remove significant amounts of carbon from the atmo-
sphere through better stewardship of natural and working lands. This 
includes land management practices that increase carbon storage and/
or avoid GHG emissions through ecological restoration, wetland protec-
tion, regenerative agriculture, community composting, carbon farming, 
and reforestation. All of these NCSs are possible in rural as well as urban 
environments.
One global study published by Griscom and colleagues in the Pro-
ceedings of the National Academy of Sciences estimates that NCSs can 
provide over one-third of the climate mitigation needed between now 
and 2030 to keep global warming under 2°C. Figure 19.3.1 illustrates 
two curves. One curve, following from the historic record (gray line), 
projects CO2 business-as-usual emissions out to the year 2050 (black 
Figure 19.3.1 Contribution of natural climate solutions (NCSs) to 
stabilization of warming to below 2°C. From Griscom et al. 2017.
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line). The green area shows the amount that NCSs can offer to the total 
mitigation needed between 2016 and 2050. It is significant.
Another study published in Science Advances by Fargione and col-
leagues focused on NCSs solely in the United States. Their study quan-
tified the potential of 21 NCSs, including conservation, restoration, and 
improved land management interventions on natural and agricultural 
lands. The authors estimate that NCSs could annually sequester and 
avoid the emissions of 1.2 petagrams CO2e per year, which is equivalent 
to 21% of current net annual US emissions. NCSs also provide many 
other co-benefits (air and water filtration, flood control, soil health, 
wildlife habitat, and climate resilience benefits).
The National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine 
notes in a 2018 report that climate change researchers and policymakers 
have historically focused most of their attention on mitigation technol-
ogies aimed at reducing or preventing greenhouse gas emissions. NCS 
efforts get less than 3% of public and private climate financing globally. 
This figure is low despite findings, reported in the journal Science Ad-
vances, that NCSs can provide 37% of the mitigation deemed necessary 
on a global scale from 2016 to 2030. The IPCC finds that it may be 
impossible to hold the increase in global average temperature to 1.5°C 
if we don’t pursue carbon removal, reduction, and prevention at the 
same time.
NCSs that are especially promising for widespread adoption at 
local and bioregional scales are biological processes to increase carbon 
stocks in soils, forests, and wetlands. The two cases we will concen-
trate on here include (1) urban agriculture and food forests and (2) 
a neighborhood-scale food-waste-to-soil-and-energy system operating 
on the UC San Diego campus. Both cases are examples of civically en-
gaged research and action helping drive localization and the bioregional 
transition.
Urban agriculture and food forests
In the journal Renewable Agriculture and Food Systems, University of 
California researcher Rachel Surls and colleagues define urban agricul-
ture as “the production, distribution and marketing of food and other 
products within the cores of metropolitan areas (comprising community 
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and school gardens; backyard and rooftop horticulture; and innovative 
food-production methods that maximize production in a small area) and 
at their edges (including farms supplying urban farmers markets, com-
munity supported agriculture and family farms located in metropolitan 
green belts).” The installation of community gardens and food forests in 
places where people live in poverty and lack access to fresh fruits and 
vegetables (that is, food deserts) creates opportunities to foster food 
justice by driving socio-ecological change that is civically engaged and 
climate friendly.
Figure 19.3.2 shows a community work group planting a food forest 
in southeast San Diego in the Ocean View Growing Grounds discussed 
above. An urban food forest is a land management system that replicates 
a woodland or forest ecosystem using edible plants, trees, shrubs, annu-
als, and perennials. Fruit and nut trees provide the forest canopy layer; 
lower-growing trees and shrubs create an understory layer; and com-
binations of berry-producing shrubs, herbs, and edible perennials and 
annuals make up the shrub and herbaceous layers. Other companions 
or beneficial plants, along with soil amendments, provide nitrogen and 
mulch, hold water in the soil, attract pollinators, and prevent erosion.
By re-creating the functions of a forest ecosystem, a food forest can 
improve air, water, and soil and can create habitat, harvestable food, 
and green space in the densest urban areas or campus environments. 
Figure 19.3.2 Food forest planting, Ocean View Growing Grounds, Southeast 
San Diego. Photograph by Keith Pezzoli.
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Properly managed trees, plants, and soil have the potential to stabilize 
nitrogen, reduce soil erosion and storm water runoff, sequester carbon, 
and remove harmful pollutants. As urban green spaces, food forests can 
reduce urban heat island effects and give residents a visual and physical 
respite from the impacts of urban living. Clean amended and replanted 
soils have the capacity to produce a healthy soil microbiome, which can 
support more nutrient-dense foods and sequester carbon. Pollinators, 
beneficial insects, and birds can also find habitat in a food forest.
Neighborhood-scale microgrid, food-waste-to-soil-and-
energy systems
Students from five different student organizations at UC San Diego have 
come together to collaborate across the boundaries of their academic 
disciplines. They work in teams to co-invent, innovate, and evolve local 
solutions to climate change and food insecurity. The students created 
Rogers Community Garden and Urban FarmLab (abbreviated here as 
Urban FarmLab). The Urban FarmLab is a one-quarter-acre site lo-
cated on land designated by UC San Diego as an urban forest. As a 
whole, the interconnected student projects constitute a functioning 
 neighborhood-scale (in this case a campus) renewable energy micro-
grid. The microgrid runs mainly on power from the sun and biogas. The 
system combines regenerative ecological approaches (food forestry, 
traditional community gardens, composting, and green/hoop houses) 
with engineered, technological approaches (an aquaponics system 
powered with photovoltaic energy, hydro- and aeroponics systems, 
and a prototype anaerobic digester). Together engineering students 
and environmental chemists are making the coupled human and natural 
systems more efficient and user friendly, biochemists are evaluating and 
maintaining the anaerobic digestate, chemical engineers are developing 
processes to convert digester output into hydroponic fertilizer, com-
puter scientists are building sensors and monitoring the streaming data, 
and visual artists/designers are incorporating an aesthetic component.
The Urban FarmLab is designated as an outdoor research space inside 
UC San Diego’s urban forest on campus. It functions as a plug-and-play 
microgrid designed to encourage transdisciplinary knowledge exchange 
and experiential learning among the student researchers. Figure 19.3.3 
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shows student leaders at Rogers Urban FarmLab explaining to campus 
planners and researchers how the anaerobic digester system works. The 
site is laid out in such a way that individual components/sections of the 
microgrid can be researched and funded by grants and outside busi-
nesses. A goal of the students and faculty running the research site is to 
find ways to affordably replicate components of the system that could 
function sustainably in community gardens and neighborhoods.
Integrated system design like this requires new forms of cyberin-
frastructure for assessment, monitoring, and evaluation based on data. 
An important aim of the Urban FarmLab has been designing a robust, 
automated, real-time data collection pipeline. This cyberinfrastructure 
enables data collection, integration, and sharing for research and teach-
ing purposes across diverse metrics of interest (for example, volume, 
composition, and energy density of biogas from the anaerobic digester; 
energy generated from the photovoltaic system; pounds of student- 
collected food waste; sequestered CO2 from edible plants and fruit 
trees grown from treated digestate; pounds of compost-enriched soil). 
The challenge is to enable measurement of such metrics in real time 
using identical core hardware and software. This common core affords 
a degree of flexibility: only slight modifications are necessary to capture/
measure each distinct metric of interest. The common core framework 
of the Urban FarmLab’s microgrid hardware/software has a plug-and-
play feature, making data collection and analysis by student researchers 
very doable. This product, referred to as the omnibox, enables the stu-
dents to quickly learn and explore fundamental and applied research 
questions, encouraging more collaboration across disciplinary silos.
The Urban FarmLab microgrid accomplishes carbon removal and se-
questration through a diverse ensemble of anaerobic/composted food-
waste-to-soil infrastructure, hydroponics, and food forestry. This gener-
ates a range of methane and carbon-based environmental and economic 
benefits. These benefits, if proven substantial enough, can be funded 
as viable carbon offsets—in this case helping the UC San Diego campus 
meet its climate action goals to be zero-waste and carbon neutral. The 
anaerobic digester project recently conducted a GHG emissions analysis 
of the digester’s inputs and outputs using the EPA’s Waste Reduction 
Model (WARM) version 14. An analysis of the 41,500 pounds of food 
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waste students collected and fed into the digester over a one-year pe-
riod demonstrated an overall reduction of 6,637 metric tons CO2e. This 
means that 6,637 metric tons of CO2 were sequestered and prevented 
from being emitted into the atmosphere. This initiative, dubbed the 
BioEnergy Project—Repurposing Food Waste, won the nationally pres-
tigious 2019 Lemelson-MIT Student Prize undergraduate-team award.
The Urban FarmLab’s BioEnergy Project has four main components: 
the anaerobic digester, digestate processing system, biogas purification 
and storage, and composting. The Lemelson-MIT award recognized the 
BioEnergy Project’s commercialization potential. The project’s food-
waste-to-food-and-fuel system produces four marketable products, 
including organic produce, organic soil and fertilizer, biogas for elec-
tricity and heating, and food waste collection. This is a good example of 
economic localization with ecological and climate benefits. The UC San 
Diego campus has already bought into this system, relying upon it to 
partially meet it’s zero-waste and carbon neutrality goals. The BioEnegy 
system can be scaled and modified for use in other public and private 
establishments such as commercial shopping malls or airports, K–12 
schools, grocery stores, and other locations that demand food waste 
collection services and fresh produce.
Figure 19.3.3 Tour of anaerobic digester at UC San Diego, Rogers Urban 
FarmLab. Photograph by Keith Pezzoli.
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19.4   Rooted Universities and the  
Green Infrastructure Nexus
Research universities have an increasingly important role to play in dis-
covering, implementing, and sharing local and bioregional solutions to 
climate change. The example given above of the plug-and-play research 
space at the Rogers Community Garden and Urban FarmLab at UC San 
Diego is one way for students to embrace this challenge by assuming 
leadership roles at the frontiers of sustainability research and action.
The rooted university and community development
The rooted university transition creates opportunities for faculty and 
students to work together with community groups in tackling root 
causes of socio-ecological problems and climate change. Three place-
based challenges are especially important for the imagination, ethics, 
and practice of rootedness: (1) rebuilding urban and rural communi-
ties—on a human scale—to nurture a healthy sense of place, secure at-
tachments, and rootedness among community inhabitants; (2) coupling 
human and natural systems in ways that holistically and equitably instill 
eco-efficiency, resilience, and green cultural values into just systems of 
production, consumption, and daily life; and (3) making known (and 
valuing) how wildlands, water bodies, working landscapes, ecological 
services, and rural livelihoods enable cities to exist. Figure 19.4.1 illus-
trates the efforts of an academic center focused on enabling the biore-
gional and rooted university transition by linking sustainability science, 
planning, and design.
Place-based efforts are key to rallying the public around climate 
change solutions. The bioregional approach advances place-based 
concepts such as foodshed, watershed, and rooted community devel-
opment. Rooted community development creates opportunities for 
coupling ecological design and democracy in how we humans build, 
work, and dwell together. Rooted universities have a role to play in 
this, on many levels. The rooted university is a university that invests 
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a significant amount of its attention and resources in place-based edu-
cation, research, and community engagement. The rooted university’s 
place-based approach is geared to understanding and improving how 
local-global forces interact and shape the coupled human-natural envi-
ronments we inhabit.
A culminating idea: the green infrastructure nexus
A green infrastructure nexus can support the coupling of ecological de-
sign and democracy in efforts to advance local and bioregional solutions 
to climate change. This kind of nexus exists where green-cyber-civic in-
frastructures converge in support of sustainable development. The Urban 
FarmLab’s bioenergy microgrid on the UC San Diego campus is a good 
example. The bioenergy microgrid integrates three infrastructures: (1) 
green—including urban agriculture and food forestry that benefits from 
the output of food-waste-to-soil-and-energy systems and solar power 
generation; (2) civic—including institutional channels for student, faculty, 
Figure 19.4.1 Bioregional Center for Sustainability Science, Planning and 
Design. Reproduced with permission.
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staff, and community input, plus citizen science; and (3) cyber—including 
hardware and software for data integration and visualization, spatial 
analytics, monitoring, integrated modeling and assessment, scenario 
planning, and so on.
One of the initiatives briefly mentioned above (Measuring, Under-
standing and Improving Natural Climate Solutions: Enabling Carbon 
Neutral Development through Transborder Urban-Rural Linkages and a 
Green Infrastructure Nexus) got a good kick start during a series of 
NSF workshops. The strategic planning workshops brought together 
researchers from eight US and Mexican universities during June 2019 
to scope out the prospect of creating a binational Border Solutions 
Alliance. The NSF’s Smart and Connected Communities (S&CC) program 
supported this effort with a grant (award number 1833482).
The S&CC program notes how rapidly changing intelligent technol-
ogies are transforming our world. And while this transformation may 
improve well-being and prosperity, it also poses significant challenges. 
The NSF thus seeks to support research aimed at understanding and 
improving how intelligent technologies can bring about economic op-
portunity, safety, security, health, and overall quality of life. The NSF 
wants this research to be place based, that is, focused on communities 
defined as having geographically delineated boundaries (for example, 
towns, cities, counties, neighborhoods, community districts, rural areas, 
and tribal regions). The research design must engage the community as 
participants, while generating new knowledge that can be used to “syn-
ergistically integrate intelligent technologies with the natural and built 
environments, including infrastructure, to improve the social, economic, 
and environmental well-being of those who live, work, or travel within 
it.” The key dimensions of the NSF’s S&CC program—its place-based em-
phasis on territorial units, community engagement, inclusion of urban 
and rural, coupling of natural and built systems—all lean toward the kind 
of localization and bioregional approach we’ve been examining in this 
chapter. The fact that one of the USA’s premier science agencies is dial-
ing into these dimensions is promising. Integrated approaches like this 
can help democratize science and technology and drum up enthusiasm 
for civically engaged scholarship urgently needed to bend the curve.
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19.5  What We Have Learned So Far
1. Global problems arising from escalating human demands and 
stresses on Earth’s natural systems are spurring interest in 
local solutions to climate change. Local solutions at the level 
of neighborhoods, cities, towns, and districts are necessary 
complements to solutions focused on higher levels of organization, 
such as nation-states and global institutions/networks.
2. The UN’s New Urban Agenda is stimulating the rise of local 
approaches to climate change.
3. Roughly 45% of the world’s population is rural. Rural communities 
need to be part of climate solutions. Rural inclusion in climate 
action planning can be improved through agrarian policy. It can 
also be improved by addressing urban-rural linkages that can join 
the fate of cities and their rural neighbors.
4. Localized climate change solutions that can strengthen urban-rural 
linkages include composting systems, carbon farming, agroforestry, 
farmers’ markets, and community-supported agriculture.
5. Localization is a narrative framework useful for elevating the value 
of integrated, territorially specific (place-based) interventions 
seeking climate-friendly development, food-energy-water security, 
equity, and justice.
6. Localization is a key component in bioregional theory and practice. 
The bioregional transition provides opportunities to value rural 
places and natural and working lands in relationship to urban and 
metropolitan areas and needs.
7. Localization is visible where place-based investments are made, 
for instance, in renewable energy microgrids, storm water 
management and water-harvesting systems, carbon-neutral and 
zero-waste local industry, urban agriculture, and farmers’ markets.
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8. Climate action plans are comprehensive road maps that outline 
specific activities an agency should undertake to reduce green-
house gas emissions.
9. Green infrastructure has become a significant element in localizing 
climate action planning focused on mitigation and adaptation. 
Green infrastructure couples natural and human systems in 
efforts to make life and living in cities, towns, and working lands 
regeneratively sustainable, resilient, and healthy.
10. Green infrastructure is made up of undergirding support struc-
tures, systems, and linkages needed to meet needs for food, 
water, energy, and healthy space for living, working, and recreat-
ing. Green infrastructure thus interacts with, and can be used to 
improve, other forms of infrastructure such as the electric grid, 
water provisioning, and transportation.
11. Green infrastructure can restore and enhance ecosystems, provid-
ing carbon sequestration and other benefits. Green infrastructure 
and biotic approaches have not yet gotten the attention they war-
rant. But this is slowly changing. Green infrastructure using biotic 
approaches includes regenerating damaged natural ecosystems, 
improving natural sinks for carbon through afforestation, reducing 
deforestation, and restoring soil organic carbon.
12. Urban forests, including food forests, are a form of green 
infrastructure. Forests in urban and rural areas alike have significant 
potential for biomass production and carbon sequestration. 
Improved management of forest and tree landscapes of all types is 
among the speediest solutions for bending the curve. The global 
annual potential for carbon mitigation from afforestation, reduced 
deforestation, and restoration of soil organic carbon is about 8 to 
12 gigatons per year.
13. Turning food waste into energy and soil is a good way to sequester 
carbon. Implementing food waste reduction programs and energy 
recovery systems can maximize the utilization of food produced 
and recover energy from food that is not consumed. Globally, 
one-third of food produced is not eaten. In the United States, 40% 
is not eaten. The carbon and other greenhouse gasses emitted in 
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producing this wasted food contribute 3.3 gigatons annually to 
carbon emissions.
14. Civically engaged, well-informed community leaders and residents 
are necessary to democratically bolster climate action planning. 
Universities can facilitate collective efforts to democratize climate 
change mitigation and adaptation.
15. Place-based (rooted) university-community partnerships can 
help establish the kind of green, civic, and cyberinfrastructure 
linkages necessary to support globally minded localization and the 
bioregional transition to a post-carbon world.
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co- directs the UCSD Community Stations, a network of field stations 
located across the San Diego-Tijuana border region. From 2014 to 2018, 
she served on the Global Citizenship Commission, advising United 
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the effectiveness of local climate plans, and future scenarios for auton­
omous vehicles. Before joining the University of California, Santa Cruz, 
he was an assistant professor at McGill University and a Principal with 
transportation planning consultant Nelson\Nygaard.
Michelle Niemann
Independent writing consultant and editor
Michelle Niemann has worked with academics as a writing consultant 
and editor since 2016. After earning her PhD in English at the University 
of Wisconsin in 2014, she coordinated a Mellon Sawyer Seminar on the 
environmental humanities as a postdoctoral scholar at the University of 
California, Los Angeles. There she also co­edited The Routledge Compan-
ion to the Environmental Humanities (2017) with Ursula K. Heise and Jon 
Christensen. Her scholarship focuses on poetry, ecopoetics, and organic 
farming and food movements.
David Pellow
Professor, Environmental Studies
UC Santa Barbara
David Pellow is the Dehlsen Chair and Professor of Environmental Stud­
ies and Director of the Global Environmental Justice Project at the Uni­
versity of California, Santa Barbara. He teaches courses on environmen­
tal and social justice, race, class, gender, and environmental conflict, 
human-animal conflicts, sustainability, and social change movements. He 
has volunteered for and served on the boards of directors of several or­
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300 peer-reviewed archival publications and conference proceedings, 
was recognized by President Obama in 2011 as a Champion of Change, 
and received the UCI Medal in 2010 for his contributions to energy and 
the environment.
Whendee L. Silver
Rudy Grah Endowed Chair in Forestry and Sustainability, Department of 
Environmental Science, Policy, and Management
UC Berkeley
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high­emitting organic waste streams into soil amendments to lower 
emissions and sequester atmospheric carbon dioxide. The Silver Lab 
was awarded the Innovation Prize by the American Carbon Registry in 
2015. Professor Silver is a fellow of the Ecological Society of America 
and was named a University of California Climate Champion for 2016 
for outstanding teaching, research, and public service in the areas of 
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and hospitalizations. Since that time, Dr. Solomon has spoken and writ­
ten extensively about the health effects of fossil fuel production and 
combustion and of climate change.
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Richard C. J. Somerville is an internationally recognized climate scientist 
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have learned about climate change. Somerville’s research has been fo­
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opening up new fields of study to create more efficient, low- carbon, and 
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Regulation and a professor at the School of Global Policy and Strat­
egy at the University of California, San Diego, where he also co­leads 
the university’s Deep Decarbonization Initiative. A political scientist, his 
research focuses on how regulatory law affects the environment, tech­
nology choices, industrial structure, and the operation of major energy 
markets. Prior to joining the University of California, San Diego, Profes­
sor Victor served as Director of the Program on Energy and Sustainable 
BIOS-10 Author Biographies
Development at Stanford University, where he was also a professor at 
the law school. He has been a member of the Board of Directors of 
the Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI), on the advisory council for 
the Institute of Nuclear Power Plant Operations (INPO), and Chairman 
of the Community Engagement Panel that is helping to guide the de­
commissioning of Units 2 and 3 at the San Onofre Nuclear Generating 
Station. He also co­leads the Initiative on Energy and Climate at the 
Brookings Institution.
Durwood Zaelke
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Durwood Zaelke is President of the Institute for Governance & Sustain­
able Development in Washington, DC, and Paris, which focuses on fast 
mitigation strategies to protect the climate, including reducing short­
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Climate Integrity. Mr. Zaelke is co­author of the standard textbook on 
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